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Abstract 
Each year, billions of people lack adequate access to urgently required medicines, 
leading to unnecessary suffering and the loss of millions of lives from preventable 
conditions. One of the main causes of this situation is that individuals living in extreme 
poverty cannot afford the prices of essential medicines, and the health-care systems of 
poverty-ridden developing countries are incapable of providing the required 
medications to their population. Exclusive patent rights contribute to the severity of 
this situation by providing the legal frameworks which enable pharmaceutical 
corporations to charge exorbitant prices for their patented drugs. Therefore, the global 
introduction of the patentability of pharmaceutical products under the WTO's TRIPS 
Agreement constitutes one of the main threats to the realisation of the Right to Health 
in developing countries. 
This thesis addresses conflicting provisions of the human right to health and patent 
rights under international trade agreements, scrutinising whether there exists a legal 
hierarchy between human rights and trade law, or whether there are moral reasons 
suggesting that one should be superior to the other. Identifying that currently a legal 
hierarchy cannot be established, but that moral reasons suggest the superior importance 
of human rights, this thesis addresses the justifiability of the current international 
patent regime. 
The main findings of this thesis suggest that the current international patent regime 
cannot be regarded as justified; either from a human rights perspective, or within itself. 
It is therefore submitted, that the international patent system urgently requires to be 
changed with respect to its regulations on the patentability of medical products. This 
thesis then proposes that the international patent regime offers the distinct opportunity 
of implementing direct responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders as 
requirements for patentability within international trade law itself, for example by an 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. In presenting these possibilities, this thesis 
contributes a further dimension to ongoing debates about how the human rights 
responsibilities of the private business sector can be identified and effectively 
enforced.  
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Introduction 
 
Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most shocking and the most 
inhuman because it often results in physical death. 
– Dr Martin Luther King, Jr 
 
The Research Context 
Despite living in a time that is characterised by distinct advancements in social, 
economic, and technological development, and vast amounts of available resources, 
billions of people suffer from poverty – with several hundred-millions living in 
extreme poverty – without the means of realising a life in dignity.1 Poverty is both a 
result of and a condition for human rights violations,2 and is regarded by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) as ‘the number one killer worldwide.’3 Globally, almost 
two billion people – or one third of the world’s population – lack adequate access to 
medicines.4 Because of the severe poverty, insufficient healthcare systems, and 
 
 Munro D, ‘The 50th Anniversary of Dr. King's Healthcare Quote’ Forbes (25 March 2016) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2016/03/25/the-50th-anniversary-of-dr-kings-healthcare-
quote/#52c591a930b5> accessed 17 May 2019. 
1 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Guiding Principles 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/39 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/A-HRC-21-39_en.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2019, para 1; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (21 October 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1, para 14; The 
World Bank, ‘Poverty’ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview> accessed 20 
April 2019. 
2 OHCHR (n 1) para 3. 
3 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Health and Sustainable Development: Key Health Trends’ 
(2002) WHO Doc WHO/HDE/HID/02.2 <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/68755> accessed 
20 April 2019, 11. 
4 Forman L, ‘From TRIPS-Plus to Rights Plus? Exploring Right to Health Impact Assessment of 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights through the Thai Experience’ (2012) 7 AJWH 347, 
350; Hunt P and others, Neglected Diseases: A Human Rights Analysis (WHO 2007) 33; Khosla R 
and Hunt P, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to 
Medicines: The Sexual and Reproductive Health Context (University of Essex 2008) 2; Lee JY and 
Hunt P, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to 
Medicines’ (2012) 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 220, 220. 
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generally heightened levels of disease burdens, it can be observed that in the 
developing world this situation is magnified, affecting half of the population in the 
poorest countries.5 As a result, it is estimated that each year ten million lives are lost 
due to the insufficient accessibility of medications.6 This is particularly devastating 
and unjust considering that the health conditions are treatable, and the deaths and 
suffering thereby preventable, but that those in need cannot access the required 
medications.7 While the inaccessibility of medicines is caused by a variety of reasons, 
including insufficient infrastructure and healthcare systems, it is commonly 
acknowledged that high drug prices are one of the main determinants, due to the 
restricted resources available to people living in poverty.8 And even when the poor can 
barely afford expensive medicines, these high expenses have detrimental impacts on 
other aspects of their lives, such as the means for acquiring food or investing in 
education for children, exposing affected families to further impoverishment.9 
The Role of Pharmaceutical Patents 
Today, it is widely accepted that the pricing of medicines is considerably influenced 
by the availability of pharmaceutical patents.10 In essence, a patent is an intellectual 
property (IP)11 right awarded to an inventor, which provides its owner with exclusive 
rights over the production, sale and use of his/her invention for a specified period of 
time.12 The pharmaceutical industry argues that these patent rights are required to 
 
5 Forman L, ‘From TRIPS-Plus to Rights Plus?’ (n 4) 350; Hunt P and others, Neglected Diseases (n 
4) 33; Sellin J, Access to Medicines: The Interface between Patents and Human Rights. Does one 
size fit all? (Intersentia 2014) 21. 
6 Khosla R and Hunt P (n 4) 2; Lee JY and Hunt P (n 4) 220; Sellin J (n 5) p21. 
7 Lee JY and Hunt P (n 4) 220; Sellin J (n 5) 23. 
8 Hunt P and others, Neglected Diseases (n 4) 33; Forman L, ‘From TRIPS-Plus to Rights Plus?’ (n 4) 
350. 
9 cf. Forman L, ‘From TRIPS-Plus to Rights Plus?’ (n 4) 350. 
10 Forman L, ‘From TRIPS-Plus to Rights Plus?’ (n 4) 351; Forman L, ‘Trade Rules, Intellectual 
Property, and the Right to Health’ (2007) 21 Ethics & International Affairs 337, 339. 
11 Historically, IP rights were further categorised as ‘authors’ and artists’ rights’, such as copyrights, 
and ‘industrial property rights’, the category to which patents belong. See thereto: Abbott FM, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ in Guzman AT and Sykes AO (eds), Research 
Handbook in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 445.  
12 Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Patent’ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/patent> 
accessed 15 May 2019; Duhaime's Law Dictionary, ‘Patent Definition’ 
<http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Patent.aspx> accessed 15 May 2019; Oxford Living 
Dictionary, ‘Patent’ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/patent> accessed 15 May 2019; 
Waelde C and others, Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (4th edn, OUP 2016) 
para 1.7. 
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recoup high-risk pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) investments.13 
Furthermore, the prospect of high profits, provided by monopolistic market positions 
granted by patent rights, is supposed to enhance research incentives for the 
development of new medical products, thereby improving the treatability of diseases 
in the future.14 
With the coming into effect of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995, patent rights 
were internationally harmonised, which established the current international patent 
regime.15  One of the basic principles introduced by the TRIPS Agreement’s patent 
section requires that patents are made available for all products and processes without 
discrimination as to the field of technology, meaning that WTO member states – with 
the exceptions of least-developed countries (LDCs) – cannot exclude the patentability 
of pharmaceutical products.16 As a result, by restricting generic competition, the 
exclusive rights provided to patent holders increased the prices of medicines in many 
developing countries where pharmaceutical patents were not available prior to 
TRIPS.17 While patents may ultimately lead to an enhanced availability of new 
medicines in the future, it must be noted that even marginal rises of medicine prices 
can severely restrict their accessibility for the poor in developing countries.18 In 2001, 
the recognition of the detrimental impacts of pharmaceutical patent rights by the WTO 
led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (Doha Declaration), which acknowledges that the TRIPS Agreement should be 
 
13 Sellin J (n 5) 24. 
14 cf. Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ in Smith R and others (eds), Trade and Health: Towards 
Building a National Strategy (WHO 2015) 135; Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property and Public 
Health: Meeting the Challenge of Sustainability’ (2011) Global Health Programme Working Paper 
No7/2011, 9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1965458> accessed 22 May 
2019; Henry D and Searles A, ‘Chapter 9: Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy’ in Management 
Sciences for Health, MDS-3: Managing Access to Medicines and Health Technologies (3rd edn, 
Management Sciences for Health 2012) 
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19577en/s19577en.pdf> accessed 02 March 2019, 
9.2 and 9.7; United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘The Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights’ (27 June 
2001) Un Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, para 11. 
15 cf. Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ (n 11) 453; Forman L, ‘Trade Rules’ 
(n 10) 339. 
16 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (as amended on 23 January 
2017), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (signed 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement] Article 27; see thereto: 
Forman L, ‘Trade Rules’ (n 10) 339. 
17 Forman L, ‘Trade Rules’ (n 10) 339; Hestermeyer H, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of 
Patents and Access to Medicines (OUP 2007) 78. 
18 Hestermeyer H (n 17) 78; Sellin J (n 5) 23. 
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implemented in a manner conducive to public health.19 In this respect, the Doha 
Declaration provides that all WTO members have the right to make full use of the 
flexibilities and exceptions provided by the TRIPS Agreement to protect public health, 
particularly in situations of national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, which explicitly include public health crises.20 The effectiveness of these 
protection mechanisms, however, is undermined by the fact that the TRIPS Agreement 
only provides minimum patent protection standards, leaving WTO members free to 
implement higher protection levels.21 This has led to the adoption of so-called TRIPS-
Plus Agreements, which tend to further strengthen patent protection and introduce 
provisions that are designed to restrict the use of the flexibilities and exceptions 
provided by TRIPS, resulting in further detrimental impacts on the accessibility of 
medicines in developing countries.22  
In view of this situation, and considering that the accessibility of medicines is 
commonly regarded as an integral part of the human right to health,23 it can be 
suggested that by limiting this accessibility, patent rights create severe obstacles for 
the realisation of human rights objectives. By potentially enhancing the future 
availability of new medicines, however, patents may provide future benefits for the 
enjoyment of the right to health. It is therefore suggested that to be justifiable, patent 
rights should be approached from a human rights perspective, which explicitly 
recognises the social function of patents.24 Such an approach requires the 
establishment of an adequate balance between exclusive rights and responsibilities of 
patent holders. At the present time, however, such responsibilities are not sufficiently 
defined, either by international human rights law, or by the international patent regime. 
 
19 World Trade Organization (WTO), ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001’ (20 November 2001) WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [Doha Declaration]. 
20 Doha Declaration (n 19) paras 4 and 5. 
21 TRIPS Agreement (n 16) Article 1(1). 
22 Frankel S, ‘Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes’ 
(2009) 12 JIEL 1023, 1025; Ho CM, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International 
Agreements on Patents and Related Rights (OUP 2011) 225. 
23 cf. Lee JY and Hunt P (n 4) 220. 
24 Sell SK, ‘TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines’ (2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review 
41, 66. 
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The Purpose of this Thesis 
Recognising the magnitude of the detrimental impacts created by the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products, the main objective of this thesis is the identification of 
responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the right to health. The aim 
is then to propose improvements to the international patent regime in order to 
adequately balance private exclusive rights with the wider societal interest in public 
health. Thereby, patent laws could be brought into line with fundamental human rights 
objectives. It is important to note here that the detrimental impacts of the international 
patent regime are not limited to the patentability of medical products, and that further 
injustices arise in other areas – for example relating to the right to food, biodiversity, 
and the protection of traditional knowledge – which should be addressed by future 
revisions of the TRIPS Agreement as well. The analysis of these issues, however, 
exceeds the scope of this research, so that the proposals made in this thesis are 
primarily tailored to the specific issues arising from pharmaceutical patent rights. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘developing countries’ and ‘developing world’ 
shall be considered synonymously, commonly referring to low- and middle-income 
countries in the global South. While for WTO purposes, the categorisation of 
developing countries is generally based on how a country perceives itself, it is 
commonly estimated that around two-thirds of WTO member states are developing 
countries.25  For the definition of ‘least-developed countries (LDCs)’, this thesis, as 
well as the WTO, follow the UN list of LDCs, which at the time of writing identifies 
47 LDCs, 36 of which are members of the WTO.26 The reference to developing 
countries or the developing world in this thesis always includes LDCs, while a direct 
reference to LDCs focusses on the specific issues faced by these countries. 
Furthermore, while occasionally drawing examples from certain countries, this thesis 
is not focussing on any specific developing country or LDC. 
 
25 Sellin J (n 5) 173. 
26 UNCTAD, ‘UN list of Least Developed Countries’ 
<https://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-
Developed-Countries.aspx> accessed 16 May 2019; United Nations, ‘LDC list’ 
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldcs-at-a-
glance.htm> accessed 16 May 2019; WTO, ‘Least-developed countries’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm> accessed 16 May 2019. 
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Research Questions 
In order to address the above elaborated issues arising from pharmaceutical patent 
rights, particularly concerning the realisation of the human right to health, this thesis 
scrutinises a number of interrelated Research Questions in the following order: 
1.  What is the relationship between international human rights law and 
international IP/trade law? 
2.  Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
3.  Recognising the importance of the right to health and access to medicines for 
human life in dignity, is the current international patent regime (under TRIPS 
and TRIPS-Plus) justified when the protection of private interests directly 
impacts on the affordability of medicines and public health? 
 3.1. Do the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-term restriction of the 
accessibility of medicines? 
 3.2. Do patents on pharmaceutical products actually fulfil their purposes and 
objectives?   
4.  Why is the corporate social responsibility approach of identifying the human 
rights responsibilities of the private business sector in non-binding international 
soft law instruments, insufficient for adequately regulating the pharmaceutical 
industry’s conduct towards the right to health? 
5.  Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime? 
 
The Structure of this Thesis 
To appropriately explore the issues created by pharmaceutical patent rights, the thesis 
is divided into two parts. Part I, consisting of chapters 1 and 2, applies descriptive and 
interpretative methods, elaborating on the underlying legal framework as relevant in 
the context of this thesis. To this end, chapter 1 provides an overview of the normative 
scope of the right to health and interrelated rights, under international human rights 
law. Adopting a hermeneutic approach, this chapter seeks to understand the 
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teleological purpose behind these the legal regulations, particularly aiming to establish 
whether the accessibility of medicines is encompassed by the right to health, and 
thereby protected under human rights law. The hermeneutic methodology is 
specifically applied to identify the implicit meaning of the legal provisions, going 
beyond their mere wording, seeking to provide an understanding of the purpose behind 
these regulations with particular regard to their intended aims and objectives.27 The 
teleological analysis shall then further scrutinise how far the purpose of human rights 
law implies the existence of non-state actor responsibilities towards the right to health. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current international patent regime, elaborating 
on the scope of patent rights as regulated under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, and 
TRIPS-Plus trade agreements. This chapter is predominantly descriptive in nature, 
outlining the content of the legal treaty texts, and conducting a literature review of 
relevant legal-political commentaries and interpretative academic scholarship. 
Thereby, this chapter aims to map out the functioning of international patent standards, 
and identify the potentially harmful consequences, inherent to the granting of 
imbalanced private exclusive rights. In summary, Part I depicts the factual situation, 
and provides an interpretation of the legal principles, underlying the descriptive 
analysis conducted in the second part of this thesis, which scrutinises the actual 
impacts of pharmaceutical patent rights on the realisation of the right to health. 
Part II of this research, consisting of chapters 3 to 5, Part II adopts analytical methods, 
examining the justification and shortcomings of the international patent regime, in 
order to then propose improvements to the system, aiming to alleviate its detrimental 
impacts. Before addressing the justification of current patent standards in chapter 4, 
however, chapter 3 establishes the parameters against which this justification can be 
scrutinised. To this end, the first part of chapter 3 contemplates the existence of a legal 
hierarchy between the right to health under international human rights law, and patent 
rights under international intellectual property (IP) and trade law, by addressing 
Research Question 1: 
What is the relationship between international human rights law and 
international IP/trade law? 
 
27 cf. Kinsella EA, ‘Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities within the Art of 
Interpretation’ (2006) 7 Forum: Qualitative Social Research <http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/145/319#gcit> accessed 24 April 2019. 
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This analysis conducts a critical literature review of the legal-theoretical concepts and 
methods of treaty interpretation, reaffirming the current position that under 
international law different treaty regimes are functionally detached, so that a 
hierarchical structure between the right to health and patent laws cannot be established.  
Therefore, the second part of chapter 3 considers the applicability of non-legal 
considerations that may imply a hierarchy of rights based on moral-philosophical 
reasons. In this respect, Research Questions 2 asks: 
Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
This analysis elaborates on the concept of morality, focussing in particular on human 
dignity and human agency, applying an egalitarian ethical concept, in that all persons 
are regarded as being of equal worth. With reference to Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC), it is then established that all human agents have equal rights to the 
generic needs necessary for their agency. Based on Gewirth’s needs based hierarchy, 
chapter 3 concludes by suggesting that the PGC can be utilised to justify a prioritisation 
of those human rights that are fundamental for the realisation and protection of human 
life and well-being, including the right to health, over less-essential rights. 
In this respect, chapter 4 scrutinises the justification of the international patent regime, 
inter alia, against its compliance with the right to health, by addressing Research 
Question 3: 
Recognising the importance of the right to health and access to medicines for 
human life in dignity, is the current international patent regime (under TRIPS 
and TRIPS-Plus) justified when the protection of private interests directly 
impacts on the affordability of medicines and public health? 
By adopting a method of inductive reasoning, the answer to this question is deduced 
from two sub-questions. First, Sub-Question 3.1 analyses: 
Do the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-term restriction of the 
accessibility of medicines? 
To answer this question, the first part of this chapter adopts descriptive and evaluative 
methods, outlining the objectives and purposes of the international patent regime, 
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before evaluating legal-political and socio-economic reports, and empirical studies, to 
identify the detrimental impacts of pharmaceutical patents. The analysis indicates that 
it is not possible to provide a unanimously conclusive answer to Sub-Question 3.1. 
However, it is suggested that if any short-term restriction of the accessibility of 
medicines shall be justifiable at all, patent rights would need to be capable of 
adequately fulfilling their purposes. In this regard, Sub-Question 3.2 asks: 
Do patents on pharmaceutical products actually fulfil their purposes and 
objectives?   
This second part of chapter 4 adopts an evaluative approach, analysing secondary 
resources and impact reports, indicating that while the patent regime may fulfil some 
of its objectives, patent rights are by nature incapable of sufficiently fulfilling all their 
purposes. An answer to Research Question 3 is then deduced from the findings of Sub-
Questions 3.1 and 3.2, determining that the current international patent regime is not 
justified. Chapter 4 further concludes that the shortcomings of international patent laws 
are, inter alia, attributable to the distinct lack of clear responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
patent holders, which could provide a counterbalance to the excessive exclusive rights 
granted by patent protection. 
Based on the recognition that the detrimental impacts of the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products can be attenuated by the introduction of responsibilities of 
pharmaceutical patent holders, chapter 5 addresses the main objective of this thesis; 
the identification and implementation of responsibilities of the pharmaceutical 
industry towards the right to health. To this end, the first part of this chapter analyses 
existing approaches to the identification of corporate human rights responsibilities, 
which are traditionally implemented in non-binding soft law instruments, based on the 
concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Indicating that non-binding 
instruments are insufficient for alleviating the detrimental impacts of the international 
patent regime, Research Question 4 evaluates: 
Why is the corporate social responsibility approach of identifying the human 
rights responsibilities of the private business sector in non-binding international 
soft law instruments, insufficient for adequately regulating the pharmaceutical 
industry’s conduct towards the right to health? 
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This analysis suggests that the implications of the right to health on the lives and 
livelihood of human beings are of such magnitude that the adherence to responsibilities 
for its respect and protection must not be subject to the goodwill of corporations. In 
this regard, the second part of chapter 5 explores the possibility of implementing 
legally binding and enforceable responsibilities, addressing this thesis’s determinative 
Research Question 5: 
Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime? 
The answer to this question brings together the findings of this research, suggesting a 
theoretical but pragmatic concept of potential solutions to the elaborated problems. 
The analysis indicates that the very patentability of pharmaceutical products itself 
provides a unique opportunity for implementing enforceable responsibilities of 
pharmaceutical patent holders as direct obligations under international IP laws. After 
elaborating on the scope of this opportunity, chapter 5 concludes by proposing an 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, suggesting the introduction of distinct 
obligations, to counterbalance the exclusive rights granted to patent holders, thereby 
harmonising the protection of private and public interests while ensuring due regard 
for human rights. 
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Part I: The Legal Framework  
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Chapter One 
1 The Human Rights Context 
The patentability of pharmaceutical products provides private exclusive rights to 
patent holders, granting them monopolistic market positions with potential direct 
negative impacts on the realisation of the human right to health. It is therefore of 
crucial importance to identify the scope of the right to health in order to scrutinise 
whether the current international patent regime can be regarded as justified, and to 
identify specific responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the 
protection of public health. As an in-depth examination of all the intricacies of the 
right to health exceeds the scope of this thesis, the following chapter only focusses on 
specific elements that are closely interconnected with the issues arising from 
pharmaceutical patent rights. To this end, the first section of this chapter provides an 
overview of the normative framework of the right to health. The second section briefly 
analyses the substantive content of the right to health by elaborating on the obligations 
of states as the main duty bearers under international human rights law, before 
considering whether non-state actors, such as private corporations, currently have 
responsibilities towards the realisation of public health, too. Lastly, the right to health 
is considered in the context of its interrelation with other human rights to indicate the 
importance of the protection of human health for the achievement of an adequate 
standard of living. In addition to providing an overview of the scope of the right to 
health, this chapter aims to reaffirm that the accessibility, and particularly the 
affordability of medicines constitutes an integral requirement for the realisation of the 
right to health. 
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1.1 The Normative Framework of the Right to Health 
As with most human rights, the human right to health has its roots in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) which states in Article 25(1): 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in 
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.1 
This provision not only recognises the entitlement to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of everyone, but explicitly recognises medical care as a 
necessity for realising this standard of living. The UDHR was adopted in 1948 as a 
direct response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime during the Second 
World War.2 The initial purpose of the declaration is therefore considered in the 
prevention of a repetition of such severe violations of basic human rights, which up 
until then were only scarcely recognised by international law.3 Nevertheless, the scope 
of the UDHR encompasses a wider variety of human rights, including political and 
civil rights, as well as certain economic and social rights.4 A main problem with the 
UDHR is that it was originally only intended to provide targets for the political 
commitment of governments, wherefore the declaration is commonly not regarded as 
being directly legally binding.5 In recognition of its longstanding acceptance 
throughout the world, however, it may be suggested that the UDHR now has become 
part of customary international law, implying a compulsory nature of the declaration.6 
This is particularly relevant in context of the declaration’s preamble, which recognises 
‘the dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ 
as the ‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace’.7 It is submitted that particularly the 
qualification ‘inalienable’ in its teleological sense promulgates a superiority of human 
 
1 UDHR The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) [UDHR], Article 
25(1) 
2 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2nd edn, Polity Press 2011) 38 
and 41. 
3 ibid 40-41. 
4 ibid 42. 
5 ibid; Woods K, Human Rights (Palgrave MacMillan 2014) 7. 
6 Flinterman C, ‘Human Rights Law Status Report’ in Grosheide W (ed), Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 38. 
7 UDHR (n 1) Preamble. 
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rights above any other, contradicting provision. As elaborated in chapter 3.1.3, 
however, this concept of superiority is controversial, as international law lacks a clear 
hierarchical structure, so that different treaty regimes currently act independently from 
each other. Nevertheless, the global progress made towards the recognition and 
realisation of human rights in the past 70 years, since the adoption of the UDHR, 
indicates the declaration’s unambiguous influence on political and legal policy 
commitments.8 
The right to health is further recognised in several international conventions and 
declarations, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention of the Right of the Child, and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.9 Similarly, the right to health is 
recognised by regional human rights documents, including the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights.10 Notably, the right to health is not considered by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. It is, however, recognised by the European 
Social Charter, which states in Paragraph 11 of Part I:  
Everyone has the right to benefit from any measures enabling him to enjoy 
the highest possible standard of health attainable.11  
Additionally, Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Freedoms provides and 
explicit right to healthcare.12 The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, furthermore not 
only recognises the right to health, but even goes a step further by defining it in Article 
10(1) as a right to ‘the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social 
 
8 Freeman M (n 2) 42. 
9 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969), Article 5; Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 
September 1981), Articles 10, 11, 12, and 14; Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 
November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), Articles 17, 23, 24, 25, 32, and 39; World 
Conference on Human Rights 14-25 June 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(adopted 25 June 1993) Un Doc A/CONF.157/23, Articles 11, 18, 24, 31, and 41. 
10 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986), Article 16. 
11 The European Social Charter (revised 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999), Part I Paragraph 
11. 
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ratified 7 December 2000), Article 35. 
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well-being.’13 In Article 10(2), health is considered a public good and Article 10(2)(f) 
explicitly considers the high vulnerability and special protection needs of people living 
in poverty.14  
Of the above-mentioned conventions, declarations, and other human rights documents, 
all but the UDHR and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action are either 
restricted by their geographical applicability, or by their applicability to only certain 
groups of people. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is important to consider 
the right to health from a global perspective, applicable and valid for as many human 
beings as possible. In this consideration, the most comprehensive affirmation of the 
right to health is to be found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In contrast to the UDHR, the ICESCR is an international 
treaty which provides directly legally binding obligations on its member states.15 The 
covenant was adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, 
and, as of March 2019, 161 states are parties to the treaty.16 Addressing the right to 
health as a social human right, Article 12 ICESCR provides:  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.17  
 
13 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (entered into force 16 November 1999), Article 10(1). 
14 ibid Article 10(2). 
15 ESCR-Net, ‘Section 5: Background Information on the ICESCR’ <https://www.escr-
net.org/resources/section-5-background-information-icescr> accessed 13 March 2019. 
16 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 13 march 2019. 
17 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR], Article 12. 
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1.2 Interpretation of the Right to Health 
On 28 May 1985, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
established the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) as the 
official body to monitor the implementation of the ICESCR.18 One of the functions of 
this committee is the interpretation of the content of the ICESCR, clarifying the exact 
meaning of the provisions in the so-called General Comments.19 In respect of the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health provided by Article 12 ICESCR, the 
committee provides a detailed analysis of the scope and content of the provision in its 
General Comment No. 14, adopted at the 22nd Session of the CESCR held on 11 
August 2000.20 It is important to note that the CESCR General Comments are not 
acknowledged by all member states of the ICESCR and therefore cannot be regarded 
as legally binding documents, as further elaborated in chapter 3.1.1.2. The US, in 
particular, does not recognise the legal validity of General Comments, pointing to the 
lack of governmental involvement in their creation.21 Nevertheless, as the CESCR is 
established by a UN body, the General Comments are the most authoritative 
documents elaborating on the content of the ICESCR, so that these comments need to 
be considered as relevant for the interpretation of international human rights law.22 
The international community provides a number of related definitions of the term 
‘health’. For the purpose of this thesis, emphasis is given to CESCR General Comment 
No. 14, which defines health as ‘a fundamental human right indispensable for the 
exercise of other human rights.’23 Paragraph 1 further clarifies that ‘[e]very human 
being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health conducive 
 
18 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘Review of the composition, 
organization and administrative arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental 
Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (28 May 1985) UN Doc E/RES/1985/17; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Monitoring 
the economic, social and cultural rights’ 
<https://ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIntro.aspx> accessed 06/03/2019. 
19 OHCHR (n 18). 
20 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14:  The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
21 cf. Wolff J, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2012) 31. 
22 Mechlem K, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 905, 929. 
23 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 1. 
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to living a life in dignity.’24 This interpretation is in accordance with the constitution 
of the World Health Organisation (WHO) which defines in its preamble that ‘[t]he 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights 
of every human being [...]’.25 Additionally, both the preamble of the WHO, as well as 
Article I of the Declaration of Alma-Ata, further define health as ‘a state of complete 
physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity’.26 The right to health, however, does not entail a right to be healthy,27 as no 
person or institution can provide for and/or guarantee such an outcome. It has to be 
accepted that all human beings are vulnerable to falling ill.28 Being affected by ill-
health or a disease thus is an unfortunate happenstance, but commonly no one is at 
fault.29  
In this consideration, the right to health under Article 12 ICESCR rather demands the 
creation of circumstances under which ‘people can lead a healthy life’.30 Article 25 
UDHR further declares that a standard of living which is adequate for human health 
and well-being encompasses a right to medical care in the event of sickness.31 In this 
respect, both case law, as well as several UN Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) 
resolutions reaffirm that access to essential medicines is an integral part of the right to 
health.32 Similarly, Section (d) of the preamble of Paul Hunt’s Human Rights 
Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines 
determines medical care and access to medicines as a ‘vital feature of the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health’.33 Paul Farmer therefore suggests that denying 
access to adequate medical care amounts to a violation of economic and social human 
 
24 ibid. 
25 Constitution of the World Health Organization (adopted 22 July 1946, entered into force 7 April 
1948), Preamble. 
26 International Conference on Primary Health Care, Declaration of Alma-Ata (adopted 6-12 
September 1978) [Declaration of Alma-Ata], Article I; Similarly expressed in the Preamble of the 
Constitution of the World Health Organization (n 25), with the only difference that ‘wellbeing’ is 
written with a hyphen in the Constitution of the WHO, i.e. ‘well-being’. 
27 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 8. 
28 Wolff J (n 21) 27. 
29 ibid 1. 
30 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 4. 
31 UDHR (n 1) Article 25. 
32 Khosla R and Hunt P, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to 
Access to Medicines: The Sexual and Reproductive Health Context (University of Essex 2008) 2 
and 3. 
33 Hunt P, ‘Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to 
Medicines’ (11 August 2008) in the Annex to the ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’, 
United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/63/263, Preamble para (d). 
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rights.34 As will be elaborated in the next section, it is submitted that allowing the 
existence of obstacles to the accessibility of medicines is a violation of a state’s 
obligation to protect and fulfil the right to health, wherefore such an omission can be 
construed as denying access. 
1.2.1 Obligations of States 
As a comprehensive analysis of all the intricacies of the right to health exceeds the 
scope of this research, the following sections focus on providing a brief outline of some 
of the key regulations and interpretations as relevant in regard to the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products addressed in this thesis. After Article 12(1) ICESCR declares 
the right to health as a human right, Article 12(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of 
state obligations that shall facilitate the realisation of equal opportunities for everyone 
to enjoy ‘the highest attainable standard of health.’35 The realisation of the right to 
health, inter alia, demands the timely provision of appropriate healthcare goods and 
services.36 For the scope of this thesis, it is emphasised that the appropriate provision 
of health-care goods and services requires states to ensure that medical products are 
available and accessible to all people, as elaborated below in 1.2.1.1. It is submitted 
that the ‘timely provision’ requirement further demands that new medications are 
made available at affordable prices, as soon as reasonably possible. 
As with most human rights, states are the main duty bearers with regard to ensuring 
the enjoyment of the right to health. In particular, states have three main obligations 
towards the realisation of the right to health, namely the obligations to respect, to 
protect and to fulfil the right to health.37 The obligation to respect demands that states 
refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to health, for example, by 
limiting or denying equal access to healthcare, or by performing discriminatory 
practices.38 The obligation to protect requires the implementation of legislation and 
other measures, ensuring equal access to medical treatment and preventing third parties 
 
34 Farmer P, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (University 
of California Press 2004) 253. 
35 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 8; See also: CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 
20) para 7. 
36 ibid para 11. 
37 ibid para 33. 
38 ibid paras 33 and 34. 
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from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to health.39 The obligation to fulfil 
requires states to pay due regard to the right to health in domestic policies and 
legislation, demanding inter alia the adoption of a detailed national health policy.40 
Fulfilment further encompasses the direct provision of essential medicines to people 
living in poverty who otherwise cannot access such medications.41 According to the 
Maastricht Guidelines, a state’s failure to meet any of the three main obligations 
constitutes a violation of the ICESCR and therefore of the right to health.42 
It is important to realise that while states are mandated to do what they can, it would 
be unreasonable to require states to accomplish the impossible. Therefore, the 
determination of the highest attainable standard of health in a given situation requires 
the consideration of a state’s available resources, as well as biological and socio-
economic circumstances of individuals.43 As elaborated below in 1.2.1.3, the 
obligations of states towards the right to health are subject to progressive realisation, 
with certain core obligations which always need to be performed. 
1.2.1.1 Availability and Accessibility 
The right to health consists of four main elements, namely the availability, the 
accessibility, the acceptability, and the quality of health care facilities, goods and 
services.44 The elements of acceptability and quality are predominantly 
appropriateness requirements in that they demand that all health-care facilities, goods 
and services must be appropriate in regard to medical ethics, cultural demands, and 
their medical quality.45 In respect of the interrelation of the right to health and the 
international patent regime, the elements of availability and accessibility in particular 
are of crucial importance for the scope of this thesis. 
 
39 ibid paras 33 and 35. 
40 ibid para 36. 
41 ibid para 37; Hunt P, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (13 September 2006) United Nations 
General Assembly, UN Doc A/61/338, para 59.  
42 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (26 January 1997), Guideline 6. 
43 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 9. 
44 ibid para 12. 
45 ibid paras 12(c) and 12(d). 
35 
 
In general, the availability requirement simply demands the existence or creation of 
health-care facilities, programmes, goods and services in sufficient quantities.46 In 
reference to the notion of health-care goods, it can be established that the realisation 
of the right to health requires the adequate availability of medicines, and particularly 
essential drugs.47 To achieve this, states are inter alia encouraged to make use of the 
flexibilities granted by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), for example by utilising compulsory license legislation, as 
elaborated in chapters 2.4.3.7 and 2.4.3.8, to alleviate detrimental impacts of 
pharmaceutical patents and ensure that medicines are available in sufficient 
quantities.48 The element of availability, however, not only concerns the availability 
of existing medications, but further entails a future oriented dimension. Notably, the 
availability of effective health-care requires the development of new medications for 
the treatment of formerly unattended diseases and health conditions. States have 
therefore a responsibility to foster pharmaceutical R&D to ensure that new medicines 
are made available.49 In this consideration, particular regard shall be given to neglected 
tropical diseases that predominantly affect the poor in developing countries.50  
Moreover, in regard to the element of accessibility, the right to health requires that 
health-care facilities, programmes, goods and services are within safe physical reach 
of everyone, and provided without discrimination.51 The non-discrimination provision 
demands that special consideration is given to vulnerable and marginalised groups of 
the population, as elaborated below in 1.2.1.2.52 In addition to the physical 
accessibility of health-care, for the context of this thesis, especially economic 
accessibility, i.e. the affordability of health care goods and services is of crucial 
importance.53 Economic accessibility requires, inter alia, that needed medications are 
affordable for everyone. This implies that states have a responsibility to take measures 
to prevent excessive pricing of pharmaceutical products, and to review import tariffs 
and tax policies which unreasonably interfere with the accessibility of medicines.54 
 
46 ibid para 12(a). 
47 ibid para 12(a). 
48 Hunt P, Un Doc A/61/338 (n 41) para 47. 
49 ibid para 48. 
50 ibid para 47. 
51 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 12(b). 
52 ibid para 12(b). 
53 ibid para 12(b). 
54 Hunt P, Un Doc A/61/338 (n 41) para 49. 
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Again, special consideration shall be given to the poor, as their inability to afford 
expensive treatment methods makes them most vulnerable to economic 
discrimination.55 It is now widely accepted that because of its vital importance for 
human health, the accessibility of medicines is an integral part of the right to health.56 
1.2.1.2 The Non-Discrimination Principle 
According to the non-discrimination principle of human rights law, discrimination is 
prohibited with regard to all human rights.57 In respect of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, such as the right to health, Article 2(2) and Article 3 ICESCR 
enumerate a list of grounds on which discrimination is prohibited.58 Of special 
relevance for the scope of this thesis is the non-discrimination principle for reasons of 
social origin, social or other status, and property. In this regard, the CESCR reaffirms 
the special protection needs of people living in poverty even in situations of severe 
resource constraint of a member state to the ICESCR.59 Consequently, it must be noted 
that the aim of the non-discrimination principle does not stipulate that everyone needs 
to be treated the same. Conversely, the differential treatment of marginalised groups 
of the population is not only justified, but rather required, as giving priority to people 
most in need is a precondition for the creation of a system of equal opportunity for 
everyone.60  
It is undeniable that there are major social and economic inequalities between different 
groups of peoples, so that considerations of justice and fairness appear to require that 
in some cases wealth is redistributed, and that vulnerable people are prioritised in order 
 
55 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 12(b). 
56 cf. Moon S, ‘Respecting the Right to Access to Medicines: Implications of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights for the Pharmaceutical Industry’ (2013) 15 Health and 
Human Rights 32, 34. 
57 Clapham A, Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2007) 143. 
58 ICESCR (n 17) Articles 2(2) and 3. 
Article 2(2) reads: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. 
Article 3 reads: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
Covenant. 
59 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 18 
60 cf. Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 26) Article VII(6); Clapham A (n 57) 143. 
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to facilitate equality of outcomes.61 In this regard, the differential treatment of different 
classes of people, commonly considered as positive discrimination in human rights 
law, is based on the two fundamental principles of non-discrimination and equality.62 
To achieve their goals, these principles must not be interpreted in a way that always 
demands equal treatment, as under certain circumstances states may rather be required 
to take specific measures for the benefit of disadvantaged groups.63 This is especially 
relevant as certain groups, inter alia including lower-income groups, 
disproportionately suffer from violations of economic, social, and cultural rights.64 In 
regard to the right to health, this is particularly true for the poor and under privileged, 
who commonly lack adequate or complete access to essential medicines.65 States 
therefore have the obligation to provide the most vulnerable people with special means 
of accessing treatment, in order to ensure equality of access.66 
1.2.1.3 Progressive Realisation and International Assistance 
As noted above, the ICESCR provides for the progressive realisation of the obligations 
of state parties, necessitating, however, that certain core obligations have to be 
performed immediately.67 This distinction is important, as many developing countries 
lack adequate financial and material resources to implement all the required measures 
without delay, and because some human rights objectives require the creation of 
ongoing programmes to achieve the intended results over time.68 Certain core 
obligations, on the other hand, are of such crucial importance for the protection of 
human integrity that their implementation has to be realised without any unreasonable 
delay.69 A state’s failure to perform those core obligations therefore amounts to a 
violation of economic, social, and cultural rights, even in situations of resource 
restrictions.70 In consideration of the most vulnerable groups of people, the CESCR 
 
61 Clapham A (n 57) 143-144. 
62 Hunt P, Un Doc A/61/338 (n 41) para 53. 
63 ibid para 53. 
64 Maastricht Guidelines (n 42) Guideline 20. 
65 Khosla R and Hunt P (n 32) 5. 
66 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 19. 
67 ibid para 30; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 
3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant) (14 December 1990) 
UN Doc E/1991/23, paras 2, 9, 10. 
68 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 67) paras 2, 9, 10. 
69 ibid para 2. 
70 ibid para 10; Maastricht Guidelines (n 42) Guidelines 9 and 10.  
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indicates that the core obligations under the right to health include, inter alia, that states 
‘take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases’,71 and 
‘ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-
discriminatory basis’.72 Furthermore, while the accessibility of non-essential 
medicines is subject to the process of progressive realisation, the provision of essential 
medicines is of such vital necessity that it is an inevitable core obligation with 
immediate effect under the right to health. 73  
Nevertheless, a considerable obstacle to the timely realisation of the right to health 
remains, as especially developing countries might not have the required resources 
readily available to guarantee the implementation of even their core obligations. This 
problem is recognised by the ICESCR, which therefore provides in Article 2(1) that 
the steps towards the realisation of the rights provided by the Covenant have to be 
taken both individually by states, as well as through international assistance and 
cooperation.74 In accordance with the Declaration of Alma-Ata, the CESCR 
emphasises that the obligation of international assistance and cooperation is an 
obligation of all member states to the ICESCR.75 The committee further indicates that 
wealthier states have responsibility to assist poorer countries where they can, and in a 
reasonable manner, especially by providing much needed resources, which can, inter 
alia, include the provision of monetary aid.76 In this consideration, the CESCR 
suggests that the maximum of available resources entails both the resources in 
possession of individual states as well as the resources available through international 
assistance and cooperation.77  
Moreover, the international responsibilities of states towards the right to health go 
beyond the mere provision of donations to developing countries. In particular, 
international duties of all states can be derived from the obligations to respect and 
protect the right to health, which are not only applicable within a country’s territory, 
but in their relation to other countries as well.78 State parties to the ICESCR have 
 
71 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 20) para 44(c).  
72 ibid para 43(a). 
73 ibid para 43(d); Hunt P, Un Doc A/61/338 (n 41) para 58. 
74 ICESCR (n 17) Article 2(1). 
75 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 67) para 14; Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 26) Article IX. 
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therefore an obligation to prevent non-state actors under their jurisdictional influence, 
such as the private business sector, from violating the right to health in other 
countries.79 Furthermore, states shall pay due regard to the right to health, as well as 
other human rights, when entering into international agreements, ensuring that such 
agreements do not create obstacles for their realisation.80 In this regard, and of 
particular importance for the scope of this thesis, it is submitted that wealthier states 
should particularly refrain from encouraging developing countries to adopt intellectual 
property standards which are designed to limit the safeguards and flexibilities provided 
by the TRIPS Agreement, as discussed in chapter 2.5.81 Furthermore, member states 
of international organisations are obliged to exercise their influence over these 
organisations to ensure that due regard is given to right to health considerations, 
safeguarding that no human rights violations emerge from international programmes 
and policies.82 Ultimately, a state entering into an international agreement which is 
likely to create obstacles for the enjoyment of the right to health, in either their own 
country or any other state, may amount to violation of the ICESCR.83  
1.2.2 Responsibilities of Non-State Actors 
While it is undisputed that states are the main duty bearers of human rights obligations 
provided by international declarations and treaties, the CESCR clarifies that the 
realisation of the right to health further entails responsibilities of non-state actors, 
including civil-society and the private business sector.84 In this context, states are 
encouraged to adopt measures for raising awareness of those responsibilities among 
non-state actors.85 Regardless of the actual measures taken by states, there is growing 
consensus that society as a whole not only has ethical, but also certain legal 
responsibilities towards the realisation of international human rights law.86 It is argued 
that such private responsibilities are logically consistent with the very teleological 
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86 Khosla R and Hunt P (n 32) 3; Hunt P, ‘Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies’ 
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purpose of human rights law.87 In this consideration, Wolff suggests that human rights 
‘provide a statement of the minimum moral obligations owed to human beings simply 
by virtue of their existence as human beings’.88 When considering that every right 
comes with a responsibility, it can be submitted that the minimum human rights 
responsibility of non-state actors is to respect, i.e. not to interfere with, the human 
rights of other groups or individuals. For a further discussion of the private actor 
responsibility to respect human rights, see chapter 5.1.3.1. 
In context of the right to health, a UK Department for International Development 
policy paper clarifies that the ‘[r]esponsibility for increasing access to essential 
medicines rests with the whole international community.’89 The policy paper further 
affirms that progress depends on everyone, which has to be regarded as including states 
as well as non-state actors.90 Furthermore, the participation of non-state actors was 
particularly emphasised in Target 8.E of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 8, 
aiming at the enhancement of access to affordable essential medicines in developing 
countries, to be achieved in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies.91 The 
involvement of the pharmaceutical industry in the strategy of the MDGs was of crucial 
relevance as several ministers and public officials still suggest that the implementation 
of the right to health is frequently obstructed by the policies and practices of certain 
pharmaceutical corporations.92 In this regard, high drug prices and a neglect of 
research into diseases that mainly affect the poor in developing countries have been 
defined as issues of particular concern.93  
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In his role as UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt elaborated that 
while the CESCR confirms the general existence of the human rights responsibilities 
of the private business sector, those responsibilities are not further specified and 
therefore unclear.94 It is therefore questionable, how non-state actors can be held to 
account when their obligations are not sufficiently defined.95 Under his mandate, Hunt 
addressed this issue by developing the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in relation to Access to Medicines (the Guidelines), which aim to clarify 
what specific corporate right to health responsibilities should entail.96 While the 
language used in the framework suggests a voluntary nature,97 the Guidelines elaborate 
on what seems to be reasonably expected of pharmaceutical corporations. In this 
context, the Guidelines may be regarded as a suggestive interpretation of private 
human rights responsibilities which the CESCR left undefined. 
In principle, Hunt proposes that the pharmaceutical industry has responsibilities 
towards enhancing the accessibility of medicines, as this is a core element of its 
societal mission.98 In particular, corporations shall at least refrain from encouraging 
states to disregard their obligations arising from human rights law, including the right 
to health.99 For the pharmaceutical industry, this is particularly relevant in 
consideration of its lobbying activity, by which corporations use their economic power 
to influence the actions taken by states.100 Furthermore, corporations shall respect the 
right of states to make use of the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement and 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, to protect public 
health by enhancing the accessibility of patented medicines, as elaborated in chapter 
2.3.101 For a further discussion of Hunt’s Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in relation to Access to Medicines, see chapter 5.1.3.2. 
In summary, it can be reaffirmed that legal human rights responsibilities of non-state 
actors, including the private business sector, are currently not sufficiently defined and 
therefore unclear. That non-state actor responsibilities towards the right to health 
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nevertheless exist, can be submitted when accepting that every right comes with a 
responsibility, as suggested by Article 29(1) UDHR which provides that ‘[e]veryone 
has duties to the community’.102 In this consideration, this thesis aims to contribute to 
the debate on corporate human rights responsibilities with a particular focus on the 
responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of the right to 
health. 
1.3 The Indispensability of Health for the realisation of 
other Human Rights 
Both the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights unambiguously determine that 
by nature all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and thus 
cannot be regarded in isolation from each other.103 In this regard, the CESCR defines 
health as ‘a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights.’104 To put it differently, violations of the right to health, or its insufficient 
realisation, may result in direct impairments to the realisation of other human rights, 
including, but not limited to the rights to education, to work, to development, and to 
life.105  
None of these rights can be fully realised without the enjoyment of the right to health, 
as health conditions directly impact on the capability of individuals and groups to 
achieve an adequate standard of living.106 A first thing to remember is that good health 
is a prerequisite for the capability of human beings to engage in a meaningful life by 
learning through education and by engaging in work to earn an income, and assure a 
livelihood.107 Education and work are thus indispensable for the realisation of the right 
to development, as they are an integral precondition for escaping poverty, and thereby 
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for achieving both the development of groups and individuals, as well as of developing 
countries as a whole. 
Of paramount importance for the most basic of human needs, however, is the 
interrelationship between the right to health and the supremely fundamental human 
right to life itself. The right to life was first adopted by Article 3 UDHR which simply 
provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life’.108 This right was then reaffirmed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966 which provides 
in Article 6(1): 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.109 
In 2018, the Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment No.36 on Article 6 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, 
providing in paragraph 2 that the right to life ‘is the supreme right from which no 
derogation is permitted’, that the right ‘is most precious for its own sake as a right that 
inheres in every human being’, and that its ‘protection is the prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of all other human rights’.110 While it is commonly defined as a civil and 
political right, the right to life both impacts and is impacted by economic and social 
rights as well. In particular, the realisation of the right to health has direct effects on 
the realisation of the right to life, and the provision of life-saving health care under the 
right to health saves human lives. In this consideration, General Comment No.36 
indicates that states have a duty to address societal conditions threatening the 
enjoyment of the right to life, including prevalent life-threatening diseases.111 In 
particular, the Human Rights Committee provides that states shall adopt measures to 
ensure the access to essential health care without delay.112 It follows that the 
accessibility of life-saving medicines is a human rights requirement under both the 
right to health as well as the right to life. In further consideration of their importance 
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for a human life in dignity,113 it can be submitted that the realisation and protection of 
both the right to health and the right to life lies at the very core of all human and other 
rights. 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated that the right to health is a fundamental right in that its 
enjoyment constitutes a necessary precondition for the realisation of other human 
rights. In this regard, it is noted that the right to health is applicable to everyone without 
discrimination, and that special measures are therefore required for the protection of 
marginalised groups and people living in poverty. Due to its adoption in a number of 
international human rights treaties, the right to health is of legally binding effect, 
imposing direct obligations on states. In general, these human rights obligations can 
be divided into three categories, namely obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. 
Summarised, states then have negative obligations preventing them from unduly 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right to health, as well as positive obligations 
requiring the adoption of measures towards the realisation and protection of the right 
to health, including measures regulating the activities of non-state actors. Notably, the 
obligations of states are not constrained by national boundaries as states have a duty 
to provide international assistance to facilitate the realisation of the right to health in 
lower-income countries. Furthermore, states shall refrain from the adoption of 
international agreements that are likely to create obstacles for the enjoyment of the 
right to health both nationally and/or in other countries.  
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While states are commonly regarded as the main duty bearers under international 
human rights law, it is now widely accepted that the right to health implies 
responsibilities for non-state actors as well. As these responsibilities, however, are 
currently not sufficiently defined by international human rights law, and therefore 
unclear, this thesis contributes to debates on the human rights responsibilities of 
private corporations, with a particular focus on the patent holding pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Lastly, in consideration of the teleological purpose behind the right to health, it can be 
observed that the accessibility and the affordability of medicines are integral 
requirements of the right to health, as the highest attainable standard of health is only 
attainable when all people have access to affordable medical treatment. Of similar 
importance, is that medicines are available in the first place. As elaborated in sub-
chapter 1.2.1.1, the availability requirement extends to the availability of new 
medicines in the future, so that states have an obligation to promote effective 
pharmaceutical research. It follows that states have an obligation to realise both the 
accessibility of medicines now as well as the availability of new drugs in the future. 
To ensure that both the accessibility and the availability requirements are appropriately 
fulfilled, it is submitted that states have a duty to ensure that the promotion of 
pharmaceutical research does not create obstacles for the accessibility of the fruits of 
such research activities. This is of particular relevance in respect of patent rights, 
which are currently the main research incentive provided to pharmaceutical 
corporations, as elaborated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
2 The International Patent Regime 
To understand how pharmaceutical patent rights impact on the realisation of the right 
to health in developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs), chapter 2 
provides an overview of the current international patent regime, elaborating on the 
scope of patent rights as regulated under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and so-
called TRIPS-Plus trade agreements. In particular, this chapter aims to explain the 
general functioning of international patent standards, outlining the potentially harmful 
consequences, inherent to the granting of imbalanced exclusive private rights. To this 
end, sub-chapter 2.1 briefly introduces the evolution of the international intellectual 
property (IP) and patent regime, to indicate the distinct power imbalances between 
industrialised and developing countries in the negotiations that ultimately led to the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Successively, sub-chapters 2.2 and 2.3 provide a 
brief overview of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) respectively. Sub-chapter 2.4 then 
addresses the interpretation of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in light of the 
Doha Declaration, with a particular focus on patent standards and other interrelated 
regulations relevant for understanding the impacts of pharmaceutical patents on the 
accessibility of medicines and public health. Lastly, sub-chapter 2.5 elaborates on 
TRIPS-Plus trade agreements, which are international agreements that implement 
higher IP and patent protection standards than those required by TRIPS, further 
aggravating the detrimental impacts of pharmaceutical patent rights on public health 
in developing countries. 
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2.1 The Evolution of the International IP and Patent 
Regime 
Initially, the protection of IP, and particularly of patents, was introduced by national 
laws, seeking to benefit society by encouraging the development of new technologies, 
or the importation of technologies from abroad, into a country’s domain.1 In the 18th 
and 19th century, the growing importance of international trade then led to the 
recognition that a cross-border IP and patent protection creates mutual benefits for the 
countries involved, protecting their inventions from replication in other countries.2 In 
1883, the first multinational treaty in the area of IP protection, namely the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, was concluded among eleven 
states3 and regulated the treatment of patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility 
models, service marks, trade names, and the repression of unfair competition between 
the signatory countries.4 While the Paris Convention does not define the substantive 
elements of patent laws, other than providing that patents shall be protected, it includes 
various reforms, regulating how patents shall be treated in a multinational context.5 
The Paris Convention, however, leaves governments free to self-determine what is 
patentable and what is not, in that Article 1(4) defines that patents shall include all 
forms of industrial patents which are recognised by a country’s national laws. 6 The 
basic principle of the convention, to be found in Article 2, then provides for the 
 
1 cf. Brinkhof J, ‘On Patents and Human Rights’ in Grosheide W (ed), Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 143; Shiva V, Protect or Plunder? 
Understanding Intellectual Property Rights (ZED Books 2001) 14; Waelde C and others, 
Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (4th edn, OUP 2016) para 10.4. 
2 Gervais DJ, ‘The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old 
and the Very New’ (2002) 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 929, 935; Waelde C and others (n 1) para 10.12. 
3 The initial signatory countries consisted of Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland. See thereto:  WIPO, 
‘Contracting Parties: Paris Convention’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2> accessed 27 April 
2019; WIPO, ‘Contracting Parties: Paris Convention: Guatemala’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=237C> accessed 27 April 2019; WIPO, 
‘Contracting Parties: Paris Convention: Serbia’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1383C> accessed 27 April 2019; WIPO, 
‘Contracting Parties: Paris Convention: El Salvador’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=225C> accessed 27 April 2019. 
4 WIPO, ‘Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883)’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html> accessed 27 April 2019. 
5 Waelde C and others (n 1) para 10.12. 
6 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (signed 20 March 1883, entered into force 
7 July 1884, last amended 28 September 1979) [Paris Convention], Article 1(4). 
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national treatment of the citizens of all signatory countries.7 This means that nationals 
of all parties to the Paris Convention shall enjoy the same treatment and protection as 
the citizens of the country where a patent is issued.8  
Three years after the adoption of the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 was concluded, becoming the second 
multinational IP agreement, regulating cross-border protection in the field of 
copyrights.9 Revised versions of the Paris and Berne Conventions still remain at the 
core of the international IP system today, with their territorial applicability 
substantially extended by the TRIPS Agreement, mandating all WTO members to 
adhere to the basic elements of these conventions.10 Initially, specialised secretariats 
were established for each of the conventions, which, in 1893, were combined to form 
the Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle11 
(BIRPI), which had the main purpose of administering the two Conventions.12 Signed 
in 1967, and coming into force in 1970, the Convention establishing the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), then transformed the BIRPI into the still 
operating WIPO,13 with the purpose of promoting ‘the protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world’.14 In 1974 the WIPO joined the United Nations, 
becoming a member of the UN Specialized Agencies.15 While mainly continuing the 
administration of international IP treaties, the WIPO further serves as a forum for 
negotiations on international IP rights.16 Under the auspices of the WIPO, a number of 
 
7 ibid Article 2. 
8 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ in Guzman AT and Sykes AO (eds), 
Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 451 
9 cf. WIPO, ‘Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(1886)’ <https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html> accessed 27 April 2019. 
10 Hughes J, ‘A Short History of Intellectual Property in Relation to Copyright’ (2012) 33 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1293, 1299; Waelde C and others (n 1) para 10.13. 
11 French for ‘United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property’. 
12 Hughes J (n 10) 1299; WIPO, ‘WIPO – A Brief History’ <https://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/history.html> accessed 27 April 2019. 
13 WIPO, ‘Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/> accessed 27 April 2019. 
14 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (adopted 14 July 1967, 
entered into force 26 April 1970, last amended 28 September 1979) [WIPO Convention], Article 
3. 
15 WIPO, ‘WIPO – A Brief History’ (n 12). 
16 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ (n 8) 475. 
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IP treaties were concluded, including the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) of 1970, 
which established an international filing system for patent applications.17  
Towards the end of the 1970s, industries in the global North increasingly recognised 
the correlation between IP protection and profitability in international trade, 
expressing particular concerns about what they considered insufficient IP protection 
standards in developing countries.18 Consequently, by the mid-1980s, the WIPO faced 
a decisive conflict of interests amongst its members, with industrialised countries 
demanding higher levels of IP protection, while the developing world, seeking for 
improved ways of transferring technologies from the North to the South, demanded 
more flexibility.19 As negotiations at WIPO level failed, and industrialised nations 
began to realise that stronger IP protection was difficult, if not impossible to achieve 
within the WIPO IP regime, the United States, Japan, and European Communities 
shifted their attention to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).20 It was 
particularly favourable for industrialised countries to introduce the debates on 
international IP protection to the GATT, where they had considerably greater influence 
than at WIPO level, as developing countries strongly relied on the GATT to facilitate 
exports of their products to the global North.21  
Substantive negotiations on international IP laws began in the early 1990s, when 
industrialised nations introduced first draft texts to the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations.22 The aim of the Uruguay Round was to facilitate increased international 
trade, which would then enhance the economic situation of developing countries.23 
The negotiations of IP rights, however, were strongly opposed by developing countries 
– led by Argentina, Brazil and India – which considered stringent IP protection at 
GATT level as a threat to their economic development progress.24 While thus not 
convinced that the benefits of increased trade would eventually outweigh the negative 
 
17 The Patent Cooperation Treaty (signed 19 June 1970, entered into force 24 January 1978, last 
modified 3 October 2001); WIPO, ‘PCT – The International Patent System’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/> accessed 27 April 2019; WIPO, ‘WIPO – A Brief History’ (n 12).  
While the PCT constitutes an important development in the field of international patent protection, 
this filing system is of no further relevance to this thesis, which predominantly focusses on the 
international patent protection standards under the TRIPS patent regime. 
18 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ (n 8) 452. 
19 ibid 452-453. 
20 ibid 453. 
21 ibid. 
22 Gervais DJ, ‘The Internationalization of Intellectual Property’ (n 2) 945. 
23 cf. Waelde C and others (n 1) para 10.43.  
24 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ (n 8) 453. 
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impacts of stronger IP protection, developing countries ultimately succumbed to power 
imbalances and economic pressure, and reluctantly accepted the proposed IP 
provisions.25 As a result, the Uruguay Round culminated in the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,26 and the harmonisation of international 
IP laws, regulated by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).27  
2.2 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Adopted, and signed in Marrakech in 1994, and coming into force on 1 January 1995, 
the TRIPS Agreement aims at harmonising international IP laws, and constitutes the 
first international treaty regulating the substantive patent laws of all signatory states.28 
Being considered the most comprehensive international agreement on IP law,29 global 
requirements for IP protection are set for all members of the WTO, which currently is 
comprised of 16430 countries at all levels of economic development.31 The TRIPS 
Agreement provided a one-year transitional period, until 1 January 1996, from which 
date and thereafter all developed WTO member states had to comply with the 
provisions set forth in the agreement.32 Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement was, and 
is, subject to further transitional periods, for developing and least-developed country 
(LDC) members, taking account of their special needs and requirements, as elaborated 
below in 2.4.5.33 
 
25 ibid. 
26 WTO, ‘The WTO’ <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm> accessed 26 May 2019. 
27 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade’ (n 8) 453. 
28 See thereto: GRAIN, ‘One global patent system? WIPO's Substantive Patent Law Treaty’ 
<https://www.grain.org/en/article/109-one-global-patent-system-wipo-s-substantive-patent-law-
treaty> accessed 28 April 2019; WTO, ‘Overview: the TRIPS Agreement’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm> accessed 28 April 2019. 
29 Pires de Carvalho N, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2005) 
28. 
30 WTO, ‘Members and Observers’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 26 May 2019. 
31 Ho CM, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and 
Related Rights (OUP 2011) 56-57. 
32 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (as amended on 23 January 
2017), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (signed 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement], Article 65(1). 
33 ibid Articles 65 and 66.  
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Article 2 TRIPS establishes that the TRIPS Agreement shall not interfere with 
obligations WTO members may have towards each other under prior existing IP 
conventions, including the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, and further 
extends the applicability of parts of the Paris Convention to all WTO members.34 
Similar to the Paris Convention, the WTO legal system builds upon a non-
discrimination principle, prohibiting measures taken by a WTO member that 
discriminate against nationals of other WTO member states.35 The national treatment 
principle found in Article 3 TRIPS, for example, was already established in both the 
Paris and the Berne Conventions, and requires that WTO members treat nationals of 
other WTO members at least as favourable as they treat their own nationals with regard 
to IP protection.36 The wording of Article 3 TRIPS – ‘no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own nationals’ – suggests that TRIPS provides a flexibility to treat 
foreign nationals more favourable than domestic citizens. The TRIPS negotiators 
therefore recognised the possibility that, as a result of power imbalances in bilateral 
agreements, some countries may be willing to grant higher levels of IP protection to 
nationals of another country than to its own citizens.37 In this consideration, Article 4 
TRIPS introduced the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment, mandating that any 
advantages granted by one WTO member to nationals of any other WTO member shall 
‘immediately and unconditionally’ be accorded to the nationals of all WTO 
members.38  
The main advancement towards the harmonisation of international IP laws, established 
by the TRIPS Agreement, can be seen in the requirement that all WTO member states 
at least implement the minimum IP protection levels defined in the agreement, as 
elaborated below in 2.4.2.1.39 Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement shifted the scope of 
international IP protection from soft law to hard law.40 Not only are WTO member 
states required to implement enforcement mechanisms for infringements of IP rights 
 
34 ibid Article 2. 
35 Ho CM (n 31) 57; Sellin J, Access to Medicines: The Interface between Patents and Human Rights. 
Does one size fit all? (Intersentia 2014) 163; UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and 
Development (CUP 2005) 89. 
36 Sellin J (n 35) 163; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 62. 
37 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 63. 
38 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 4. 
39 ibid Article 1(1). 
40 Lucyk S, ‘Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines Under the TRIPS 
Agreement’ (2007) 38 Ottawa Law Review 191, 195. 
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into national law,41 but further, the IP protection introduced by the TRIPS Agreement 
is linked to the WTO dispute settlement system. Under this Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), which is compulsory and binding, WTO member states can 
submit complaints against other WTO members for implementing TRIPS-inconsistent 
measures into their national laws.42 
It must be noted here that the provision of IP rights under WTO law is not to be seen 
as a self-contained means for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of rights 
holders. In its objectives and principles, as analysed below in 2.4.2.3, the TRIPS 
Agreement rather defines that IP rights shall constitute a means to an end, serving a 
broader public interest. In particular, TRIPS shall reduce distortions and impediments 
to international trade, by promoting adequate protection, while ensuring that IP rights 
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.43 While this shall promote 
‘technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology,’ a balance 
of rights and obligations shall ensure the compliance with social and economic 
welfare.44 In this regard, and pertinent to the focus of this thesis, Article 8 TRIPS 
explicitly recognises the right of WTO members to adopt measures to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to prevent the abuse of IP rights, as long as such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of the agreement.45 
Of particular relevance for the purpose of this thesis, are the provisions regulating the 
protection of patents found in Section 5 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, and the 
protection of undisclosed information found in Section 7 of Part II. As analysed below 
in 2.4.3, Articles 27 to 34 TRIPS provide standards concerning the scope and 
applicability of patent rights, mandating the availability of patents for products and 
processes in all fields of technology, including pharmaceutical products, provided that 
they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.46 
Patents under TRIPS provide their owners with exclusive rights47 for a minimum 
patent term of 20 years from the date of filing a patent application.48 The exclusive 
 
41 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 41. 
42 Lucyk S (n 40) 195. 
43 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Preamble para 1. 
44 ibid Article 7. 
45 ibid Article 8. 
46 ibid Article 27(1). 
47 cf. ibid Article 28. 
48 ibid Article 33. 
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rights conferred by Article 28 TRIPS are subject, however, to exceptions provided for 
in Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS, establishing limitations and flexibilities for the protection 
of public interests.49 As further elaborated below in 2.4.3.6 and 2.4.3.7, these 
exceptions are commonly regarded as not being sufficiently equipped to adequately 
alleviate the negative consequences of pharmaceutical patent rights.50 Additionally, 
Article 39 TRIPS further strengthens the private rights of pharmaceutical IP owners 
by mandating the protection of undisclosed information, including data submitted as a 
condition for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical products.51  
From its outset, the TRIPS Agreement was criticised for not adequately taking into 
account the problems and special needs of developing countries.52 As outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis, it is commonly accepted that by restricting generic 
competition, the exclusive rights granted by pharmaceutical patents can significantly 
impinge upon the pricing of medical products.53 Further, considering that the prices of 
pharmaceutical products directly determine their accessibility, it can be observed that, 
particularly in developing countries with high levels of poverty, even marginal 
increases of medicine prices can have severe impacts on the realisation of public 
health.54 In this regard, it can be argued that the TRIPS Agreement established an 
imbalanced patent regime favouring the interests of patent holders, without paying due 
regard to the public interests of developing countries.55  
 
49 ibid Articles 30 and 31. 
50 cf. Lucyk S (n 40) 193. 
51 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 39. 
52 As elaborated below in 2.4.5, the TRIPS Agreement provided transitional periods for developing 
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2.3 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration) 
In the light of the extensive exclusive rights granted to patent owners, the mandatory 
introduction of patents for pharmaceutical products under TRIPS raised severe 
concerns among developing countries about the impacts pharmaceutical patents will 
have on public health and access to medicines.56 In particular with regard to the 
worsening of the HIV/AIDS pandemic around the turn of the century, Zimbabwe, on 
behalf of the African Group and supported by other developing countries, requested a 
special session of the TRIPS Council to address those concerns.57 The papers 
submitted to this session by developing country groups elaborated on the specific 
problems arising from the provisions of TRIPS, including concerns about how 
industrialised countries invoked claims on behalf of their industry groups.58  
Examples of those concerns can be seen in the way the US and the EU, on behalf of 
their research-based pharmaceutical industries, campaigned against developing 
countries that intended to make use of the flexibilities provided by TRIPS, such as 
South Africa in the early 2000s.59 At that time, South Africa was about to introduce 
health reform legislation in order to deal with the acute HIV/AIDS pandemic, which 
was opposed by several developed country groups and pharmaceutical corporations 
that invoked litigation and threatened trade and economic sanctions.60 It was only the 
work of NGOs, and an immense public outcry that eventually led to the withdrawal of 
these claims.61 Similarly, the US initiated dispute settlement proceedings under the 
WTO DSU against Brazil, which was widely perceived as directed against Brazil’s 
successful HIV/AIDS treatment program that relied upon the use of compulsory 
licenses to provide affordable generic antiretrovirals (ARVs).62 While the US 
eventually withdrew its complaint, these cases highlighted the concerns of developing 
 
56 cf. Abbott FM, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark 
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countries that the TRIPS Agreement could be utilised in a way that jeopardised the 
realisation of public health.63  
The concerns of developing countries were addressed at the Fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference from 9 to 14 November 2001 which adopted the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) on 14 November 2001.64 
While the exact legal status of the Doha Declaration is unclear, it represents a strong 
political statement in the form of a Ministerial decision, and could be further 
considered a subsequent agreement, as defined in Article 31 paragraph 3(a) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.65 In this respect, it seems generally 
accepted that the Doha Declaration constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which developing members can rely upon when implementing 
domestic IP provisions.66  
Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration recognises the gravity of public health problems 
faced by many developing countries. While this provision specifically refers to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, it further explicitly mentions other epidemics, 
indicating that the Declaration is not limited to certain diseases.67 Paragraph 2 then 
stresses the need for the TRIPS Agreement to  ‘be part of the wider national and 
international action to address these problems.’68 This indicates that while the TRIPS 
Agreement can be part of the problem, depending on national implementation, it could 
also be used as a means to address such public health needs.69 In this consideration, 
paragraph 3 of the Doha Declaration recognises the importance of IP protection for the 
development of new medicines, while also recognising the potential negative effects 
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64 World Trade Organization (WTO), ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001’ (20 November 2001) WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [Doha Declaration]; Lucyk S (n 40) 197. 
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on the pricing of medicines.70 In consideration of paragraphs 1 to 3, paragraph 4 of the 
Doha Declaration provides: 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.71 
There are different ways to interpret this provision. On the one hand, it is possible to 
regard paragraph 4 as ‘a statement of fact’, simply reaffirming that within the TRIPS 
flexibilities public health overrides commercial interests, without rebalancing the 
TRIPS Agreement.72 On the other hand, it can be suggested that when IP rights may 
be in conflict with public health objectives, IP rights under TRIPS should not create 
obstacles for public health.73 Either way, the adoption of the Doha Declaration 
explicitly acknowledged public health as a purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, 
reaffirming that IP provisions can be interpreted and implemented in ways which are 
conducive to public health objectives.74 
Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration has important political and legal implications, in 
that it provides a non-exhaustive interpretation of the largely undefined flexibilities 
provided for by the TRIPS Agreement with particular respect to public health.75 In 
essence, paragraph 5(a) reaffirms the importance of the objectives and purposes of 
Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS for the interpretation of the substantial IP provisions of the 
agreement.76 Furthermore, paragraph 5(b) explicitly acknowledges compulsory 
licensing as a legitimate flexibility provided for by Article 31 TRIPS, and reaffirms 
the freedom of member states ‘to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are 
granted’.77 Paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration then reaffirms the undisputed right 
of every sovereign nation to self-determine national emergencies and other 
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circumstances of extreme urgency, which is of particular importance for the 
applicability of certain exceptions to patent rights, as further elaborated below in 
2.4.3.7.78 Lastly, paragraph 5(d) reaffirms the right of member states to establish their 
own regime of exhaustion of IP rights, without challenge, the significance of which is 
addressed below in 2.4.2.2.79 While paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration does not 
amend the substantive scope of the TRIPS Agreement, the reaffirmation of the 
agreement’s flexibilities is of considerable importance for clarifying their 
interpretation.80 Notably, prior to the adoption of the Doha Declaration, many 
developing countries refrained from utilising these flexibilities in their domestic 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, because of their unclear wording.81 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration then addresses specific issues arising from Article 
31(f) TRIPS, as discussed in detail below in 2.4.3.7 and 2.4.3.8, which mandates that 
compulsory licenses shall be granted predominately for the supply of the domestic 
market.82 In this regard, paragraph 6 recognises that ‘WTO Members with insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in 
making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.’83 This 
recognition was of major importance, as when the Doha Declaration was concluded 
developing countries were not yet required to provide patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals.84 At that time, developing countries with pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacities, such as India, provided cheaper generic medicines to other 
developing countries and LDCs in need of such medications.85 With the end of the 
transitional periods for developing countries in 2005, as elaborated below in 2.4.5, this 
situation, however, would change, and developing countries could no longer supply 
generic copies of patented drugs.86 For developing countries and LDCs without 
sufficient manufacturing capacities, the compulsory licensing exception was then 
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useless, as they could neither produce their own generic drugs, nor import cheaper 
generic medicines under such a license. 
In response to this concern, the Doha Declaration instructed the Council for TRIPS to 
find an expeditious solution to this problem,87 which culminated in the WTO General 
Council’s Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health on 30 August 2003, providing eligible 
members88 with a waiver of Articles 31(f) and 31(h) TRIPS for pharmaceutical 
products.89 In accordance with those waivers, countries with manufacturing capacity 
can now utilise compulsory licenses to export generic pharmaceuticals to countries 
without sufficient manufacturing capacities.90 On 6 December 2005, the WTO General 
Council decided to permanently implement this interim waiver, by amendment, into 
the TRIPS Agreement, subject to the acceptance by two-thirds of WTO member states, 
as required by Article X(3) of the WTO Agreement.91 While WTO members initially 
had until 1 December 2007 to accept the amendment,92 the two-thirds majority was 
only reached in 2017. On 23 January 2017, the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
entered into force, introducing Article 31bis, and an Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 
as further discussed below in 2.4.3.8.93  
Lastly, paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration reaffirms the commitment to encourage 
and promote technology transfer to LDCs.94 More importantly, however, the second 
sentence of paragraph 7 provided a waiver for LDCs, effectively extending the 
transitional period for pharmaceutical products until 1 January 2016, without prejudice 
to the right of LDCs ‘to seek other extensions of the transition periods as provided for 
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in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.’95 Subsequently, this waiver was further 
extended until 1 January 2033, as discussed below in 2.4.5. 
In conclusion, the Doha Declaration can be regarded as a considerable political 
achievement of developing countries, highlighting the importance of protecting public 
health.96 In this respect, the Doha Declaration provides a clarification of the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health, thereby addressing 
urgent problems faced by many developing countries.97 In particular, the declaration 
defines some of the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and reaffirms the right of 
WTO member states to adopt measures for the protection of public health.98 
Furthermore, the way in which the Doha Declaration addresses pharmaceutical 
products implies that differential treatment of certain fields of technology is possible 
under TRIPS,99 even though Article 27(1) explicitly prohibits discrimination as to the 
field of technology, as elaborated below in 2.4.3.1. Ultimately, the Doha Declaration 
can be regarded as an important tool, providing guidance on how the TRIPS 
Agreement can be interpreted in a manner conducive to public health. 
2.4 Interpretation of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights under 
the TRIPS Patent Regime in Light of the Doha Declaration  
Of the IP regulations provided by TRIPS, the international harmonisation of patent 
laws seems to have the most significant economic impact on developing countries.100 
In this regard, the following section of this chapter provides a brief interpretation of 
the TRIPS Agreement in context of the Doha Declaration, focussing on patent 
standards and other interrelated regulations relevant for understanding the impact of 
pharmaceutical patents on the accessibility of medicines and public health. Due to the 
constraints of this thesis, this analysis is limited in scope and can only introduce the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, after providing a brief introduction 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to indicate the strong 
 
95 ibid. 
96 Lucyk S (n 40) 194. 
97 Correa CM, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (n 
57) 48. 
98 ibid. 
99 ibid 42. 
100 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 363. 
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enforceability of the TRIPS patent regime, this analysis will primarily address the 
substantive provisions of TRIPS, leaving regulations on procedural requirements, 
predominantly unaddressed, due to their limited relevance for the scope of this 
research. It is further important to note that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
are not necessarily addressed in chronological order here, but instead enumerated in a 
way that provides an easy and coherent understanding of interrelated regulations. 
2.4.1 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as found in Annex 2 of the WTO 
Agreement,101 is one of the central pillars of the WTO, upholding the rule of law by 
ensuring that in situations of dispute WTO rules can be effectively enforced. 102 The 
purpose of the DSU is to ‘provide security and predictability […], and to clarify the 
existing provisions of [WTO] agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.’103 The ultimate aim of the DSU, however, 
is not to issue judgments, though it may do so, but to find mutually acceptable solutions 
through consultation and mediation.104 It must be noted that while the DSU addresses 
specific issues between disputing parties, its findings do not create precedents, 
meaning that future panels are not bound by former decisions even where disputes 
concern the same subject matter.105 While according to Article 1(1) of Annex 2 the 
DSU is only applicable to disputes concerning WTO agreements, the law covered in 
DSU proceedings is not limited to those agreements.106 In the context of this thesis, it 
is relevant to provide a condensed overview of the DSU for a better understanding of 
the enforceability of WTO trade agreements, including the TRIPS patent regime, 
 
101 The abbreviation DSU refers to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding which is regulated by 
the ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ in Annex 2 of 
the WTO Agreement, which is also abbreviated as DSU. As the context of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding in this thesis is always connected to Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, both 
abbreviations of DSU are used synonymously. 
102 WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm> accessed 1 May 2019. 
103 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (signed 15 April 1994, entered 
into force 1 January 1995) [DSU], Article 3(2). 
104 WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution’ (n 102). 
105 WTO, ‘Legal effect of panel and appellate body reports and DSB recommendations and rulings’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm> accessed 2 
May 2019. 
106 cf. Sellin J (n 35) 155. 
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which will be of further relevance when scrutinising the potential existence of a 
hierarchy between different international treaty regimes, in chapter 3.1. 
The applicability of the WTO DSU to disputes under the TRIPS Agreement is 
established in Article 64(1) TRIPS.107 In brief, for disputes arising from the TRIPS 
Agreement, the DSU typically addresses violation complaints, with the rationale of 
protecting the reasonable expectations of WTO member states relating to ‘the 
competitive relationship between their own and foreign products.’108 This competitive 
relationship is considered to be disrupted when a violation of a WTO obligation leads 
to an impairment or nullification of the benefits provided by the WTO trading 
system.109 If a violation can be proven, it is generally assumed that this leads to an 
impairment or nullification of these benefits, without the need for the claimant to prove 
that the violation actually led to such an impairment.110 The burden of proof then lies 
with the responding member state, which is required to either demonstrate that a 
violation of a WTO obligation does not result in an impairment of the benefits of the 
claimant,111 or to legitimise its violation by proving an appropriate justification, as for 
example found in the TRIPS exceptions and flexibilities.112 If a member state is 
ultimately found to be in violation of a WTO obligation, that member is required to 
amend inconsistent measures so that they comply with WTO obligations.113 If the 
responding member fails or refuses to comply with the decisions of a DSU panel within 
a reasonable time frame, the WTO can impose sanctions in the form of mutually agreed 
compensation, or a temporary suspension of trade or other concessions.114  
The possibility for the DSU to directly impose sanctions on member states for 
violations of WTO agreements, provides a comparatively strong enforcement 
 
107 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 64(1). 
108 Sellin J (n 35) 157; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 664. 
109 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 664; cf. Sellin J (n 35) 157. 
110 Sellin J (n 35) 157; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 665-666. 
111 In reality, historic GATT and WTO dispute settlements indicate considerable difficulties for 
respondents to prove that a violation does not lead to an impairment of the expected benefits, so 
that an effective defence commonly requires the respondent to prove that a violation has not 
occurred in the first place. See thereto: UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 666. 
112 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 665-666; Sellin Book p. 157. 
113 Sellin J (n 35) 157. 
114 DSU (n 103) Article 22(2); Sellin J (n 35) 157; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 667-668. 
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mechanism115 under international law.116 At the same time, however, the DSU 
safeguards that remedial actions are based on justified reasons, in that Article 23(1) 
DSU provides:  
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other 
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, 
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding.117 (emphasis added) 
The requirement that members abide by the rules of the DSU establishes that the WTO 
DSU is mandatory for addressing violations of, inter alia, the TRIPS Agreement, 
suggesting that unilateral measures to remedy a violation – such as unilateral trade 
sanctions, or economic or political pressure – are not permissible.118 While on first 
glance, this seems to protect developing countries from unjustified unilateral 
measures, the threat to invoke the DSU itself may be utilised to influence policy 
decisions of economically less powerful countries. In particular, developing country 
governments may refrain from adopting public health policies, if there is a realistic 
risk of facing expensive litigation, and the possibility of becoming liable to 
remuneration payments.119    
 
115 The WTO DSU constitutes a considerably stronger enforcement mechanism than usually provided 
for by international treaty regimes, in particular, when compared to the relatively weak 
enforcement mechanisms available under international human rights law, as further elaborated in 
chapters 3.1.1.3 and 3.1.2.1. 
116 de Feyter K, Human Rights: Social Justice in the Age of the Market (Zed Books 2005) 8. 
117 DSU (n 103) Article 23(1). 
118 cf. Sellin J (n 35) 158. 
119 Kapczynski A, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership - Is It Bad for Your Health?’ (2015) 373 The New 
England Journal of Medicine 201, 202; Ruckert A, Schram A, and Labonte R, ‘The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement: Trading away our health?’ (2015) 106 Canadian Journal of Public Health 
249, 250; Stuhldreier M, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and its Threats to the 
Affordability of Medical Products in Developing Countries’ (2016) 19 Trinity C.L. Rev. 175, 189. 
My article – Stuhldreier M, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and its Threats to the 
Affordability of Medical Products in Developing Countries’ – was published during the first year 
of my PhD studies, and is attached in the appendix to this thesis. 
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2.4.2 General Provisions and Basic Principles under Part I TRIPS 
2.4.2.1 Article 1: Minimum Protection Standards 
Article 1 TRIPS identifies the nature and scope of the provisions of the agreement, 
stipulating in paragraph 1 that WTO members ‘shall give effect to the provisions of 
this Agreement.’120 The third sentence of Article 1(1) determines the freedom of 
member states to implement the TRIPS provisions in a manner appropriate for ‘their 
own legal system and practice.’121 On the one hand, this determination indicates that 
the TRIPS Agreement is not of direct effect, and therefore necessitates the 
implementation into national law.122 On the other hand, this provision grants WTO 
members the freedom to implement the agreement in a way suitable for their individual 
needs, making use of the flexibilities provided under TRIPS.123 
Of particular importance for the scope of this thesis is the second sentence of Article 
1(1) TRIPS, which reads: 
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more 
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.124 
This provision establishes what is commonly referred to as TRIPS minimum 
standards. As indicated above in 2.2, WTO members are free to implement stronger 
levels of IP protection, but are not allowed to provide a lesser degree of protection than 
that required by TRIPS.125 The minimum standards thus have to be implemented 
regardless the level of a WTO member’s development,126 subject, however, to the 
transitional periods provided for in TRIPS, as elaborated below in 2.4.5. Of further 
importance is the qualification of Article 1(1) that members ‘shall not be obliged’ to 
implement more extensive IP protection than the minimum standards.127 This 
expression indicates the illegitimacy of practices that pressure WTO members into 
 
120 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 1(1). 
121 ibid. 
122 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 17. 
123 ibid 17-18. 
124 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 1(1). 
125 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 24. 
126 Sellin J (n 35) 162. 
127 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 1(1). 
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conceding to the adoption of stronger IP protection standards in bilateral or multilateral 
trade agreements – which is common practice in TRIPS-Plus agreements, as elaborated 
below in 2.5 – as such practices disregard the requirement that WTO members shall 
not be obliged to implement more extensive protection.128  
2.4.2.2 Article 6: Exhaustion 
Article 6 TRIPS addresses issues regarding the exhaustion of IP rights. In essence, the 
principle of exhaustion establishes that once a product which is protected by an IP 
right129 legitimately enters the market, that specific product is no longer protected by 
the exclusive rights of the right holder.130 The rationale behind the exhaustion of rights 
is that after an IP rights holder makes a first sale of a product, he/she is economically 
compensated for his/her innovative efforts in regard to that specific product.131 With 
the transfer of a good, the purchaser thus receives the right to freely use and dispose 
of that product without restriction.132 The exhaustion of IP rights, however, does not 
impact the right of an IP right holder to prevent others from making a protected 
product, meaning the manufacturing of generic copies remains subject to authorisation 
by the rights holder.133 
Generally, three systems of exhaustion can be identified. The first is the principle of 
national exhaustion, the second is the principle of regional exhaustion, and the third is 
the principle of international exhaustion. The principle of national exhaustion provides 
that once a product is placed on the domestic market, the IP rights holder can no longer 
 
128 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 24. 
129 The question of when a product is legitimately placed on a market is not conclusively answered by 
international IP laws. In particular, there are controversies concerning whether goods 
manufactured under a compulsory license can be considered as legitimately placed on the market. 
It may be argued that by providing adequate compensation to an IP rights holder for products 
manufactured under a compulsory license, the legitimate economic interests of the rights holder in 
respect of those products are satisfied. A different view proposes that in order for a product to be 
legitimately placed on the market, the consent of the rights holder is required, meaning either that 
the right holder himself places the product on the market by selling it, or that a product is placed 
on the market in accordance with a (voluntary) licensee granted by the rights holder. See thereto: 
Correa CM, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (OUP 2007) 84-85; Gervais DJ, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 
(4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 2.99. 
130 Sellin J (n 35) 165-166. 
131 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 93. 
132 ibid. 
133 ibid. 
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control sales of that specific product within the domestic market.134 Similarly, the 
principle of regional exhaustion provides that once a product is placed on a regional 
market, the IP right holder can no longer control sales of this specific product within 
the trade region, as for example adopted in the EU.135 In contrast, the principle of 
international exhaustion provides that once a product is legally placed on a market 
anywhere in the world, the IP rights holder can no longer control importation and sales 
of that specific product in any country that adopts this principle of exhaustion.136 The 
principle of international exhaustion opens up the possibility of parallel trade, i.e. the 
parallel importation of products legally placed on another market, without the 
authorisation of the IP rights holder.137  
In regard to the domestic implementation of an exhaustion system, Article 6 TRIPS 
provides: 
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.138 
By exempting issues of exhaustion from the WTO DSU, the TRIPS Agreement 
provides a flexibility for WTO member states to determine their own preferred way of 
dealing with issues of exhaustion, indicating that members are free to choose any 
principles, subject to the non-discrimination requirements of Articles 3 and 4 TRIPS. 
This interpretation, however, is not undisputed. In the field of patents, Article 28(1) 
TRIPS provides that a patent holder can prevent third parties from importing a patented 
product or a product produced using a patented process, as elaborated below in 
2.4.3.3.139 It may therefore be argued that a system of international exhaustion, which 
facilitates parallel importation, would violate the right to prevent the importation of 
patented products.140 It can be suggested, however, that the exhaustion of rights defines 
 
134 Sellin J (n 35) 166. 
135 Saggi K, ‘Regional exhaustion of intellectual property’ (2014) 10 International Journal of 
Economic Theory 125, 126.  
The principle of regional exhaustion, however, may arguably amount to an infringement of the 
MFN treatment under Article 4 TRIPS, by treating WTO members within a region differently than 
members outside the region. See thereto: Gervais DJ, The TRIPS Agreement (n 129) para 2.102; 
Saggi K (n 135) 126. 
136 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 93. 
137 Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 78. 
138 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 6. 
139 ibid Article 28(1). 
140 cf. UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 94. 
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an end to IP protection claims, including those of Article 28, in that the legitimate 
interests of the IP rights holder are fulfilled with respect to the specific product. It 
therefore seems likely that the international exhaustion principle can be applied 
alongside Article 28 without contradiction. Additionally, Footnote 6 to Article 28 
TRIPS explicitly provides that the conferred rights ‘in respect of the use, sale, 
importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6.’141 
The controversy regarding legitimate principles of exhaustion was further addressed 
by the Doha Declaration, which settled any dispute by reaffirming in Paragraph 5(d): 
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free 
to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject 
to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.142 
This reaffirmation is of particular relevance, as the right to facilitate parallel 
importation under the principle of international exhaustion has been considered by 
many developing countries as a key element for protecting public health, because 
pharmaceutical products can be imported from countries where they are available at a 
lower price.143 In the context of pharmaceutical products, however, parallel 
importation can have negative impacts as well. A common practice of pharmaceutical 
corporations is to offer certain medications at cheaper prices on markets in developing 
countries and LDCs.144 Permitting parallel trade, may then have the negative impact 
that pharmaceutical corporations refrain from such differential pricing strategies, to 
prevent lower priced medicines from entering wealthy markets.145 According to 
Correa, however, the risk of cheaper medicines from developing countries entering 
developed markets is often overstated, as parallel importation is only worthwhile when 
price differences are significant, and because developed countries can further take 
measures, consistent with WTO rules, to restrict such parallel imports.146 
 
141 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Footnote 6 to Article 28; see thereto: Correa CM, A commentary on the 
TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 82. 
142 Doha Declaration (n 64) Paragraph 5(d). 
143 Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 80. 
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2.4.2.3 Articles 7 and 8, and the Preamble: Objectives and 
Principles 
The objectives and principles of TRIPS are established in the agreement’s preamble, 
as well as in its main provisions in Articles 7 and 8, indicating that the objectives and 
principles are aimed at creating direct rights and obligations.147 This is of major 
importance, as it elevates the scope of the principles and objectives from being merely 
interpretative guidelines148 to being an integral part of the agreement itself.  
Generally speaking, by reflecting the intentions of the negotiating parties, the preamble 
of TRIPS is of particular relevance for identifying the agreement’s teleological 
purpose. In regard to the relation between the patentability of medical products and the 
right to health, paragraphs 1, 4, 5, and 6 of the preamble are of particular relevance for 
the context of this thesis. Paragraph 1 establishes the main purpose of the TRIPS IP 
regime as the reduction of ‘distortions and impediments to international trade’ by 
promoting ‘effective and adequate protections’ of IP rights, recognising, however, the 
possibility that excessive IP protection can become a barrier to legitimate trade 
itself.149 This acknowledgement reaffirms that the protection of IP rights is not an end 
in itself. According to the WTO Agreement, the WTO rather aims to promote trade 
and economic development, and not merely the protection of private interests of rights 
holders.150 In this regard, paragraph 4 of the preamble of TRIPS defines IP rights as 
private rights, which can be of importance when these private rights have to be 
balanced against greater public interests, such as the protection of public health.151 In 
this consideration, paragraph 5 of the preamble recognises that IP rights are subject to 
‘public policy objectives’ of WTO member states, including, inter alia, developmental 
objectives.152 Paragraph 6 of the preamble then further recognises the special needs of 
 
147 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 118-119. 
148 The preamble of an agreement commonly reflects the nature of negotiations and elaborates the 
intention of the parties entering such negotiations. In this consideration, a preamble provides 
interpretative guideline for the implementation of an agreement and the settlement of disputes in 
cases of ambiguity. This is in accordance with Article 31(2) VCLT which stipulates that the 
preamble is an integral part for the purpose of interpreting a treaty, as the context shall comprise, 
inter alia, the text of the treaty, including its preamble and annexes. See thereto: UNCTAD-ICTSD 
(n 35) 2; VCLT (n 65) Article 31(2). 
149 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Preamble para 1; cf. Gervais DJ, The TRIPS Agreement (n 129) para 
2.10. 
150 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 10. 
151 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Preamble para 4; Gervais DJ, The TRIPS Agreement (n 129) para 2.11. 
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LDCs, and the necessity of maximum flexibility for the domestic implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement.153 
In essence, the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement thus indicates that IP rights serve a 
higher purpose than the simple protection of rights holders. By promoting innovation, 
IP rights should particularly facilitate international trade and economic development, 
and thereby, in accordance with the core objective of the WTO, improve standards of 
living.154 In this consideration, the preamble confirms the need to strike a balance 
between the protection of IP rights and free trade, between the developed world and 
developing countries, and, not least, between private IP rights and higher public 
interests.155  
The necessity to balance rights and obligations is therefore explicitly integrated in the 
main text of the TRIPS Agreement, in Article 7. It must be noted, however, that while 
TRIPS quite clearly defines the rights of IP rights holders, concomitant obligations are 
commonly not further elaborated by the agreement.156 The general existence of 
obligations is nevertheless confirmed by Article 7, which outlines the objectives of the 
agreement, providing: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.157 
This provision again reaffirms that IP rights under TRIPS are not an end in themselves, 
but that they are a means to achieve the objectives set out in Article 7.158 In particular, 
the promotion of innovation, and the transfer and dissemination of technology should 
serve wider public policy objectives, including social and economic welfare.159 The 
use of the term ‘should’ in Article 7, however, indicates that IP rights do not 
automatically fulfil these objectives.160 In this respect, it is of vital importance that the 
national implementation of the TRIPS Agreement is conducted in a manner that gives 
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effect to an adequate balance of private and public interests.161 This is of particular 
importance, as IP rights are liable to impact on the enjoyment of human rights. While 
the UN argues that the WTO is bound by human rights laws, human rights concerns 
are not directly expressed by the TRIPS Agreement.162 This could be remedied by a 
balanced implementation of the agreement, which should therefore pay due regard to 
human rights considerations in domestic IP laws.  
While Article 7 indicates the importance of striking a balance, the TRIPS Agreement 
does not further elaborate on the ways in which an adequate balance can be 
achieved.163 Consequently, Article 7 must be seen as a guideline providing context for 
the interpretation of other TRIPS provisions.164 This was confirmed by the WTO panel 
in the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case,165 and further 
reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration providing in Paragraph 5(a) that ‘each provision 
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles’, i.e. Articles 7 
and 8.166 Therefore, Article 7 is of particular relevance for the interpretation of 
insufficiently defined obligations and exceptions, and undefined terms,167 as well as 
for establishing whether the current international patent regime can be regarded as 
justified in chapter 4.  
Article 8 TRIPS establishes the core principles of the agreement. To this end, Article 
8(1) explicitly facilitates the adoption of internal measures168 for the protection of 
public health, further referring to sectors of vital importance to socio economic 
development, providing:  
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.169 
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Similar to Article 8(1), Article 8(2) TRIPS allows for the adoption of measures to 
prevent or remedy the abuse of IP rights by rights holders, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.170  
Article 8 is more strongly formulated than Article 7 and, contrary to Article 7, allows 
members to take specific action.171 WTO member states have considerable leeway in 
implementing Article 8(1), as TRIPS leaves the scope of the term ‘public interest’ 
undefined.172 However, any action taken under the provisions of Article 8 has to be 
necessary to achieve the stated purpose,173 and must be administered in the form of 
laws or regulations.174 While the adopted measures have to be consistent with the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, it seems that Article 8 at least allows for the 
maximum use of the flexibilities and exceptions provided for by TRIPS.175 To assess 
the legitimacy of a measure taken under Article 8, Article 7 and the preamble have to 
be taken into consideration, with particular regard to the requirement of striking a 
balance between rights and obligations, and socio-economic welfare.176 Nothing in the 
TRIPS Agreement should then prevent members from protecting public health or 
promoting other vital public policies as defined in Article 8, so long as the measures 
are adopted in good faith.177   
This interpretation was reaffirmed by paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, stipulating 
‘that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health’, and ‘that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.’178 
Thereby, as indicated above in 2.3, the Doha Declaration made public health a stated 
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.179 It has been further argued that legitimate 
measures for the protection of public health and the public interest are not limited to 
the flexibilities and exceptions provided by the TRIPS Agreement, but may include 
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other measures related to the use of IP rights as well.180 In this regard, the purpose of 
paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration indicates that certain derogations from TRIPS 
provisions seem to be justified if they serve the purpose of Article 8.181 The Doha 
Declaration, however, does not explicitly provide that TRIPS provisions may be 
overridden, but rather stipulates that a maximum use of flexibilities and exceptions 
provided for in TRIPS must be available for the protection of public health, with the 
agreement’s objectives and principles determining their justification.182 Therefore, 
Article 8 itself does not justify the creation of new exceptions.183 Article 8 thus rather 
provides a rationale for the flexibilities and exceptions provided by TRIPS, and, like 
Article 7, constitutes an interpretative guideline.184  
In summary, Articles 7 and 8 stipulate the right of WTO members to implement the 
TRIPS Agreement in a way suitable to their specific needs, their public policy 
objectives, and their general social and economic welfare.185 In concordance with the 
Doha Declaration, the objectives and principles particularly provide developing 
countries with the right to make full use of the flexibilities in TRIPS to protect public 
health and access to medicines, without, however, constituting a general exception in 
themselves.186  
2.4.3 Substantive Patent Law Provisions under Part II Section 5 
TRIPS 
2.4.3.1 Article 27: Patentable Subject Matter 
Article 27 TRIPS is the first international regulation on the substantive elements of 
patent laws, providing minimum standards on patentable subject matter and conditions 
for patentability,187 providing: 
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Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place 
of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced.188 (footnote omitted) 
In essence, this provision mandates the availability of patents for all types of product 
and process inventions.189 In particular, the non-discrimination principle as to the field 
of technology stipulates that patents must be made available in all industrial sectors, 
including for pharmaceutical products.190 The TRIPS Agreement thus constitutes an 
intensification of international patent standards, as prior patent treaties, such as the 
Paris Convention, did not establish specific patentability criteria and allowed for 
exclusions from patentability.191 Notably, before the TRIPS Agreement was 
concluded, about 50 countries did not provide for the patentability of pharmaceutical 
products.192  
The non-discrimination principle aims at the protection of rights holders from arbitrary 
policies,193 and is limited to the grounds provided for by Article 27(1), namely the 
place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported or 
produced locally.194 This principle is a new development in international patent laws, 
providing that patent standards must not be discriminatory with regard to the 
availability of patents, and their enjoyment.195 It follows that patent periods, for 
example, may not differ for different fields of technology, nor may the patentability 
requirements vary between different fields.196 The non-discrimination principle, 
however, may not be regarded as absolute.197 In the Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products case, the WTO panel explicitly distinguished between 
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discrimination and differential treatment.198 In this regard, differential treatment of 
certain fields of technology can be regarded as legitimate, as long as patents for all 
fields of technology are generally available, and the differentiation is not 
discriminatory.199 In certain circumstances, a differentiation between different fields 
of technology may even be desirable.200 In this respect, the panel indicated that 
different rules can be applied to different fields of technology, as long as such 
differentiations are adopted for bona fide purposes,201 arguing that ‘Article 27 does not 
prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain 
product areas.’202 This view was implicitly reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration, 
specifically addressing pharmaceutical products in paragraphs 6 and 7, seeking a 
specific solution for issues connected to this field of technology.203 
While Article 27(1) requires the availability of patents for products and processes in 
all fields of technology, the patentability of a specific product or process is subject to 
certain conditions. In particular, TRIPS only stipulates that patents shall be available 
for inventions, so that mere discoveries, i.e. substances that exist in nature, can – but 
do not have to – be excluded.204 Further requirements for the patentability of an 
invention are established by Article 27(1) in the criteria of novelty, the involvement of 
an inventive step, and the capability of industrial application.205 In accordance with 
Article 1(1) TRIPS, WTO members have considerable freedom for implementing 
these criteria in a way appropriate for their specific needs, subject to certain basic 
definitions.206  
The novelty requirement simply necessitates that an invention is new, meaning that 
before the date of a patent application, i.e. the priority date, no information about this 
invention is publicly available.207 In accordance with Article 29 TRIPS, as elaborated 
below in 2.4.3.2, the rationale for this requirement is that the granting of a patent is 
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subject to the disclosure of something new.208 In order to determine information as 
new, rather than as part of the prior art, such information must not have been disclosed 
anywhere in the world.209 A prior secret use of such information, without public 
disclosure, however, does not adversely impact upon patentability in regard to novelty 
considerations.210 
The requirement of an inventive step stipulates that additionally to being new, an 
invention must constitute an advancement over prior art.211 Footnote 5 to Article 27(1) 
further defines the term ‘inventive step’ as being synonymous to the term ‘non-
obvious’.212 As the requirement of inventiveness, however, is not defined in further 
detail by the TRIPS Agreement, WTO members are free to determine their own level 
of inventiveness required for the grant of a patent.213 Developing countries can utilise 
this leeway to implement a system which is appropriate for their needs by setting high 
inventiveness requirements, preventing the patentability of incremental 
developments.214 An adequate implementation of the inventive step requirement, 
suitable to the needs of each WTO member, can thus be used to mitigate negative 
impacts and to prevent the ‘evergreening’ of patents.215 Patent evergreening is the use 
of strategic measures to create a perpetuation of the benefits of patent protection, by 
disclosing information in a way that facilitates the acquisition of successive patents. 
While one possibility of achieving this goal is the patenting of new uses of known 
products, as established by a number of TRIPS-Plus agreements discussed below in 
2.5.1.1, the patenting of incremental developments, i.e. innovations that are not truly 
new or inventive, can lead to the same effect.216 
The capability of industrial application requirement is relatively straight forward, 
simply providing that an invention must be of use for any kind of industry.217 In this 
regard, footnote 5 to Article 27(1) defines the term ‘industrial application’ as being 
synonymous with the term ‘useful’. Subject to national implementation, it thus seems 
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to be clear that product innovations which can be manufactured, and process 
innovations which can be used to produce goods, such as pharmaceuticals, fulfil this 
requirement.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 27 is subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 which provide optional 
exceptions that override the general requirements of paragraph 1, if provided for by 
domestic patent laws.218 In this respect, Article 27(2) allows members to exclude 
products from patentability, as necessary for the protection of ordre public or morality, 
explicitly including the protection of human life and health.219 In this regard, it may be 
asked whether the protection of human health would allow a general exclusion of 
pharmaceutical products from patentability.220 Article 27(2), however, only addresses 
specific inventions, rather than categories of inventions.221 Furthermore, the 
applicability of Article 27(2) requires that the protection of ordre public or morality 
necessitates the complete prevention of the commercial exploitation of a product, i.e. 
its general availability on the market.222 Therefore, Article 27(2) is not applicable for 
generally excluding pharmaceutical products from patentability.223 
Article 27(3) provides a list of focussed exclusions from patentability that do not need 
to be justified in the same strict way as the exclusions provided under Article 27(2). 
With respect to the protection of human life and health, Article 27(3)(a) allows for the 
exclusion from patentability for ‘diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals’.224 While pharmaceutical products and processes 
themselves cannot be excluded from patentability under the TRIPS Agreement, certain 
uses may be considered a method of therapeutic treatment, and may therefore 
potentially be excluded from patentability.225 Such an interpretation, however, seems 
rather controversial, and its analysis exceeds the scope of this thesis. 
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2.4.3.2 Article 29: Disclosure of the Invention 
As mentioned above in 2.4.3.1 where the novelty requirement is considered, the 
granting of a patent is subject to the disclosure of the invention. According to Article 
29(1) TRIPS, the disclosure of an invention has to be conducted in a ‘manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled 
in the art’.226 Notably, this disclosure requirement can help to identify whether an 
invention fulfils the patentability requirements.227 More importantly, however, the 
complete disclosure of an invention means that the invention can be freely used by 
everyone once the patent period expires, which can be seen as one of the greatest 
advantages of patent systems.228 The disclosure of the invention is fundamental to 
patent laws, and, by enhancing the public benefit, can to a certain extent 
counterbalance the exclusive rights granted to patent owners, as further elaborated in 
chapter 4.3.1.229 Patents can only fulfil this objective, if the disclosure of an invention 
is made in an enabling manner.230 In reality, however, patent applicants regularly aim 
to only disclose minimal information in order to hamper follow-up inventions by 
competitors, and to further limit competition even after a patent expires.231 To remedy 
this behaviour, Article 29(1) provides WTO members with the option to ‘require the 
applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor’.232 
2.4.3.3 Article 28: Rights Conferred 
Article 28 TRIPS defines the exclusive rights granted to patent holders, providing 
minimum protection standards regarding acts of manufacturing and commercialisation 
of patented products and processes.233 The granting of exclusive rights constitutes a 
basic principle of patent protection, which aims to promote innovation by ensuring that 
patent holders can obtain significant returns on their investments throughout the patent 
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period.234 In this respect, the WTO panel in the Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products case clarified that, for the limited period of the patent term, 
the rationale of patent rights ‘is to exclude all forms of competition that could detract 
significantly from the economic returns anticipated’, as otherwise the purpose of 
patents could not be achieved.235 It is important to note that the rights conferred by 
Article 28 TRIPS are negative rights, i.e. rights to prevent other from taking certain 
actions,236 they do not, however, include any positive rights.237 Positive rights to use 
or market certain products are subject to other specific requirements provided by 
national laws, such as marketing approval for pharmaceuticals, meaning that the 
existence of a patent does not automatically stipulate that a product can be legally 
placed on the market.238 
Paragraph 1 of Article 28 is divided into two sub-paragraphs, each providing an 
exhaustive list regulating the exclusive rights conferred by product patents and process 
patents respectively.239 For product patents, Article 28(1)(a) TRIPS provides that 
patent owners are entitled ‘to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from 
the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing’ the patented 
product.240 Footnote 6 to this paragraph, however, explicitly limits the scope of the 
rights to prevent the use, sale, and importation or other distribution of patented goods 
by subjecting these rights to Article 6 TRIPS, and the principle of exhaustion chosen 
by each state, as elaborated above in 2.4.2.2.241 
A product patent holder can prevent the production and distribution of any product 
covered by the patent, irrespective of the  process used to make that product.242 The 
right to prevent any acts of making a product generally extends to products that are 
made for non-commercial use.243 Therefore, national patent laws commonly provide 
exceptions allowing the production of patented goods for private non-commercial use, 
and/or scientific research and educational purposes.244 According to the principle of 
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exhaustion, the right to prevent the use of a patented product does not entail that a 
patent holder can prevent the use of a product that was legitimately placed on the 
market.245 This right instead permits the patent owner to bring actions against the user 
of a counterfeit good, as well as against the manufacturer of such a product.246 
Likewise subject to the principle of exhaustion, the rights to prevent the offering for 
sale, the selling, and the importation of a patented product, grant the patent owner the 
right to prevent any of these acts without his authorisation in jurisdictions where the 
product is patented.247 
Article 28(1)(b) TRIPS then regulates the exclusive rights granted by process patents. 
Unlike product patents, process patents do not encompass the right to prevent the 
making of a product, as long as the product is made without using a patented process.248 
This means that if the same product can be manufactured using a different method of 
production, the patent owner cannot prevent the production and distribution of 
products made using that different method, unless the product itself is patented as 
well.249 Preventable acts under paragraph 1(b) are thus limited to ‘using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing’ products directly obtained by a patented process without 
the patent holder’s consent.250 In summary, Article 28(1) provides that product patents 
can prevent the manufacturing and commercialisation of all generic copies of a 
patented product, while process patents can only prevent the production and 
commercialisation of products made using the specific patented process, not, however, 
of products that merely can be made using that process.251 Process patents, however, 
are not limited to a specific product, but cover all types of products that are made using 
the patented process.252  
While Article 28(1) TRIPS provides negative rights to prevent others from undertaking 
certain acts, Article 28(2) provides positive rights, i.e. the rights to assign patents, to 
transfer them by succession, and to conclude licensing contracts.253 Patent owners are 
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generally not restricted as to the terms on which they transfer their rights, whether in 
exchange for royalty payments or free of costs.254 Administrative requirements, 
however, may be imposed by domestic legislation.255 According to the principle of 
freedom of contract, a patent owner not only has the right to enter into a contract, but 
further has the right not to enter into a licensing contract.256 As this can be detrimental 
to the public interest, however, governments can, in specific situations, provide 
compulsory licenses under Article 31 TRIPS, as elaborated in chapter 2.4.3.7.257 
2.4.3.4 Article 33: Term of Protection 
Article 33 TRIPS is the first international provision regulating the term of patent 
protection, requiring that every WTO member state provides for a minimum patent 
period of 20 years calculated from the date of filing, i.e. from the date a patent 
application is submitted.258 While this provision should be relatively uncontroversial, 
in 2000, Article 33 was subject of a dispute between Canada and the United States 
(US), addressed by the WTO Appellate Body in the Canada – Term of Patent 
Protection case.259 In brief, the US filed a complaint against Canada regarding the term 
of patent protection provided under Canadian law, which, rather than providing 20 
years of protection from the filing date, provided 17 years of protection from the date 
on which a patent was issued. Canada suggested that a minimum protection period of 
20 years from the filing date was nevertheless provided, as the process of reviewing 
an application and issuing a patent in Canada takes on average five years.260 The 
Appellate Body, however, established that the interpretation of Article 33 is relatively 
clear, providing that a 20-year patent period, calculated from the date of filing, must 
be provided by the law, thereby rejecting Canada’s argument.261 This interpretation 
indicates that the patent term under TRIPS does not offer 20 years of effective 
protection.262 Thus, both the time required for reviewing and issuing a patent, as well 
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as the time required for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical products count 
against the initial patent period.263 While, in accordance with Article 1(1) TRIPS, 
WTO members may provide longer patent terms to remedy the time lost, no state may 
be obliged to do so.264 Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry regularly loses years 
of effective patent protection because of lengthy approval processes, so that industry 
lobbyists tend to push for longer patent periods in bilateral and multilateral TRIPS-
Plus agreements, as further elaborated below in 2.5.1.2.265 
2.4.3.5 Article 32: Revocation/Forfeiture  
Article 32 TRIPS provides procedural requirements for the revocation and forfeiture 
of a patent. These requirements simply stipulate that for acts of revocation or forfeiture 
judicial review shall be available.266 Article 32, however, does not define or limit the 
legitimate grounds for the revocation or forfeiture of a patent.267 Therefore, WTO 
members have the freedom to self-determine these grounds in domestic laws, suitable 
to their needs.268 The forfeiture of a patent could thus, for example, be utilised to 
sanction abuses of patent rights, such as prohibitive pricing or not-working of a 
patent.269 Similarly, the revocation of patents may potentially be utilised to facilitate 
the protection of the public interest.270 Certain limits, however, are imposed by other 
international treaties. Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention, for example, provides 
that ‘[f]orfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant 
of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses.’271 
Furthermore, forfeiture and revocation of patents shall only be executed two years after 
the grant of a first compulsory license.272 It follows that for the purpose of protecting 
public health against the detrimental impacts of patent rights, the compulsory licensing 
system provided by Article 31 TRIPS has to be the first measure taken. As elaborated 
below in 2.4.3.7, however, compulsory licenses are not always adequate for addressing 
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urgent public health demands in a suitable manner. Thus, the forfeiture of a patent may 
constitute a further measure to respond to such situations.  
2.4.3.6 Article 30: Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
The exclusive rights granted by patents under Article 28 TRIPS are not absolute, 
meaning that under specific circumstances exceptions to those rights are justified.273 
In this consideration, Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS, as well as the newly adopted Article 
31bis, provide exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred to patent holders.274 In this 
respect, Article 30 provides general exceptions, while Articles 31 and 31bis provide 
specific exceptions, meaning that Article 30 is only applicable in cases where the 
exceptions under Article 31 and 31bis cannot be utilised.275 It must be noted here that 
the following sections – on Articles 30, 31, and 31bis TRIPS – can merely provide a 
brief overview of eligible exceptions to the patent rights conferred by TRIPS, due to 
the constraints of this thesis.276 
Article 30 TRIPS provides: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties.277 
In general, WTO member states are free to legislate on the grounds for which 
exceptions to patent rights shall be available,278 provided that those exceptions fulfil 
the three conditions provided by Article 30;279 namely that an exception a) must be 
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limited, b) must not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent, and 
c) must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of a patent owner, taking 
into account, however, the legitimate interests of third parties.280 In 2000, 
controversies regarding the legitimacy of exceptions provided under Article 30 TRIPS 
were addressed by a WTO panel in the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products case.281 The panel stated that for determining the justification of an 
exception, not only Article 30 TRIPS, but also the objectives and principles of Articles 
7 and 8 have to be taken into consideration.282 Furthermore, the panel identified that 
the exceptions provided by both Article 30 and Article 31 TRIPS are subject to the 
non-discrimination principle of Article 27(1), indicating, however, that discrimination 
and differential treatment are not the same, and that, in accordance with the Doha 
Declaration, the differential treatment of different fields of technology is not generally 
prohibited.283 The panel then held that legitimate exceptions are narrowly confined by 
the three conditions provided by Article 30, which, in the view of the panel, are 
cumulative, in that all three requirements must be fulfilled independently and 
separately from each other to justify an exception under Article 30.284 
Firstly, an exception must be limited,285 i.e. subject to certain boundaries or confined 
within definite limits, for example regarding permissible acts, the purpose of use, 
eligible persons, or their duration.286 In this consideration, the panel in the Canada – 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case held that the Bolar exception287 
provided for by Canadian legislation, is not inconsistent with Article 30, as it is 
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sufficiently limited regarding permissible acts and the purpose of use; i.e. the 
production of a patented product by a competitor, for the sole purpose of obtaining 
marketing approval.288 The stockpiling exception,289 however, was not considered to 
be sufficiently limited, in that the exception was for commercial purposes,290 and did 
not impose any limitation on the quantity of production.291 The panel thus held that 
this exception unreasonably interfered with the right of a patent owner to prevent 
competitive commercial activities by others.292  
Secondly, an exception shall not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of 
a patent.293 As the TRIPS Agreement leaves this requirement undefined, the panel in 
the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case defined that the 
normal exploitation of a patent includes the right ‘to exclude all forms of competition 
that could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated’ by a patent 
owner.294 A measure conflicting with the normal exploitation of a patent, however, 
may nevertheless be justified under Article 30, as long as the conflict is not 
unreasonable.295 As the term ‘unreasonable’ is not further defined, it can be suggested 
that the identification of the reasonableness of an exception should be conducted on a 
case by case basis, paying due regard to the objectives and principles of TRIPS, as 
reaffirmed by paragraph 5(a) of the Doha Declaration.296 
Thirdly, an exception shall not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of a 
patent owner, however, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.297 
According to the WTO panel, legitimate interests are interests that are justified, i.e. 
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supported by public policies and social norms.298 In this regard, and especially in 
consideration of the legitimate interests of third parties, it seems logical to suggest that 
legitimate interests are not limited to purely legal interests.299 While certain 
interpretative issues of Article 30 were clarified by the panel, some of the arguments 
of the EC and Canada raised new obscurities, for example regarding the term ‘third 
parties’, which were not further clarified by the panel.300 In particular, the EC argued 
that third parties under Article 30 encompass competitors only,301 while Canada 
suggested that the interests of third parties include ‘general societal interests and 
particularly interests connected with health policy’.302 In the absence of clarification 
by the panel, it is submitted by the author that in light of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, and 
the Doha Declaration, it seems sensible to follow Canada’s interpretation suggesting 
that the public interest constitutes a legitimate interest of third parties. 
In conclusion, Article 30 TRIPS can provide distinct limitations for the exclusive 
rights granted to patent holders, intended to mitigate some of the detrimental effects 
patents may have.303 Particularly, the Bolar exception is of relevance for protecting 
public health, and for enhancing the accessibility of medicines, by enabling generic 
drugs to enter the market more rapidly after a patent expires.304 The narrow 
interpretation of the three requirements of Article 30, provided by the WTO panel, 
however, considerably limits the number of legitimate exceptions available for the 
protection of public health.305 Ultimately, it is therefore submitted that the narrow 
limitations of Article 30 constrain its capability to  adequately protect public interests 
against the detrimental impacts of the exclusive patent rights provided by TRIPS. 
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2.4.3.7 Article 31: Other Use Without Authorization of the Right 
Holder 
Article 31 TRIPS regulates  exceptional uses of patented inventions other than those 
allowed under Article 30.306 In particular, Article 31 facilitates the granting of non-
voluntary or compulsory licenses under specific circumstances, where the public 
interest is regarded of higher importance than the exclusive rights of patent owners.307 
The concept of compulsory licensing is not new and existed in most nations long 
before the TRIPS Agreement was concluded.308 In brief, a compulsory license is 
granted by a government, directed at a single patented invention, permitting a third 
party to produce and use the patented goods without requiring the authorisation of the 
patent owner.309 However, compulsory licenses do not generally ‘break’ a patent, so 
that rights holders retain their exclusive rights towards all other actors interested in 
using the patented invention.310 Thus, compulsory licenses are not intended to 
undermine the legitimate rights of patent holders, but to amend or regulate 
inappropriate market behaviour. The imposition of compulsory licenses can therefore, 
be utilised for the protection of public interests, by limiting the private power inherent 
to exclusive patent rights.311 In particular, such licenses can drive down prices, and 
facilitate follow-up and new inventions, thereby not only improving the affordability 
of products, but generally facilitating a wider accessibility.312  
In the context of addressing public health concerns, compulsory licenses can serve the 
purpose of reducing the prices of pharmaceutical products in order to make them 
accessible to a larger number of patients, including poorer members of the 
population.313 India’s patent laws, for example, utilised this TRIPS flexibility for 
enhancing the accessibility of medicines, by implementing the non-availability of a 
pharmaceutical product at a ‘reasonably affordable price’ as a ground for issuing a 
 
306 TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Footnote 7 to Article 31; cf. Sellin J (n 35) 201; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 
461. 
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compulsory license.314 Furthermore, the general possibility of threatening the use of a 
compulsory license can provide an essential means of leverage for governments in 
negotiations with the industry, regarding the pricing of medicines.315 Thereby, the 
availability of compulsory licenses is not only an exception to the exclusive rights 
granted by a patent, but also a means for ‘promoting effective price negotiations with 
patent holders’.316  
Article 31 TRIPS provides detailed conditions and limitations regulating the use of 
compulsory licenses, but refrains from defining or limiting the grounds upon which a 
compulsory license can be granted, indicating that WTO member states are free to self-
determine these grounds.317 Similarly, TRIPS does not limit the types of patents or 
products that can be subject to compulsory licensing.318 The right of governments to 
freely determine the grounds upon which compulsory licenses can be granted was 
further reaffirmed by Article 5(b) of the Doha Declaration, which explicitly provides 
that every member of the WTO not only has the right to grant compulsory licenses, 
but also ‘the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are 
granted.’319 Similarly, with regard to pharmaceutical products, TRIPS does not include 
any limitations on the types of diseases for which compulsory licenses can be 
granted.320 Again, this was reaffirmed by paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration which, 
while mentioning examples of specific diseases, provides a non-exhaustive list of 
health conditions, thereby not limiting the applicability of the TRIPS flexibilities to 
any specific diseases.321  
It follows that compulsory licenses under TRIPS can theoretically be issued for any 
reasonable purposes.322 In this respect, Article 31 simply regulates the procedures and 
conditions to be followed when issuing a compulsory license in order to ensure the 
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fairness of the system and its use in a legitimate manner.323 In general, compulsory 
licenses can be issued both for governmental use, and for use by third parties 
authorised by the government.324 Governments, however, cannot issue general 
compulsory licenses for entire fields of technology or types of enterprises, as, just like 
Article 30 TRIPS, Article 31 is subject to the non-discrimination principle of Article 
27.1 regarding, inter alia, the field of technology.325  
For the issuance of a compulsory license, Article 31(a) TRIPS provides that each 
‘authorisation of such use shall be considered on its individual merits’.326 It follows 
that every application needs to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to establish 
whether the criteria for the grant of a compulsory license are fulfilled.327 To protect 
the legitimate interests of patent owners, however, compulsory licenses should only 
be adopted as a measure of last resort. Thus, before a compulsory license can be 
granted, Article 31(b) requires that the proposed grantee has to engage in prior 
negotiations with the rights holder, seeking to obtain a voluntary license based on 
‘reasonable commercial terms and conditions’.328 While this requirement is not further 
defined by TRIPS, ‘reasonable commercial terms and conditions’ seem to include the 
payment of adequate royalty fees, the reasonable duration of the license, and potential 
export restrictions to protect the interests of the patentee in other markets.329  
The subsequent grant of a compulsory license is only adequate if such negotiations 
‘have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.’330 The reasonableness 
of this period may, inter alia, depend on the purpose for which a license is required.331 
It can therefore be suggested that a license for the production of a life-saving drug 
would justify a relatively short negotiation period, as otherwise unwilling patent 
holders could abuse negotiations to substantially delay the issuance of compulsory 
licenses.332 In this respect, Article 31(b) further provides that the requirement of prior 
negotiations can be waived in situations ‘of a national emergency or other 
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circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.’333 Of 
particular importance in this regard, is paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration, 
acknowledging the right of each WTO member to self-determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or ‘other circumstances of extreme urgency’, further recognising 
that public health crises, including, but not limited to, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics ‘can constitute a national emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency.’334 To remedy anti-competitive behaviour, the requirement of prior 
negotiations can further be waived under Article 31(k) TRIPS, when a compulsory 
license is granted after a judicial review.335  
According to Article 31(c) TRIPS, the scope and duration of a compulsory license 
‘shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized’.336 As the TRIPS 
Agreement sets no criteria for the assessment of the scope and duration, it seems 
sensible to suggest that every compulsory license needs to be customised for the 
specific purpose of its authorisation.337 In consideration of this specific purpose, 
Article 31(g) TRIPS regulates that a compulsory license shall further be subject to 
termination once the circumstances that led to its authorisation cease to exist.338 
Nevertheless, Article 31(g) acknowledges the importance of protecting the legitimate 
interests of the persons authorised under a compulsory license, to recover the 
potentially substantial investments made in order to work a compulsory license in the 
public interest.339 Without the safeguard provided by Article 31(g), it could be 
expected to be exponentially difficult to find a distributer willing to make such an 
investment.  
To protect rights holders, Article 31 TRIPS provides certain safeguards to ensure that 
compulsory licenses do not unreasonably interfere with the legitimate interests of 
patent owners.340 In this respect, Article 31(h) requires the payment of adequate 
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remuneration to the rights holder, subject to the circumstances of each individual 
case.341  To determine the adequacy of this remuneration, TRIPS provides that the 
‘economic value of the authorization’ shall be taken into account.342 While it would be 
in the interest of patent holders to receive a remuneration equivalent or similar to the 
market rate, it has to be borne in mind that compulsory licenses aim to serve higher 
public objectives, so that the term ‘adequate’ may suggest that the remuneration should 
rather be sufficient on a minimum level.343 In particular, in the context of the protection 
of public health, it can be suggested that remuneration for pharmaceutical products 
should be below the common market rate, to ensure that compulsory licenses can 
effectively reduce the prices of required medicines.344  
Lastly, Article 31(f) TRIPS stipulates that compulsory licenses ‘shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such 
use’,345 unless a compulsory license is issued in accordance with paragraph (k), to 
remedy anti-competitive behaviour.346 As the TRIPS Agreement does not provide any 
further guidance on the term ‘predominantly’, it is commonly suggested that the 
majority of products produced under a compulsory license, i.e. at least 50.1 percent, 
need to be produced for the supply of the domestic market.347 Simultaneously, this 
definition suggests that compulsory licenses can generally be issued for exportation, 
as long as the majority of products stay within the issuing country’s market.348 
However, this also means that in situations where a product is urgently required 
abroad, production under a compulsory license can only be of assistance where the 
same product is required in the domestic market of the exporting country.  
While the possibility to grant compulsory licenses should provide considerable 
benefits for enhancing the accessibility of medicines in developing countries, the 
 
requirement aims to prevent the emergence of a market in compulsory licenses, which undermines 
the rights of patent holders. Furthermore, Article 31(i) and (j) TRIPS safeguard patent holders by 
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system provided by Article 31 was heavily criticised as being ineffective for a variety 
of reasons.349  In particular, it can be suggested that the WTO does not provide 
sufficient safeguards to prevent threats of trade sanctions against countries intending 
to utilise Article 31.350 A major problem in this respect, can be seen in the imbalance 
of power between developing countries and multinational corporations, particularly 
with regard to the pharmaceutical industry with exclusive rights over life-saving 
medications. Any government that intends or decides to grant a compulsory license 
does so in the knowledge that this will displease the patent holder, and that patent 
holders are likely to try anything to prevent a compulsory license being issued. This 
means that when the legal means to prevent such licenses under TRIPS are exhausted, 
a corporation might decide to retaliate against government decisions by withdrawing 
other patented products from markets where compulsory licenses are issued.351 This 
happened for example, when Thailand issued a compulsory license for Abbott’s HIV 
drug Kaletra. Abbott decided to withdraw from filing patents for seven new drugs in 
Thailand, including an HIV drug that is particularly suitable for Thailand’s tropical 
climate.352 Considering the severity of those threats, developing countries tend to be 
more cautious about issuing compulsory licenses, as the balance of power is lopsided 
towards the multinational industry.353 
Similarly, developing countries and LDCs may be threatened by unilateral economic 
and/or trade sanctions imposed by industrialised nations.354 If a developed country 
government assumes that a compulsory license interferes with the interests of patent 
holding corporations based in their country, such a developed nation may try to 
intervene to prevent the issuing of such a license. One of the practices applied by 
developed country governments is to threaten trade sanctions, which may lead to even 
more severe problems in developing countries, than the acute health issues which the 
compulsory license is intended to alleviate.355 While this imposition of unilateral 
measures is not allowed under TRIPS and the WTO, trade sanctions are a very real 
 
349 Sellin J (n 35) 210-211. 
350 ibid 211. 
351 Ho CM (n 31) 149. 
352 ibid 150. 
353 ibid 150-151. 
354 ibid 151. 
355 ibid. 
91 
 
threat for developing countries – as past state practices prove356 – and seem to be one 
of the main reasons for developing countries and LDCs refraining from issuing 
compulsory licenses.357  
Additionally, compulsory licensing under TRIPS can be criticised for the complexity 
of the procedural and administrative requirements of Article 31 itself, which severely 
constrain the efficacy of the system.358 Scrutinising this inefficacy of the procedural 
requirements, it becomes apparent that a particular problem for the protection of public 
health is inherent in the requirement of prior negotiations with the rights holder. As 
the industry is not keen on providing licenses that lower their profitability, such 
negotiations are complicated and can become a rather lengthy process, thereby 
jeopardising the timely issuance of compulsory licenses for the protection of human 
health and life.359 Another obstacle to the efficacy of compulsory licenses is that such 
licenses seemingly only provide exceptions to patent rights under Section 5 of Part II 
TRIPS, not, however, to the data exclusivity provisions of Section 7 of Part II TRIPS, 
 
356 A much-recited illustration of such unilateral threats can be found in the example of the United 
States pressurising Thailand as a countermeasure for making use of the flexibility to issue 
compulsory licenses for public health reasons. Thailand attempted to utilise the system provided 
by Article 31 to provide compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals intended to treat cancer and 
heart diseases. This led to strong criticism from conservative media, pharmaceutical corporations, 
and industrialised country governments, which – disregarding the actual wording of TRIPS and the 
Doha Declaration – claimed that Thailand was in violation of global trade rules. For US retaliation 
measures, however, it is not necessary to be in violation of any specific TRIPS regulations. 
Thailand, although in compliance with international IP laws, was thus listed in the US ‘Special 
301’ report for allegedly offering inadequate IP protection. As such a listing may have 
implications on the investment strategies of rights holding industries with severe impacts on the 
economy of a listed country, the action taken by the US governments must be regarded as an 
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as discussed below in 2.4.4.360 If compulsory licenses did not include a right to waive 
these data exclusivity provisions, generic manufacturers would be required to conduct 
their own clinical trials, which would delay the introduction of generic medicines, and 
increase their costs.361 Similarly, the requirement of adequate remuneration for the 
patent holder under Article 31(h) TRIPS, as discussed above, can have detrimental 
impacts on the pricing of generic medicines produced under compulsory licenses. 
Most notably, however, the compulsory licensing system of TRIPS can be criticised 
for Article 31(f), as the export restriction seems to disregard the special needs of 
developing countries and LDCs in urgent need of cheaper generic medicines. While in 
theory, developing countries and LDCs can grant compulsory licenses for the 
production of generic drugs, in practice, most of those countries frequently lack the 
manufacturing capacity to do so.362 While other countries that do have the required 
manufacturing capacity would potentially be willing to supply the required generic 
products, the export restriction of Article 31(f) provides a distinct legal obstacle.363 
Developing countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector cannot simply authorise an overseas manufacturer to work a compulsory license, 
as compulsory licenses need to be issued in the country of production as well.364 As 
the compulsory license in the manufacturing country would then be required to be 
predominantly for domestic use, that country would need to require the same generic 
medicine in order to grant a compulsory license, and could further only export a 
maximum of 49.9 percent of the production to the initial country in need.365 In this 
respect, the export restriction of Article 31(f) seems to unduly burden countries that 
rely on the importation of generic medicines to satisfy the health needs of their 
population.366 It was therefore recognised by the WTO General Council that the initial 
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compulsory licensing system under Article 31 TRIPS was impractical for many 
countries, particularly for those that needed cheaper medications most urgently.367 
This problem of WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector was recognised by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which 
instructed the Council for TRIPS ‘to find an expeditious solution to this problem […] 
before the end of 2002.’368 While not within the deadline, a solution was agreed upon 
on 30 August 2003, providing an interim waiver which then led to a permanent 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement in January 2017, as elaborated in the next 
section.369  
2.4.3.8 Article 31bis: The Initial Waiver and the TRIPS Amendment 
– Compulsory Licensing for Export Purposes  
On 30 August 2003, after almost two years of negotiations, the WTO General Council 
adopted the Decision on the ‘Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and public health’, providing an interim waiver of the 
obligations under Article 31(f) TRIPS for exporting countries, allowing WTO 
members with pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to produce medicines under 
compulsory licenses for export to countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity 
in need of such pharmaceuticals.370 Furthermore, this decision waives the requirement 
to pay remuneration to the rights holder under Article 31(h) for the importing 
member.371 The system is designed to provide required medications to countries in 
need when a patent holder refuses to offer such medications ‘at a price or under 
conditions acceptable to the interested country.’372 In this respect, the Chairperson of 
the General Council proclaimed that WTO members shall use the system in good faith 
for the protection of public health and not as ‘an instrument to pursue industrial or 
 
367 ibid 172. 
368 Doha Declaration (n 64) Paragraph 6. 
369 WTO, WTO Doc WT/L/540 (n 89); WTO, WTO Doc WT/L/641 (n 91); See thereto: Abbas MZ 
and Riaz S, ‘Compulsory Licensing and Access to Medicines: TRIPS Amendment allows Export 
to Least-Developed Countries’ (2017) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 451, 
451; Anderson B (n 356) 172; Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 325; 
Dutfield G, ‘Delivering Drugs to the Poor’ (n 356) 122; Ho CM (n 31) 198-209; UNCTAD-
ICTSD (n 35) 474. 
370 WTO, WTO Doc WT/L/540 (n 89); UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 484. 
371 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 484. 
372 Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 339. 
94 
 
commercial policy objectives.’373 This statement, however, does not generally prohibit 
corporations from acting for a commercial gain, as otherwise it would be extremely 
difficult to find private actors willing to work a compulsory license for the supply of 
countries in need.374 Ultimately, the statement simply indicates that the main intention 
of the system is the support of public health, and not the furthering of economic 
objectives.375 
The initial waiver – as well as the now implemented Article 31bis – generally are 
applicable and necessary when three conditions are met: 
1) A country needs more drugs at a lower price than currently obtainable, 
2) that country has no or inadequate manufacturing capacity for the drugs in 
question, and 
3) that country seeks to import cheaper generic drugs from a country willing to 
export such products.376 
On 6 December 2005, WTO member states agreed to transform the interim waiver into 
the first permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement.377 After an initial deadline, 
which required the acceptance by two-thirds of the WTO members, was extended from 
1 December 2007 to 31 December 2017, the TRIPS Amendment was eventually 
ratified and entered into force on 23 January 2017, implementing Article 31bis and an 
Annex to The TRIPS Agreement.378  
Article 31bis(1) TRIPS provides that ‘[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under 
Article 31(f) shall not apply with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to 
the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s)’ 
 
373 WTO, ‘The General Council Chairperson’s Statement’ (30 August 2003) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm> accessed 27 May 
2019; cf. Abbott FM and Reichman JH (n 313) 945-946; UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 485. 
374 cf. UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 35) 485. 
375 Abbott FM and Reichman JH (n 313) 946. 
376 Ho CM (n 31) 201. 
377 WTO, WTO Doc WT/L/641 (n 91); cf. Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 
129) 325; Yu PK, ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Indiana Law Journal 827, 
881. 
While Article 31bis is a measure intended to address situations that require urgent and timely 
intervention, paragraph 6 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement implicitly acknowledges that 
providing compulsory licenses for export purposes cannot be regarded as a sufficient long-term 
solution to the problems faced by many developing countries and LDCs. In this consideration, 
paragraph 6 recognises ‘the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and capacity 
building in the pharmaceutical sector’ to overcome the problems faced by members without 
sufficient manufacturing capacity. See thereto: TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Annex, Paragraph 6. 
378 cf. TRIPS Agreement (n 32); Abbas MZ and Riaz S (n 369) 451. 
95 
 
subject to the condition that this product is exported to an eligible379 importing 
Member.380 This waiver is further subject to a set of specific terms and conditions 
provided in paragraph 2 of the newly implemented Annex to the TRIPS Agreement.381  
Paragraph 2 of the Annex regulates the administrative and procedural conditions for 
the granting of compulsory licenses under the waiver system. According to Paragraph 
2(a)(i), eligible importing members have to notify the Council for TRIPS about the 
‘names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed’.382 According to paragraph 
2(a)(ii) of the Annex, the notification has to further confirm that an importing Member, 
other than a LDC, ‘has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities’ to produce the 
pharmaceutical product in question.383 Capacity in this regard has two dimensions; one 
being the technical capability, and the other being the economic feasibility.384 Article 
31bis is no longer applicable once the manufacturing capacity in a formerly eligible 
importing member becomes sufficient to meet that country’s pharmaceutical 
 
379 The ‘eligible importing member’ is defined by paragraph 1(b) of the Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement as any LDC member, and any other country ‘that has made a notification to the 
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production needs, at least in regard to the products in question.385 Lastly, under 
paragraph 2(a)(iii) of the Annex, the importing member has to confirm that where 
products are patented in its territory, ‘it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory 
license’ for such products.386  
Paragraph 2(b) of the Annex then regulates the conditions an exporting country has to 
comply with, providing in paragraph 2(b)(i) that the exporting member shall only issue 
a compulsory license for ‘the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible 
importing Member(s)’, and that all products manufactured under the license shall be 
exported to that member.387 According to paragraph 2(b)(ii), ‘products produced under 
the license shall be clearly identified as being produced under the system through 
specific labelling or marking.’388 The rationale behind this regulation is to make such 
products easily identifiable in order to prevent their diversion into other markets.389 
According to paragraph 2(b)(iii), information about the quantities of products shipped, 
as well as their distinguishing features shall then be published by the licensee on a 
website.390 
Paragraph 2(c) of the Annex further requires the exporting member to notify the 
Council for TRIPS about the grant of a compulsory license, as well as the conditions 
attached to that license.391 As the Annex simply serves the purpose of providing 
transparency when the system is used, there is no requirement for this notification to 
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be approved by the WTO, meaning the Council for TRIPS cannot review or object to 
the notification, or its grounds and conditions.392  
To avoid double remuneration payments, Article 31bis(2) TRIPS provides the 
importing country with a waiver of its obligation under Article 31(h) TRIPS, so that 
adequate remuneration to the patent holder shall only be paid in the exporting country, 
taking account, however, of the economic value to the importing member.393 Lacking 
a distinct definition of the adequacy standard for the remuneration, a controversy has 
arisen, with industrialised nations regularly arguing that adequate remuneration should 
provide full compensation to the patent holder, while developing countries suggest 
there should be no, or only a minimal compensation.394 The suggestion of no 
compensation fails to pay justice to the legitimate interests of patent holders.395 In 
respect to the public health objective of the Doha Declaration and the waiver, however, 
the author suggests that the remuneration should be low enough so as not to become 
an obstacle to the efficacy of the waiver, which aims to enhance the affordability of 
urgently required medicines. 
While Article 31bis(1) and (2) waive the export restriction under Article 31(f), and the 
importing country’s obligation under TRIPS to remunerate the patent holder under 
Article 31(h), the other requirements of Article 31 remain applicable.396 Article 
31bis(5) clarifies that nothing in Article 31bis, nor in the Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement, shall prejudice any of ‘the rights, obligations and flexibilities that 
Members have under the provisions of this Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and 
(h) of Article 31’ including those of the Doha Declaration and their interpretation.397 
Among others, Article 31bis notably does not waive the requirement to seek a 
voluntary license from the patent owner under Article 31(b) TRIPS. The exporting 
 
392 Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 337; Gervais DJ, The TRIPS 
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396 cf. Correa CM, A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (n 129) 332; Ho CM (n 31) 207. 
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TRIPS Agreement (n 32) Article 31bis(5). 
98 
 
country may however rely on public non-commercial use or an emergency situation in 
the importing country to circumvent this requirement.398  
To reduce the prices of generic medications, it is important to produce larger quantities 
in order to reduce the average unit cost. Addressing this so-called ‘economies of scale’, 
Article 31bis(3) TRIPS facilitates that under certain conditions generic 
pharmaceuticals under the waiver can be re-exported to other developing countries and 
LDCs within the area of a regional trade agreement, provided that the region consists 
to over 50% of LDCs.399 In all other circumstances, however, it is, according to 
paragraph 3 of the Annex, the obligation of eligible importing members to ‘take 
reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative 
capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products 
that have actually been imported into their territories under the system.’400 In addition, 
paragraph 4 of the Annex provides that all WTO members shall ensure that effective 
measures are available within their territories preventing the importation of re-
exported products diverted into their markets.401  
Article 31bis(3) was rather controversially received, as the parameters within which 
countries can or cannot provide for economies of scale seem rather arbitrary.402 The 
waiver depends on low prices to be effective, but commonly fails to offer the 
possibility of shipping sufficiently large quantities required to make low prices 
economical.403 Under Article 31bis(3) the realisation of economies of scale is generally 
permitted, subject, however, to three strict conditions. These conditions are that (1) 
countries utilising economies of scale need to be a party to a WTO recognised regional 
trade agreement (RTA), (2) at least half of the members of that RTA must be on the 
UN list of LDCs, and (3) the eligible importing country is responsible for the re-
exportation of the medications to other eligible members within that RTA.404 The 
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imposed limitations in this provision create another burdensome process, leaving only 
a few countries eligible for facilitating economies of scale for making needed 
medications as affordable as possible.405 Furthermore, countries that do qualify under 
Article 31bis(3) TRIPS face additional administrative hurdles before they can make 
effective use of economies of scale.406 As the initial eligible importing country has to 
take the responsibility for administrating the utilisation of the economies of scale, 
products produced under the waiver have to be first imported to this member, before 
they can be re-exported to other eligible countries that have the same public health 
problems.407 Ultimately, while the provisions set out by Article 31bis TRIPS are a step 
in the right direction, the current economies of scale provision does not provide the 
best way of making required drugs available at the cheapest possible price.408  
Lastly, to provide a safeguard against lengthy and costly legal procedures under the 
WTO DSU, Article 31bis(4) TRIPS regulates that WTO members ‘shall not challenge 
any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of this Article and the Annex to 
this Agreement under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994’.409 
The rationale behind this regulation is to prevent non-violation nullification or 
impairment claims under GATT rules, as it is obvious that the use of compulsory 
licenses impairs the enjoyment of exclusive rights, which, under the conditions of 
Article 31bis and the Doha Declaration, is automatically justified.410  
The waiver system provided by Article 31bis TRIPS was repeatedly criticised by 
developing countries as ineffective, particularly concerning its inherent administrative 
hurdles and unnecessary obstacles.411 A strong indicator of the inefficacy of the system 
can be seen in the fact that as of 2018, the waiver has only been used once during its 
15 years of existence, and that that use was hampered by several administrative 
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difficulties.412 While some countries have reportedly considered using the waiver, they 
ultimately refrained due to the complexity of the requirements.413 In this regard, Abbott 
and Reichmann argue that the cumbersome process ‘follows from the developed 
countries’ strategy of loading-up the Waiver Decision and Amendment with 
bureaucratic requirements.’414 A further reason for the reluctance of developing 
countries to make use of the waiver is potentially connected to fears of political, 
economic, or trade repercussions – similar to those discussed above in 2.4.3.7 – which 
might follow once a country decides to use the system.415 In this respect, particularly 
the requirement of public notifications about the intention to use the system, generates 
a risk of retaliatory sanctions.416  
In general terms, the complex and burdensome process under Article 31bis entails the 
likelihood of increasing costs and generating possibilities for delay.417 An example can 
be seen in the requirement to establish that a developing country does not have 
adequate manufacturing capacities, which can be a rather costly process for most of 
those countries.418 Further, the requirement that the generic manufacturer needs to 
enter into negotiations seeking a voluntary license from the patent holder is an 
additional burden with negative impacts on the timely availability of urgently required 
affordable medications.419 Similarly, the required limitations of the duration and/or 
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quantity for which a compulsory license can be granted constitute unnecessary hurdles 
which unreasonably interfere with the effectiveness of the waiver, as it is virtually 
impossible to accurately predict the course of public health crises.420 If any change of 
circumstances requires further shipments of generic drugs, the whole burdensome 
process has to be repeated.421 
While the system provided by Article 31bis is already intricate in itself, further 
complications may be introduced depending on how the national implementation of 
the waiver is conducted.422 In general, before a compulsory license under the waiver 
can be granted, three basic requirements need to be fulfilled.423 First, an exporting 
country needs to implement laws facilitating the possibility of issuing compulsory 
licenses for export purposes. Second, a company willing to take up production under 
the waiver must be identified. And third, that company needs to receive a compulsory 
license.424 Accordingly, in most countries national patent laws need to be changed to 
enable the use of the system, as prior to the waiver, WTO members were required to 
implement an export restriction under Article 31(f) TRIPS.425 Furthermore, importing 
countries need to amend their laws to facilitate the issuance of compulsory licenses for 
import purposes, and to waive the remuneration requirement of Article 31(h) 
TRIPS.426 Such changes to domestic laws, however, may face legal difficulties in cases 
where countries have signed up to TRIPS-Plus agreements that restrict the use of the 
exceptions and flexibilities provided by TRIPS, as further discussed below in 
2.5.1.4.427 As patent laws and regulatory laws operate separately from each other, it 
may be necessary for the importing country to make amendments to existing data 
exclusivity provisions428 in relation to the marketing approval of pharmaceuticals, in 
order to ensure that such regulations do not hinder the distribution of the licensed 
products.429 Similar amendments are required in the exporting country to ensure that 
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data exclusivity provisions do not create barriers for the production of generic 
medications under compulsory licenses.430 
A further considerable problem of the waiver is that its cumbersome regulations and 
requirements can make it rather complicated to find a generic manufacturer willing to 
produce under the system. One particular obstacle can be seen in the remuneration 
requirement. TRIPS does not provide any guideline on how the amount of 
remuneration should be determined, other than that the amount shall be adequate.431 
Therefore, the adequacy of remuneration payments will potentially be subject to 
intense debates and litigation.432 The general lack of clarity regarding the remuneration 
may thus impact the decision making of generic manufacturers considering whether it 
is reasonable for them to make an investment in producing under a compulsory 
license.433 Furthermore, the production of generic pharmaceuticals under the waiver 
does not create distinct financial incentives, as only confined quantities at limited 
profit margins can be produced.434 Usually, generic manufacturers generate a return 
on their investments by selling large quantities at low prices.435 With the strict 
limitation of the production to the quantity needed by the eligible importer, potential 
producers might refrain from making necessary investments in required production 
facilities.436 At the same time, such constraints of the quantity seem to be required to 
protect the legitimate interests of patent holders.437 Nonetheless, it has to be borne in 
mind that generic manufacturers are not commonly charitable organisations, connoting 
that as players on the global market, their economic strategies are based on profitability 
considerations.438 Without a prospect of making sufficient profits, it may prove fairly 
difficult to find manufacturers willing to work under the waiver. 
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2.4.4 Protection of Undisclosed Information under Part II Section 
7 TRIPS 
Besides patent rights, Part II of TRIPS regulates a second category of IP protection in 
Section 7, relevant to the context of public health and the accessibility of medicines. 
Formerly often referred to as trade secrets,439 Article 39 TRIPS is the first specific 
international provision addressing the protection of undisclosed information and test 
data.440 The use of the term ‘undisclosed information’ seems to be slightly misleading, 
as not all categories of undisclosed information are entirely undisclosed.441 Of 
importance is rather that such information is not generally accessible to persons that 
commonly deal with that kind of information.442 In this consideration, undisclosed 
information under Article 39 includes technical know-how, data of commercial value, 
and, of particular importance for the scope of this thesis, test or other data submitted 
for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical products.443 An important advantage for 
research based industries is, that unlike patents, the protection of undisclosed 
information is not subject to registration.444 
According to Article 39(1) TRIPS, the protection of undisclosed information is aimed 
at ‘ensuring effective protection against unfair competition’.445 While the protection 
against unfair competition generally goes alongside industrial property rights – such 
as patents and trademarks – it commonly does not provide exclusive rights.446 This 
form of protection rather seems to provide redress against competitors who acquired 
secret information in an unlawful manner.447 Examples of this are provided in footnote 
10 to Article 39(1) TRIPS, which enumerates ‘practices such as breach of contract, 
breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of 
undisclosed information by third parties who knew,’ or should have known that 
unlawful practices were involved.448 
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In this consideration, the second paragraph of Article 39 stipulates that  
[n]atural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing 
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired 
by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest 
commercial practices.449  
Article 39(2) does not, however, protect the information itself, meaning that 
information which was lawfully acquired by competitors, for example by their own 
research, can be legally used by them.450 The protection of trade secrets under Article 
39(2) TRIPS, and more importantly the general existence of such secrets, provides an 
indicative example of one of the main advantages of pharmaceutical patent rights; 
namely the disclosure of an invention for public use after a patent period expires.451 
This can be illustrated by reference to the history of Coca Cola. If the company had 
filed for a patent in 1886, the recipe would have been available for other manufacturers 
to copy from the early 20th century onwards. Coca Cola, however, decided against 
filing for a patent, rather keeping the recipe secret, thereby successfully protecting 
their invention for over 130 years now.452 If this was done in the field of 
pharmaceuticals, the results would potentially be devastating. While without patent 
protection, competing corporations would be free to conduct their own research to 
come up with a generic version of a drug, this would require further lengthy and costly 
research processes and product safety trials. Consequently, the prices of such 
medicines would remain high, and research capacities would be missing for the 
development of other new medicines. 
Article 39(3) TRIPS requires WTO member states to provide protection for test data 
and other data, submitted for the marketing approval of, inter alia, pharmaceutical 
products, against the disclosure of such information.453 The applicability of Article 
39(3) is subject to four conditions, namely 1) that the submission of test data is required 
by a state ‘as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products’, 2) that such products ‘utilize new chemical entities’, 
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3) that the generation of such data ‘involves a considerable effort’, and 4) that this 
information is otherwise undisclosed, i.e. not publicly available.454 As the scope of the 
term ‘new’ for the requirement of utilizing new chemical entities is not defined by the 
agreement, it is commonly suggested that this requirement is similar to the concept of 
novelty used for patents in Article 27 TRIPS,455 indicating that test or other data 
relating to new uses or new forms of known chemical compounds456 do not qualify for 
protection under Article 39(3).457  
When the four requirements of Article 39(3) are fulfilled, WTO member states are 
obliged to provide protection for the data submitted against disclosure. Exceptions to 
this obligation are permissible where necessary for the protection of the public.458 In 
cases where such data is disclosed, however, steps have to be taken to protect this data 
against unfair commercial use,459 i.e. competition based on practices which are not 
equitable, not honest, not impartial, or not according to the rules.460 
A question arising in this context is whether the protection of data submitted means 
that national authorities cannot rely on protected test data when examining the 
marketing approval application of an identical generic pharmaceutical product of a 
competitor.461 If the protection of data submitted encompasses a period of exclusive 
use of that data, as provided for by some industrialised countries, it seems that national 
authorities must not rely on such data when considering the marketing approval of a 
generic product.462 According to research-based industry, this is necessary for the 
protection of investments into clinical trials, and can further provide a certain degree 
of protection against generic competition in cases where patents have not been 
granted.463 If a period of exclusive use is not provided for by national legislation, 
competitors must still be prevented from using test data when such data was acquired 
in an unlawful manner.464 In the field of pharmaceuticals, however, a particular 
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problem arises when a generic manufacturer is required to submit new test data, as this 
would necessitate new proceedings of tests – including animal and human trials – 
which is not only a waste of recourses and research capacity, but also ethically 
questionable.465 In this context, some national courts have ruled that the reliance on 
prior submitted test data does not constitute ‘use’ of such data,466 and therefore cannot 
constitute unfair commercial use.467  
Ultimately, the way Article 39 is implemented and applied can directly impact the 
accessibility of medicines, as an early availability of generic pharmaceuticals – which 
can only be guaranteed if the protection of undisclosed information does not prolong 
the process of marketing approval of such products – commonly reduces drug 
prices.468 While the TRIPS Agreement leaves considerable flexibility for the national 
implementation of Article 39, the associated research-based industry commonly 
strives to achieve a higher degree of protection. Therefore, as discussed below in 
2.5.1.3, the protection of undisclosed information has become an important issue in 
TRIPS-Plus agreements, a number of which aim at limiting the flexibility provided by 
TRIPS.469 
2.4.5 Transitional Arrangements under Part V TRIPS 
Generally speaking, a transitional period is ‘the time period available for a WTO 
member to comply fully with the obligations set out by an Agreement’.470 All WTO 
member states had a general transitional period of one year, until 1 January 1996, from 
which date onwards all developed member states had to comply with the provisions 
set forth in the agreement.471 Before TRIPS, many developing countries and least-
developed countries (LDCs) did not have a comparable IP law system, so that the 
implementation of the agreement required, and in many cases still requires, substantial 
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efforts.472 In recognition of the challenges faced by developing countries, Articles 65 
and 66 TRIPS introduced further transitional periods, applicable to developing 
countries and LDCs.473 These transitional periods, however, do not extend to Articles 
3, 4, and 5 TRIPS,474 regulating the national treatment and most-favoured nation 
treatment, as addressed above in 2.2, as these principles are regarded as fundamental 
for the functioning of the TRIPS IP system.475 For all other provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, Article 65(2) granted developing countries a further four-year transition 
period until 1 January 2000.476 Furthermore, Article 65(4) TRIPS provided an 
additional five-year period, which ended on 1 January 2005, for developing countries 
to extend patent protection under Article 27 TRIPS to fields of technology that were 
formerly not patentable within their territory.477 This provision was particularly 
relevant for the protection of public health, as for many developing countries it 
provided an opportunity for delaying the implementation of pharmaceutical patent 
rights.478 
In further recognition of the particular needs and requirements of LDCs, Article 66(1) 
TRIPS granted such countries a longer general transitional period of ten years.479 In 
accordance with paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, this transitional period was 
subject to several extensions by the WTO General Council, effectively extending the 
general transitional period until 1 July 2021.480 Additionally, the WTO General 
Council granted a further extension, until 1 January 2033, to the transitional period for 
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LDCs with specific respect to the field of pharmaceuticals.481 This extension exempts 
LDCs from the obligation to extend patent rights and the protection of undisclosed 
information to pharmaceutical products.482 While this exemption should in theory be 
conducive to the protection of public health, in reality, the mere exclusion of 
pharmaceutical products from patentability in LDCs is not very effective.483 As 
discussed above in 2.4.3.7, LDCs commonly lack the manufacturing capacity to 
produce medicines themselves, so that they heavily depend on pharmaceutical 
imports.484 Consequently, it is the patent protection of pharmaceutical products in 
exporting countries, and the concomitantly higher drug prices, which constitutes the 
biggest threat to the availability of affordable medications in LDCs.  
2.5 TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements 
The term ‘TRIPS-Plus’ is used to describe any IP law provision – commonly adopted 
in bilateral and multilateral485 free trade agreements (FTAs) – that implements higher 
levels of IP protection than required by the TRIPS Agreement, or provides limitations 
to the flexibilities of TRIPS.486 According to Article 1(1) TRIPS, as discussed above 
in 2.4.2.1, WTO members are required to implement at least the minimum IP 
protection standards provided by TRIPS into their domestic laws.487 This connotes that 
countries are free to negotiate and adopt higher standards of IP protection, not, 
however, lower.488 Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement left many terms and provisions 
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without distinct definitions, allowing flexibilities for domestic interpretation by WTO 
members. TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs utilise this freedom granted by TRIPS, and 
adopt IP protection that goes beyond the minimum standards.489 TRIPS-Plus FTAs can 
further provide clear definitions for the terms left open by TRIPS, thereby limiting the 
flexibility of governments to interpret the provisions in a way best suited to their own 
needs.490 
In the belief that the TRIPS Agreement would adequately reflect the interests of 
industrialised nations, some developing countries expected the minimum standards to 
simultaneously be the limits of international IP protection, therefore assuming that 
unilateral pressure by developed countries would discontinue.491 However, it became 
apparent that TRIPS only constitutes the base for a further push for extended 
protection, driven by developed countries.492 Having failed to achieve the desired level 
of IP protection in TRIPS, industrialised nations began shortly after the agreement’s 
conclusion with the negotiation of higher IP standards, including more extensive 
protection, new areas of IP rights, and the attenuation of flexibilities and the special 
treatment of developing countries.493  
It seems that the reasons for developing countries to agree to higher levels of IP 
protection are the same for TRIPS-Plus FTAs as they were for the TRIPS 
Agreement.494 While TRIPS-Plus protection can be implemented by any country on 
its own, more commonly higher protection standards are adopted as a result of 
international negotiations and external pressure.495 In theory, sovereign governments 
are free to agree to or reject FTAs, or specific regulations thereof, throughout the 
negotiations. In practice, however, there is an imbalance of power between the 
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negotiating parties, and developing countries tend to accept unfavourable IP standards 
as a trade-off for potential gains in other areas of trade.496 
Exploiting this imbalance of power, developed countries497 can achieve their goals by 
applying economic pressure, for example by threatening the withdrawal of trade 
preferences or the imposition of sanctions, or by offering trade-offs such as market 
access in exchange for higher IP protection.498 This strategy has been adopted in both 
TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus negotiations, particularly because developing countries with 
an up-striving export industry are prone to submitting to trade-offs for gaining wealthy 
export markets.499 As part of these trade-offs, governments may further accept 
restrictions to the accessibility of medicines today, in the belief that profit 
maximisation for the industry is a necessary compromise to ensure that future advances 
in the medical field lead to benefits for the public interest.500 
In this regard, particularly the research-based pharmaceutical industry pushed for 
higher protection as it considered TRIPS to be insufficient.501 In 2004, Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) questioned the value of the WTO, 
explicitly stating that the Doha Declaration – and thereby the protection of public 
health – constituted an obstacle to achieving higher international IP protection.502 As 
the WTO thus has increasingly become an unfavourable forum for extending IP 
protection,503 PhRMA successfully lobbied the US government to strategically use 
FTAs to gradually ‘ratchet up’ international IP standards beyond the requirements of 
TRIPS.504 To this end, developed countries shifted negotiations for higher IP 
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protection from the international forum under the WTO and WIPO to the bilateral and 
multilateral level in order to undermine the combined resistance of the developing 
world, by isolating developing countries from stronger coalitions, and limiting NGO 
support, in smaller scale FTAs.505  
Compared to the WTO level, negotiations with a smaller number of developing 
countries offer a higher chance for TRIPS-Plus IP standards being accepted, so that 
FTAs are liable to enable industrialised countries to circumvent WTO measures aimed 
at the protection of public health.506 Furthermore, it seems that IP policy is generally 
directed towards a constant proliferation of private rights, with TRIPS-Plus FTAs 
following a sentiment that considers private investment protection of higher 
importance than the broader public interest.507 Consequently, each new FTA 
seemingly intends to implement higher standards of IP protection, introducing further 
regulations that delay the availability of generic medicines, and limit the TRIPS 
flexibilities designed to safeguard public health.508  
In acknowledgement of the potentially detrimental impacts of certain TRIPS-Plus 
provisions, some FTAs include side letters, i.e. ancillary documents to a contract or 
treaty, providing that the regulations of an agreement shall not restrict the ability of 
governments to take measures for the protection of public health.509 While such side 
letters, as commonly advocated by developing countries, seem to pay due regard to 
public health concerns and the flexibilities provided by the Doha Declaration, they 
raise many questions about their significance.510 As public health is commonly only 
addressed in preambles and side letters, rather than in the main text of FTAs, there 
exists an uncertainty about the interpretational value and binding nature of such 
statements.511  
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2.5.1 An Overview of Reoccurring TRIPS-Plus Standards 
As indicated above, TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs frequently introduce new or more 
strictly defined criteria for patentability, thereby limiting the flexibilities provided by 
TRIPS, taking away the opportunity for developing countries to implement the 
agreement in a way most suitable to their specific individual requirements. TRIPS-
Plus FTAs typically allow for the patentability of a broader scope of inventions, for 
example by exploiting the fact that TRIPS does not define the terms ‘new’, ‘useful’ or 
‘capability of industrial application’, and ‘inventive step’.512 As countries can 
voluntarily implement higher standards of protection than required by TRIPS, TRIPS-
Plus agreements can further be used to limit the special treatment granted to LDCs, 
requiring them to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals before the end of the 
transitional periods.513  
The following section provides a general overview of frequently reoccurring TRIPS-
Plus provisions that have been particularly criticised for their adverse impacts on 
public health and the accessibility of medicines.514 This overview is only indicative, 
and cannot address all types of TRIPS-Plus provisions due to the constraints of this 
thesis. The focus of the next section therefore lies on measures extending the scope of 
patentability, extensions to patent terms, extended data exclusivity rights, restrictions 
of exceptions, exacerbations of the use of compulsory licenses, and the linking of 
patents to regulatory approval.515 Measures not further addressed by this thesis include, 
inter alia, regulations for goods in transit,516 restrictions of pre-grant 
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opposition,517 restrictions of international exhaustion,518 and restrictions of price 
controls.519 
2.5.1.1 Extended Scope of Patentability: New Uses and ‘Patent 
Evergreening’ 
While TRIPS requires inventions to be new in order to be patentable, WTO members 
are free to determine what exactly the term ’new’ encompasses.520 To broaden the 
scope of patentability, FTAs regularly provide clear definitions of what is considered 
new, thereby limiting the right of governments to self-determine this requirement 
under domestic law.521 TRIPS-Plus agreements regularly provide that new forms and 
new uses or new methods of using known substances shall satisfy the premise of being 
new, requiring the patentability of new uses even when they do not lead to improved 
efficacy.522 As this was not required by the TRIPS Agreement, most developing 
 
517 For further information on TRIPS-Plus restrictions of pre-grant opposition see:  Ho CM (n 31) 234-
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countries did not facilitate the patentability of new uses prior to TRIPS-Plus, and some 
countries, like India for example, explicitly preclude the patentability of new forms 
and new uses of known substances.523 
The patentability of new forms and uses of known products basically eliminates the 
requirement of an inventive step, thereby abrogating the purpose of patents to provide 
incentives for true innovation.524 This further creates an opportunity for rights holders 
to utilise new use patentability in order to extend monopoly positions for older 
pharmaceuticals, preventing generic medicines from entering the market once the 
initial patent period expires.525 This facilitates the possibility of ‘patent evergreening’, 
a business strategy that can not only extensively delay the market entry of generic 
medicines, but likewise can delay the availability of new or improved treatment 
methods when the disclosure of knowledge is postponed for strategic purposes.526 To 
utilise the evergreening of a patent, the rights holder can apply strategic methods to 
effectively manage the life-cycle of the patent by withholding certain knowledge and 
data when filing for an initial patent application. Towards the end of the first patent 
period, the patent holder can then disclose the formerly withheld information to 
establish new uses, new target groups, or new methods of administering a medical 
product in order to receive a successive patent, extending the product’s monopoly 
position.527 
The adverse consequences of patent evergreening can be illustrated with the aid of a 
hypothetical example of the well-known drug Aspirin, a multi-purpose drug probably 
best known for its use as a mild pain killer. However, Aspirin is further used for the 
treatment of stroke and heart attack patients, and for the treatment of colorectal 
cancer.528 For this theoretical example it shall be presupposed that Aspirin currently 
was a novel drug and that all its uses are known to its inventor. To utilise the strategy 
of patent evergreening, the originator company can file for an initial patent for Aspirin 
as a mild painkiller. Delaying the disclosure of information on Aspirin’s capabilities 
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for the treatment of strokes and heart attacks to the end of the first 20-year patent 
period, enables the company to acquire a second patent, extending the monopoly 
position by another 20 years. This process can then be repeated, providing a third 
patent period for the treatment of colorectal cancer. At this stage, Aspirin has an 
effective patent term of 60 years, with the patentability of new uses delaying the 
market entry of cheaper generic versions by 40 years. This strategy further delays the 
availability of Aspirin as a medication for strokes and heart attacks by 20 years, and 
for colorectal cancer by 40 years, leaving patients without treatment for purely 
monetary reasons.529 
While it may be argued that the patentability of new uses creates research incentives 
for finding improved treatment uses of known substances, it can be suggested that the 
detrimental effects to public health caused by patent evergreening outweigh its 
benefits. This can be supported by the fact that Aspirin was first invented well before 
the patentability of new uses existed, and that further uses were discovered even 
without the incentive of successive patent protection.530 
2.5.1.2 Patent Term Extensions: Effective Protection Periods 
According to Article 33 TRIPS, the 20-year minimum patent term is counted from the 
date a patent application is filed.531 The time required for the examination of patent 
applications therefore reduces the effective protection period.532 For pharmaceutical 
products, the marketable patent term is further curtailed as pharmaceutical patents are 
of no commercial value before a drug has received marketing approval, which usually 
takes between eight to twelve years.533 To compensate for such administrative delays, 
many FTAs include regulations that require members to provide patent term 
extensions at least for unreasonable delays in either of the approval processes.534 These 
patent term extensions particularly tend to prolong patent periods in developing 
 
529 cf. Stuhldreier M (n 119) 180 and 185. 
530 For a brief overview of the historic development of Aspirin, see: Roberts L, ‘Aspirin Timeline’ The 
Telegraph (07 December 2010) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/8185164/Aspirin-
timeline.html> accessed 27 May 2019. 
531 Ho CM (n 31) 235. 
532 ibid; Morin JF (n 496) 43. 
533 Ho CM (n 31) 236; Mercurio B, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs’ (n 491) 229; Morin JF (n 496) 
43. 
534 Ho CM (n 31) 236; Mercurio B, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs’ (n 491) 229; Morin JF (n 496) 
43; Stuhldreier M (n 119) 186. 
116 
 
countries, as patent offices and regulatory approval authorities in developing countries 
frequently lack sufficient expertise for dealing expeditiously with applications.535 
While patent term extensions for unreasonable delays seem justified from an economic 
perspective, they also delay the introduction of generic medicines.536 This can have 
considerable impact on the timely availability of affordable generic drugs in 
developing countries, aggravating public health concerns already faced by these 
countries.537 Ultimately, while patent term extensions seem to be a just compensation 
for the industry, they mainly burden patients in need of treatment who cannot afford 
higher priced patented products.538 It is therefore submitted that such extensions are 
inappropriate for dealing with unreasonable delays, and that instead measures should 
be developed to improve the efficiency of the review processes to limit the occurrence 
of unreasonable delays in the first place.539 
2.5.1.3 Extended Data Exclusivity Provisions 
Under Article 39 TRIPS, WTO members are only required to protect the data 
submitted for regulatory approval from unfair commercial use, which, as discussed 
above in 2.4.4, potentially does not exclude generic manufacturers from relying on 
clinical test data originally submitted by the rights holder.540 As Article 39 TRIPS 
further does not require a specified period of data protection, WTO members are 
generally free to grant marketing approval for generic medicines based on test data 
submitted by a prior patent owner.541 This provides a cost effective way for ensuring 
the timely market entry of generic drugs, because in order to  receive marketing 
approval a generic manufacturer is simply required to establish that the generic drug 
is identical to a prior approved medicine.542  
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As the gathering of clinical test data is a time and cost expensive process, TRIPS-Plus 
FTAs frequently aim to protect the investments of research-based pharmaceutical 
companies by explicitly preventing generic manufacturers from relying on an 
originator company’s test data for marketing approval applications of generics, during 
specified data exclusivity periods.543 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 
for example, provides that third parties shall not be permitted to use such data, without 
the consent of the rights holder, for a period of at least five years.544 This five year data 
exclusivity period shall further be applicable where a country relies on test data 
submitted for marketing approval in another country.545 While most FTAs require at 
least this five-year data exclusivity period, certain agreements, like the TPP, go even 
further, by requiring additional three-year protection periods for data submitted for the 
marketing approval of new uses of prior known products.546  
Data exclusivity is automatically granted and constitutes an independent IP right 
applicable to pharmaceuticals irrespective of patent status, providing protection where 
a patent is expired, no patent was filed for, and even for unpatentable inventions.547 
This protection, however, does not prevent other corporations from submitting their 
own test data.548 As the required clinical trials, however, are lengthy and expensive, 
generic manufacturers regularly lack the resources to conduct this research.549  Even 
where a manufacturer is capable of accumulating the required data, the costs involved 
can significantly increase the price of generic drugs. 550 Consequently, data exclusivity 
provisions are liable to directly impair the affordability of medicines in developing 
countries by delaying the introduction of generic competition.551 As indicated above 
in 2.4.4, It is further submitted that the rather unnecessary repetition of clinical trials 
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on human beings is ethically hardly justifiable, as the safety of the products has already 
been established.552  
2.5.1.4 Restrictions of TRIPS Exceptions 
TRIPS-Plus FTAs can further limit the exceptions provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement.553 The ability of governments to facilitate exceptions to patent rights – like 
the Bolar exception, as discussed above in 2.4.3.6 – is of particular importance for the 
protection of public health.554 While under TRIPS, governments are free to provide 
such exceptions with the main limitation being that this should not unreasonably 
conflict with the normal exploitation of patents, TRIPS-Plus provisions can limit 
eligible exceptions to specific permissible categories, thereby restricting the flexibility 
of governments to self-determine suitable grounds.555  
While US FTAs for example, explicitly allow for the use of the Bolar exception, they 
commonly simultaneously limit eligible exceptions, only permitting the production of 
generic patented medicines for purposes of marketing approval.556 According to a 
group of congressmen, parties to those FTAs can also only facilitate the export of such 
products for marketing approval purposes.557 If this holds true, such provisions would 
effectively render the export solution of Article 31bis TRIPS – as discussed above in 
2.4.3.8 – useless, as FTA members with pharmaceutical production capacity would be 
prevented from exporting generic medicines, produced under a compulsory license, to 
countries without adequate production capacity.558 
2.5.1.5 Restrictions of Compulsory Licensing 
TRIPS-Plus FTAs commonly include provisions that may either directly or indirectly 
affect the ability of governments to make use of compulsory licensing. Direct 
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implications can derive from provisions aimed at limiting the right to and reasons for 
issuing compulsory licenses to specific grounds, while indirect implications can be 
introduced by regulations not directly aiming at, but implicitly creating obstacles to 
the utilisation of compulsory licenses, such as data exclusivity provisions, or 
investment protection clauses.559 As discussed above in 2.4.3.7 and 2.4.3.8, the 
interpretation of how compulsory licenses can successfully be used is already 
complicated under Articles 31 and 31bis TRIPS. Additional controversy introduced by 
TRIPS-Plus standards can further compromise the effective utilisation of such licenses 
for the protection of public health in developing countries, disregarding the purpose of 
the Doha Declaration.560 
TRIPS-Plus agreements often aim to limit the applicability of compulsory licenses to 
specific situations, thereby restricting the freedom of WTO members under TRIPS and 
the Doha Declaration to self-determine the grounds upon which compulsory licenses 
can be granted.561 Such limitations frequently only permit the grounds explicitly 
referred to in the Doha Declaration, namely national emergencies, situations of 
extreme urgency, and public non-commercial use.562 Some FTAs go even further by 
restricting the use of compulsory licensing to the specific diseases of HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, i.e. only the examples provided by the 
Doha Declaration, even though the declaration’s list is non-exhaustive.563 Moreover, 
while under TRIPS, rights holders are entitled to receive an adequate compensation 
when their patents are affected by compulsory licenses, some TRIPS-Plus agreements 
require that patent owners receive reasonable or even full compensation.564 
Particularly, the requirement of full compensation seems to defeat the purpose of 
compulsory licensing for public health reasons, as the aim of such licenses is to make 
urgently required medicines as cheap as possible. 
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Furthermore, certain FTAs, such as the TPP, introduced investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) proceedings. Such proceedings enable private corporations to 
directly challenge states over treaty breaches, without the need to rely on their home 
states to do so, as would be required under the WTO DSU.565 Thereby, patent owners 
can directly challenge policy decisions aimed at the protection of public health, 
including compulsory licenses, as well as the determined amount of compensation, 
adding even more uncertainty. 566 As ISDS proceedings usually incur high costs, 
developing countries in particular, might become even more reluctant to pursue the 
granting of compulsory licenses, even where this would be justified, due to the fear of 
expensive litigation.567 Therefore, the mere possibility of private investors being able 
to challenge policy decisions taken in the interest of the population seems dangerous 
and potentially anti-democratic.568 
Additionally, data exclusivity provisions in particular, can interfere with the 
effectiveness of compulsory licenses both under Article 31 TRIPS and under the 
waiver system of Article 31bis TRIPS. There is a certain controversy regarding 
whether compulsory licenses provide exceptions to data exclusivity provisions.569 It 
generally seems that compulsory licenses only affect patents as regulated under Part II 
Section 5 TRIPS, arguably not, however, data exclusivity provisions under Part II 
Section 7 TRIPS, as data exclusivity constitutes its own category of IP rights alongside 
patents.570 While generic medicines produced under compulsory licenses nevertheless 
need to receive marketing approval, TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity provisions can 
prevent generic manufacturers from relying on data submitted by the originator 
company for the duration of a specified data exclusivity period, as discussed above in 
2.5.1.3.571 Further, some FTAs explicitly provide that patent holders may not be 
required to disclose specific clinical information and know-how even in cases where 
compulsory licenses are granted for national emergencies.572 As a result, to operate 
under compulsory licenses, generic manufacturers are required to conduct their own 
 
565 Stuhldreier M (n 119) 187. 
566 Bernieri RC, ‘Compulsory Licensing and Public Health’ (n 486) 17; Lopert R and Gleeson D (n 
490) 209. 
567 Lopert R and Gleeson D (n 490) 209. 
568 Stuhldreier M (n 119) 195. 
569 Morin JF (n 496) 42. 
570 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 522) 299-300; Sell SK (n 488) 60; Stuhldreier M (n 119) 
178-179. 
571 Lopert R and Gleeson D (n 490) 201; Mercurio B, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs’ (n 491) 228. 
572 Morin JF (n 496) 47. 
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clinical trials which substantially delays the availability of cheaper generic products, 
increases their costs, and further requires the unethical repetition of human trials.573  
Consequently, TRIPS-Plus FTAs can directly limit a government’s ability to facilitate 
compulsory licenses, and further indirectly jeopardise their effective utilisation for the 
protection of public health, potentially defeating their very purpose. This may result in 
a further aggravation of the already existing uncertainty regarding the use of 
compulsory licenses, potentially making governments overly cautious, which may lead 
to developing countries completely refraining from their utilisation.574 Ultimately, 
because the TRIPS Agreement provides no sufficient safeguards preventing FTAs 
from limiting the applicability of compulsory licenses and the export solution, TRIPS-
Plus provisions can be systematically used to undermine public health objectives that 
restrict the rights of patent holders.575  
2.5.1.6 Patent Linkage 
Under patent linkage regulations, the marketing approval of medicines is linked to 
their patent status, providing that regulatory approval has to be declined when the 
marketing of a product would interfere with an existing patent, unless the patent owner 
of the latter consents.576 This creates new responsibilities for regulatory authorities 
which commonly lack relevant expertise in the field of IP law.577 Traditionally, the 
owners of private rights – the category to which patent rights belong – are self-
responsible for initiating their enforcement. Patent linkage provisions thus give patent 
holders a major advantage by diverting this responsibility to the regulatory 
authorities.578 
Patent linkage is further particularly criticised for the adverse impacts it may 
potentially have on generic drugs produced under compulsory licenses.579 As 
 
573 Mercurio B, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs’ (n 491) 229; Morin JF (n 496) 47; Townsend B, 
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compulsory licenses do not affect the validity of a patent, and as patent linkage 
provisions commonly do not address the issue of compulsory licensing, patent linkage 
provisions require that the marketing approval of any generic drug has to be declined 
while a patent is in force, even when produced under a compulsory license.580 While a 
solution to this problem may potentially be found in form of an exception for the 
protection of public health, an initial refusal and the concomitant litigation can 
significantly delay the effectiveness of compulsory licenses. 
2.5.2 Impacts of TRIPS-Plus Provisions 
The world has reversed from the global WTO and WIPO stage, back to an era of  
bilateral and multilateral IP rights negotiations.581 While in general, TRIPS-Plus 
provisions are only applicable to member states of the relevant agreement, it has been 
suggested that FTAs can lead to a global ratcheting up of IP standards.582 The higher 
protection provided by TRIPS-Plus agreements is not limited to rights holders from 
contracting parties, as according to the MFN treatment, under Article 4 TRIPS, as 
discussed above in 2.2, the same extended protection has to be granted to rights holders 
from any WTO member.583 Further, when enough countries implement higher IP 
protection, or when a large number of FTAs include similar TRIPS-Plus provisions, 
those regulations can de facto turn into new global standards.584 Accordingly, FTAs 
can lead to a steady increase of international IP protection levels.585 
Furthermore, certain FTAs require their members to always adopt the highest 
international standards of IP protection. Such FTAs can systematically proliferate 
minimum standards, as members to an initial agreement have to implement higher 
 
580 Abbott FM, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the 
Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements’ (April 2004) Quaker 
United Nations Office, Occasional Paper 14 
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581 Mercurio B, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs’ (n 491) 216. 
582 ibid 222; Drahos P, ‘Expanding Intellectual Property's Empire: The Role of FTAs’ (November 
2003) <https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2008/08/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf> 
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protection standards from subsequent agreements, even where they are not involved in 
the negotiation process.586 If a hypothetical FTA between the US and Vietnam, for 
example, required the parties to always adopt the highest international standard of IP 
protection, and the US later concluded an agreement with Nigeria introducing higher 
patent protection than the US-Vietnam FTA, Vietnam would be required to provide 
the same level of patent protection as Nigeria.  Consequently, as members of such 
FTAs will always be required to implement the highest international level of IP 
protection, those standards will effectively become new international minimum 
standards from which any future debates on IP laws in a global forum have to start.587 
As they are commonly pushed by industrialised nations, TRIPS-Plus FTAs are 
designed to best represent those countries’ interests, omitting the concerns of the 
developing world.588 In particular, FTA negotiations are strategically used for 
segmenting developing country coalitions, and subsequently exploiting power 
imbalances between developed and developing countries.589 As FTAs are furthermore 
frequently negotiated in secret, developing countries can be cut off from NGO support, 
further weakening advancements made in the area of public health protection at the 
WTO level.590 Additionally, less consideration might be given to the general 
implications of TRIPS-Plus standards, as scholars and experts have no access to secret 
documents underpinning negotiations prior to their conclusion.591  
The TRIPS Agreement intended to balance the interests of rights holders with the 
broader public interest.592 Under TRIPS-Plus provisions, however, this balance is 
likely to be neglected.593 While the WTO approach to interpreting TRIPS became 
increasingly contributory to the protection of public health, FTAs tend to have their 
own ways of interpretation with potentially detrimental outcomes for public health.594 
Although TRIPS-Plus provisions should not be used to circumvent the objectives and 
principles of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, and the Doha Declaration, FTAs may in fact 
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have exactly this effect, so that a conflict between TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus standards 
is likely to arise.595 Due to the enhanced IP protection in TRIPS-Plus agreements, the 
interpretations of these will inevitably deviate from TRIPS.596 This concern is 
particularly problematic with respect to FTAs that establish their own dispute 
settlement systems to deal with TRIPS-Plus IP disputes, potentially ignoring WTO 
interpretations aimed at the protection of public health.597  
While under international trade law, TRIPS-Plus is a perfectly lawful means to go 
beyond the regulations of TRIPS, stronger IP protection generally has detrimental 
impacts on public health.598 By extending the monopolistic positions of patent owners, 
TRIPS-Plus standards are responsible for delaying the market entry of cheaper generic 
medicines, thereby increasing health-care costs for governments and limiting the 
accessibility of medicines, with little or no added benefits for developing countries.599 
Likewise, TRIPS-Plus FTAs can jeopardise the efficacy of compulsory licenses and 
the export solution.600 Additionally, extended patent protection may further hamper 
innovative advances in the medical field by competitors, and the possibility of patent 
evergreening can delay the disclosure of new treatment methods.601 Given these points, 
TRIPS-Plus FTAs are eminently harmful for poorer developing countries without 
public healthcare systems or insurance, where major parts of the population are already 
incapable of acquiring urgently required medications.602 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
After briefly introducing the evolution of the international IP and patent regime, this 
chapter provided an overview and interpretation of the scope of the patent related 
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provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in light of the Doha Declaration, as well as 
frequently reoccurring provisions of TRIPS-Plus FTAs. In particular, this chapter has 
shown that the international harmonisation of IP standards under the WTO system in 
combination with the non-discrimination principle as to the field of technology under 
Article 27 TRIPS has led to the global introduction of pharmaceutical patent rights 
with a minimum protection period of 20 years, even in countries that formerly 
explicitly excluded pharmaceutical products from patentability. During this protection 
term, patent holders enjoy extensive exclusive rights over their patented inventions, 
basically granting them monopolistic positions on the markets. To counterbalance 
these excessive rights, the TRIPS Agreement provides a number of flexibilities and 
exceptions that can be utilised by governments for the protection of the public interest. 
As elaborated in this chapter, however, these flexibilities and exceptions are 
considerably restricted by the narrow limitations attached to their applicability, which 
create obstacles for their effective utilisation. Additionally, the use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities and exceptions is frequently hampered by economic and political pressure 
utilised by the home states of IP holding industries, commonly discouraging 
developing countries from exercising their rights to restrict IP rights in the public 
interest. This economic and political pressure in combination with extensive lobbying 
activity by powerful corporations has further led to a constant proliferation of IP and 
patent standards through so-called TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs. This proliferation 
is possible, because the TRIPS Agreement only defines minimum protection 
standards, without defining any limitations as to appropriate ceilings of protection, 
which led to a further strengthening of the rights of IP and patent owners. In particular, 
TRIPS-Plus standards tend to relax patentability requirements, and explicitly restrict 
the use of flexibilities and exceptions, thereby aggravating the already detrimental 
impacts of the patentability of pharmaceutical products. The problems brought about 
by the global introduction of pharmaceutical patent rights, and particularly their 
detrimental impacts on the realisation of the right to health, will be further scrutinised 
in Part II of this thesis, aiming to identify whether the current international patent 
regime can be regarded as justified, and how the system can be improved to better 
balance the private rights of inventors with wider public interests. 
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Part II: Analysing the Issues 
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Chapter Three 
3 The Legal and Moral Relationship between 
Human Rights and the International IP Regime 
Part I of this thesis provides a brief overview of the legal framework, elaborating on 
the right to health under international human rights law, and the international patent 
regime established by the TRIPS Agreement, and TRIPS-Plus agreements. Part II of 
this thesis analyses the justification of the current international patent regime, and 
addresses whether and if so, how the system of pharmaceutical patentability can be 
improved. Before examining the justification of the international patent regime in 
chapter 4, however, it is of crucial importance to establish the parameters against 
which this justification can be scrutinised.  
Firstly, in regard to the detrimental impacts of pharmaceutical patents on the 
realisation of the right to health, it is necessary to consider whether there exists a 
hierarchy in international law prioritising either human rights or trade law; under the 
latter of which current international IP and patent rights are regulated. Secondly, it is 
necessary to consider whether IP may constitute a human right, and if so, whether 
human rights law provides for an intra-regime hierarchy that prioritises certain 
fundamental human rights above less-essential rights in cases of norm conflicts. To 
this end, the analyses provided by the first part of this chapter addresses Research 
Question 1: 
What is the relationship between international human rights law and 
international IP/trade law?  
After indicating that such a legal hierarchy currently cannot be established, the second 
part of this chapter analyses whether other, non-legal considerations may suggest the 
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legitimacy of prioritising certain fundamental human rights above conflicting norms 
of international IP law. In this regard, this thesis analyses moral reasons, which may 
reinforce the vital importance of those human rights that protect human life and well-
being, justifying the prioritisation of such rights based on the concept of human 
dignity. The second part of this chapter then aims to answer Research Question 2: 
Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
3.1 The Relationship between International Human Rights 
Law and International Trade and IP Law 
3.1.1 The Scope of International Human Rights Law 
Following the atrocities of the second World War, human rights have been integrated 
at the centre of the international community, soon becoming a cornerstone of public 
international law.1 Human rights are inherently connected to human dignity and held 
by all human beings without discrimination, solely founded on the virtue of humanity.2 
While human rights are based on the fundamental value of human dignity, and give 
rise to special moral claims justified by fundamental and universal human interests 
that do not derive their validity from their recognition by positive law, they require 
further elaboration by legal provisions  to facilitate their meaningful acknowledgement 
and protection.3 Nevertheless, it is embedded in the nature of human rights, as ‘self-
evident’ moral norms, that their legitimacy is not dependent on their recognition by 
any form of contract or positive law, so that human rights exist even where an authority 
denies their recognition.4 They are described as equal and universal ethical principles, 
applying to all humans in all places, recognising the equal worth of all human beings.5 
 
1 Ziegler AR and Boie B, ‘The Relationship between International Trade Law and International 
Human Rights Law’ in de Wet E and Vidmar J (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place 
of Human Rights (OUP 2012) 272. 
2 Woods K, Human Rights (Palgrave MacMillan 2014) 5. 
3 cf. ibid 20 and 69; de Feyter K, Human Rights: Social Justice in the Age of the Market (Zed Books 
2005) 60; Freeman M, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2nd edn, Polity Press 2011) 
67. 
4 Woods K (n 2) 5 and 7. 
5 ibid 6-7; O’Byrne DJ, Human Rights: An Introduction (Pearson Education 2003) 26-27. 
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In regard to this universal applicability, it is generally held that human rights cannot 
be voluntarily surrendered.6 
The recognition of human rights entails counterpart duties and obligations.7 While the 
main duty bearers under international human rights law are sovereign states, the nature 
of human rights implies duties on everyone as a society.8 It is often held, however, that 
international human rights law does not impose duties on non-state actors.9 In contrast, 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) provides that all 
human beings ‘should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’10 Further, 
Article 29 UDHR explicitly provides that ‘[e]veryone has duties to the community in 
which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.’11 The 
wording of the UDHR implies that everyone as a bearer of human rights has 
concomitant obligations towards the realisation of the human rights of everyone else. 
The interpretation that human rights law is supportive of the accountability of actors 
other than states, however, is not unanimous. Opposition is even raised by human 
rights lawyers apprehensive that such an interpretation may weaken the integrity of 
human rights.12 In particular, both the fact that the binding nature of the UDHR – as 
discussed in the next section – is disputed, as well as the use of the term ‘should’ in 
Article 1, indicate that legal obligations of non-state actors cannot be derived from the 
UDHR alone. 
3.1.1.1 The Binding Nature of International Human Rights Treaties 
Further controversy exists regarding the direct binding nature of international human 
rights obligations. Being merely a declaration, it seems that the UDHR itself is of an 
aspirational rather than a directly legally binding nature.13 At the same time it can be 
submitted that due to its nature, its historic importance, its widespread acceptance, as 
well as through state practice, and opinio juris, the UDHR has now become part of 
customary international law, thereby receiving the status of a binding legal 
 
6 Woods K (n 2) 6. 
7 ibid 20. 
8 cf. ibid 8. 
9 de Feyter K (n 3) 1. 
10 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) [UDHR], Article 1. 
11 ibid Article 29(1). 
12 de Feyter K (n 3) 32. 
13 Woods K (n 2) 7; O’Byrne DJ (n 5) 26. 
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document.14 This view can be supported by considering that the UDHR, in 
combination with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
form the International Bill of Rights, i.e. the decisive origin of international human 
rights law.15 To have legal legitimacy, human rights can only be binding for states that 
consent to them, either by explicit agreement or by consistent practice.16 Accordingly, 
‘customary international law […] binds all states except persistent objectors.’17 The 
question of whether the UDHR has achieved the status of customary international law, 
however, has not yet been ruled upon by the international Court of Justice.18 
The two international Covenants, i.e. the ICCPR and the ICESCR, by way of contrast, 
are voluntarily accepted by states and impose legally binding obligations on their 
members upon ratification.19 Similarly, regional human rights treaties, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), are legally binding for their 
members.20 While in the view of lawyers the binding force of the covenants thus is 
clearly established, the sentiment of economists and political scientists may differ, 
suggesting that public policy is more decisive.21 It must be borne in mind, however, 
that ‘[r]atification implies consent to be bound.’22 While recognising that not all human 
rights norms have an entirely global reach yet, a strong case can be made, suggesting 
that international human rights law generally is legally binding upon states. In this 
regard, the Second World conference on Human Rights concluded in 1993 by 
establishing that ‘the universality of all human rights is beyond question.’23  
 
14 cf. Flinterman C, ‘Human Rights Law Status Report’ in Grosheide W (ed), Intellectual Property 
and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 38. 
15 Drahos P, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights’ (1999) 3 IPQ 349, 359; Flinterman C (n 14) 38; 
O’Byrne DJ (n 5) 89; ESCR-Net, ‘Section 5: Background Information on the ICESCR’ 
<https://www.escr-net.org/resources/section-5-background-information-icescr> accessed 23 May 
2019. 
16 Karamanian SL, ‘Human Rights Dimensions of Investment Law’ in de Wet E and Vidmar J (eds), 
Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012) 238. 
17 de Wet E and Vidmar J, ‘Conclusions’ in de Wet E and Vidmar J (eds), Hierarchy in International 
Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012) 302. 
18 de Feyter K (n 3) 59. 
19 Woods K (n 2) 7; ESCR-Net, ‘Section 5’ (n 15). 
20 Woods K (n 2) 7. 
21 Freeman M (n 3) 181. 
22 de Feyter K (n 3) 49. 
23 Flinterman C (n 14) 38. 
131 
 
3.1.1.2 The Binding Nature of CESCR Comments and 
Interpretations 
While accepting the general binding nature of international human rights laws, it has 
to be acknowledged that the universality of human rights is not equal to uniformity of 
interpretation, and that historical contexts and the convictions of individual countries 
have to be accounted for.24 Thus, recognising that different cultural contexts may lead 
to diverging interpretations of specific human rights provisions, it is important to 
identify whether universally valid legally binding human rights interpretations may 
exist. In the context of the right to health, and the importance of CESCR General 
Comment No. 14 for its interpretation, the following analysis scrutinises the validity 
of the General Comments provided by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
The CESCR has attempted to clarify the vagueness of the original ICESCR treaty 
obligations, inter alia by providing General Comments on specific provisions thereof. 
As indicated in chapter 1.2, General Comments provide expedient guidance on how 
the ICESCR should be implemented, but while governments and national courts are 
recommended to acknowledge their authority, from a strictly legal perspective they are 
not binding.25 States are therefore free to decide for themselves whether they accept 
the Committee’s interpretations.26 At the same time, UN treaty bodies like the CESCR 
consist of experts in the relevant fields and, at an international level, constitute the 
principal non-political interpreting, monitoring and enforcement bodies of those 
treaties.27 As stipulated by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
24 ibid 38-39. 
25 Bódig M, ‘Soft Law, Doctrinal Development, and the General Comments of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Lagoutte S, Gammeltoft-Hansen T, and Cerone J (eds), 
Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (OUP 2016) 69; de Feyter K (n 3) 48; McCall-
Smith KL, ‘Interpreting International Human Rights Standards: Treaty Body General Comments 
as a Chisel or a Hammer’ in Lagoutte S, Gammeltoft-Hansen T, and Cerone J (eds), Tracing the 
Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (OUP 2016) 30. 
26 de Feyter K (n 3) 49. 
27 McCall-Smith KL (n 25) 27 and 29. 
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(VCLT), states have the duty to perform treaty obligations in good faith, which 
arguably requires the cooperation with UN treaty bodies.28  
CESCR General Comments fall within the category of soft-law, and imply a certain 
degree of normative force despite their non-binding character.29 The general lack of 
enforceability of international human rights law and the vagueness of many treaty 
provisions – as scrutinised in further detail in the next sub-chapter – have created the 
requirement for soft-law instruments to provide guidance on adequate interpretation.30 
Particularly when considered in national or regional courts, General Comments can 
gradually turn from soft law instruments towards the direction of binding 
interpretations, thereby filling gaps in treaty provisions.31 Notably, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), as the primary human rights court in Europe, is frequently 
expeditious in referencing treaty body recommendations and comments, which 
support their validity and the recognition of human rights law as an evolving field that 
cannot be viewed as a self-contained system.32 Therefore, CESCR General Comments 
have been acknowledged as serving as important tools for addressing shortcomings of 
the ICESCR’s treaty text by clarifying specific human rights obligations.33 They 
operate as norm-filling where relevant binding treaty provisions require a clarification 
of the commitments of the various actors.34 It must be noted, however, that CESCR 
General Comments can sometimes come into collision with the original doctrinal 
content of the treaty.35 Therefore, not all courts follow CESCR General Comments, 
with some providing alternative interpretations, indicating that there are legitimate 
diverging opinions.36 
The question of how authoritative these General Comments truly are, therefore cannot 
be unanimously answered. While supporters of their validity acknowledge the 
 
28 ibid 30; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) [VCLT], Article 26.  
It must be noted here that the VCLT only requires the performance of treaty obligations in good 
faith but does not directly refer to treaty specific monitoring mechanisms such as General 
Comments. See thereto: McCall-Smith KL (n 25) 34. 
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Human Rights’ in Lagoutte S, Gammeltoft-Hansen T, and Cerone J (eds), Tracing the Roles of 
Soft Law in Human Rights (OUP 2016) 1. 
30 ibid 6; Bódig M (n 25) 70 and 74; Drahos P (n 15) 361. 
31 McCall-Smith KL (n 25) 33-34. 
32 ibid 42 and 45. 
33 Gammeltoft-Hansen T, Lagoutte S, and Cerone J, ‘Introduction’ (n 29) 10. 
34 ibid 6 and 8; McCall-Smith KL (n 25) 28. 
35 Bódig M (n 25) 71. 
36 McCall-Smith KL (n 25) 46. 
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authoritative nature of their interpretations, critics consider these interpretations as 
arbitrary and thus not qualifying for legal recognition.37 Furthermore, in their 
opposition to the validity of the General Comments, certain states argue that they 
overstep the authority of the CESCR.38 As most human rights treaties, however, 
explicitly establish that monitoring bodies can provide interpretations by issuing 
recommendations and General Comments as part of the ‘communication and 
cooperation between state parties and treaty bodies’,39 it can generally be submitted 
that the CESCR simply carries out its duty under the treaty text.40  
General Comments, however, often tend to go beyond their norm-filling objective by 
engaging in normative development or norm creation.41 While this invites criticism 
and opposition, it must be acknowledged that normative development is essential for 
human rights doctrine in order to ensure that human rights are capable of adequately 
addressing current challenges.42 To be meaningful, CESCR interpretations therefore 
need to refine treaty terms in order to elaborate human rights in context of the ever-
changing environment.43 This practice of evolutive interpretation is supported by the 
ECtHR, and the principle of positive interpretation is similarly recognised by 
Article31(1) VCLT.44 Nevertheless, when General Comments depart too much from 
state practice and existing treaty obligations, the authoritative status of their 
interpretations may be disputed.45 Furthermore, while the purpose and subjects of 
General Comments may generally seem appropriate, they can lead to doctrinal and 
political dissonance.46 In particular states with lower human rights standards than those 
suggested by General Comments tend to oppose their validity as they feel exposed by 
them.47 
In conclusion, it must therefore be acknowledged that the authority and legal value of 
CESCR General Comments remains disputed, and that a unitary legal boundness 
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cannot be established.48 Nevertheless, it can be observed that General Comments 
constitute a substantive means for refining human rights doctrine by challenging 
states’ practice without constraining their sovereignty.49 
3.1.1.3 The Enforceability of Human Rights 
The international human rights system ‘lacks the power to enforce compliance.’50 Its 
major weakness is that it is therefore highly dependent on politics, and that without the 
existence of a specialised court enforcing the Bill of Rights, international human rights 
law relies on the willingness of states to uphold it.51 As political action, however, 
represents the impact of power relationships, human rights are often neglected as a 
direct consequence of this power play.52 
Notably, the international human rights regime lacks mechanisms by which 
individuals can seek redress for general human rights violations on an international 
level, and those enforcement measures that are currently available cannot influence 
governments in the same way as binding court judgments.53 This weakness is deeply 
embedded in the UN regime, with the UN Commission on Human Rights only 
adopting non-binding resolutions applying strategies of naming and shaming.54 
Similarly, the decisions of the committees of the two international covenants adopt 
instruments for monitoring human rights violations that are recommendatory only.55 
The effective enforcement of human rights law is thereby shifted to regional and 
national jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, economic and social human rights have been regarded as mere policy 
prescriptions due to their interdependence on available resources.56 Claims have been 
made in this regard, suggesting that economic and social rights are not justiciable, even 
though case law suggests otherwise.57 In particular Article 2(1) ICESCR, which 
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facilitates the progressive realisation of economic and social human rights, may 
undermine their enforceability by providing an easy defence for non-compliance.58 
Therefore, it seems that the enforceability of economic and social rights is particularly 
limited, and can only be effective when supported by political action.59 In the era of 
globalisation, human rights have further suffered from their limited ability to come to 
terms with new challenges arising from the international economic order and 
transnational economic actors.60 Even where legal remedies exist, all too often the 
most vulnerable and marginalised groups of society face the greatest obstacles when 
seeking legal redress for human rights violations.61 
The situation is somewhat different for regional human rights protection, for example 
in the Americas and Europe, where the relevant treaties have specialised regional 
human rights courts, which provide for more effective enforcement mechanisms by 
adopting binding rulings.62 While regional human rights enforcement can thus serve 
as an example of how human rights protection should effectively work, the scope of 
regional judgements only concerns regional treaty law and international treaties in a 
regional context, and is therefore not referable to human rights disputes outside these 
regions.  
3.1.2 The Scope of International Trade and IP Law 
3.1.2.1 The Scope and Enforceability of WTO Law and FTAs 
As international trade law and international IP law derive from multinational or 
international treaty law to which states expressly consent, for example in WTO trade 
agreements, they are of a directly binding nature for the member states of such 
agreements.63 While this is in general very similar to human rights treaty law, in 
comparison to UN human rights law, WTO law is more easily enforceable as the WTO 
can directly impose valid sanctions on member states that violate treaty provisions.64 
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In the context of international law, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
provides an exceptionally strong enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with 
WTO trade law, as discussed in chapter 2.4.1.65 As the power of WTO enforcement 
mechanisms can thus significantly exceed the power of democratically elected 
governments, the WTO can have considerable influence over public policy 
decisions.66 Similarly, most free trade agreements (FTAs) implement their own 
arbitration system dealing with disputes under the agreements, thereby establishing 
effective enforcement mechanisms.67 
3.1.2.2 Intellectual Property as a Human Right 
Before scrutinising the concept of intellectual property as a human right, it needs to be 
noted that in the domain of industrial property rights,68 patents these days are 
commonly held by corporations – the employer of an inventor – rather than by the 
individual inventors themselves.69 Therefore, when considering the concept of 
intellectual property as a human right, it is important to consider whether corporations 
can be beneficiaries of human rights law. This is a controversial issue, as human rights 
are inherently connected to human dignity, recognising the equal worth of all human 
beings, aiming at the protection of fundamental human interests. Corporations, on the 
contrary, are legal entities and not human beings. If it is then proposed that human 
rights can be held by corporations, there is a risk that if such rights conflict with the 
rights of natural persons, the protection of human life in dignity is jeopardised.70 It is 
therefore questionable whether IP rights held by corporations should be conceded the 
status of human rights.71  
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As IP rights can also be held by natural persons, the controversy surrounding the 
question of whether IP rights constitute human rights is even deeper, and two main 
diverging views can be identified. The first sentiment suggests that by protecting 
private interests, IP rights are fundamentally incompatible with the public law 
character of human rights.72 Likewise, human rights generally belong to all human 
beings without a limitation in time, while IP rights under trade law, conversely, are 
subject to registration and limited in their duration.73 In the light of these arguments, 
IP rights cannot be regarded as human rights.  
The second opinion, on the contrary, contends that IP and human rights are cohesive 
in the sense that, similar to the human right to property more generally, human rights 
provide the foundation for the recognition of IP rights.74 In effect, the perception of IP 
as a human right is principally based on the recognition of the human right to property, 
suggesting that IP is virtually identical to property in tangible assets.75 In reality, 
however, there is a fundamental difference between IP and property in tangible assets, 
in that IP protects knowledge which is a ‘non-contentious resource’76 that does not 
necessarily lose its value if it becomes more widely available.77 If anything, the value 
of knowledge to society can increase, the greater its accessibility.78 In his role as the 
first U.S. Patent Commissioner, Thomas Jefferson insinuated that the protection of 
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patents, and thereby of IP, is not comparable to the protection of property in tangible 
assets.79 In a letter to Isaac McPherson dated 13 August 1813, Jefferson wrote: 
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may 
give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this 
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the 
society, without claim or complaint from any body.80  
It can thus be suggested that, because of the considerable differences between IP and 
property in tangible assets, IP does not qualify as a human right based on the concept 
of the right to property alone. This interpretation is not unanimous, however, as notably 
the ECtHR proposes that the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
ECHR is not limited to physical property, and thus implicitly includes the right to IP.81  
Even when following the interpretation that IP fails to qualify as a human right under 
the right to property, IP may nevertheless constitute a human right, if it is expressly 
recognised as such by international human rights law. In this regard, while the UDHR 
does not directly refer to the term IP, Article 27(2) UDHR provides for the ‘protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production’ of authors, which could be construed as a human right to IP.82 The 
protection interest of authors, however, is balanced against the public interest by 
Article 27(1) UDHR stipulating that everyone has the right ‘to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits.’83 Similarly worded, Article 15 ICESCR provides a right 
to the protection of the moral and material interests of authors of scientific, literary or 
artistic production in paragraph (1)(c) and a right of the public to share the benefits of 
scientific progress in paragraph (1)(b).84 The CESCR further reaffirmed that IP serves 
a social function and should therefore ultimately be aimed at the promotion of human 
well-being.85 Consequently, it must be acknowledged that the protection interests of 
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authors and creators need to be adequately balanced against the public interest in the 
accessibility of intellectual products, so that IP rights need to be drafted in a way that 
respects the public right to access scientific advancements.86 This limitation of IP 
rights, established within the doctrine of human rights law, is reflected by the 
objectives and principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement for IP rights 
under private international law.87 It follows that the rights of creators cannot be 
absolute, which indicates that states have a duty to implement a system of IP protection 
that strikes an adequate balance between private and public interests.88 
As can be seen, it can be suggested that the protection of certain forms of IP – namely 
scientific, literary and artistic productions – seemingly constitute a human right. It is 
argued by Brinkhof, however, that the term ‘scientific production’ is not synonymous 
with the term ‘invention’, as required by patent law.89 As neither patents, nor 
inventions are explicitly referred to by human rights law, it may be suggested that not 
all types of IP are necessarily protected as human rights.90 Brinkhof therefore proposes 
that there is no human right to patent protection.91 This view can be supported by 
acknowledging that patents under current international IP legislation fail to fulfil the 
requirement of Article 27(2) UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR which aim at the 
protection of the authors of scientific production.92 Patents, in contrast, are regularly 
granted to persons who are not the original creator, such as the corporations or 
institutions that employ a successful inventor. A human right to IP is intended to 
‘safeguard[] the personal link between authors and their creations’.93 Therefore, the 
CESCR clarifies in General Comment No 17 that only the author or creator can be the 
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beneficiary of human rights protection under Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR.94 Furthermore, 
as human rights are inalienable, they cannot be assigned to another person, because, 
as elaborated above in 3.1.1, they cannot be voluntarily surrendered.95 
It can be concluded that in the light of the current understanding of patents, there seems 
to be no human right to patent protection under international law, particularly when 
patents are held by corporations. Once a patent – or any other type of IP for that matter 
– has been granted, however, it may qualify as regular property and should then be 
protected by the human right to property, as provided for by Article 17 UDHR.96 
Article 17 stipulates the right of everyone to own property, and protects against 
arbitrary expropriation.97 Like the protection of the rights of authors under 
international human rights law, the right to property is limited and can be restricted for 
public interests, at least in regional human rights treaties, for example under Article 1 
of Protocol 1 to the ECHR and under Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights.98 
While patents are not explicitly recognised by human rights law on an international 
level, they may still be regarded as human rights in a regional context. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), for instance, not only 
provides a general right to property in Article 17(1), but furthermore explicitly 
stipulates in paragraph 2 that ‘Intellectual Property shall be protected.’99 While it is 
noteworthy that again patents are not explicitly mentioned,100 it must be acknowledged 
that by direct reference to the term IP, Article 17(2) of the EU Charter is more inclusive 
of different types of IP than both the UDHR and ICESCR. As the EU Charter does not 
provide any limitation to the term ‘intellectual property’, it can be suggested that, by 
conventional definition of IP, patents are included and thus protected as a human right 
under the EU Charter. While Article 17(2) gives little guidance on how IP shall be 
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protected, it has been elucidated, in particular by the drafting committee of the EU 
Charter, that the right to IP protection is subject to the conditions of the general right 
to property under Article 17(1).101 Hence, IP protection under the EU Charter has again 
to be balanced against the broader public interest. 
In the final analysis, a convincing argument can be made proposing that the right to IP 
generally constitutes a human right, although it is not conclusively clarified whether 
this equally extends to patents, at least on a global level. At the same time, it can be 
submitted that conceptually IP does not belong to the category of fundamental human 
rights. For the purpose of this thesis, I propose that fundamental rights are those rights 
that are fundamental for human existence and well-being. It is therefore submitted that 
the protection of private monetary interests cannot be compared to the importance of 
fundamental human rights, protecting human life in dignity.102 The classification of 
rights as fundamental serves the purpose of emphasising specific supremely important 
values, thereby implying a hierarchical structure. It follows that in cases of conflict 
between fundamental and non-fundamental rights, fundamental rights should be 
prioritised. Consequently, if all human rights were awarded a fundamental status, the 
concept would become meaningless as no right could be prioritised.103 It further 
follows that both the right to property and the right to IP cannot be regarded as 
absolute, as their protection is conditioned by the broader public interest, and aimed at 
contributing to the common good and welfare of society.104 Thus, states are permitted 
not only to provide limitations to the protection of property in the public interest, but 
arguably further to adjust them to economic and social circumstances.105  
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the protection of IP as a human right 
fundamentally differs from the extensive protection granted under international trade 
and IP law.106 In this respect, the CESCR notes: 
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The fact that the human person is the central subject and primary 
beneficiary of human rights distinguishes human rights, including the right 
of authors to the moral and material interests in their works, from legal 
rights recognized in intellectual property systems. […] Human rights are 
fundamental as they derive from the human person as such, whereas 
intellectual property rights derived from intellectual property systems are 
instrumental, in that they are a means by which States seek to provide 
incentives for inventiveness and creativity from which society benefits. 
[…] While intellectual property rights may be allocated, limited in time 
and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights are timeless 
expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person. Whereas 
human rights are dedicated to assuring satisfactory standards of human 
welfare and well-being, intellectual property regimes, although they 
traditionally provide protection to individual authors and creators, are 
increasingly focused on protecting business and corporate interests and 
investments.107 (footnote omitted) 
It is therefore crucial to differentiate between the human rights attributes and the non-
human rights attributes of IP.108 In particular, it is suggested that the purpose of the 
human right to IP is not to secure a monetary right for creators, but rather to protect 
them from arbitrary governmental repression.109 Thus, the human rights protection of 
IP cannot encompass the same private exclusive rights as granted to IP under 
international trade law. Otherwise, the construction of IP as a human right would entail 
the risk of elevating a right to a monopoly to a human rights standard, even where this 
is detrimental to society at large.110 According to Dreyfuss, the human rights 
recognition of IP should therefore not be furthered by providing ‘full control over the 
information that creative labor produces.’111 Instead, human rights claims to IP must 
undoubtedly be limited by the human rights claims of the public at large.112  
For the purpose of this thesis, it can be particularly emphasised that states should 
ensure that IP rights do not complicate the protection of the right to health, particularly 
with respect to unreasonably high pricing of patented products impeding the 
affordability of medicines, as further elaborated in chapter 4.2.2.113 As elaborated 
above, international instruments recognising IP as a human right provide for a balance 
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between the rights of creators and the public interest, suggesting that private national 
and international IP laws need to be shaped in a way that pays due regard to this 
balance. As further elaborated in chapter 4.2.3, the current international patent regime, 
as established by the TRIPS Agreement, seemingly does not adequately reflect this 
balance, wherefore it must be called into question whether private international IP 
rights under the WTO system can be regarded as being in accordance with the 
requirements of the human right to IP.114 
IP rights and other human rights, however, do not necessarily conflict and can, if 
appropriately applied, support each other.115 To this end, IP rights need to be balanced 
with essential other human rights, in order to reshape the understanding of their 
relationship towards one another.116 As a result, human rights could assist the 
designing of IP rights, and IP rights could then be utilised for the promotion of other 
human rights, by incentivising the development of vital public goods.117 Furthermore, 
when establishing a hierarchy between fundamental and non-fundamental human 
rights, IP as a human right could be more explicitly balanced with other human 
rights.118 Thereby, if adequately implemented, IP as a human right could, in theory, 
facilitate the identification of a hierarchy between the rights of creators and other 
human rights within human rights doctrine, which would eliminate the difficulty of 
establishing a hierarchy between different systems of international law, as discussed 
in the next section. For this approach to be effective, however, the concept of IP as a 
human right requires further authoritative interpretation. 
3.1.3 The Relationship between IP Rights and Human Rights in 
Situations of Norm Conflict  
Notwithstanding the recognition of IP as a human right, the question remains what the 
relationship, on the one hand, between international human rights law and IP regulated 
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under private international trade law, and on the other hand between IP as a human 
right and other human rights, and particularly the right to health, looks like. In order 
to explore this question, the following analysis considers the relevance of the 
fundamental status of the right to health, to identify whether a general superiority of 
this right can be established. The analysis then considers the inter-regime relationship 
between IP rights under trade law and human rights, before turning to the intra-regime 
relationship between IP as a human right and other human rights to identify whether a 
hierarchy between potentially conflicting norms exists within the doctrines of 
international law. 
According to Woods, ‘[h]uman rights are especially weighty moral claims that 
generate corresponding duties, they are typically justified by appeal to universal 
human interests, they trump competing general claims.’119 It follows that human rights 
should only be impaired for exceptionally substantial objectives.120 While it therefore 
seems entirely adequate to stipulate the existence of fundamental human values and 
rights applicable to everyone, it becomes more controversial to suggest that in general 
such rights are inalienable and incontrovertible.121  
In contrast to domestic legal structures with hierarchical orders, international law is 
commonly considered as being of horizontal nature.122 Consequently, it is complex to 
identify a hierarchy between human rights and investment or trade law.123 Conflicts 
can therefore arise when the adherence of one legal provision either, under a narrow 
definition unavoidably leads to, or, under a broad definition at least can lead to the 
breach or limitation of another legal norm.124  
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3.1.3.1 Superior Norms, Absolute Rights, and the Fundamental 
Nature of the Right to Health 
According to Vidmar, the prerequisite for the evolution of a hierarchical structure in 
international law, would be the ‘existence of an international value system’.125 It may 
be submitted, however, that this value system is already provided for by the UDHR. 
Furthermore, the general existence of an international value system can be emphasised 
at least to the extent to which obligations erga omnes and jus cogens are recognised 
by international law.126 Similarly, in accordance with its preamble, it can be suggested 
that the UN Charter emphasises the fundamental values of the international 
community.127 When following the assumption that the UN Charter is at the core of 
the international constitutional order, it can arguably be proposed that the UN Charter 
establishes the priority of human rights.128 This is supported by Article 103 of the UN 
Charter which stipulates that ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.’129 Thus, Article 103 essentially grants the UN Charter hierarchically 
superiority in international law.130 
Article 103 becomes particularly relevant for this thesis when read in conjunction with 
Article 55(b) of the UN Charter, which, inter alia, stipulates the promotion of the 
protection of human health.131 As a result, it can be proposed that the UN Charter may 
elevate the protection of human health to a superior level in situations of norm conflict 
under international law. A dissenting opinion, however, may suggest that Article 103 
of the UN Charter is not designed to establish a general hierarchy in international 
law.132 This view can be supported when accepting that, according to Vidmar, ‘Article 
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103 does not invalidate an obligation contradicting the Charter, but rather suspends the 
duty of a state to fulfil such an obligation.’133 Similarly, while the UN Charter 
reinforces the superior importance of the protection of human health, it must be 
acknowledged that Article 103 does not elevate specific human rights provisions to a 
superior status, but only the obligations of the UN Charter.134 It follows that because 
Art 55(b) refrains from clearly identifying specific obligations other than the general 
promotion of the protection of human health, a legal superiority of the human right to 
health under international law cannot be derived from the UN Charter per se. 
A superiority of the right to health may nevertheless be established in recognition of 
its classification as a fundamental human right, as suggested in chapter 1.2. For this, it 
must be scrutinised whether, due to its fundamental status, the right to health 
constitutes an absolute right. In that case, the right to health would be of legal 
superiority, as inherently, derogations from absolute rights cannot be justified.135 The 
absoluteness of the right to health could potentially be established, if it was recognised 
as a norm of jus cogens or as an obligation erga omnes. Such norms are international 
principles from which no derogation is permitted, which, according to Ragazzi, do not 
merely derive their binding nature from states recognising their validity, but more 
fundamentally ‘because nobody can claim special exemptions from moral 
absolutes.’.136 In this regard, Article 53 VCLT provides that treaties that conflict with 
such peremptory norms of international law are automatically void.137 Conceivably, 
the prohibition of gross and systematic violations of human rights may be considered 
as a peremptory principle.138 According to de Feyter, the patent regime provided by 
the TRIPS agreement may potentially lead to such gross and systematic violations of 
the human right to health when extensive patent protection prevents the accessibility 
of essential medicines.139 
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Most peremptory norms belong to the field of human rights, which may suggest that 
certain human rights enjoy superiority within international law.140 The identification 
of such norms, however, is rather difficult and broad interpretations are regularly 
rejected by the courts.141 After all, only a very limited number of indispensable rights 
– including the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of 
slavery, and the prohibition of racial discrimination – have been widely acknowledged 
as jus cogens and obligations erga omnes,142 whereas the argument that the right to 
health falls within these categories would be difficult to uphold.143 The practical 
relevance of peremptory norms in consideration of trade law and human rights, thus 
appears to be rather limited.144  
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle for proposing the absoluteness of the right to health 
may be created by the ICESCR itself. The fact that the right to health is subject to 
progressive realisation under Article 2(1) ICESCR indicates that, at least to a certain 
extent, derogations are permissible. It is therefore concluded that the fundamental 
nature of the right to health does not imply its recognition as absolute, so that a general 
superiority of the right to health in international law cannot be established. 
3.1.3.2 The Inter-Regime Relationship between IP Rights under 
Trade Law and Human Rights 
The general binding nature of international human rights law suggests that normative 
conflicts may emerge when states enter into other legally binding treaties – for instance 
under international trade law – which may entail provisions that undermine the spirit 
of human rights.145 While, as discussed in chapter 1.2.1.3, the CESCR regards the 
signing up to treaties that restrict a state’s capability of complying with relevant human 
rights obligations as a potential violation of the ICESCR,146 in reality international 
trade law frequently restricts governmental room for manoeuvre. Similarly, the 
obligation of international assistance is frequently repeated throughout the ICESCR 
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and was interpreted as including the obligation of state parties to abstain from any 
policies that adversely impact on the protection of economic and social human right in 
other countries.147 Under the ICESCR, limitations of economic, social, and cultural 
rights are only permitted ‘for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a 
democratic society’,148 not, however, for the mere promotion of private economic 
interests.149 In this regard, while reaffirming the right of authors under Article 27(2) 
UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR, the UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights declared in 2001 that ‘the TRIPS Agreement does not 
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights’.150 The 
Sub-Commission therefore proceeded to remind ‘all Governments of the primacy of 
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements’.151 Consequently, 
the ratification of WTO or FTA provisions that interfere with human rights obligations 
could conceivably constitute a violation of the ICESCR. While it thus seems that 
human rights are considered as being more essential than private IP rights, the Sub-
Commission further recognises the important social function of IP of encouraging 
innovation and creativity.152 The question of whether IP rights provided under 
international trade law actually stand in contradiction to economic and social human 
rights, is thus to be determined in light of the extent to which international IP law is 
capable of adequately promoting the general welfare of the public, as further 
elaborated in chapters 4.2 and 4.3. From a human rights point of view,153 it therefore 
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seems crucial, for IP rights to be accepted and justified, that human rights are duly 
considered as determining limitations of IP protection.154 
The WTO, however, arguably sets out rules that are designed to restrict the public 
policy options of states by enforcing regulations that expand the private power of 
international economic actors.155 While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) recognised potential exceptions to free trade rules for, inter alia, the protection 
of public morals, and human life and health, the WTO has never explicitly elaborated 
the relationship between its trade rules and human rights.156 The objectives and 
exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement, nevertheless, indicate the WTO’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of striking an adequate balance between IP and 
the public interest,157 particularly the interest in knowledge that directly impacts on 
human life and health. Consequently, the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and 
implemented in a way that pays due regard to human rights, and particularly the right 
to health, before conflicts arise.158 When further considering the Doha Declaration’s 
reaffirmation of the authority of governments to protect public health, as elaborated in 
chapter 2.3, the existence of a certain superiority of the right to health over IP rights 
within the WTO system may be implied, as the Doha Declaration constitutes a 
document of both trade law and human rights, which implicitly recognises the 
significance of the rights to life and health.159 Thereby, the Doha Declaration may be 
regarded as the basis for the acknowledgement of human rights within the international 
IP regime.160  
It must be noted, however, that both the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration 
avoid any direct reference to human rights.161 It therefore seems that while the WTO 
recognises the importance of certain human rights elements, human rights are not 
generally accepted as a justification for the disregard of international trade obligations. 
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Similarly, as indicated in chapter 2.5, a number of FTAs implement objectives or side 
letters that, without making any direct reference to human rights, seem to highlight the 
importance of certain public rights, commonly including the protection of public 
health. The mode of expression used in those FTAs, however, appears to be directed 
at promoting trade objectives, while avoiding conflicts by maintaining the authority of 
states to regulate in the public interest, and not at establishing a general superiority of 
human rights concerns.162  
It is important to realise that the avoidance of human rights language in trade 
agreements tends to hamper the observance of human rights in trade related conflict 
resolutions. This is due to the fact that the prioritisation of certain rights is subject to 
the body dealing with a specific dispute.163 To put it differently, courts and tribunals 
are required to act within their mandate, meaning that human rights courts are 
instructed to follow applicable human rights treaties, potentially prioritising human 
rights law over trade rules, while trade tribunals focus on trade agreements, and 
prioritise trade concerns.164 Thus, without an explicit reference to human rights in 
relevant trade agreements, there is hardly an incentive for trade tribunals to elaborate 
on human rights issues in trade disputes. It can therefore be suggested that in 
international law separate treaty systems generally tend to operate parallel to each 
other without significant interdependence.165 
Consequently, as the WTO DSU ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
members under the covered agreements,’ and as its rulings ‘cannot add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’,166 the DSU is unlikely 
to defer trade law in order to prioritise human rights obligations which are not covered 
by WTO treaties.167 Nevertheless, according to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, ‘[a]ny relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ shall be taken 
into account, indicating that human rights treaties applicable to either of the disputing 
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parties should be given due consideration in WTO and FTA disputes.168 In 1996, the 
WTO Appellate Body acknowledged the applicability of ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ to WTO disputes, stipulating that WTO law 
‘is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.’169 The Appellate 
Body’s disinclination to separate WTO law from other systems of international law, 
implies that the WTO acknowledges the significance of recognising public 
international law, including human rights concerns, when addressing trade disputes.170  
Furthermore, Professor Monica Pinto, in her role as expert witness to the Impregilo v 
Argentina case, pointed out that arbitrational tribunals may not ‘overlook the fact that 
one of the parties’ to trade and investment disputes is a sovereign state that ‘cannot set 
aside the issues relating to public law affected by such negotiations,’ which includes 
human rights.171 Additionally, in light of the repeated affirmation of the right of states 
to make exceptions to trade rules for the protection of public health, it must be 
acknowledged that the WTO DSU is required to give meaningful effect to this right in 
its rulings.172 In effect, it may be suggested that this acknowledgement grants the right 
to health a certain priority within the WTO’s constitutional order.173 
Be that as it may, trade tribunals that actually do rule in favour of protecting human 
rights still tend to avoid making direct references to human rights law, instead 
cautiously founding their decisions on trade law objectives and principles.174 
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According to Ziegler, it may therefore be suggested that in international legal 
proceedings there is a general tendency of tribunals to avoid directly addressing the 
controversial question of identifying treaty overarching superior norms.175 
Consequently, international case law does not provide precedents to establish an 
unanimous hierarchy between trade law and human rights.176 
It is noteworthy, however, that trade disputes are not only heard in international 
proceedings, and that national courts can interpret the domestically implemented 
TRIPS and FTA provisions in a manner supportive of human rights, particularly where 
human rights are recognised by national constitutions, which may grant them 
superiority within a national legal order.177 As the ensuing rulings would then 
potentially require governments to disregard international trade obligations in order to 
comply with their human rights obligations, resulting state action would likely be 
challenged under international arbitration. In this regard, FTAs have extensively 
contributed to shifting the balance towards a factual prioritisation of trade obligations, 
as modern trade agreements require states to pay compensation to private actors for 
executing policy measures that reduce the value of investments, even where such 
policies are aimed at the protection of human rights.178 Furthermore, the unusual strong 
enforcement and harsh sanctions for non-compliance provided for by international 
trade law ensure its practical efficacy, while major parts of human rights law remain 
paper rules due to its comparatively weak enforcement mechanisms.179 As a result, this 
can lead to a ‘regulatory chill’ where in particular developing countries become 
reluctant to adopt public policies aimed at the protection of human rights, if there is a 
risk of facing expensive trade litigation and potential sanctions.180 
Additionally, it can be observed that the poor and marginalised in developing countries 
frequently lack adequate access to legal representation due to the high costs 
involved.181 In combination with the fact that powerful corporations, with 
sophisticated legal representation, are frequently parties to disputes involving 
economic and social human rights, it can be anticipated that human rights come out on 
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the short end.182 It can thus be concluded that while from a purely doctrinal view there 
is no prioritisation of trade concerns in international law, the extensive power of the 
WTO and subsequent FTAs seem to elevate trade law to a factually superior level.  
3.1.3.3 The Intra-Regime Relationship between IP as a Human 
Right and other Human Rights 
In addition to inter-regime conflicts, there is a further possibility that, in respect of the 
human right to IP, intra-regime conflicts between IP and other human rights may occur 
within the human rights doctrine.183 In such situations, it may be adequate to allocate 
different importance to individual human rights, based on their relevance for protecting 
human dignity.184 Stipulating such a distinction, however, would be difficult to justify 
within the international human rights framework.185 According to Freeman, a better 
solution to this problem may therefore be established by respecting all rights alike, and 
in cases of unavoidable collision distributing sacrifices evenly.186 Where one right, 
however, directly protects human life and health, while another right mainly concerns 
monetary interests, such balanced sacrifices seem to contradict the very fundamental 
value of human dignity. 
A different approach to addressing conflicting human rights would be to follow the 
concept of human rights being grounded in human agency. Under this notion, priority 
is conceded to rights of higher significance for human agency, which interrelates with 
human dignity.187 Consequently, certain basic rights, i.e. rights addressing essential 
objectives, would need to be identified: the protection of which would justify 
disregarding other less important rights, but not vice versa.188 This conceptualisation 
of basic rights, however, is highly controversial and not universally accepted.189 
Nevertheless, rights that protect human life in dignity seem to enjoy an elevated 
fundamental status.190 Under European law, for example, the ECJ has confirmed that 
 
182 ibid. 
183 de Wet E and Vidmar J, ‘Introduction‘ (n 122) 2. 
184 cf. Freeman M (n 3) 83. 
185 ibid. 
186 ibid. 
187 ibid. 
188 ibid 83-84; Brown AEL (n 55) 48. 
189 Freeman M (n 3) 84. 
190 ibid 179. 
154 
 
human dignity was a fundamental value against which the validity of other rights needs 
to be justified.191 More explicitly, the Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property stipulates that IP laws ‘must serve, and never overturn, the basic 
human rights to health, education, employment and cultural life.’192 Apart from the 
recognition of a limited number of peremptory norms of international law, as 
elaborated above in 3.1.3.1, however, it seems that the question of an intra-regime 
hierarchy within the human rights doctrine is not yet conclusively established. The 
concepts of human dignity and human agency will be revisited below in 3.2.1.2, 
scrutinising moral reasons that may suggest the superiority of certain human rights 
above other less-essential rights. 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
In the final analysis, the preceding sections of this chapter can be summarised to 
answer Research Question 1: 
What is the relationship between international human rights law and 
international IP/trade law? 
In essence, the present analysis established that international law is divided into 
functionally detached treaty regimes that frequently omit providing a distinctive 
elaboration of their relationship towards one another.193 Furthermore, judicial bodies 
are commonly reluctant to explicitly address the controversial issues surrounding the 
identification of hierarchical structures between conflicting norms of different treaty 
regimes.194 It can therefore be concluded that from a purely legal point of view there 
is no consistently uniform rule of hierarchy between human rights and IP/trade law 
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under international law.195 Instead, according to the principle of harmonious 
interpretation, as indicated by Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, different treaty regimes should 
be harmonised by avoiding conflicts through balanced interpretations.196 This, 
however, can be detrimental for the protection of human rights where restrictions 
adversely impact on human dignity.197 The extensive, strong enforcement mechanisms 
provided for international trade law further jeopardise the adequate observance of 
comparatively more weakly enforced human rights, so that human rights are destined 
to lose out in situations of conflict. It can therefore be observed that the non-existence 
of a prioritisation of human rights is debilitating to their very purpose. 
3.2 The Concept of Morality and its Applicability to Norm 
Conflicts in International Law 
In order to analyse the justification of the international patent regime in chapter 4, it is 
essential to establish the parameters against which this justification can be scrutinised. 
In this regard, the preceding analysis established that currently there exists no clearly 
defined hierarchy in international law which would suggest the superiority of either IP 
or human rights law in cases of norm conflict. Therefore, the following analysis steps 
aside from purely legal considerations and takes account of moral values to establish 
whether there are ethical reasons that suggest the superiority of either of the legal 
regimes, particularly in respect of the fundamental status of the right to health. 
As shown above, IP rights are designed to fulfil the objective of serving the public 
benefit by promoting progress and development.198 The right to intellectual property, 
similarly to all property rights, therefore does not constitute and end in itself. As can 
be derived from the various limitations imposed on property rights, IP rights are 
subordinated to the public interest and serve the purpose of contributing to the 
achievement of higher societal aims, including the protection of human life and human 
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dignity.199 It is therefore crucial for human rights to provide external limitations to the 
application of IP rights.200  
Without delving into the scrutiny of the justification for the state, it is submitted here 
that the general purpose of states is to ensure that societal needs are fulfilled. The rights 
of individuals must therefore be considered in a societal context and adequate 
limitations should be applied to safeguard the public benefit.201 Correspondingly, 
Ostergard argues that certain human rights should stand above other (human) rights, 
and that in particular, human rights that protect human well-being should have priority 
over IP rights.202 As the human right to (intellectual) property can be restricted for the 
promotion of fundamental public interests, the right to property, according to 
Grosheide, does not constitute a fundamental right.203  
The aim of the following section is to establish that – unlike intellectual property rights 
– the protection of human life and human health, and the concomitant human rights, 
serve fundamental human interests, not only justifying limitations to property rights, 
but being hierarchically superior to less-essential rights. In the light of the prior 
discussion that international law does not establish a clear hierarchy between these 
fundamental public interests and trade law, the following analysis needs to be founded 
on considerations other than purely legal reasoning and black-letter law. Therefore, 
the identification of a potential hierarchical superiority of specific rights will be based 
on ethical philosophy and moral principles. In particular, the analysis follows the 
concept that certain human rights are distinguished from less-essential rights not by 
law, but by the very nature of the fundamental value of human dignity.204 
In order to establish whether moral values and the concept of human dignity justify 
the hierarchical superiority of certain human rights, it is of crucial importance to 
consider further the exact scope and meaning of the concepts of morality and human 
dignity. The following sub-chapter 3.2.1 does this by providing a definition of 
morality, and the concepts of human agency and human dignity, before considering 
ethics as moral philosophies, and the possibility of identifying a universally valid 
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supreme moral principle. Subsequently, sub-chapter 3.2.2 applies the concept of 
human dignity in the light of Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’ and Gewirth’s ‘Principle 
of Generic Consistency’, aiming to identify a valid moral principle which equates 
moral goodness with the promotion of human well-being as a basic right. Ultimately, 
sub-chapter 3.2.3 will provide an answer to Research Question 2:  
Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
3.2.1 The Concept of Morality 
3.2.1.1 Definition of Morality 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, morality is defined as: ‘Principles concerning the 
distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.’205 Thus morality can 
be both (a) ‘[a] particular system of values and principles of conduct’, and (b) ‘[t]he 
extent to which an action is right or wrong.’206 Morality is not only concerned with 
human actions as such, but further considers the motives and reasons behind such 
actions.207 Morality thus evaluates the goodness of conduct, as well as the goodness of 
character.208 In particular, two main aspects have been utilised by philosophers aiming 
to define the meaning of morality. The first aspect quite simply holds that the concept 
of morality strives to achieve well-being and to avoid ill-being.209 The second aspect 
emphasises an egalitarian and universalist nature of morality, suggesting that moral 
rules are those that promote the good of everyone.210 Moral conduct can be contrasted 
either with (a) non-moral conduct, i.e. actions that are not of a moral nature, or (b) with 
immoral conduct, i.e. actions that  directly contradict valid moral principles.211  
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Morality, as a rule of conduct, prescribes guidelines for everyone’s conduct that take 
precedence over all other motivations, such as self-interest, by determining how 
anyone ought to act in certain circumstances.212 Further, morality can be a mode of 
evaluation, establishing whether a certain action is good or bad.213 While there are a 
variety of meanings attributed to the concept of morality, according to Gewirth, a 
certain core meaning can be constructed:  
‘[M]orality is a set of categorically obligatory requirements for action that 
are addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, and that 
are concerned with furthering the interests, especially the most important 
interests, of persons or recipients other than or in addition to the agent or 
the speaker. The requirements are categorically binding in that compliance 
with them is mandatory for the conduct of every person to whom they are 
addressed regardless of whether he wants to accept them or their results, 
and regardless also of the requirements of any other institutions such as 
law or etiquette, whose obligatoriness may itself be doubtful or 
variable.’214 (emphasis added)  
It can thereby be determined that the protection of the most important human interests 
imposes binding moral obligations on everyone, irrespective of whether one personally 
accepts the moral principle. The weight of such a moral principle, further, elevates the 
requirement to adhere to it above contradictory legal provisions. According to natural 
law theory, for example, a law is only justified if it is rationally moral and for the 
benefit of the common good.215 The purpose of law is therefore to be seen in the 
rendition of moral obligations.216 It is on this assumption that the following analysis 
seeks to identify a moral principle that justifies the superiority of certain human rights 
in the legal hierarchy.  
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3.2.1.2 Definition of Human Agency and Human Dignity 
The definition of the exact scope of these moral obligations for the protection of the 
most important human interests requires the identification of what those interests are. 
In this respect, the following analysis elaborates on the concepts of human agency and 
human dignity, which may potentially constitute the most essential human values 
because of their fundamental importance for realising a meaningful human existence. 
Human agency is the capability of human beings to act independently, making 
voluntary choices according to their free will.217 To that end, human agents have 
generic needs, i.e. requirements that need to be fulfilled for agents to successfully act 
towards a purpose.218 According to Gewirth, those generic needs, also referred to as 
generic goods, consist of three types of goods: non-subtractive goods, additive goods, 
and basic goods.219 Non-subtractive and additive goods constitute second-order goods 
in that they are relative to an individual’s status quo of possessions and opinions.220 
Non-subtractive goods are goods that retain an individual agent’s current standard, 
while additive goods are required for raising this standard, i.e. for achieving a higher 
level of purpose-fulfilment.221 While the scope of second-order goods varies between 
different groups and persons, basic goods can be regarded as first-order goods as they 
have the same relevance for all human agents.222 This can be illustrated, for example, 
by reference to the right to food, on the one hand, which protects a basic good in that 
nutrition is a vital prerequisite for the existence of all humans alike, while a right to 
paid holidays, on the other hand, addresses a second order good in that it increases 
living standards without being an essential human need.223 In fact, basic goods 
‘constitute the general necessary preconditions of action’.224 They comprise, inter alia, 
physical and mental capacities, including an agent’s freedom, life itself, and physical 
integrity.225 The notion of physical integrity stipulates that the basic goods further 
include the necessary means for the preservation of life, i.e. food, clothing, shelter, 
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health and the like.226 As the basic goods – which summarised comprise of freedom 
and basic well-being – are the fundamental requirements for human agency, they can 
also be considered as necessary goods, or basic needs.227  
This is where, for the purpose of this thesis, a connection between human agency and 
human dignity can be drawn. A major obstacle with the consideration of human 
dignity, is that the very notion of dignity is vague and ambiguous.228 In essence, 
however, two concepts of dignity can be identified. In the historical context, dignity 
was commonly regarded as being attached to a certain role or position, for example 
someone holding a particular office. Further, dignity was connected to the social order, 
and persons of higher standing, such as members of the nobility, were considered to 
attract a higher degree of dignity.229 This concept can therefore be labelled as 
hierarchical dignity.230 Conversely, the contemporary moral concept of dignity, i.e. 
human dignity, recognises the inherently equal worth of all human beings.231 The 
dignity of the human person is inalienable, or, as illustrated by Article 1(1) of the 
German Constitution, inviolable, and applies equally to everyone simply as an inherent 
feature of being human.232 Reference to human dignity can further be found in all three 
documents of the International Bill of Rights, with both the ICESCR and the ICCPR 
stipulating that human rights ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.233 
In other words, it is because humans ought to have dignity that they deserve to be 
treated equally, and with respect.234  
According to Kant, human dignity stems from the human capacity for freedom and 
rationality, and mandates that human beings are never to be treated as mere means, but 
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as ends in themselves.235 For Kant, however, dignity is connected to morality rather 
than to simply being human. It therefore remains unclear whether for him dignity 
attaches to the moral capacity or to the actual moral conduct of a person.236 It seems, 
that Kant adopted a two-fold approach to dignity in that a realised dignity depends on 
the actual moral conduct of a human agent, while an initial dignity applies to every 
human being irrespective of behaviour.237 While persons who fail to act according to 
their dignity may therefore become subject to contempt, all human beings nevertheless 
deserve respect inherent to their basic dignity.238  
While the contemporary view of human dignity understands the concept ‘as a source 
of claims toward others’,239 those claims are not further specified other than that every 
human being has the right that his/her dignity is respected. As the worth of human 
beings and their rationality ultimately depend on their capability to freely engage in 
action, human agency must be seen as a prerequisite for human dignity. Therefore, 
while it is not within the scope of this analysis to provide a conclusive enumeration of 
all the rights entailed within human dignity, it is suggested that at least the Gewirthian 
basic needs for human agency – i.e. freedom and basic well-being – also constitute the 
basic needs for human dignity; to which, according to the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC), as elaborated below in 3.2.2.3, every human being is entitled. For 
human dignity, however, it is submitted that the aforementioned basic needs only 
constitute the absolute minimum requirements, and that the listed goods therefore are 
non-exhaustive. As human dignity entails the equal and respectful treatment of every 
human being, it can be submitted that the realisation of human dignity requires more 
than the mere realisation of freedom and basic well-being. 
3.2.1.3 Ethics: Moral Philosophy and the Identification of a 
Supreme Moral Principle 
After elaborating on the concept of morality and the essential human interests that 
ground moral obligations, the following analysis explores the concept of ethical studies 
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to indicate how morality can be applied to identify ‘goodness’, and whether it is 
possible to identify a generally valid supreme moral principle.  
Ethics, in essence, is the philosophical study of morality, or moral philosophy.240 One 
of the basic questions of moral philosophy, on a normative ethical level, is whether 
and if so how, it is possible to identify a framework of moral norms that is valid for 
everyone, providing an accurate and justified definition of moral rightness.241 Moral 
philosophy thus tries to identify principles according to which anyone, in any situation 
can assess how he/she ought to act.242 For this, a rational foundation, i.e. the 
correctness of purposes and principles on which moral obligations can be based, needs 
to be established.243 In reality, the identification of an indisputable principle of moral 
correctness is contentious, as can be seen from the wide variety of diverging moral 
philosophies that have emerged throughout human history. Adopting an inegalitarian 
and non-universalist view, ethical relativists, for example, contend that different 
persons and groups have different understandings of what constitutes well-being and 
moral goodness.244 Thus, moral values are regarded as being dependent on societal and 
cultural contexts.245 Ethical relativism therefore rejects the existence of a unitary 
universal moral principle applicable to all human beings, and rather regards morality 
as relative to the epoch, the location, and the culture of where it is found.246 
Nevertheless, it can be suggested that a great number of moral systems share common 
denominators in that they agree to a certain extent that moral conduct promotes what 
is good for the community. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that not all 
cultures at all times shared this consideration of goodness, and that some cultures 
actively rejected the dignity of certain peoples on discriminatory grounds, such as, for 
example, the Nazi regime in Germany. It can be suggested, however, that while certain 
cultures at certain times have rejected human dignity in some form or another, the 
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underlying ethical concepts have been retrospectively condemned as immoral, for 
example with the adoption of the UDHR. 
But even in universalist moral theories, discrepancies arise particularly regarding the 
question of whose interests and which interests should be emphasised, especially when 
the interests of the actor differ from those of other persons.247 In this regard, analytical 
ethics – or meta-ethical studies – analyse the concepts of morality, seeking to resolve 
the question of what constitutes goodness in order to determine whether certain moral 
ends and rules can be considered as more correct than others.248 This cannot simply be 
answered by referring to a generic moral point of view, as moral opinions vary widely 
among different moral philosophies.249 While the naturalistic position sees goodness 
in actions that promote human happiness – or human well-being as the most basic form 
of happiness – discrepancies remain when considering whose happiness should be 
prioritised in cases of conflict.250 According to utilitarianism, for example, morally 
right conduct is regarded objectively and seen in actions that result in the greatest 
increase of happiness, with the lowest increase of unhappiness, for the greatest number 
of persons.251 Utilitarianism is thus concerned with the happiness of society at large.252 
The theory is frequently criticised, however, for its neglect of individual rights – 
particularly where an overall increase in happiness severely impacts on the lives of 
individuals whose interests are neglected – as actions pursuing the greatest amount of 
happiness for the greatest number of persons may inevitably also produce unhappiness 
for other groups of persons. 253 Furthermore, it is questionable how the greatest amount 
of happiness and the lowest amount of unhappiness can be measured objectively, 
considering that happiness is perceived subjectively differently by individuals. 
In what he calls the problem of the independent variable, Gewirth therefore questions 
‘whether there are any objective independent variables that serve to determine the 
 
247 Gewirth A, Reason and Morality (n 209) 2. 
248 ibid 2-3; Taylor PW, ‘What Is Morality? Introduction’ (n 207) 9-10. 
249 Gewirth A, Reason and Morality (n 209) 4. 
250 ibid 4-5. 
251 Little IMD, Ethics, Economics, and Politics: Principles of Public Policy (OUP 2002) 39; Raphael 
DD (n 244) 39; Sidgwick H, ‘Utilitarianism’ (2000) 12 Utilitas 253, 253 and 255; Taylor PW, 
‘Classical Utalitarian Ethics: Introduction’ (n 242) 139. 
252 Sidgwick H (n 251) 253-255. 
253 ibid 256; Little IMD (n 251) 53.  
For further details on the distribution of happiness and unhappiness among different groups, see: 
Taylor PW, ‘Classical Utalitarian Ethics: Introduction’ (n 242) 147-149. 
164 
 
correctness or rightness of moral judgements.’254 In view of the variety of answers 
provided to ethical questions by the different moral philosophical concepts, Gewirth 
contemplates whether it is possible to rationally advocate the existence of a supreme 
moral principle, which provides a unitary and universally valid interpretation of 
morally right conduct.255 As a supreme moral principle thus needs to be capable of 
resolving all moral conflicts, it is necessary to establish a single precept encompassing 
all justified moral positions.256 This idea, however, has been criticised on the basis that 
different valid moral values may stand in contrast with each other, and that therefore 
a supreme moral principle itself may be in conflict with another justified moral 
value.257 Then again, a supreme moral principle constitutes the very foundational 
moral concept from which all other moral rules derive their justification, while the 
supreme principle itself is not dependent on any other justification.258 This assumption, 
however, raises the conundrum of how a supreme moral principle can have validity, 
as it must in itself be justified; because if it was dependent on any other justification, 
this other justification would in fact need to be superior to the supreme principle, which 
thereby could not logically be supreme in the first place.259 The existence and logical 
derivation of a supreme moral principle is elaborated in the next section, by analysis 
of Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’, and Gewirth’s ‘Principle of Generic Consistency’ 
(PGC). 
3.2.2 The Supreme Moral Principle  
As elaborated above, a supreme moral principle is an objective universally valid norm, 
prescribing what is morally correct. Both Kant and Gewirth considered the concept of 
such a supreme moral principle in their extensive philosophical scholarship, aiming to 
logically derive its existence and validity. In this respect, Kant sees the supreme moral 
principle in the ‘Categorical Imperative’ which is based on the concepts of rationality 
and universality, while Gewirth sees the supreme moral principle in the ‘Principle of 
Generic Consistency’ (PGC) which is based on the concept of human action, and the 
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agency required to engage in action. The following section of this chapter elaborates 
on Kant’s and Gewirth’s philosophical theories to indicate the existence of a supreme 
moral principle, and to scrutinise its applicability to the concept of human dignity. In 
essence, a brief introduction to Kant’s conceptualisation of the Categorical Imperative 
is intended to simply illustrate how a supreme moral principle can be deduced, based 
on considerations of universality and humanity. The analysis then turns its focus on 
Gewirth, who, while not strictly following the Categorical Imperative, implicitly 
accounts for universality and humanity in his rational derivation of the PGC, which is 
based on the universality of human agency. In the context of this thesis, the supreme 
moral principle shall not be seen as a single rule capable of solving all moral conflicts, 
but rather as an underlying basic principle that guides all other rules by providing a 
minimum requirement for moral conduct. This basic principle could then be utilised 
to identify a moral hierarchy between conflicting legal norms, where international law 
fails to appropriately define this relation. 
3.2.2.1 Kantianism and the Categorical Imperative 
Kantianism is a deontological philosophy that prioritises the rules of moral conduct 
over the consequences of specific actions.260 For Kant, moral worth is thus not derived 
from the effect of an act, nor from an action that is required to achieve a desired 
outcome, but can only be derived from the duty to abide by the law given by a rational 
being.261 In Kantianism, all moral rules are then derived from a single supreme 
principle of morality that Kant establishes in the ‘Categorical Imperative’.262 To 
provide guidance on how rational and universal moral rules can be identified, Kant 
establishes a number of formulations for the Categorical Imperative, the first two of 
which – namely (1) the Formula of Universality, and (2) the Formula of Humanity – 
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are of relevance for this analysis, to provide an understanding of how a supreme moral 
principle can be deduced.263 
First, the Formula of Universality prescribes: 
[A]ct only according to that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law.264  
To be accepted by every person of good will, a moral rule needs to be necessary and 
universal in that it is applied to everyone without exception, meaning that everyone 
and anyone is required to act in the same way in a given situation.265 According to this 
principle, morally right conduct is required to be impartial, meaning that it is not 
permissible for actors to make exceptions for themselves. Actors thus always need to 
consider whether they would be happy for everyone else to act in the same way as they 
do.266 Kant therefore goes on to stipulate: 
[S]o act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a 
universal law of nature.267  
Second, the ‘Formula of Humanity’ prescribes: 
So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.268  
An emphasis in the second formulation needs to be placed on the term ‘merely’. In 
human interactions, we regularly and justly treat other human beings as means. Using 
other persons as means, for example, is an inherent requirement of the service industry. 
When employing a mechanic to repair a car, we use the mechanic as a means to our 
ends. At the same time, however, this employment also serves the ends of the mechanic 
in that he is financially compensated for the work conducted. The importance of the 
second formulation therefore is to be seen in the requirement that one never uses 
another human being merely as a means to achieve one’s own ends.269 According to 
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Kant, treating human beings as ends is to act rationally in recognition of their purpose 
as you recognise your own purpose.270 To put it differently, as all persons have to 
regard their ‘own existence as an end in itself’, by rational reason, every person has to 
regard ‘the existence of every other person […] as an end in itself’ as well.271  
Kant’s Categorical Imperative lends itself to comparison with the so called ‘Golden 
Rule’, as found in a variety of ethical and religious contexts, which proclaims that one 
shall treat others in the same way as one would wish to be treated by them.272 The 
Golden Rule and the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative are both 
frequently considered to be fundamental to ethics.273 It can be suggested that the 
requirement of the Categorical Imperative, to treat all human beings as an end in 
themselves, furthermore shares a distinct commonality with the concept of human 
dignity, which requires that all human beings are treated equally and with respect. Both 
concepts seem inherently connected to the equal worth of all human beings, and 
rationally derive their validity based on human existence as such. Thereby, the inherent 
value of every person is acknowledged, as all actors are required to validate the rights 
and interests of all other persons in the same way that they validate their own rights 
and interests. However, as Kant considers the Categorical Imperative to be the supreme 
moral principle, he derives its justification a priori by reason rather than by the nature 
of humanity or concerns of human dignity.274 Kant explicitly excludes benevolence 
and compassion for others as being the motivation for moral conduct from his principle 
of morality. Nevertheless, regard for others, by recognising the equal worth of all 
human beings, which is inherent to the concept of human dignity, seems to be a central 
aspect of the Categorical Imperative as well. 275  
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3.2.2.2 From Kant to Gewirth 
For Kant, the moral rightness of an act is not dependent on its consequences, but only 
on its adherence to a valid moral rule.276 This is particularly problematic when multiple 
obligations stand in contrast to each other. In situations where two persons require 
help, but an actor only has the capacity to provide aid to one of them, the Categorical 
Imperative provides no guidance on whom help shall be provided to.277 Kant therefore 
acknowledges that the requirement to act cannot exceed an actor’s capabilities, 
meaning that an actor is only required to do what he reasonably can perform.278 If it is 
impossible to provide help to two persons at the same time, the actor is not and cannot 
be morally obliged to help them both. The Categorical Imperative, however, fails to 
provide guidance on how to assess which person in need is more deserving of help.279 
In such a situation, the Gewirthian concept of needs, as discussed above in 3.2.1.2, can 
provide appropriate parameters to assess which person requires help the most. 
According to Gewirth, a needs-based hierarchy can be established, which prioritises 
those needs that are most essential to human agency. As an illustration, and using the 
concept of human agency, it seems logically sensible to prioritise the needs of a person 
whose very basic goods of life or physical integrity are at risk, above the needs of a 
person whose non-subtractive goods, such as recreational property, are at risk. Gewirth 
then bases his concept of morality, inter alia, on the importance of these basic goods 
for human agency, and the recognition of agency as the fundamental requirement for 
individuals to engage in voluntary and purposeful action. Establishing action as the 
objective universal feature held by all persons, as elaborated in the next section, 
Gewirth derives his supreme moral principle from the concepts of action, and the 
agency required to engage in action, in what he calls the Principle of Generic 
Consistency. 
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3.2.2.3 Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency 
For Gewirth, the determination of morality cannot be derived from empirical 
observations, but rather needs to be based on a feature that is universally held by all 
persons capable of morality, irrespective of individual opinions.280 This feature is 
simply to be regarded as ‘action’ itself, and thus also the agency which is required by 
all persons to freely engage in any action.281 The main aim of Gewirth’s concept of 
morality is to establish the existence of an objective supreme principle of morality, 
which is categorically obligatory in that it has to be logically accepted by every agent 
based on the simple fact that he engages in action.282 Human action generally 
composes of two generic features, namely a) voluntariness, i.e. the freedom to engage 
in an action, and b) purposiveness, i.e. the intention or reasons for an actor to engage 
in such action.283 The agency required for action can therefore be employed as a 
universal criterion for morality, as everyone has to accept its validity.284 This is 
because the denial of its relevance would itself require an agent to engage in a 
voluntary and purposeful action.285 As elaborated below, by denying the supreme 
moral principle, an agent would thus necessarily contradict himself.286 
Based on the universality of action, and the required agency to engage in any action, 
Gewirth derives his supreme moral principle from a logical progression of statements 
in three stages:287 
1. When an agent engages in an action, he/she has a purpose which he/she 
implicitly considers to be good. Thereby, the agent considers his/her basic 
goods required for agency, and thereby for action – namely freedom and well-
being, as elaborated above in 3.2.1.2 – as good in that they are necessary to 
enable him/her to act towards his/her purposes.288  
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2. As every agent has to accept the necessity of the basic goods for acting towards 
the purpose he/she considers good, ‘every agent implicitly makes a deontic 
judgement in which he claims that he has rights to freedom and well-being.’289  
3. It necessarily follows, that every agent has to claim these rights simply because 
he/she has purposes which he/she intends to fulfil. In acknowledgement of the 
principle of generalisation, logic then demands that every agent also has to 
accept ‘that all prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-
being.’290  
To emphasise the importance of these statements, this derivation requires further 
elaboration. Notably, an agent’s evaluation of the goodness of his/her actions and 
purposes is subjective, and therefore does not implicitly establish the objective 
goodness of his/her actions.291 The necessary means for action – namely the basic 
goods of freedom and well-being – however, are universally required by any agent in 
order for him to engage in action. Thus, Gewirth also refers to these features as ‘generic 
goods’.292 Notwithstanding the recognition that between different groups and persons 
diverging views exist as to what individuals consider to be good and what is perceived 
to be entailed by well-being, Gewirth can demonstrate that these variations do not 
affect his conception of the basic goods:293  
For the assertion that agents necessarily regard these contents as good is 
made within the context of purposive action; it indicates the preconditions 
necessary to the existence of any agent’s purposive actions viewed 
generically and collectively. Hence, since the agent regards his purposes 
as good, he must, insofar as he is rational, regard these conditions as at 
least instrumentally good, whatever his particular contingent and variable 
purposes and evaluations.294  
It is due to the universal necessity of the generic goods, which all agents must hold as 
the generic features of their successful action, that all agents must logically claim these 
as rights simply because of their agency.295 In other words, every agent must at least 
claim that other agents shall not interfere with the generic goods necessary for his/her 
agency, which Gewirth therefore also calls ‘generic rights’.296 These rights are generic 
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in that they summarise all rights that are merely specifications of the rights to freedom 
and well-being. According to Gewirth, they are further to be regarded as superior to 
other rights that contradict these generic rights, and may therefore also be defined as 
fundamental.297 As the rights to freedom and well-being are the ‘most general and 
proximate necessary conditions of all […] purpose-fulfilling actions,’298 without 
which any purposive action is impossible, they are human rights required by all human 
beings in order to occupy agency.299 From this fundamental necessity, Gewirth derives 
that the basic rights, and only these, are inviolable, so that an agent has the right to 
claim that all other persons not only shall, but must refrain from interfering with his 
generic rights.300  
The rights as they are presented so far are claimed by individual agents in consideration 
of their self-interest, and are thus prudential but not moral in nature.301 Morality is only 
regarded in conduct that favourably considers persons other than the actor.302 
According to Gewirth, however, every prospective agent can and must claim the 
generic rights necessary for his/her agency, so that this rights claim is made by all 
agents alike.303 It follows that there is a general claim to the generic rights, whereby 
every agent must logically accept that all agents possess the same basic rights.304 If an 
agent failed to acknowledge the generic rights of other agents, he would contradict 
himself in that he would be ‘both affirming and denying that being a prospective 
purposive agent is a sufficient condition of having rights to freedom and well-
being.’305 In other words, every agent necessarily must admit that the grounds upon 
which his/her own rights are based also provide the foundation for all other agents 
having the same rights.306 The progression of this argument can thus be illustrated in 
simplified terms with the statement:  
 
297 ibid 64. 
298 ibid 65. 
299 ibid 64-65. 
300 ibid 81-82. 
301 For further reading on this, see: ibid 68-75. 
302 ibid 71 and 129; Jowitt J (n 226) 83. 
303 cf. Gewirth A, Reason and Morality (n 209) 72-73. 
304 ibid 74-75 and 102. 
305 ibid 133; see also: ibid 74-75. 
306 ibid 103 and 146. 
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An agent has generic rights for the very reason that he is an agent. Because of 
their agency, all agents thus must logically possess these generic rights.307  
As elaborated so far, generic rights entail a negative feature that requires all agents to 
refrain from interfering with the basic rights of other agents. For Gewirth, generic 
rights are furthermore positive in that they require that agents ought to help other 
persons to achieve and safeguard their freedom and well-being.308 In other words, 
where persons lack the capacity to satisfy their basic needs themselves, other agents 
shall provide aid to the persons in need, if this can be undertaken at reasonable 
expense.309 It thus follows that the universal necessity of basic needs for human agency 
entails both generic rights as well as generic obligations.310 In the light of this, derived 
from the above mentioned three statements and the principle of generalisation, Gewirth 
formulates his supreme principle of morality, called the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC), which states: 
Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of 
yourself.311  
The PGC derives its justification as a moral principle from two main factors: firstly, 
from its universality, as it is logically derived from the fact that all agents have to 
engage in purposive action, and, secondly, because the PGC prescribes respect for the 
recipients of such actions. This entails both respecting the recipients’ purposive actions 
as well as their rights as persons in general.312 As a result, the PGC is a moral principle 
in that it is both self-regarding and other-regarding, as it requires agents to favourably 
consider the interests of others as well as of themselves.313 The PGC thus is egalitarian 
in that it requires that the rights of everyone are considered equally, by prescribing that 
agents shall always be treated as persons.314 In this regard, the PGC has a distinct 
commonality with Kant’s Categorical Imperative as both principles require that human 
beings are not to be treated as mere means but as ends in themselves.  
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For Gewirth, the PGC as the supreme moral principle is superior to all other rules of 
morality and/or personal interaction.315 Rules that stand in contradiction to the PGC 
are thus considered to be invalid.316 With the PGC, Gewirth provides rationally 
deduced answers to two of the essential questions of moral philosophy, as described 
above in 3.2.1.3, namely: whose interests, and which interests shall be favourably 
considered by morally right conduct. The PGC prescribes that the rights of all agents 
have to be treated equally, meaning that the generic rights held by all human agents 
have to be respected.317 Furthermore, the PGC acknowledges the superiority of the 
generic or basic rights, i.e. it favourably considers the rights to freedom and well-being 
due to their essential importance for purposive action.318 Gewirth, however, recognises 
further hierarchical structures within the scope of generic rights, by placing a higher 
emphasis on those rights that are more essential for the preservation of life itself.319 In 
regard to the conceptualisation of action, this hierarchy is justified when considering 
that while the basic goods are required for actions to be successful, certain basic goods 
are essential for an agent being able to act in the first place.320 The latter is especially 
true for life itself and the means required to sustain life.  
It must be noted that because Gewirth intends to prescribe a universally applicable 
supreme moral principle, his views are not unanimously accepted, and the diverging 
opinions are accompanied by criticism of the PGC. The PGC has been particularly 
criticised for being too simple, in that it derives a very strong conclusion, namely a 
supreme moral principle, from a rather simple premise, only basing the PGC on the 
concept of human agency.321 A further point of criticism is that constructing a 
normative concept of morality, i.e. a morality that is rational in itself and independent 
of individual opinions, may be impossible in a pluralistic world.322 It is submitted, 
however, that by eliminating subjective factors, focussing only on the objective and 
universal requirements for action and agency, Gewirth manages to establish the PGC 
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as a valid moral principle, which is justified by ‘the recognition that action is the 
universal and necessary context of all moralities’.323  
Ultimately, the PGC prescribes that all human agents are to be treated equally, and 
with respect to their generic rights. While the PGC may thus constitute the foundation 
of morally right conduct, the determination of whether Gewirth actually established 
the PGC as the one and only supreme moral principle exceeds the scope of this thesis, 
as this question requires a deeper analysis within the field of moral philosophical 
scholarship. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is acknowledged that the PGC 
is derived by logical progressions and thereby sufficiently justified by Gewirth as an 
eligible moral principle. The validity of the PGC is therefore accepted here, so that the 
PGC is considered as a suitable principle for the determination of a moral hierarchy 
between international IP law and the human rights to health and life. 
3.2.3 The Application of the Principle of Generic Consistency in 
the Context of International Law: The Moral Superiority of the 
Rights to Health and Life  
The first part of this chapter, analysing the relationship between international human 
rights law, and international trade and IP law, found that because different international 
treaty regimes are functionally detached from each other, a clear legal hierarchy 
between trade rules and human rights cannot be established. Similarly, international 
human rights law does not provide sufficient clarification on issues arising from intra-
regime conflicts between the human right to IP and the fundamental human rights to 
life and health. With respect to the vital importance of the human rights to life and 
health for the realisation of a dignified standard of living, and in order to scrutinise the 
justification of the current international patent regime in the next chapter, the second 
part of this chapter analyses moral philosophical principles, aiming to provide 
guidance on whether the superiority of rights protecting fundamental human interests 
can be ethically established. In this regard, it is proposed that based on the concept of 
human dignity, it can be argued that certain human rights, especially those that protect 
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human freedom and well-being, are to be prioritised over less-essential rights, such as 
the right to IP. 
To support this argument, the first part of this analysis provided an evaluation of the 
scope of the concept of morality, to establish whether there is a general understanding 
of what is considered to constitute moral goodness. To this end, sub-chapter 3.2.1.3 
indicated that moral goodness, or morally right conduct, is commonly equated with 
the promotion of human happiness, which in turn can be considered to entail human 
well-being,324 as well-being constitutes a main prerequisite for the pursuit of 
happiness, or, in other words, the most basic form of happiness. As morality also 
requires an act being other-regarding and not simply performed in the actor’s self-
interests, moral conduct exists in those acts that advance the well-being of other 
persons. Differences between the various streams of moral philosophy can be 
identified in the way they approach how morality should be achieved. A notable 
difference can be identified when comparing utilitarianism with Gewirthian ethics. For 
the utilitarian, moral conduct is that which brings about the greatest surplus of 
happiness, for the greatest number of persons. However, recognising that different 
types of happiness cannot be horizontally compared with each other, as the parameters 
that actually generate happiness for individual persons are subjective, it seems more 
logical to follow the Gewirthian concept of needs, prioritising those human needs that 
are most essential for human well-being. This concept, moreover is in accordance with 
the concept of human dignity which stipulates that there is a certain core value attached 
to humanity which must not be denied. 
This analysis then explored the existence and applicability of a supreme principle of 
morality – i.e. a moral principle that supports the prioritisation of certain rights above 
any other considerations – by scrutinising the Kantian ‘Categorical Imperative’ and 
the Gewirthian ‘Principle of Generic Consistency’. Both principles share distinct 
commonalities in that they both acknowledge the inherent value of all human beings 
by stipulating that all persons must be regarded as ends in themselves. They are further 
closely related to the Golden Rule, as all three principles emphasise that other persons 
ought to be treated in the same way as one wishes to be treated by them. As this rational 
consideration of the equal worth of all persons lies at the heart of morality, the 
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Categorical Imperative and the PGC can both be regarded as providing fundamental 
moral principles. A supreme moral principle, however, needs to be justified in itself. 
While the differences between the content of the Categorical Imperative and the PGC 
are marginal, the main distinction between the two principles is the way in which their 
applicability is derived. For Kant, the applicability of the Categorical Imperative stems 
from duty, i.e. the duty to abide by valid moral rules. This, however, leaves the 
question of where that duty comes from. Further, by only stipulating that human beings 
shall never be treated as mere means, Kant does not establish measures to evaluate 
what type of interests are to be prioritised in situations of conflict, which can arise even 
where all parties concerned are treated as ends in themselves. Gewirth, in comparison, 
bases the PGC on agency and the universally necessary requirements for purposive 
action. In doing so he manages to determine that rational logic demands agents to 
accept that all agents have the same rights simply based on the virtue of their agency. 
While it may be submitted that due to the close similarity between the Categorical 
Imperative and the PGC, the Categorical Imperative could also be based on human 
agency, by actually employing human agency as the determining factor, Gewirth can 
establish that there exists a hierarchy of rights prioritising the most essential needs for 
agency over second-order needs. Consequently, the greatest emphasis is placed on life 
itself, granting superiority to all goods that are necessary to sustain life.325 The PGC is 
therefore not only in itself justified as the supreme moral principle, but further 
establishes which interests ought to be prioritised in situations of conflict. 
Acknowledging that the basic or generic needs of human agency likewise constitute 
the most basic preconditions for a human life in dignity, the PGC can be employed to 
evidence the superior importance of protecting human dignity. Consequently, by 
considering that denying the PGC is to contradict one’s very own agency, it can also 
be suggested that denying the PGC is to contradict one’s own human dignity.326 The 
PGC therefore provides a rational moral justification for the fundamental concept of 
human dignity. This connection to human dignity is of particular importance for this 
thesis, because human rights are derived from the dignity inherent to all human beings, 
as elaborated above in 3.1.1. As a result, it is proposed that the PGC can be utilised as 
 
325 Gewirth A, Reason and Morality (n 209) 62-63. 
326 Beyleveld D and Brownsword R (n 218) 110. 
177 
 
a means of identifying and prioritising those human rights that are most important for 
human dignity over less essential rights.327  
The PGC can then be employed as the basis for providing a positive answer to 
Research Question 2:  
Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
By providing that all human agents have equal rights to the generic needs necessary 
for agency, the PGC is in accordance with the basic considerations of egalitarian 
ethics. By deriving the PGC from the fundamental requirements for human agency and 
purposive action, Gewirth can further establish that the PGC is in itself justified and 
therefore may reasonably constitute the supreme principle of morality. By applying 
the needs-based conceptualisation of the PGC to the concept of human dignity, the 
moral principle can be utilised to address challenges of norm-conflicts in the legal 
domain. Considering that human dignity, as recognised by all major human rights 
instruments, is intrinsic to human existence, the basic rights emphasised by the PGC 
cannot be denied, so that it is applicable regardless of personal opinions or acceptance. 
Thus, for Gewirth generic rights are of such importance that they exist independently 
from any culture or community,328 and thereby exist independently from their legal 
recognition. Furthermore, the recognition that human rights shall provide protection 
against wrongs that no human being should experience, by providing limitations to the 
power of governments, indicates the existence of legally recognised values that are 
superior to any other considerations.329 The present analysis thus indicates that the 
protection of the most fundamental human needs imposes moral obligations that are 
binding irrespective of personal beliefs. It is the unconditional universal necessity of 
those fundamental needs that further elevates the requirement to adhere to such moral 
principles above any contradictory legal obligations. As the purpose of law may 
arguably be seen in the regulation of human behaviour by way of reinforcing moral 
obligations, the question arises of whether morally flawed laws can be regarded as 
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legitimate.330 It thus follows that legal norms ought to be in accordance with valid 
moral rules protecting fundamental human interests. Therefore, it is sensible to suggest 
that the PGC, and in particularly the rights to freedom and well-being, should 
constitute the standard against which the legitimacy of all other laws is scrutinised.331  
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, it is essential for the examination of the 
justification of the international patent regime in the next chapter, to establish the 
parameters against which this justification can be scrutinised. To this end, the first part 
of this chapter analysed the existence of a legal hierarchy under international law, 
which prioritises either human rights or trade/IP concerns in cases of norm conflicts, 
concluding that such a hierarchy currently cannot be established. For this reason, the 
second part of this chapter considered whether other considerations support the 
prioritisation of certain rights, against which the justification of the international patent 
regime can be examined, by analysing moral and ethical concepts. The analysis 
concluded that the needs-based hierarchy, established by Gewirth in his derivation of 
the Principle of Generic Consistency, suggests the superiority of those rights that are 
most essential for the realisation and protection of human life and well-being. It is 
therefore proposed that when the concept of basic human needs is applied to the 
concept of human dignity, the PGC can be utilised to morally justify the prioritisation 
of those human rights that protect human dignity over provisions of international trade 
law and patent law. Thus, for the purpose of the analysis of the justification of the 
international patent regime – with a particular reference to the patentability of medical 
products – human rights that are most essential for human dignity are considered of 
greater importance than TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus patent laws. Therefore, this thesis 
claims priority to the right to health, based on moral and ethical considerations. 
Consequently, in the next chapter, the justification of the international patent regime 
is scrutinised, inter alia, against its compliance with the right to health. 
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Chapter Four 
 
4 The Justification of the International Patent 
Regime 
4.1 Introduction  
The following chapter provides an analysis of the justification of the international 
patent regime with respect to the patentability of medical products, and the 
implications of this to human health and life, with a particular focus on the accessibility 
of medicines in developing countries. As elaborated in the previous chapter, there are 
moral reasons founded on the needs-based hierarchy which suggest that it is sensible 
to prioritise those human rights most essential for human life in dignity over any other 
legal considerations. Following this concept, the present analysis scrutinises the 
justification of the patentability of medical products against the right to health, which 
includes a right to accessible and affordable medicines for everyone, as discussed in 
chapters 1.2.1.1 and 1.4. In cases of norm conflicts between the international patent 
regime and the human rights to health and life, this analysis will therefore prioritise 
the relevant human rights concerns over the provisions of international IP law. One of 
the main issues in such conflicts is the identification of the right balance. There is 
ample reason to reaffirm the importance of the right of authors and inventors to be 
compensated for investments made in the development of new inventions, and it must 
be acknowledged that adequate incentives to conduct further research are essential for 
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the advancement of medical knowledge.1 It does not seem to be justified, however, 
that such compensation is provided at the cost of human health and life. As elaborated 
in chapters 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.3.2, human rights documents have regularly taken account 
of the IP interests of authors and inventors, while international IP laws have paid little 
regard to related human rights issues.2 The current international IP regime thus 
neglects the emphasis on public benefits as provided for by human rights law, and 
instead focusses mainly on the private rights of authors and inventors, which is 
detrimental to the establishment of an adequate balance.3 
While concerns about the accessibility, and particularly the affordability, of medicines 
are at the heart of this inquiry, this analysis will scrutinise all aspects of the right to 
health including the importance of incentivising research in order to advance 
pharmaceutical innovation to address health concerns in the future. As innovation, 
however, is insufficient for realising the right to health when the resulting medical 
products are unaffordable for patients in desperate need of treatment, concerns of 
affordability constitute the main factor against which the justification of the 
international patent regime needs to be scrutinised. While the issue of affordable 
medical products is of high importance for all countries, a particular focus on 
developing countries is applied because of the severe impacts increased prices on 
medicines have on the public health situation of countries with high levels of poverty. 
Furthermore, this analysis will not only take into consideration the public health 
concerns of developing nations, but also the implications of the international patent 
regime on the development process of poorer countries. To do this, this chapter 
elaborates the shortcomings of the current international patent regime, identifying 
issues that require amendment in order for the regime to be considered as justified 
from a moral and human rights point of view. 
The following analysis addresses Research Question 3:  
Recognising the importance of the right to health and access to medicines for 
human life in dignity, is the current international patent regime (under TRIPS 
 
1 cf. Hestermeyer H, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (OUP 
2007) 137. 
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and TRIPS-Plus) justified when the protection of private interests directly 
impacts on the affordability of medicines and public health? 
The answer to this question is reached by scrutinising the two Sub-Questions:  
3.1: Do the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-term restriction of the 
accessibility of medicines?  
3.2: Do patents on pharmaceutical products actually fulfil their purposes and 
objectives?   
The results of these sub-questions will then be analysed to answer Research Question 
3. To this end, sub-chapter 4.2, addressing the first sub-question, compares the pro 
patent arguments and the purposes of the international patent regime with the 
immediate negative impacts of the patentability of pharmaceutical products. The 
analysis then considers the balance between human rights and patent rights, before 
concluding that there is a controversy regarding the justification of short-term 
restrictions of the accessibility of patented medicines for the purpose of advancing 
medical research. It is then concluded that in order to be justified, the international 
patent regime is required to adequately fulfil its objectives and purposes. In this regard, 
sub-chapter 4.3 provides an argument establishing that patents do not fulfil their 
purposes, by particularly scrutinising how far patents actually provide an adequate 
incentive to conduct meaningful research into truly novel pharmaceutical products, 
and how far the international IP system actually fulfils its purposes of facilitating 
technology transfer to developing countries, and increasing foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in those countries. Lastly, sub-chapter 4.4 then proposes an answer to the main 
Research Question 3, which can be derived from the answers to the two Sub-Questions 
3.1 and 3.2, providing an argument that due to the non-fulfilment of its purposes and 
objectives, the current international patent regime is not justified. It is therefore 
proposed that amendments to the system are required in order to adequately harmonise 
the rights and obligations of patent holders, thereby establishing a balance between 
human rights demands and patent rights. 
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4.2 Do the Aims and Purposes of Patents Justify a Short-
Term Restriction of the Accessibility of Medicines? 
4.2.1 Arguments Pro Patents 
The main positive aspect supporting the public interest generated by patent rights 
originates from the requirement that patents are granted in exchange for the disclosure 
of knowledge about the technicalities of an invention. Thereby, patents provide a trade-
off that ensures that inventions are not kept as trade secrets by the originator, and thus 
can be freely used for the public benefit once a patent period expires, leading to an 
enhanced availability of useful products.4 It can therefore be deduced that patents 
themselves provide the foundation for cheaper generic competition as the disclosure 
requirement enables generic manufacturers to enter the market once a patent expires, 
without facing high research costs.5 Thus, it can be suggested that the exception to 
free-trade and anti-monopoly regulations provided by patent rights is balanced, to a 
certain degree, by the required disclosure of the invention and the timely limitation of 
the exclusive rights.6  
Furthermore, a main reason for patents being offered to inventors is the creation of an 
incentive to be innovative.7 The premise of stronger patent protection therefore is to 
increase encouragement for the development of new products.8 It is generally accepted 
that, particularly in the field of pharmaceuticals, the research and development (R&D) 
of new products involves substantially high costs, ranging from between $115m and 
$802m for the development of a single new drug.9 Additionally, pharmaceutical 
 
4 cf. Dutfield G, ‘Healthcare Innovation and Patent Law’s “Pharmaceutical Privilege”: Is there a 
Pharmaceutical Privilege? And if so, should we remove it?’ (2017) 12 HEPL 453, 453; United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights’ (27 June 2001) Un Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, para 11. 
5 cf. Phillips AA, ‘Strengthen Pharmaceutical Patent Rights: Lowering the Cost of Prescription Drugs 
by Stopping the Reckless Patent Litigation Abuse of Generic Companies’ (2006) Conn. Ins. L. J. 
397, 407. 
6 Cullet P (n 2) 140; Lucyk S, ‘Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines 
Under the TRIPS Agreement’ (2007) 38 Ottawa Law Review 191, 207. 
7 cf. ECOSOC (n 4) para 11. 
8 Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ in Smith R and others (eds), Trade and Health: Towards Building 
a National Strategy (WHO 2015) 135. 
9 ibid 128; ECOSOC (n 4) para 37; Hestermeyer H (n 1) 142 and 159; Lucyk S (n 6) 206. 
Phillips even suggests that the development costs of new pharmaceutical products averages at 
$897m. See: Phillips AA (n 5) 406. 
183 
 
research is a high-risk investment, as new drugs are required to go through expensive 
and risky clinical trials before being approved for marketing, so that shareholders 
commonly demand high returns in order to be willing to make such investments.10 A 
particular problem in the field of pharmaceuticals is that due to the lengthy research 
efforts and clinical trials required for marketing approval, the effective exclusive 
market protection of patents is shorter for medical products than for innovations in 
other fields of technology, and lasts, on average, for 11 years only.11 Furthermore, as 
a large proportion of pharmaceutical R&D is unsuccessful, with only one in five drugs 
in clinical testing being ultimately approved for marketing, novel medications that do 
succeed need to be capable of not only recouping their own R&D costs, but also 
compensating a corporation’s expenses into the R&D of unsuccessful products.12 
Thus, if patents were too restrictive to provide adequate returns on pharmaceutical 
research, there would be the likelihood of investments being shifted to more profitable 
fields of technology.13  
For these reasons, the research-based industry relies on patent protection to attract 
investors willing to support the development of new medical products. Patents, by 
providing exclusive rights to inventors, facilitate the successful commercialisation of 
new medical products, and therefore create the required research incentive by 
promising investors a period of monopoly position on the market which can be used 
to recover R&D costs and to make higher profits.14 In the end, it must be acknowledged 
that the investment into pharmaceutical research today is expected to have substantial 
benefits for future health.15 In consideration of the right to health, it must be 
remembered that not only the affordability of current medications is of concern, but 
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<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1965458> accessed 22 May 2019; Flynn S, 
Hollis A and Palmedo M, ’An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine 
Patents in Developing Countries’ (2009) 37 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 184, 186; 
ECOSOC (n 4) para 11. 
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that innovation is essential in the field of pharmaceuticals to advance the treatment of 
diseases for the future.16 Therefore, by providing a research incentive for the 
development of new cures to address disease burdens, patents not only serve the 
interests of the industry, but can further serve an undeniably positive purpose for public 
health.17  
In comparison to other fields of technology, the pharmaceutical industry seems to be 
especially dependent on patent protection due to the high costs involved in medical 
R&D and clinical trials, and the comparatively low costs required for the 
manufacturing of generic copies.18 Information, like the knowledge of the 
technicalities of an invention, generally can be regarded as a public good, which once 
it becomes available can be used by anyone without any benefit for the creator.19 Thus, 
after the initial development of new pharmaceutical products, it is comparatively 
simple for a competitor to copy the drugs.20 Generic manufacturers can thus offer 
lower prices as they are not required to recover high investments made into R&D and 
clinical trials.21 For this reason, a perfectly competitive market does not provide 
adequate incentives for expensive high-risk research undertakings, as market prices 
determined by copied competition lowers prices to a level close to the production costs 
without taking account of the other costs involved in the R&D process.22 Therefore, 
there exists a market failure in that the free market is not capable of adequately 
facilitating inventiveness.23 Without patents, originator companies would be at risk of 
losing their investments as competitors could simply make profits by free-riding on an 
inventor’s expenses, with the added advantage of being able to provide cheaper 
prices.24 Without patent protection, the substantial costs and risks of pharmaceutical 
research could discourage innovation due to the real prospect of impaired 
profitability.25 Arguably, without patent protection a large number of available 
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medications may never have been invented.26 Given these points, it can be suggested 
that patents safeguard the future development of new medicines by rewarding 
innovators and protecting inventors against unauthorised use of their inventions.27 It is 
further claimed by the industry that the patentability of new uses of known substances 
– as included in a number of TRIPS-Plus FTAs – provides incentives for conducting 
continued research into already patented drugs to find potential additional benefits.28 
This is a controversial issue, however, as the availability of second use patents also 
facilitates strategic planning to prolong exclusive rights without providing any 
substantial added benefits; a strategy which is known as patent ‘evergreening’, as 
explained in chapter 2.5.1.1, and further elaborated below in 4.3.2.3. 
Additionally, it is claimed that a generally heightened level of IP protection in 
developing countries is beneficial in that it arguably leads to the development of 
domestic R&D capacity, and that the overall strengthening of the international patent 
system would lead to higher levels of innovation globally, for the benefit of all 
countries.29 This can be exemplified by considering that in the wake of the TRIPS 
Agreement, Indian pharmaceutical companies, which traditionally focused their 
activity on the production of generic drugs, began to increase investments into their 
own R&D capacity, seeking to develop new innovative medicines themselves.30 
Furthermore, heightened IP standards arguably make developing countries more 
attractive for FDI implying an overall benefit for those countries.31 This argument is 
derived from the consideration that investors in knowledge based industries may be 
reluctant to make investments in countries with insufficient IP standards due to an 
insufficient protection against piracy.32  
The patentability of pharmaceuticals in developing countries is further defended by 
the research-based industry as a necessary requirement for keeping patented drugs at 
profitable prices in industrialised nations in order to recoup research investments. This 
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28 cf. Phillips AA (n 5) 407. 
29 Turk M, ‘Bargaining and Intellectual Property Treaties: The Case for a Pro-Development 
Interpretation of TRIPS but not TRIPS Plus’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 981, 1000-
1001. 
30 Phillips AA (n 5) 412. 
31 cf. Turk M (n 29) 1001. 
32 Richards DG, ‘A Skeptik’s View of Intellectual Property Rights’ in Bird RC and Jain SC (eds), The 
Global Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing 2008) 272. 
186 
 
argument is connected to the fear of the industry that cheaper prices may leak into 
developed markets as consumers may challenge high prices when cheaper drugs are 
available in developing countries.33 This suggestion, however, seems to be redundant 
as consumers in developed markets are aware of the poverty in developing countries 
and for decades have accepted that wealthy countries indirectly subsidise cheaper 
medications in developing countries.34 
4.2.1.1 Objectives and Purposes of the International IP Regime  
When scrutinising the arguments in support of patent rights, it is of essential 
importance to take into consideration the general objectives and purposes of the 
international IP system. As established so far, the main purpose of patents is to foster 
innovation and to facilitate technological development.35 Additionally, for patents 
under the WTO regime, a wider perspective needs to be adopted, taking account of the 
objectives of the WTO which include the clear goal of ‘raising standards of living’.36 
Thus, when regarded in correlation with the statement of Art XX(b) of the GATT 1994, 
which provides members with the right to adopt measures ‘necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life and health’, and Art 8(1) TRIPS which facilitates the adoption of 
measures ‘necessary to protect public health and nutrition’, it can be suggested that an 
integral purpose of the international patent regime is the protection and promotion of 
public health.37 Furthermore, the objectives of TRIPS emphasize the mutual advantage 
to both the producer and the user of technological knowledge, and particularly 
references the importance of social and economic welfare including the need for an 
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adequate balance between rights and obligations of IP rights holders.38 The TRIPS 
Agreement, however, does not provide further details on how such a balance shall be 
achieved.39 
4.2.2 Immediate Negative Impacts of Pharmaceutical 
Patentability 
While providing a valuable incentive for innovation, patents also come at a cost for 
society.40 Particularly in the field of pharmaceuticals this is a great social cost to bear. 
Patents are likely to aggravate the problem of access to medicines in developing 
countries, as the existence of competition has considerable impact on the price and 
availability of pharmaceuticals.41 In a perfectly competitive market, competition 
reduces prices because potential customers have the freedom to choose from different 
offers.42 Here, sellers only receive regular revenues which cover productions costs and 
a slight profit.43 Any increased revenue margins would attract further competition, 
which in return would drive down the prices again.44 The effects of competition on 
pharmaceutical prices can be best observed after a patent expires when generic 
products enter the markets, regularly leading to significant reductions of drug prices 
by up to 80 percent.45 This can be further exemplified when considering that by 
producing HIV/AIDS drugs in its own government laboratories in the early 2000s, 
Brazil managed to reduce the treatment costs by an average of 70 percent.46 
Furthermore, the introduction of generics not only provides for cheaper off-brand 
products, but commonly leads to a reduction of the prices offered by originator 
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companies as well.47 The combined effect of this can be tremendous. By 2006 Brazil 
managed to reduce the annual treatment costs of HIV/AIDS patients from $10,439 to 
$132 for its generic drugs, with the price of the branded version dropping to $556.48 It 
can thus be seen that by preventing competition, patents are a principal determinant of 
high drug prices.49 
By granting exclusive rights to inventors, patents provide the basis for pricing drugs 
above their competitive market value, thereby limiting the accessibility of novel 
medicines for the poor.50 Given that the very concept of patents is designed to 
strengthen the market position of originator companies, the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry is enabled to set high prices for patented drugs almost freely.51 
When further considering that profit maximisation is one of the fundamental purposes 
of corporations, it becomes apparent that there is little reason for patent holders to 
reject the possibility of setting high prices.52 Evidence for the correlation between 
patents and price increases above the competitive market value can be examined when 
drawing attention to the case of Malaysia, where between 1999 and 2005, following 
the introduction of pharmaceutical patentability, the prices of medicines increased on 
average by 28 percent per year.53 Similarly, in a cross-border study from 2007, Borrell 
revealed that drug bundles for the treatment of HIV/AIDS which include at least one 
patented pharmaceutical, are on average 70 percent more expensive than drug bundles 
that only consist of generic copies.54 In a report from 2001, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights highlighted that 150 milligrams of the HIV drug Flucanazole cost $697 
in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in the Philippines, while India, where 
Flucanazole was not patented, kept the price as low as $55.55 
In monopolistic market positions, corporations are commonly enabled to set prices 
freely without regard to competition, which, due to the limited choices left for 
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consumers, commonly leads to higher prices.56 Corporations are generally enabled to 
increase prices until they reach a level where the number of customers unwilling to 
pay high prices ultimately reduces profitability.57 Thus, for regular types of products, 
corporations are prevented from charging unreasonably high prices as consumers can 
simply decide not to acquire products which they consider to be too expensive.58 In 
the field of pharmaceuticals, however, the situation is rather different and more 
problematic. Notably, corporations can charge considerably higher prices the more 
inelastic the demand for a product is.59 As can be expected, the demand for medications 
is commonly relatively inelastic as patients are willing to pay extensive prices in order 
to protect their life and health.60 The price elasticity is therefore directly connected to 
the essential nature of medicines, meaning that the more essential a medicine is, the 
more consumers are willing to pay. For the most essential medications, consumers are 
willing to pay almost anything, as long as they can afford it.61 Thus, the prices of 
essential medicines are also relatively inelastic to income levels, suggesting that 
patients only cease to buy such medications when they run out of resources.62 
Furthermore, prices tend to go even higher for patented products which do not have 
any close substitutes, as this puts corporations in a strong market position in which 
they can exercise true monopoly power.63 
Monopolists can generally choose from two different distribution strategies: (1) 
producing and selling large quantities of a product at a low margin, or (2) limiting the 
output and selling low quantities at a high margin.64 Manufacturers will commonly 
employ the strategy that expectedly generates the highest overall profits.65 Particularly 
in the field of pharmaceuticals, this tends to lead to higher drug prices as due to the 
inelastic demand curve, low volume sales at high prices regularly generate the highest 
profit margins.66 Patented medicines are thus not priced in a way that recoups 
competitive market returns plus the R&D costs, but rather follow the industry’s interest 
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in increasing prices until they reach the maximal possible profitability.67 In effect, this 
has a substantial adverse impact on society as a so-called ‘deadweight loss’ is created, 
meaning that a large number of consumers are excluded as they cannot afford the 
products.68 Thus, patients who would be able to be cured at lower medicine costs are 
prevented from receiving available treatment.69 Therefore, in the field of 
pharmaceuticals, the term ‘deadweight loss’ has a particularly cynical ring to it, as 
human lives are literally falling victim to high medicine prices.70  
Where patents lead to unrestricted monopoly positions, the system completely fails to 
account for substantial wealth inequalities and severe poverty, and the implications on 
public health in developing countries. This can be illustrated by reference to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, where in the early 2000s Antiretroviral (ARV) 
therapies were offered at basically the same prices that were charged in industrialised 
OECD countries.71 In other words, ARVs were priced out of reach for the poor, with 
only 7% of the population in developing countries being able to afford them.72 
Counter-intuitively, purely economic monopolistic pricing strategies may actually lead 
to higher prices for medicines in developing countries than in industrialised markets.73 
In 2009, for example, the price of the drug Stavudine in low-income countries was 37 
percent higher than in middle-income countries.74 The reason for such a seemingly 
illogical pricing strategy is that in many developing countries, and particularly in 
LDCs, there exists an extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth in that large 
sectors of the population live in severe poverty, while the much smaller and wealthier 
part of the population can have incomes similar to those of the wealthy in industrialised 
nations.75 A middle class is basically non-existent and can be ignored in pricing 
considerations. In such markets, it can be more profitable for the pharmaceutical 
industry to set prices that only the wealthiest can afford.76 Flynn, Hollis and Palmedo 
show in a 2009 study that in markets with high levels of income inequality the highest 
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pharmaceutical profits are achieved when prices are set to a level which only the 
wealthiest 10 percent can afford, as the few rich people can spend more on medications 
than the entire poor population combined.77 Conversely, in industrialised nations the 
highest profits are commonly achieved when prices are set to a level where both the 
highest income class as well as the middle class can afford the products.78 The 
availability of health insurances, as large-scale buyers in monopsony79 positions, and 
price controls, further ensure that certain price levels can be maintained.80 In the 
developed world, corporations thus can achieve the highest profit margins when drugs 
are sold at a slightly lower price to a substantially larger group of the population, as 
there exists a sufficiently sized middle-class.81 In Norway, for example, the highest 
profits are realised at a price that all but the poorest 20 percent can afford.82  
This is particularly problematic as most people in developing countries do not have 
health insurance, meaning 90 percent of the population are left without access to 
patented medicines.83 A theoretical solution to this problem would be the consideration 
of price discriminations within a market, whereby the pharmaceutical industry could 
receive higher profits from the wealthy population while at the same time ensuring the 
affordability of medicines for the poor. In reality, however, discounted prices are 
commonly negotiated by large volume purchasers, such as health insurances. As in 
developing countries most people living in poverty are not covered by health 
insurances, the price reductions would only benefit the wealthy population while doing 
little for the poor.84  
As can be seen, the overall implication of pharmaceutical patentability is an increase 
in medicine prices due to the restricted and delayed availability of cheaper generic 
alternatives, which comes at a substantial human cost.85 The prices of medications 
directly determine whether patients can afford required medications, with lower prices 
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allowing for more patients receiving treatment while higher prices restrict access to 
treatment.86 Furthermore, while the majority of the drugs included on the WHO’s List 
of Essential Medicines are off-patent, there are a small number of essential medicines 
on the list which are relatively new and will enjoy patent protection for a number of 
years to come before cheaper generics become available.87 A problem of the WHO 
List of Essential Medicines is that it is drafted with regard to budgetary restrictions, so 
that, according to Abbott, there is a reasonable concern that certain essential medicines 
are excluded specifically because of their high prices resulting from patent rights.88 In 
summary, it can be observed that, especially in developing countries, the accessibility 
of medicines is severely affected by patents, with patented medications regularly being 
priced above affordability for large sectors of the world’s population, preventing 
patients from accessing treatment for, at times, life-threatening conditions.89  
The already concerning situation is further aggravated by other IP provisions alongside 
patent protection. In particular, the protection of test and other data through data 
exclusivity provisions can further delay the introduction of cheaper generic 
alternatives by preventing generic manufacturers from using existing clinical test data 
submitted by the originator company for the marketing approval of generics.90 
Furthermore, the protection of test data can provide exclusive protection for products 
that do not meet patentability requirements, as data exclusivity protection cannot be 
challenged, in the way that patents can be challenged, for a failure to make an adequate 
contribution to science.91 As a result, the market entry of generic medicines is either 
delayed until after data exclusivity periods expire, or generic manufacturers are 
required to conduct their own clinical trials, which, as elaborated above in chapter 
2.4.4, is ethically questionable and would furthermore increase the prices of the 
generics due to additional research costs.  
Similarly, patent linkage provisions, which are regularly included in TRIPS-Plus 
FTAs, enable patent owners to block the marketing approval of generic versions of 
 
86 Abbott FM, ‘WTO TRIPS Agreement and its Implications’ (n 33) 8; Hunt P and others, Neglected 
Diseases (n 51) 33. 
87 Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ (n 8) 123; Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property and Public Health’ (n 
14) 7-8; Hestermeyer H (n 1) 150. 
88 Abbott FM, ‘Intellectual Property and Public Health’ (n 14) 7-8. 
89 ibid 8; Cullet P (n 2) 151; Forman L (n 41) 350. 
90 Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ (n 8) 120; Henry D and Searles A (n 15) 9.9. 
91 Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ (n 8) 127-128. 
193 
 
their patented drugs.92 Thereby, patent owners can, in principle, negate the value of 
compulsory licenses that address public health emergencies. While a generic drug can 
be produced under a compulsory license, it also requires marketing approval before it 
can be brought into circulation. By making use of a patent linkage provision, a patent 
holder can prevent the marketing approval of the generic drug produced under a 
compulsory license, for as long as the product is patented.93 It can thus be seen that 
patent linkage provisions can hamper the market entry of affordable medications, even 
where patent provisions directly provide for exceptions for the protection of public 
health.94 
All things considered, it can be submitted that pharmaceutical patents in particular, 
and international IP law more generally, severely restrict the affordability and 
accessibility of medical products by excluding competition which is an essential 
requirement for lowering medicine prices.95 
4.2.3 Balancing Mechanisms under TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus 
Standards 
As can be seen in the above analysis, patents generate both positive and negative net 
effects. From a general human rights perspective, it can be regarded as positive that 
patents promote property rights by protecting the interests of authors and creators of 
IP. Similarly, patents promote development by providing an incentive for the R&D of 
new products. In the field of pharmaceuticals, however, the mechanics of patents lead 
to a considerable controversy. On the one hand, patents contribute to the accessibility 
of medicines by providing the aforementioned incentives for innovation in the field of 
pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, patents can create severe obstacles, restricting the 
accessibility of medicines by increasing the prices of patented drugs to levels which 
the majority of the world’s population simply cannot afford.96 It is therefore crucial to 
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acknowledge that pharmaceutical patents can only be justified if the research incentive 
provided is adequately balanced with the public health interest of the population in 
having affordable access to required medications. Achieving this balance, however, is 
particularly intricate as the importance of the affordability of today’s existing 
medicines has to be weighed against the importance of the availability of new 
medications in the future, with both sides having direct implications for the enjoyment 
of the human rights to health and life.97 One approach to striking a balance is briefly 
mentioned in Article 7 TRIPS, calling for a balance of rights and obligations.98 As 
TRIPS however, does not provide any further details as to how such a balance can be 
achieved,99 the following analysis will scrutinise how far the international patent 
regime actually provides for establishing the required adequate balance. 
In this regard, it may be suggested that the TRIPS flexibilities can be utilised to 
minimise the adverse impacts of patents on the accessibility of medicines.100 Thus, the 
flexibilities provided for may be regarded as a means for achieving a balance. In 
reality, the TRIPS flexibilities have turned out to be the only remaining leeway for 
governments seeking to provide more affordable medical treatment.101 Furthermore, 
the applicability of the flexibilities, as well as the interpretation of their exact scope, 
are not clarified, so that an adequate utilisation of these flexibilities requires skilled 
legal negotiations. Developing countries, however, commonly have a deficit in the 
high skills required to ensure that the flexibilities can be implemented in their best 
interests.102 Thus, even though the TRIPS Agreement provides for flexibilities, 
conflicts between human rights and the international patent regime remain unresolved 
and of considerable concern.103  
More generally speaking, while explicitly referred to in the objectives and purposes of 
TRIPS, the protection of public interests only finds minor consideration in the specific 
IP provisions of the agreement, and is seemingly relegated to constituting an exclusion 
to the applicable rule. In particular, the public interest is merely addressed by the 
 
97 Hestermeyer H (n 1) 158. 
98 TRIPS Agreement (n 37) Article 7. 
99 ECOSOC (n 4) para 23. 
100 Helfer LR, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 43. 
101 Forman L (n 41) 351. 
102 Richards DG (n 32) 277. 
103 cf. Helfer LR (n 100) 49. 
195 
 
exceptions and flexibilities of the agreement’s IP sections, rather than being a concern 
of the treaty’s main provisions.104 This stands in stark contrast to the very idea of 
human rights, which strive to always focus on the public societal interests.105 While it 
seems positive that under TRIPS deviations from the general patent rules to address 
public health issues are permissible, from a human rights perspective this approach is 
insufficient.106 The importance of human dignity is such that the realisation of the 
human rights to health and life cannot be adequately achieved as a mere exception to 
private property rights.107 Thus, a human rights approach to IP would place concerns 
about the protection of human rights at the centre of a patent regime, i.e. in the main 
provisions of an agreement rather than only in its exceptions.108 Furthermore, 
according to Guan, the TRIPS Agreement has an inherent ‘birth defect’ which is to be 
seen in the insubstantial idea that public interests such as health concerns can be 
adequately promoted through a private rights regime that provides for market 
exclusivity.109 In this regard, Richards rightly points out that a solution to the issues 
surrounding the accessibility and affordability of medical products is unlikely to be 
found in ’market solutions’.110 
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that when taking a deeper look at the exceptions 
and flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement, particularly the way its system of 
compulsory licensing works, a number of flaws become apparent. First and foremost, 
it must be acknowledged that the availability of compulsory licensing in general is 
beneficial as it provides a mechanism for taking measures for the protection of public 
health. When successfully utilised, compulsory licenses can substantially enhance 
access to medicines. In Thailand, for example, the use of compulsory licenses 
increased access to Efavirenz four-fold between 2006 and 2008, from 5000 people 
receiving treatment to 20000, and access to Lopinavir-Ritonavir increased more than 
ten-fold, from under 300 persons receiving treatment to 3000 persons.111 Similarly, the 
use of compulsory licenses on Efavirenz in Malaysia reduced the drug’s price by two 
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thirds.112 Furthermore, Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses led to a global reduction 
of prices of the patented drugs.113 Nevertheless, compulsory licenses cannot be 
regarded as the ultimate solution to the public health issues faced by developing 
countries, which are aggravated by the international patent regime.114 
According to Forman, it is inadequate to refer to compulsory licenses as a TRIPS 
flexibility, as there is nothing flexible about the system that facilitates their use.115 One 
of the main problems with compulsory licensing under international patent laws is that 
its use regularly becomes a political issue, rather than a purely legal one, and that 
countries which grant compulsory licenses may face political and economic 
sanctions.116 A further flaw of the compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS is that 
the agreement does not sufficiently define the exact scope of the requirement to 
provide adequate remuneration to the patent holder.117 This introduces a further 
problem to the exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement. On the one hand, a remuneration 
that is set too high artificially increases the price of a generic drug produced under a 
compulsory license. On the other hand, if the remuneration is too low, the research-
based industry loses out on profits and may thereby be discouraged from conducting 
further expensive pharmaceutical research.118 For this reason, compulsory licenses that 
safeguard the affordability of medicines may be regarded as an obstacle to innovation, 
on the grounds that when the pharmaceutical industry is exposed to the risk of 
excessive use of compulsory licenses, corporations have no incentive for being 
innovative.119 According to Phillips, compulsory licenses therefore constitute a direct 
threat to the development of new medical products.120 
Accordingly, while the use of compulsory licenses as an exception to patents in order 
to address urgent health concerns generally seems reasonable, a systematic use of this 
flexibility can have negative impacts on innovation.121 Thus, any decision on the 
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granting of a compulsory license requires the balancing of public health interests now, 
with the public health interests of the future.122 It is submitted, however, that 
compulsory licenses granted in developing countries only have minor impacts on the 
overall research incentives for medications for diseases that affect both developing 
countries and industrialised countries, as the pharmaceutical industry commonly 
recoups its research costs in wealthy markets.123 Furthermore, as compulsory licenses 
can bring about substantial benefits for the public health situation in developing 
countries, their use is particularly justified in markets where patented medicine prices 
are set to a level which only the wealthiest class of the population can afford, as 
discussed above in 4.2.2.124 
Another inherent problem of the initial compulsory licensing system under TRIPS, i.e. 
how to legally supply developing countries that do not have adequate pharmaceutical 
production capacity with the generic drugs produced under a compulsory license, was 
addressed by a waiver decision that ultimately led to an amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement with the purpose of improving the compulsory licensing system. After 
conducting an analysis of the waiver system in chapter 2.4.3.8, however, it becomes 
apparent that the TRIPS Amendment is not sufficient to improve the balance between 
private IP rights and the public interest in health, but rather creates new obstacles.125 
According to Guan, the waiver creates a segmentation of the compulsory licensing 
system by limiting its scope of applicability and the countries that can benefit from the 
system.126 The TRIPS amendment thereby exacerbates barriers to the utilisation of 
compulsory licenses which undermines the flexibility the system should have provided 
under the initial TRIPS Agreement.127 This stands in stark contrast to the agreement’s 
objectives and purposes.128 
The imbalances of the international patent regime, arguably may be a reflection of the 
power imbalances between the negotiating parties, i.e. between developing countries 
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as net importers of IP and industrialised countries as net producers of IP.129 Such 
imbalances of power become particularly apparent when considering how pressure 
exercised by industrialised countries has led to restrictions of the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities and exceptions in developing countries.130 These pressures are commonly 
manifested in one of two ways. Firstly, patent holding corporations that feel unjustly 
deprived of their exclusive rights may threaten to, or actually withdraw products from 
the national markets of countries that make use of the exceptions provided for by 
TRIPS. This happened, for example, in 2007 after Thailand granted a compulsory 
license on Lopinavir+Ritonavir, marketed as Kaletra, when the patent holder, Abbott 
Laboratories, decided to retaliate against the use of the compulsory license by 
withdrawing its new medicines from the Thai market.131  
Secondly, there is the possibility of direct political and economic threats made by the 
governments of countries where patent holders are based.132 This, again, can be 
exemplified by reference to Thailand’s experiences, where US pressure led to Thailand 
implementing an IP system in full compliance with the TRIPS requirements by the 
early 2000s, neglecting its right to make use of the transition periods provided for 
developing countries, and the extensions thereto.133 Furthermore, Thailand faced 
threatening political objections by the EU, against its use of compulsory licensing to 
increase access to HIV/AIDS and coronary disease treatments, which was perfectly 
legal under TRIPS and the Doha Declaration.134 It should be noted that such 
governmental pressure is not only unlawful under WTO rules, but further seems to 
stand in contradiction to the human rights obligation of states to cooperate and provide 
international assistance to facilitate the realisation of the right to health in developing 
countries.135 The same can be said in regard to pressure exercised by industrialised 
nations in FTA negotiations, pushing developing countries to relent to accepting ever 
increasing TRIPS-Plus patent standards which are detrimental to public health 
concerns. 
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This trend of developed countries exercising their power was already observed 
throughout the initial TRIPS negotiations, where, according to Abbott, developing 
countries were basically forced to accept the high IP provisions through the ‘take it or 
leave it’ approach offered at the establishment of the WTO.136 In this way, the 
developed world prevented developing countries from implementing an IP system that 
adequately accounts for their needs and current degree of development.137 Where 
increased IP standards, particularly in TRIPS-Plus FTAs, are in fact forced upon 
developing countries, it must be brought into question whether those standards can 
actually be regarded as legitimate.138 According to a statement of then French president 
Chirac in 2004, forcing TRIPS-Plus standards on developing countries is comparable 
to immoral blackmail.139 Ultimately, while Article 1(1) TRIPS enables member states 
to adopt higher standards of IP protection, it also provides that members may not be 
obliged to do so.140 
As the TRIPS Agreement itself establishes high levels of patent protection, there seems 
to be little rationale for introducing even stronger protection, particularly in developing 
countries where the patentability of pharmaceuticals under TRIPS already has severe 
impacts on the public health situation.141 Particularly in consideration of the 
deadweight loss created by pharmaceutical patents, the 20-year minimum protection 
period established by TRIPS seems quite extensive, but may be regarded by society as 
a necessary trade-off to incentivise further pharmaceutical research.142 Any increase 
of this protection term through TRIPS-Plus standards, however, inadequately shifts the 
balance towards the protection of private interests, and seems therefore unjustified in 
view of the resulting adverse impacts on human health and life.143  
At the same time, while providing clearly defined minimum standards of protection, 
the TRIPS Agreement fails to define any upper limits that ensure that protection 
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standards are kept in a certain balance.144 Thus, it may be argued that under TRIPS, 
industrialised nations cannot be prevented from pushing for ever increasing levels of 
IP protection in FTAs to the detriment of developing countries.145 This problem was 
not eliminated through the Doha Declaration, which, while providing guidance on how 
a balance between patent rights and the public interest in health can be achieved, does 
not provide any upper limits of IP protection either.146 It follows that while the Doha 
Declaration and the resultant amendment of the TRIPS Agreement provide safeguards 
and flexibilities that can be used to protect public health, WTO member states remain 
free to adopt higher IP standards and restrictions of the flexibilities in bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements.147 The Doha Declaration, nevertheless, constitutes a 
crucial reaffirmation of the need to balance IP rights and the public interest, and the 
importance of maintaining the TRIPS flexibilities to achieve this. 
Article 1(1) TRIPS, furthermore, establishes that voluntarily implemented higher 
protection standards than those provided for by TRIPS must ‘not contravene the 
provisions of this Agreement.’148 It is submitted here, that this has to include the 
objectives and purposes of the agreement, as well as the Doha Declaration which 
reinforces the importance of public health as a basic principle of TRIPS under Article 
8. It is therefore false to suggest that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement can prevent an 
unrestricted proliferation of IP protection levels. The conception that higher IP 
protection is generally legitimate is thus oversimplified, as TRIPS-Plus standards that 
do not comply with the agreement’s objectives and regulations are inconsistent with 
TRIPS, and may, according to Frankel, constitute a violation thereof.149 Accordingly, 
it can be suggested that TRIPS-Plus FTAs need to pay due regard to the objectives and 
purposes of TRIPS in order to be legitimate.150 This point of view, however, is not 
uncontroversial, as it may be argued that TRIPS-Plus provisions constitute lex 
specialis, which under international law prevail over the lex posterior rules of the 
TRIPS Agreement.151 Conversely, I suggest that this may not hold true where such 
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TRIPS-Plus provisions directly violate the objectives and purposes of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
TRIPS-Plus Agreements can be considered as a simple continuation of the long-
standing trend in international law, striving for ever increasing IP rights.152 Protection 
under TRIPS is simply regarded by industrialised nations and the pharmaceutical 
industry as the bare minimum, rather than as an adequate standard of protection.153 
Imposing stricter, first-world IP protection levels on all countries alike, including 
poverty stricken developing countries, however, does not take account of the particular 
needs of each individual country.154 Increases in IP protection in TRIPS-Plus FTAs, 
including patent term extensions and relaxed patentability standards, ultimately lead 
to an increased amount of patented medicines with direct negative implications on the 
affordability of drugs and the number of people who receive treatment.155 
Additionally, by providing restrictions to the exceptions and flexibilities of TRIPS, 
TRIPS-Plus standards erode the already limited balancing mechanisms, and thereby 
shift the balance even more towards the protection of private economic interests.156 It 
is thus suggested that TRIPS-Plus standards are frequently inconsistent with the 
obligations of governments under the right to health, because human rights and public 
health concerns are often neglected in TRIPS-Plus negotiations.157 If FTAs take public 
health into consideration at all, the issue is frequently addressed in side letters with 
unclear legal standing, which are therefore, inadequate for providing reliable 
flexibility.158 
In summary, it can be noted that TRIPS-Plus standards are particularly unsuitable for 
developing countries, as they shift the balance away from public health concerns 
towards a proliferation of IP protection, without adding any benefits. This can be 
derived from the fact that the supporters of TRIPS-Plus standards commonly claim 
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that they bring about similar benefits to those that the initial TRIPS Agreement should 
have achieved. These include enhanced research incentives and increased FDI in 
developing countries, which, as shown in the second section of this chapter below, 
have not even been approximately realised under TRIPS.159 It can thus be concluded 
that TRIPS-Plus standards that aggravate problems of the accessibility of medicines 
for the sake of industry profits are unethical and cannot be justified.160 
4.2.4 Concluding Controversy 
Generally speaking, it is suggested by Abbott that currently there is no uniformly 
accepted model providing guidance on how an adequate balance between private 
economic rights and public health can be established.161 Neither is there an easy 
approach to balancing the affordability of medicines now with the availability of new 
medicines in the future.162 In its most basic form, however, a balanced approach to 
pharmaceutical patentability would provide protection standards that are strong 
enough to create real research incentives, while at the same time not being so strong 
that they generate obstacles to the accessibility of medicines, or become obstacles to 
innovation themselves.163 As seen above, however, there currently exists an imbalance 
leaning towards to the protection of private rights.164 Additionally, the rights of IP 
owners and their responsibilities are in a severe disequilibrium towards one another, 
as the responsibilities are rarely defined by international IP laws.165 Thus, a major 
problem with market mechanisms more generally is that they provide rewards for 
successful economic actors, while paying little regard to the distribution of public 
goods, such as health.166 Health, however, is a basic human need which should not be 
subject to purely economic considerations.167  
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It must be noted here that pharmaceutical patents, and IP rights more generally, are not 
the only issues that negatively affect the accessibility of medications, and that a variety 
of factors contribute to the occurrence of unaffordable medicine prices.168 While these 
other factors – which include, inter alia, poverty, infrastructure, taxes, administration 
costs, et cetera – can undoubtedly have serious negative impacts on the accessibility 
of medicines, patents nevertheless constitute a significant determinant of the prices of 
pharmaceutical products, with direct impacts on the affordability and distribution of 
drugs.169   
While the TRIPS Agreement provides for flexibilities and exceptions that can be 
utilised to at least avert some of the detrimental impacts of IP rights on public health, 
these mechanisms are not frequently applied by developing countries for fear of trade 
sanctions and retaliations by the private business sector.170 This is particularly 
unfortunate, as the Brazilian experience, as discussed above in 4.2.2, proves that 
TRIPS can theoretically be implemented in a way that strikes a relatively adequate 
balance which pays due regard to public health concerns.171 TRIPS-Plus standards, on 
the other hand, tend to further frustrate these last remaining balancing mechanisms, 
which seems completely unjustifiable in light of the Doha Declaration.172 The Doha 
Declaration provides an explicit reaffirmation of the right of governments to apply the 
exceptions and flexibilities of TRIPS for the protection of public health, wherefore I 
suggest that the Doha Declaration must always constitute the absolute minimum 
safeguard of the right to health in order for medical patents to be justifiable.  
Nonetheless, the modern international patent regime is particularly inclined towards 
the protection of the economic interests of the research-based industry, which reflects 
a seemingly one-sided view in which research incentives are attributed more 
importance than the protection of public welfare against concomitant losses.173 And 
while the pharmaceutical industry has a long established place amid the most profitable 
technological sectors, patent holders in developed countries continue to push for higher 
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protection standards and limitations of flexibilities.174 It can thus be observed that the 
current international patent regime is particularly suitable for the pharmaceutical 
industry in the developed world, with the majority of pharmaceutical patents being 
held by corporations from OECD countries.175 This is unsurprising when considering 
that 75% of the global pharmaceutical sales take place in North America, Europe and 
Japan alone.176 The implication of the majority of pharmaceutical patents being held 
by corporations in industrialised nations, is that such patents not only restrict the 
affordability of medicines, but further lead to a wealth transfer from the developing 
world to OECD countries.177  
In developing countries, the importance of affordable medicines is of such impact that 
the human costs of higher priced patented products do not seem to be justifiable by the 
marginal increase in research incentives such markets provide.178 Thus, it seems 
particularly unfair that the shortcomings in negotiation power of developing countries 
and LDCs were exploited by industrialised countries to force IP standards upon the 
developing world which are counter-productive to their development progress.179 
While developing countries gained enhanced access to markets in the global North, it 
cannot be denied that inappropriately high IP protection nevertheless impairs the 
process of economic development.180 Even greater, however, are the social costs 
inherently connected to pharmaceutical patents in developing countries. While from a 
trade perspective, it is true that enhanced market access has furthered the interests of 
developing countries, these benefits come at an extensive trade-off at the expense of 
public health.181 As will be elaborated in the second section of this chapter, it can be 
generally observed that the advantages of increased patent protection have commonly 
been overestimated, while the welfare losses were often misjudged or ignored.182 
Furthermore, it is not conclusively established how far changes to IP protection – 
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irrespective of the direction – actually affect the future availability of new 
medicines.183  
As analysed above in 4.2.1, adequate standards of patent protection can, at least to a 
certain extent, have positive impacts on the right to health by providing enhanced 
research incentives.184 If sufficiently balanced, the patentability of pharmaceuticals 
may actually be in compliance with the right to health, as according to the UN 
Economic and Social Council the duty to fulfil under the right to health entails the 
obligation that states actively promote health related research.185 A constant increase 
of IP protection levels, on the other hand, is unlikely to lead to more or faster 
developments being made in the pharmaceutical sector.186 Conversely, unreasonably 
high standards of IP protection may actually hinder future research by restricting 
access to knowledge, as elaborated below in 4.3.2.4. Furthermore, even where patents 
actually lead to increased research activity, they cannot be regarded as unconditionally 
justified, particularly where the protection of economic interests leads to impairments 
of other areas of the right to health by restricting the affordability of medical 
products.187 As the accessibility of medicines is integral to the realisation of the right 
to health, states are obliged to safeguard the affordability of drugs by ensuring that 
appropriate prices are maintained.188 This is further in accordance with the 
responsibility of states to protect the public against harmful activities of third parties, 
which requires governments to regulate the scope of action of the private business 
sector to ensure that commercial exploitation does not impair the enjoyment of the 
right to health.189 
Additionally, according to the CESCR, entering into international agreements may 
lead to human rights violations, when such agreements conflict with the prior existing 
obligations of states under the ICESCR.190 Thus, an international trade agreement that 
restricts the capability of states to comply with right to health obligations is 
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incompatible with international human rights law.191 In other words, where 
international IP standards lead to a restriction of the accessibility of medicines, the 
strict compliance with such standards may be regarded, under right to health 
considerations, as a ‘deliberately retrogressive step’, which constitutes a direct 
violation of Article 12 ICESCR.192 While states thus have a clear duty to ensure that 
patent rights do not lead to the unaffordability of medicines, the net effect of the 
international patent regime, as elaborated above in 4.2.2, in fact severely restricts the 
capability of governments to comply with this human rights obligation.193 The legal 
and political implications of such a potential violation of the ICESCR, however, may 
be expected to be marginal due to the lack of a sufficiently defined hierarchy between 
different treaty regimes under international law. This discrepancy can in fact be 
observed when considering how governments continuously agree to increases of 
patent protection in TRIPS-Plus FTAs – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) in recent years – that may lead to adverse impacts on public health.  
As has been indicated in chapters 1.3 and 3.2.1.2, health is a basic human need of 
particular magnitude for realising and safeguarding that all individuals can enjoy a life 
in dignity. For this reason, I follow the opinion that adherence to the right to health 
should always be prioritised in situations of norm conflicts.194 This is not to say, 
however, that pharmaceutical patents should be abolished all together, but rather that 
the establishment of an adequate balance ‘with the primary objective of promoting and 
protecting human rights’ is required.195 Even where the right to IP is acknowledged as 
a human right under Article 15 ICESCR, the UN Economic and Social Council has 
clarified that a balanced approach to IP ‘should not work to the detriment of any of the 
other rights in the Covenant.’196  
Finally, this section turns to Sub-Question 3.1:  
Do the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-term restriction of the 
accessibility of medicines? 
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Here it is recognised that a number of controversies are raised. Generally speaking, it 
can be held that pharmaceutical patents may be justified to a certain extent if they 
adequately fulfil their purposes without leading to inappropriate limitations on the 
accessibility of medicines.197 The justification can be derived from the fact that 
adequate levels of patent protection benefit the future availability of new medications 
by encouraging investments into pharmaceutical R&D.198 While a short-term 
restriction of the accessibility of medicines thus may be justified, a controversy arises 
regarding the question whether the minimum patent period of 20 years under TRIPS 
can actually be regarded as a short-term restriction, considering that the affordability 
of medical treatment directly impacts human health and life. Therefore, the 
justification of the international patent regime depends on the establishment of an 
adequate balance between the future availability of new medicines and current public 
health requirements.  
Under the initial TRIPS Agreement, it is possible to achieve such a balance, at least in 
certain circumstances. This, however, depends on how the agreement is implemented 
into domestic law, and to what extent the use of the flexibilities and exceptions is 
facilitated. TRIPS-Plus Agreements, on the other hand, frequently aggravate the 
negative impacts of pharmaceutical patents, by, inter alia, limiting the freedom to 
adequately utilise the flexibilities and exceptions provided by TRIPS and the Doha 
Declaration without adding any compensating benefits to the public interest. TRIPS-
Plus provisions thus thwart the establishment of an adequate balance between private 
economic interests and the public interest in health, and therefore cannot be deemed 
as justified. Ultimately, an adequate balance can only be achieved, and any short-term 
restrictions of the affordability of medicines can only be justified, on the basis that 
patents in fact entirely fulfil their purposes.199 While it can be concluded that in theory 
a short-term restriction of the affordability of medicines may be justified if this 
considerably enhances the enjoyment of the right to health in the future, the current 
international patent regime does not seem to be capable of establishing an adequate 
balance. It can, therefore, be submitted that the potential advantages of pharmaceutical 
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patentability do not justify the concomitant extensive trade-offs in the area of public 
health. 
4.3 Do Patents on Medical Products Actually fulfil their 
Purposes and Objectives?   
After establishing that in order to be justified, pharmaceutical patent rights need to be 
adequately balanced with public health interests, it is submitted that any restriction of 
the affordability of medicines can only be accepted if pharmaceutical patents 
sufficiently fulfil their purposes and lead to an enhanced availability of new medicines 
in the future. The following analysis therefore scrutinises whether the provisions of 
the international patent regime are actually capable of fulfilling the promises made in 
favour of patent protection, as specified above in 4.2.1. As the negative consequences 
of pharmaceutical patents especially disadvantage developing countries, the purpose 
fulfilment of the international patent regime is scrutinised with particular regard to the 
interrelation between market incentives and poverty levels in developing countries.  
4.3.1 Argument 1: The Disclosure Requirement of Patents 
Enhances Access to Knowledge in the Long-Run 
One of the main requirements for the approval of a patent application is that the 
inventor discloses the technicalities of an invention to the patent office, which will 
then publish the information in exchange for exclusive marketing rights awarded to 
the patent holder. While exclusive rights prevent third parties from using this 
information without the consent of the patent holder, upon the expiry of a patent the 
knowledge enters the public domain. This is of particular importance, as the public 
benefits of an invention considerably increase when more people have access to the 
knowledge that facilitates the utilisation of the invention.200 Without the availability 
of patents, inventors would potentially be inclined to keep their research results secret. 
Thus, while pharmaceutical patents provide a short-term restriction on the affordability 
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of medicines, in the long-run they enhance the accessibility of such products by 
directly enabling competing manufacturers to produce generic versions of the drug. 
This can be illustrated by reference to the example of Coca Cola, as discussed in 
chapter 2.4.4, which managed to keep its Cola recipe undisclosed as a trade secret, 
rather than seeking time-limited patent protection, preventing competitors from 
producing and marketing identical versions of the product for now over 130 years.201 
If the same strategy was applied by pharmaceutical corporations, the impact on public 
health would potentially be devastating, as the originator company would be able to 
maintain a monopolistic position, keeping drug prices high for several decades.   
Retaining the technicalities of new pharmaceutical products in secret, however, would 
not indefinitely prevent the emergence of generic substitutes, as competitors would be 
free to conduct their own research, and, without patent protection, would be able to 
replicate the originator drug via reverse engineering. The prices of those drugs would 
nevertheless remain comparatively high, as each competitor would have to make 
significant investments into R&D, which would need to be recovered on the markets. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the disclosure requirement is one of the most significant 
benefits pharmaceutical patents provide for the public interest.   
4.3.2 Argument 2: Patents Enhance Research Incentives into New 
Medicines 
The potentially strongest argument made in favour of patent protection is that by 
rewarding successful inventors, patent protection aims to create research incentives for 
the development of new products, including medicines. Upon closer examination, 
however, it becomes apparent that the current international patent regime does not 
include sufficient mechanisms to ensure that research is conducted in areas most 
important for the public interest. As the following analysis shows, patents frequently 
fail to ensure the creation of adequate incentives for highly required research projects, 
so that it can be submitted that patents tend to reduce social welfare instead of 
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enhancing the public benefit.202 In other words, the current IP regime provides no 
guarantee that pharmaceutical patents lead to the development of those medications 
that are most needed, i.e. drugs for the treatment of conditions that constitute the 
majority of the global disease burden.203 As will be elaborated in the following 
sections, the R&D strategy of pharmaceutical corporations is directed towards the 
development of products with a high demand in industrialised countries with the 
intention of recouping investments and turning high profits in wealthy markets.204 As 
the marginal returns expected from developing country markets are almost minuscule 
to originator industries, it seems that by focussing on market incentives patents fail to 
encourage research into diseases that predominantly affect poor populations.205  
Furthermore, it is questionable how far patents in developing countries actually 
enhance the global pharmaceutical research incentive.206 In the majority of cases, a 
research incentive is established in industrialised nations through the wealthy markets 
they provide. Commonly, this happens completely irrespective of whether there is a 
market for the resulting innovative products in the developing world.207 According to 
Hestermeyer, 80% of pharmaceutical sales are made in the US, the EU, Canada, and 
Japan, while the entirety of African markets only account for 1.1%.208 It can thus be 
suggested that the influence of pharmaceutical patents in developing countries and 
LDCs on the incentive to innovate is insignificant.209 This can be illustrated by 
reference to the experience with HIV/AIDS drugs in the early 2000s, when public 
campaigns and particularly the Doha Declaration led to significant reductions of the 
medicine prices in the developing world. The research-based pharmaceutical industry 
lost sales to generic manufacturers, and further faced reduced profits due to price cuts, 
particularly in Brazil and Africa. Nevertheless, the substantial investment into the 
R&D of new HIV/AIDS treatments continued, because of the expected profits from 
patients in industrialised countries, where prices remained high.210 
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It can thus be observed that pharmaceutical patentability in developing countries only 
has marginal impacts on the global research incentive, and that market incentives in 
general are inadequate for promoting research into diseases that mainly affect poor 
populations.211 For countries that do not provide valuable markets to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and therefore only marginally affect the creation of research 
incentives, a 20-year protection period restricting the accessibility of medicines for the 
majority of its population, thus seems rather extensive. A study by Scherer therefore 
concludes with the argument that while the non-patentability of medicines in 
developing countries would allow them to free-ride on inventions with adverse effects 
on the welfare of industrialised nations, the overall global welfare would be 
significantly improved by providing enhanced access to medicines for the poor.212 
Additionally, it can be suggested that ‘[t]he impulse to create and to innovate is 
intrinsic to human beings.’213 Mankind has been innovative since long before IP rights 
came into existence. While it may be true that patent rights impact the amount of risk 
innovators are willing to accept, it can be held that without IP protection innovation 
would not simply vanish all together.214 
Although this may be true, the long-standing history of patent rights indicates that the 
availability of patent protection, at least to a certain extent, furthers inventiveness. This 
does not substantiate, however, that prolonged patent periods are actually the best 
method for creating research incentives.215 As will be elaborated in the following sub-
chapters, the current international patent system does not adequately provide 
incentives for ground-breaking research, but rather facilitates the patentability of 
minor inventions.216 Pharmaceutical research is mainly driven by prospective 
profitability, which increases when R&D costs can be kept low and products can be 
marketed to a large number of customers.217 Thus, pharmaceutical research is often 
directed towards particularly well-selling products, such as life-style drugs, minor 
improvements of existing products with low-risk research investments, and me-too 
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drugs, i.e. chemically amended substances with similar effects as existing blockbuster 
drugs.218  
4.3.2.1 Counterargument 1: Neglected Diseases 
The fact that pharmaceutical patents fail to provide adequate incentives for the 
development of urgently required medications can best be observed by analysing the 
insufficient encouragement provided for the research into neglected diseases which 
mainly affect the poor. In its broadest interpretation, the term ‘neglected diseases’ can 
refer to all health conditions for which treatment is not available or accessible for a 
wide variety of reasons.219 In a more conventional sense, neglected diseases 
specifically refer to conditions with low research activity due to a failure of market 
incentives. In this sense, neglected diseases commonly affect marginalised and 
vulnerable groups living in poverty, particularly in rural areas in developing 
countries.220 Due to the climate and geographical location where most neglected 
diseases most commonly appear, they are at times also referred to as tropical 
diseases.221 While neglected diseases may also affect poor groups within the 
population of developed countries, they generally do not provide wealthy markets for 
medicines,222 so that the research into treatment opportunities is neglected by the 
industry. Thus, neglected diseases can be identified as a direct consequence of poverty, 
commonly hitting those who already lack access to health care facilities and services, 
and whose concerns often remain unaddressed.223 Especially for developing countries, 
neglected diseases constitute a serious burden, not only because they affect the lives 
of people who are infected or at high risk of infection, but because they also affect a 
country and its development process due their adverse impact on working capacity, 
health care costs, and education.224 According to Hunt, neglected diseases are therefore 
‘both a cause and a consequence of human rights violations.’225  
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The difficulty of tackling neglected diseases can be attributed to market failures which 
are inherent to the functionality of patents in that the augmented private power 
attributed to the pharmaceutical industry does nothing to encourage addressing the 
needs of the marginalised and poor.226 Thus, the R&D of medications for the treatment 
of neglected diseases remains largely insufficient and underfunded as ordinary market 
incentives fail to cater for the requirements of destitute markets.227 Consequently, it 
can be observed that the incentive created by patents and market forces is insufficient 
when it is appreciated that ‘only 10% of global funding for research goes towards 
diseases which affect 90% of the world’s population’.228 Trouiller et al identified that 
between 1975 and 1999 only 16 medications were developed and approved for the 
treatment of tropical diseases and tuberculosis, compared to a total of 1393 drugs that 
were approved throughout this period.229 Similarly, of the estimated 2100 drugs in 
development between 1999 and 2000, only 18 research projects specifically addressed 
neglected diseases.230 Additionally, the lower priority allocated to the development of 
drugs for the treatment of neglected diseases leads to a prolonged average development 
time of 8.8 years, in comparison to an average of 5.4 years for other medical 
products.231 Furthermore, a considerably large number of pharmaceutical research 
projects are abandoned – with, for example, 39% of all drugs in development in the 
US being prematurely terminated – leading to the emergence of so-called orphan 
drugs, i.e. chemical compounds that are potentially effective treatment methods, 
which, however, never make it into clinical trials as the high costs involved are not 
economically viable. 232 While these medicines are not necessarily intended for the 
treatment of diseases that predominantly burden developing countries, orphan drug 
research is likewise neglected because of the low profit margin expected of such 
products. 
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While the neglected research activity is thus a direct result of market failures, the issues 
of neglected diseases must further be attributed to improper public policies in that 
governments rely solely on the market incentives created by patents to encourage 
pharmaceutical research.233 As the investments of pharmaceutical corporations are 
largely profit driven, however, there is a general improbability that market forces can 
lead to the development of products and medications that predominantly improve the 
welfare in poor countries, irrespective of the availability of patent protection.234 
According to the pharmaceutical industry, the R&D of medications for the treatment 
of neglected diseases is too expensive and risky to be viable, particularly in 
consideration of the marginal returns expected from the marketing of the resulting 
products.235 In other words, the reluctance of the industry to invest in the development 
of drugs for diseases that mainly affect the poor – with investments into research 
relating to neglected diseases commonly being less than 1% of a corporation’s overall 
research budget – is directly attributable to the risk that adequate financial 
compensation for such investments cannot be achieved.236 By nature, patents are thus 
incapable of providing incentives for research into medicines for which the markets 
fail to offer desirable returns due to a lack of spending capacity.237 Outterson therefore 
concludes that ‘diseases are neglected due to the poverty of the afflicted, not the lack 
of IP rights.’238 
As can be seen, the historical experience clearly indicates that market incentives 
cannot provide adequate stimulation for addressing health conditions that 
predominantly affect people living in poverty.239 Most of the medications for the 
treatment of tropical diseases available today were developed in the first half of the 
20th century in close correlation with the demands of colonial powers.240 With the 
sudden end of colonialism, however, such research efforts have been increasingly 
abandoned.241 While it is only economically logical for private corporations to 
prioritise research into diseases that mainly affect wealthy countries, the detrimental 
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impact of the pharmaceutical industry continuously shifting its focus away from 
neglected diseases increases public health problems in the developing world.242 
According to the objectives and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, IP rights shall lead 
to technology transfers and capacity building, thereby enabling developing countries 
to conduct their own pharmaceutical research. Most low-income countries, however, 
continue to be devoid of both the economic and technological means required for 
addressing the neglected diseases that affect them most.243  
It can thus be concluded that pharmaceutical patent rights cannot provide adequate 
solutions for addressing global health needs, and particularly the disease burdens that 
predominantly affect poor countries.244 Especially for neglected diseases, a different 
approach to incentivising research activity is required, which enables corporations to 
recoup their research investments and to realise sensible profit margins.245 This can be 
exemplified by reference to the successful experience in finding a treatment for 
HIV/AIDS. The development of ARV therapies was largely driven by a strong 
political devotion of industrialised nations, as well as by the fact that HIV/AIDS 
similarly affected the population of wealthy countries, thereby providing more 
profitable markets than most other tropical diseases.246 
Additionally, it must be noted that the argument of the pharmaceutical industry that 
the use of compulsory licenses in developing countries is likely to disincentive 
pharmaceutical research, may hold true for the specific circumstances surrounding 
neglected diseases, particularly as there are no other wealthy markets for the industry 
to recoup their research costs.247 This argument, however, may nevertheless be 
redundant, as there is currently hardly any private research activity conducted into such 
diseases which could be discouraged.248  
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4.3.2.2 Counterargument 2: Me-Too Drugs 
Although it may be true that pharmaceutical patentability creates at least certain 
research incentives in the medical field, it is unlikely that patents can by themselves 
ensure that pharmaceutical research is mainly directed towards the development of 
ground-breaking new medications. As the pharmaceutical industry is profit-oriented, 
research is likely to be directed at products that promise high returns and successful 
markets. Thus, pharmaceutical research regularly leads to the development of so-called 
me-too drugs, which consist chemically of substances that are altered just enough to 
fulfil the novelty requirement for patentability, while having basically the same effects 
as well established drugs of competitor companies.249 In other words, me-too drugs are 
patentable ‘inventions’ that frequently fail to offer any new therapeutic benefits.250 
The term ‘me-too drugs’ is particularly employed when a considerable number of 
similar drugs are marketed by competing companies, with the main aim of receiving a 
share of the profitability of well-selling blockbuster drugs.251 According to Trouiller 
et al, 68.7% of the pharmaceutical products registered between 1975 and 1999 were 
me-too drugs, or, in other words, only one third of patentable pharmaceutical products 
provide distinct therapeutic progress.252 It is thus questionable how far patents satisfy 
the right to health requirement of encouraging the development of novel medicines, 
and particularly of new treatment methods to tackle future disease burdens.253 
At the same time, it can be acknowledged that a certain focus on the development of 
me-too drugs is not entirely negative for public health. The availability of equivalently 
effective substitutes can reduce the prices of patented medicines through a timely 
introduction of competition, although this price reduction cannot be expected to be on 
a par with the benefits of introducing generic drugs to the markets.254 On the other 
hand, excessive investment into the development of profitable me-too drugs entails the 
risk that research budgets are shifted away from the R&D of other new medications.255 
Furthermore, future research efforts may be hindered by the culmination of a large 
 
249 cf. ECOSOC (n 4) para 39. 
250 Lopert R and Gleeson D (n 160) 210. 
251 Henry D and Searles A (n 15) 9.8. 
252 Trouiller P and others (n 165) 2189 and 2193. 
253 ECOSOC (n 4) para 39. 
254 ibid; Hestermeyer H (n 1) 148. 
255 Henry D and Searles A (n 15) 9.8. 
217 
 
number of patents on similar chemical substances in the hands of a limited number of 
corporations.256 It is therefore questionable whether the marginal price reductions 
offered by patented me-too drugs provide an adequate balance to the concomitant loss 
of investments in other vital areas of pharmaceutical research.257 Here, similar to the 
issues of neglected diseases, patent protection offers an incentive for the industry to 
seek high profitability, but fails to encourage investments into the R&D of the 
medicines most needed to tackle pressing disease burdens. 
4.3.2.3 Counterargument 3: The Relaxation of Patentability 
Requirements and Successive Patent Periods 
So far, it has been argued that patents fail to provide the intended research incentive 
required for the development of fundamentally novel medicines. Due to inherent 
market failures, patents are by nature incapable of promoting research into highly 
required medications for the treatment of diseases that mainly affect the poor. 
Furthermore, the intense profit orientation of the pharmaceutical industry has led to 
the relocation of research budgets, now aiming for the development of imitator drugs 
without any distinct therapeutic advancements. It must therefore be questioned, to 
what extent the inventions brought about by pharmaceutical research activity actually 
deserve patent protection? Currently, however, patent laws fail in providing means to 
identify adequate protection levels and periods for each individual invention.258 This 
is of particular concern in consideration of the continuous relaxation of patentability 
requirements, and especially the introduction of the patentability of new uses, in a 
number of TRIPS-Plus FTAs, as elaborated in chapter 2.5.1.1. 
The requirements set out for the patentability of innovations provide the essential 
parameters according to which an invention arguably deserves the enjoyment of patent 
protection. Subsequent to the initial TRIPS Agreement, however, those requirements 
were continuously amended, leading to a progressive reduction of patentability 
standards in favour of the research-based industry, most notably seen in the relaxation 
of novelty requirements.259 These changes are controversial, as they do not seem to 
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follow a sensible purpose or objective enhancing the public benefit.260 Conversely, the 
relaxation of patentability requirements destabilises the already fragile balance 
between private and public interests. Not only does this relaxation lead to a larger 
number of drugs being patented, incurring higher costs for patients in need of 
treatment, but further, the reduction of novelty requirements is counterproductive to 
providing real research incentives by facilitating the patentability of minor adjustments 
of prior known products.  
Where the novelty requirement is reduced to a point that new uses of prior known 
products qualify for patentability, simple changes to recommended dosages, different 
ways of administering a drug, or minimal changes to the chemical structure of existing 
drugs can be utilised to extend the monopoly position of originator companies far 
beyond the initial 20-year patent period.261 In particular, the patentability of new 
dosages is of major concern for public health considerations, as AbbVie, for example, 
managed to receive a patent on a new dosage that was already known to professionals 
in the medical field, and thereby known to prior art.262 While a new dosage may 
actually have clinical benefits for the treatment of certain patients, patents on such new 
uses prevent doctors from prescribing cheaper generic drugs to be used with a newly 
patented dosage.263 In other words, the new dosage can only be administered by 
prescribing the expensive patented product. 
Additionally, it must be noted here that the patentability of new uses of known 
products arguably can be identified as an infringement of the regulations provided by 
the TRIPS Agreement. This is because, first and foremost, Article 27(1) TRIPS 
explicitly requires patentable products and processes to be new, and to involve an 
inventive step.264 The ‘inventive step’ requirement shall furthermore be synonymous 
with ‘non-obvious’.265 It is thus questionable whether new uses of known products 
fulfil these requirements, particularly where different dosages adjusted to the needs of 
individual patient groups are obvious to health care professionals, i.e. to persons 
skilled in the arts. Furthermore, Article 27(1) provides that patents shall not 
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discriminate between different fields of technology.266 According to Dutfield, 
however, TRIPS-Plus patentability standards seem to privilege pharmaceutical 
products, the only field of technology capable of adequately utilising the patentability 
of new uses of known substances, with the option of acquiring patents on innovations 
that fail to satisfy the novelty requirement of the TRIPS Agreement.267 Conversely, in 
other fields of technology the novelty and non-obviousness requirements appear to be 
much more strictly applied.268 
From a different angle, however, the patentability of new uses in the pharmaceutical 
sector may prove itself to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a number of 
chemical structures found in medications may actually have beneficial effects for the 
treatment of a variety of different diseases; other than those for which a drug was 
originally approved.269 A prime example for such a drug can be seen in Aspirin, which, 
as elaborated in chapter 2.5.1.1, was initially marketed as a mild pain killer. Since 
further research into the chemical compounds of Aspirin was conducted, it has been 
discovered that the drug is also effective for the treatment of heart disease and 
colorectal cancer. As those research results constitute considerable improvements in 
the medical field, and as similar advancements may be expected from other chemical 
compounds, it seems sensible to acknowledge that there are certain benefits attached 
to the patentability of new uses as incentives for continuous research into existing 
medicines.270  
The downside, on the other hand, is that the patentability of new uses also provides a 
different incentive for economic disclosure strategies, referred to as ‘patent 
evergreening’, as elaborated in chapter 2.5.1.1. IP systems that provide more 
opportunities for the patentability of new uses of known substances make it effectively 
easier for corporations to receive successive patents.271 By utilising evergreening 
strategies, it becomes advantageous for pharmaceutical corporations to keep certain 
research results secret when applying for an initial patent, disclosing further treatment 
opportunities only at a later stage of the life circle of a drug, in order to extend 
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monopoly positions by receiving successive patents. 272 As successive patents receive 
another full 20-year protection period, it must be questioned whether the patentability 
of new uses and minor advancements hinders real innovation because the incentive to 
invest in expensive high-risk research is reduced when the same protection is granted 
for low risk investments.273 Thus, the opportunity of ‘gaming’ the patent system diverts 
research activity away from real innovation, while strategic economic planning is 
incentivised instead.274 As the patentability of new uses and incremental improvements 
therefore fails to provide adequate research incentives, a further protection period of 
20 years seems imbalanced and unjustifiably long.275  
From a public health standpoint, lengthy monopoly periods only seem to be just about 
justifiable where patents are awarded in order to incentivise and reward true 
pharmaceutical innovation.276 The development of follow up inventions and new use 
applications, on the other hand, only require minor inventiveness and there are 
considerably lower costs and risks involved than in substantially new R&D 
activities.277 Similarly, the clinical trials required for the market approval of new 
dosages are significantly less expensive and risky than the clinical trials required for 
novel medications.278 It is therefore submitted that minor advances with limited 
therapeutic improvements do not seem to justify the award of a successive full length 
monopoly positions, keeping drug prices high after the initial patent period expires.279  
It must be noted here, however, that at the end of an initial patent period the originally 
patented product enters the public domain irrespective of the award of a successive 
patent, as at that point only a new use, a new dosage, or amendments of the chemical 
structure of a drug are patentable.280 By engaging in excessive marketing campaigns, 
however, the research-based industry aims to convince patients that minor 
improvements are of such magnitude that they decide to purchase the expensive newly 
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patented version of a drug, rather than a generic copy of the old drug.281 Here, the 
pharmaceutical industry takes advantage of a severe imbalance between the seller and 
the consumer, generated by the fact that patients are not consumers in the regular 
sense.282 Patients, as consumers of pharmaceutical products, commonly lack the 
medical knowledge required for making informed choices about which drug to 
purchase, and therefore completely rely on assistance provided in form of expert 
advice.283 Physicians, however, may be reluctant to prescribe generic drugs where the 
originator company is awarded a patent on a new use or a new dosage, as prescribing 
a generic product for patented new uses or dosages may be construed as a patent 
infringement committed by the doctor.284 In other words, generic pharmaceuticals can 
only be marketed and utilised for the treatment of certain health conditions, but not for 
all the conditions a chemical compound can effectively be used to treat.285 
Consequently, the award of successive patents continues to limit competition on the 
markets, leading to higher prices for medicines even where an initial patent period has 
expired.286 
It can therefore be concluded, that even though the patentability of new uses and new 
dosages may provide a certain incentive for conducting further research into existing 
medical products with the possibility of improving available treatment methods, the 
drawbacks of the relaxation of patentability requirements outweigh any advantages. In 
particular, the patentability of new uses of known substances facilitates strategic 
economic planning, and the patentability of minor changes to the chemical structures 
of drugs facilitates the protection of meagre clinical advancements, rather than 
providing real research incentives. This leads to an unjustified artificial restriction of 
competition, which in its extremes can take the form of excessive patent evergreening, 
keeping drug prices high for decades after an initial patent period expires. As the 
research focus of the pharmaceutical industry may further be shifted away from 
essential areas addressing major disease burdens, it can be submitted that from a right 
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to health perspective the relaxation of patentability requirements is imbalanced and 
inadequate. 
4.3.2.4 Counterargument 4: Patents Create Obstacles Preventing 
Further Innovation 
Thus far, this analysis indicates that the contribution of pharmaceutical patentability 
to the creation of adequate research incentives is rather limited. The extent to which 
changes to the level of patent protection – irrespective of the direction – impact future 
research activity, therefore, remains controversial.287 While an adequate degree of 
protection may indeed facilitate a certain amount of investments into pharmaceutical 
R&D, there is no indicator that the continuous strengthening of patent rights positively 
affects innovation.288 Conversely, as will be shown in this section, excessive patent 
protection may in fact create obstacles for future research activity. 
Innovation is frequently brought about by research activity that builds upon prior 
discoveries.289 If the patent protection of older inventions is too stringent, researchers 
are prevented from utilising existing knowledge, whereby future innovation is 
delayed.290 Thus, the continuous increase of protection levels directly contradicts the 
very purpose of patents – i.e. the stimulation of innovation – by restricting the 
innovative progress of competitors.291 In other words, when the patents awarded are 
too broad, they can be used to effectively prevent any further research activity.292 This 
is of particular concern in the field of pharmaceuticals, as the development of an 
administrable medicine commonly requires several stages of innovation, each of which 
could suffice for patentability creating a further obstacle for researchers.293 Taking into 
account the possibility of strategic disclosure and patent evergreening, the 
development of medicines that build upon prior inventions can be severely hindered 
for unreasonably lengthy periods of time. Restricting the possibility of utilising 
existing knowledge through the provision of excessive exclusive rights will ultimately 
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delay technological progress in both developing and industrialised countries.294 
According to the UN Economic and Social Council, the provision of excessive patent 
protection can therefore constitute an undue restriction of medical research, which 
stands in contrast to Article 15 ICESCR which requires that the protection of private 
interests is adequately balanced with the public interest of advancing and 
disseminating medical knowledge.295 
Furthermore, patents may hinder pharmaceutical research in another way. This is 
where the public interest in a specific medication is of such concern to a country that 
the fear of high prices resulting from patent protection may incline governments of 
developing countries to keep certain information secret. This was the case in 2007, for 
example, when the Indonesian government was reluctant to share samples of the H5N1 
bird flu virus from Indonesian patients with WHO researchers.296 The reluctancy of 
the Indonesian government stemmed from the fear that pharmaceutical corporations 
would then gain unrestricted access to those samples, which would have increased the 
likelihood that the private pharmaceutical industry would develop flu vaccines 
resulting from this information.297 While the development of treatment methods in 
itself is positive, the Indonesian government considered the threat that concomitant 
patent protection would set the prices of bird flu medicines at levels unaffordable for 
patients living in poverty.298 Thus, Indonesian health officials only accepted to share 
the samples after the WHO committed to not passing on such samples to private 
industry without the authorisation of the Indonesian government, in order to protect 
affordable access.299   
Given these points, it can be concluded that the tightening of the international patent 
regime not only fails to provide adequate research incentives for real innovativeness, 
but furthermore may in itself create considerable obstacles preventing appropriate 
continuous research efforts. As a result, an imbalanced increase of patent protection is 
likely to defeat the very purpose of the international patent regime. 
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4.3.2.5 Counterargument 5: High Prices Neither Save Lives Now, 
Nor in the Future 
Lastly, when scrutinising the extent to which patents are capable of providing adequate 
incentives for promoting pharmaceutical research, it must be considered that one of 
the main purposes of such incentives is the accessibility of new pharmaceutical 
products in the future. Pharmaceutical patents thus provide a controversial trade-off, 
sacrificing the health and life of current populations in order to improve the overall 
public health environment for the future. Considering the lengthy patent periods 
awarded under the international IP regime, and the possibility of further extending 
monopolistic positions on the markets via successive patents on new uses of known 
products, it is questionable whether patents are actually capable of fulfilling this 
purpose at all. 
In general, it is true that both the health of current populations as well as the health 
concerns of future populations need to be taken into account.300 When medications, 
however, are too expensive to be affordable for major sectors of the world’s 
population, advancements in the medical field will only provide meagre benefits for 
the global health situation.301 Thus, when the prices of novel medications are too high, 
their mere existence is of no value for people in need of treatment who cannot afford 
those drugs.302 In other words, the value of pharmaceutical innovation is directly 
dependent on the accessibility and affordability of the resulting pharmaceutical 
products.303 It is therefore submitted, that irrespective of the creation of any 
pharmaceutical research incentives, by inducing high monopoly prices on novel 
medicines, patents neither save the lives of the poor now, nor in the future. 
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4.3.3 Argument 3: Patents Lead to Technology Transfer and 
Enhance Wealth in Developing Countries 
Together with the supposed creation of enhanced research incentives, one of the main 
objectives of the harmonisation of the international IP system is that increased 
protection of IP rights shall lead to the dissemination and transfer of technology, 
increasing wealth and ultimately enhancing the welfare of developing countries. It can 
then be surmised that the introduction of pharmaceutical patentability would lead to 
capacity building of the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries. This could 
theoretically lead to remarkable benefits as developing countries would be enabled to 
utilise new pharmaceutical capacities to address their most pressing public health 
needs themselves. Unfortunately, however, there is currently no indicator which 
suggests that increased IP protection actually leads to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology. Conversely, as will be elaborated in this section, technology transfers 
and technological capacity building depend on a wide variety of circumstances, and it 
seems that stringent IP rights in fact create further obstacles for technological 
development rather than encouraging the transfer of knowledge to developing 
countries.  
According to Abbott, it is now commonly accepted by researchers in the field of IP 
and health that the strengthening of patent laws by itself is unlikely to lead to an 
increase of pharmaceutical research conducted in developing countries.304 This view 
can be supported by reference to the experiences of several developing countries. A 
notable example is the situation of Malaysia, which, despite providing suitably strong 
patent laws, did not attract technology transfers in the pharmaceutical sector.305 
Similarly, the strengthening of IP protection levels in Jordan introduced in accordance 
with the Jordan-US TRIPS-Plus FTA has not led to increases in the pharmaceutical 
R&D activity of Jordanian corporations.306 The inability of developing countries to 
attract the anticipated transfer and dissemination of technology thus seems attributable 
 
304 Abbott FM, ‘WTO TRIPS Agreement and its Implications’ (n 33) 2 and 6. 
305 Smith RD, Correa C and Oh C (n 19) 689. 
306 Ho CM (n 84) 250. 
226 
 
to factors other than mere IP considerations, including economic short-comings and 
the lack of an adequate infrastructure in low-income countries.307 
It can therefore be seen that a strengthening of IP protection does not automatically 
increase the pharmaceutical research capacity of developing countries to conduct R&D 
into medications for diseases that mainly affect the poor, for at least as long as low-
income countries continue to struggle with the accumulation of the required economic 
and technological means.308 Even where certain developing countries, commonly 
middle-income countries, did manage to develop suitable production capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector, local corporations are generally comparatively small and 
focussed on the production of generic drugs.309 Thus, there remains a distinct gap 
between the production of replicated chemical structures and the capacity to conduct 
intensive research into the development of novel medications. It must be further called 
into question, whether the industry of developing countries that actually manage to 
develop pharmaceutical research capacity would in fact be incentivised by higher IP 
standards to conduct research into neglected diseases. With an average annual 
spending on medicines of $239 per person in OECD countries, compared to an average 
spending of less than $20 in developing countries, and less than $6 in sub-Saharan 
Africa, IP rights would nevertheless encourage the pharmaceutical industry of 
developing countries to invest into the development of drugs that can be marketed in 
wealthy countries.310 It thus seems that even if the strengthening of IP rights led to 
pharmaceutical capacity building in developing countries, without additional strong 
political commitments and international cooperation, increased patent protection 
would be unlikely to notably improve the public health situation for the developing 
world. 
Furthermore, as the majority of pharmaceutical patents is held by corporations from 
industrialised nations, developing countries are generally required to import expensive 
patented medications.311 This means that developing countries have a trade deficit in 
medical products, and the strengthening of patent rights is highly unlikely to change 
this situation.312 Conversely, the current international IP regime is designed in a way 
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that facilitates the transfer of wealth from net importers of technology – the majority 
of which are developing countries – to exporting industrialised nations.313 This may 
then lead to a further accumulation of the ownership of IP in the hands of the industry 
in the Global North, to the detriment of the developing world.314 Therefore, rather than 
facilitating the transfer of technology to developing countries, the current international 
IP system seems to create further obstacles hindering the dissemination of 
technology.315 
With this in mind, and in light of the historical experience, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the international harmonisation of IP standards is unlikely to provide adequate 
solutions for reducing the wealth gap between the Global North and the Global 
South.316 In particular, appropriate standards of domestic IP protection are clearly 
dependent on the actual level of a country’s development.317 Historically, protection 
standards thus varied widely between different nations, as each country adopted IP 
laws most suitable to their current economic and technological needs.318 The 
establishment of an international IP regime that strictly requires the same protection 
levels in both high-income and low-income countries fails to pay due regard to specific 
individual circumstances and is therefore particularly burdensome for poor 
countries.319 In other words, developing countries are unlikely to benefit from 
protection standards which are mainly suitable for industrialised nations, as they are 
commonly designed to further the interests of multinational corporations.320 
Furthermore, the required patentability of inventions in all fields of technology under 
TRIPS prevents developing WTO member states from implementing economic IP 
strategies tailored to their specific developmental needs.321 Ultimately, it is thus widely 
accepted that, at least in the short-term, the negative impacts of strengthened IP laws 
on developing countries outweigh any benefits thereof.322 
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The historical experience outlines that today’s industrialised nations developed their 
technological capacity at a time when international IP standards were weak, so that 
local industries were enabled to develop technical know-how by copying and imitating 
inventions made in other countries.323 Correspondingly, it is generally accepted that 
for human development imitation is a key step towards building the capacity to 
innovate.324 Ultimately, today’s industrialised countries that benefited from low IP 
standards quickly moved on from being imitators to advancing their technical 
capacities and increasing their own innovativeness.325 For developing countries, and 
particularly for LDCs, affordable access to technology is therefore regarded as an 
essential prerequisite to facilitating the development of national industries in order for 
them to catch up with industrialised nations.326 By relaxing its patent laws in the 1970s, 
India, for example, enabled its national pharmaceutical industry to thrive and to 
establish substantial pharmaceutical R&D capacities.327 This, however, would not be 
possible under today’s international IP regime. It is thus frequently suggested that via 
the WTO system, industrialised nations took away the opportunity for developing 
countries to implement IP laws suitable to their developmental needs, including the 
utilisation of reverse engineering where required; an opportunity which itself was very 
integral to the historical industrialisation of the Global North.328 In other words, under 
a harmonised international patent regime, developing countries are effectively barred 
from utilising patents as a tool to facilitate adequate development.329 Thus, by 
preventing poorer countries from adopting patent standards appropriate to their 
specific needs, the harmonisation of international IP laws will ultimately slow down 
development processes, thereby creating an obstacle for the industrialisation of the 
Global South and the fight against poverty.330 
While developing countries currently have to endure the IP rules imposed on them by 
the Western World, according to Dutfield and Suthersahnen there is a real likelihood 
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that industrialised nations would change the IP system again if they needed to 
implement lower IP standards in order to ensure their own keeping up to date with 
technological developments.331 In fact, early indicators of this strategy may already be 
observable in the US under the Trump administration. For example, President Trump 
does not hesitate to pull the US out of international trade agreements, such as the TPP, 
which he considers unfavourable, irrespective of the considerable advantages such 
agreements already provide, particularly for the US.332 Prima facie, the revocation of 
imbalanced TRIPS-Plus FTAs may seem to be a favourable development for access to 
medicine concerns. Eventually, however, the aim of the Trump administration is to 
achieve even greater advantages for the US, so that future FTAs may, in fact, lead to 
even stricter standards favouring US wealth acquisitions at the expense of the poor.  
In conclusion, it is submitted that the current international IP regime is designed to 
protect the interests of the industries of industrialised countries, neglecting the 
importance of countries being able to utilise appropriate protection levels as a means 
of technological development. Therefore, it can be observed that the current patent 
regime is not capable of facilitating the promised technology transfers and capacity 
building, with the concomitantly expected increase of wealth in developing countries. 
Ultimately, the mere fact that the WTO regime recognises, and regularly extends 
transitional periods for the introduction of pharmaceutical patentability in LDCs, as 
elaborated in chapter 2.4.5, indicates the acknowledgement that the negative effects of 
unsuitable patent protection outweigh the alleged benefits. In other words, if the 
advantages provided by pharmaceutical patents would culminate in a net benefit for 
low-income countries, there would be no need for an extension to the transitional 
periods. 
4.3.4 Argument 4: Patents Increase Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) 
In addition to the claim that increases of IP protection would lead to technology 
transfers and capacity building, it is regularly suggested that higher IP, and particularly 
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patent standards, can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries. 
This idea, however, is regarded sceptically and there exists an ongoing controversy 
surrounding the suggestion that IP protection would automatically increase FDI.333 
Notably, US corporations hold the view that the FDI undertakings of pharmaceutical 
corporations are significantly influenced by the strength of local IP standards.334 In 
contrast, though, studies conducted on the experiences of Brazil and Turkey indicate 
that the availability of pharmaceutical patentability did not have any noticeable 
impacts on FDI levels.335 This calls into question whether there actually exists a strong 
relationship between IP rights and FDI decisions.336 In fact, for several decades, China 
has managed to receive enormous sums of FDI, irrespective of its comparatively weak 
IP protection standards.337 It can thus be suggested that FDI decisions depend on a 
variety of economic considerations, and that the direct impact of IP rights seems 
negligible. 
Furthermore, in order to provide an actual advantage in the competition for FDI, the 
IP protection in one country needs to be higher than the protection standards of another 
country.338 When all countries have similar IP standards, as anticipated by the 
harmonisation of the international IP regime under the TRIPS Agreement, then no 
country will end up having an advantage.339 The idea that having higher IP standards 
than the next country brings about advantages in the competition for FDI, then makes 
TRIPS-Plus Agreements – with all the negative consequences of increasing IP 
protection – more attractive for developing countries, although there is little evidence 
that more stringent IP protection actually leads to an increase in FDI.340 Moreover, the 
aim of attracting FDI may have further adverse impacts on public health because 
research based pharmaceutical corporations may threaten to reduce their investments 
into a country as a retaliation against the use of compulsory licenses to address urgent 
public health needs.341 Thus, the wish to receive or maintain FDI may indeed prevent 
governments from exerting their rights under TRIPS to adequately utilise the 
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exceptions and flexibilities of the agreement for the protection of public health. 
Ultimately, however, even when a country agrees to higher IP protection standards 
there is no guarantee that this will actually lead to a commensurable increase of FDI.342 
4.3.5 Concluding Remarks: Patents do not Adequately Fulfil 
Their Purposes 
As can be seen in this analysis, the patentability of pharmaceutical products fails to 
provide suitable incentives to encourage the risky R&D of radically new medicines, 
especially for diseases that mainly affect the poor. Thus, the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patentability in developing countries seems inequitable when the 
specific health needs of the poor remain neglected.343 Even where medicines targeting 
those diseases which predominantly affect people in the developing world enter the 
markets, such as ARVs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, patent protection frequently 
leads to such drugs being priced at an unaffordable level for the majority of the world’s 
population, and therefore negates any benefits for people living in poverty.344 
Furthermore, a continuous relaxation of patentability requirements facilitates the 
patentability of incremental advancements, thereby encouraging strategic economic 
planning instead of investments into real pharmaceutical R&D activity. It is therefore 
questionable whether there exists an actual justification for ever-increasing patent 
protection standards, particularly when considering that patents are not the only system 
– and potentially not the best way – of encouraging innovativeness.345 Instead, it seems 
that, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, a different way of incentivising research 
is required, which pays due regard to both the investments made by the industry as 
well as the affordability of medicines in developing countries, as further discussed in 
chapter 5.2.2.5.  
Additionally, the harmonisation of patent standards between industrialised nations and 
the developing world does not provide any considerable benefits for developing 
countries. In particular, neither the introduction of pharmaceutical patents nor the 
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harmonisation of IP laws notably impact the FDI decisions of multinational 
corporations or encourage the dissemination and transfer of technology to developing 
countries, thereby leading to pharmaceutical capacity building. In effect, due to the 
general neglect of the interests of developing countries in international IP laws, it is 
unlikely that poor countries will derive any considerable benefits from the 
strengthening of patent protection.346 Conversely, this analysis indicates that the 
stringent harmonisation of IP protection standards between the Global North and the 
Global South in fact creates obstacles for adequate development processes in low-
income countries, by preventing the utilisation of reverse engineering as a means for 
learning innovativeness. 
Ultimately, the preceding analysis leads to a negative answer for Sub-Question 2: 
Do patents on medical products actually fulfil their purposes and objectives?  
because the introduction of pharmaceutical patentability in developing countries does 
not lead to the fulfilment of the promises made in favour of patent protection. In 
particular, the patentability of pharmaceuticals in developing countries does not lead 
to an enhanced availability of new medicines in the future, especially not of drugs for 
the treatment of neglected tropical diseases which mainly burden developing countries. 
It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that a limitation of fundamental human rights 
cannot be justified by a patent regime which is not capable of fulfilling its purposes. 
4.4 Is the Current International Patent Regime Justified? 
In the final analysis of this chapter, examining the justification of the current 
international patent regime, the findings of the previous analyses will be scrutinised to 
derive an answer to Research Question 3:  
Recognising the importance of the right to health and access to medicines for 
human life in dignity, is the current international patent regime (under TRIPS 
and TRIPS-Plus) justified when the protection of private interests directly 
impacts on the affordability of medicines and public health? 
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As stipulated in chapter 3.3, for the purpose of this thesis, human rights that are most 
essential for a life in dignity are regarded as superior to less fundamental rights. Thus, 
the right to health is considered superior to property rights, including IP rights. This is 
in accordance with the very purpose of international human rights law, which 
stipulates the equal worth of all human beings, and aims to protect the dignity inherent 
to human existence in itself. Thus, fundamental human rights should always have 
primacy over trade concerns.347  
The issues with patent rights on pharmaceutical products, however, are not simply 
about conflicting norms between the right to health and IP laws, but furthermore entail 
a conflict within the right to health itself. On the one hand, the right to health entails 
the responsibility of states to ensure the affordability of medicines.348 The current 
international patent regime seems to compromise this human rights objective as the 
capability of governments to fulfil their duty is directly impaired, inter alia by lengthy 
patent periods as well as by political pressure directed at restricting the flexibilities 
provided by the TRIPS Agreement.349 On the other hand, as the provision of essential 
medicines is a core obligation of the right to health, the inaccessibility and the 
unavailability of medicines may both constitute a human rights violation.350 This is of 
particular concern, as the right to health requires the promotion of research for an 
enhanced availability of new medicines in the future. Patent rights may therefore be in 
accordance with the right to health when they adequately promote pharmaceutical 
research activity. 
The first thing to remember is that the purpose behind IP rights is the achievement of 
higher societal objectives, so that patent rights should serve rather than suppress public 
interests.351 Accordingly, patent rights must be identified as a means to an end, and not 
as an end in themselves.352 In this regard, the British Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights suggests that IP rights shall contribute to the fulfilment of economic 
and social human rights.353 This, however, does not directly follow from patent laws, 
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as the international patent regime fails to provide an explicit recognition of human 
rights concerns.354 In examining this, the first part of this chapter established that the 
current international patent regime is not adequately balanced, as while the rights of 
patent holders are clearly defined, there is a general lack of reference to the 
responsibilities of patent holders towards society.  
To now identify if the current international patent regime is justified, it is essential to 
consider Sub-Question 3.1 on whether the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-
term restriction of the accessibility of medicines. As provided here, the right to health 
entails both the requirement that medicines are affordable as well as that new 
medicines are available in the future. While under certain conditions a limitation of 
human rights standards may be justified according to Article 4 ICESCR, the Limburg 
principles suggest that limitations which directly impact on the life and survival of 
individuals are never permissible.355 Similarly, the ICCPR, which regulates the right 
to life, does not contain this type of a general limitation provision.356 Thus, there seems 
to be a strong case to be made against any restriction on the accessibility of medicines. 
On the other hand, however, both the affordability of medicines as well as the 
availability of new drugs are integral requirements of the accessibility of medicines 
and health care, and may directly impact the life and survival of individuals. It is 
therefore currently impossible to provide an uncontentious or conclusive answer to 
Sub-Question 3.1. Sub-chapter 4.2.4 concluded, however, with the suggestion that for 
a short-term restriction of the accessibility of medicines resulting from patent 
protection to be justifiable at all, the current international patent regime needs to 
adequately fulfil its purposes and objectives, thereby promoting pharmaceutical 
research activity which leads to an enhanced availability of new medicines in the 
future.  
Conversely, however, following an examination of the current international patent 
regime addressing Sub-Question 3.2, sub-chapter 4.3.5 concluded that patent rights 
currently do not adequately fulfil their purposes and objectives. Instead of promoting 
real research activity, the current patent regime rather seems to incentivise incremental 
innovations and strategic economic planning by which private rights holders can 
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extend monopoly positions without the requirement of making risky investments into 
radically new pharmaceutical R&D projects. Furthermore, patent rights completely 
fail to cater for the needs of poor populations, as medications for diseases that mainly 
affect the poor offer no profitable markets and therefore do not generate the required 
market incentives for investments by the profit driven industry. 
It can therefore be derived that impairments to the accessibility of medicines resulting 
from the protection of private rights under the current international patent regime are 
not justified. While the objectives and purposes of pharmaceutical patentability would 
potentially have positive impacts on the right to health if adequately fulfilled, the fact 
that current patent rights are not capable of fulfilling these aims suggests that the 
imbalances of the international patent regime create obstructions of the right to health 
without providing any considerable benefits for the public interest. Thus, from a 
human rights point of view, particularly with regard to the importance of the right to 
health and access to medicines for a human life in dignity, the patentability of medical 
products under the current international patent regime is not appropriate. Furthermore, 
it seems that the current international IP regime is not justified within itself, as at least 
for the patentability of medical products it becomes apparent that the current rules are 
not sufficiently capable of fulfilling their very own purposes.  
The incapability of patent rights to effectively promote the most needed 
pharmaceutical research projects is inherently connected to their reliance on 
commercial market incentives. Hence, it is important to realise that insufficiently 
regulated medicines markets lack the capability of adequately fulfilling public health 
requirements.357 As the accessibility of drugs, however, can directly impact the life 
and survival of patients in need of treatment, it must be acknowledged that the 
medicines market is more than an economic sales channel for trading consumer 
goods.358 For this reason, the common argument of market economists suggesting that 
trade markets should remain free from political interventions but regulate themselves 
is deficient, as it has become apparent that the pharmaceutical sector suffers from a 
wide array of market failures.359 Ultimately, pharmaceutical patents themselves are a 
means for addressing such a market failure; i.e. the failure of a completely competitive 
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market, which by itself is not capable of creating adequate incentives for conducting 
high risk pharmaceutical R&D. The current international patent regime, however, is 
insufficiently equipped to remedy this failure as it only regulates the private rights of 
patent holders and not their responsibilities towards society. Lacking an adequate 
balance between the private and public interests that are involved, and by granting 
monopolistic powers to rights holders, the current international patent regime leads to 
an exacerbation of a particular failure of the medicines market; namely the inadequate 
accessibility of drugs due to profit driven pricing strategies. 
With this in mind, it becomes apparent that the provision of private IP rights requires 
the introduction of counterbalancing mechanisms which ensure both the creation of 
pharmaceutical R&D incentives while at the same time safeguarding the affordability 
of medicines by preventing restrictive drug prices.360 For establishing a balance 
between the right to health and patents rights it is crucial to pay due regard to the social 
dimension of IP.361 According to former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health, Paul Hunt, patents can be described as a ‘social contract’362 by which the 
research efforts of a patent holder are rewarded with exclusive marketing rights. Once 
life-saving medicines are developed, a patent holder then ‘has a human rights 
responsibility to take all reasonable steps to make the medicine as accessible as 
possible, as soon as possible, to all those in need.’363 In this regard, it must be 
reemphasised that the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognise the need 
to establish a balance between the rights and obligations of IP rights holders ‘to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge’.364 While the 
TRIPS Agreement comprehensively defines the rights of patent holders, there is little 
clarification of the scope of the responsibilities of rights holders in international patent 
provisions.365 Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement only provides minimum protection 
standards, conferring on states the complete freedom to determine higher levels of 
protection. As a result, the current lack of clearly defined corporate responsibilities 
and ceilings of protection, in combination with the push for ever increasing patent 
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standards under TRIPS-Plus FTAs, generate a substantial obstacle for the 
establishment of the required balance.  
In summary, it can be concluded that the current international patent regime is not 
justified, and that particularly the restriction of the accessibility of essential medicines 
cannot be vindicated by the marginal incentive pharmaceutical patents provide for the 
development of new medications. From an ethical point of view, and in special 
consideration of human rights and human dignity, it can never be acceptable that 
human lives are sacrificed for the mere economic purpose of maximising monetary 
profits. While the current international patent regime may be sufficient for 
industrialised nations with wealthy markets and social insurance systems, it 
completely fails to cater for the specific requirements of developing countries and 
LDCs.366 When reflecting on the historic objectives and purposes of patents, however, 
it can be observed that the foundational idea behind their protection, namely the 
fostering of innovativeness for the benefit of the public interest, is generally a sensible 
approach to enhancing the well-being of human populations. It is therefore suggested 
that even though the international patent regime is currently not justified, it should not 
be abolished all together.367 Instead it is submitted that the international IP regime 
requires substantive revisions and amendments in order to facilitate the establishment 
of an adequate balance that provides adequate incentives encouraging truly needed 
pharmaceutical research projects while at the same time ensuring the affordability of 
medicines for everyone.368  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
Based on the premise that for the purpose of this thesis the protection of human health 
is considered of higher importance than the economic interests protected by private 
patent rights under international trade law, the present chapter analysed the 
justification of the international patent regime, inter alia, against the human right to 
health. In this consideration, it was reemphasised that the right to health entails both 
the affordability of medicines now, as well as the availability of new medicines in the 
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future. To identify the justification of the international patent regime, this chapter 
therefore scrutinised whether the anticipated benefits of newly developed medicines 
in the future can justify a short-term restriction of the affordability of medicines now. 
This question, however, cannot be conclusively answered because of ethical intricacies 
which would require the determination of whether the lives of current patients, or the 
lives of future patients are of higher importance, which conflicts with the basic human 
rights principle that all human beings are equal. Ultimately, it was submitted in the 
first part of this chapter that for such a restriction to be justifiable at all, the 
international patent regime would need to adequately fulfil all of its objectives and 
purposes, and ultimately lead to better medical treatment in the future. Scrutinising the 
objectives and purposes of the international patent regime and the real impacts of 
pharmaceutical patent rights on both the affordability of medicines and the availability 
of new medicines in the future, the second part of this chapter analysed whether 
pharmaceutical patents actually fulfil their aims. After careful examination, it was 
established that because of an inherent shortcoming – namely that the fulfilment of a 
public function is simply subjected to market incentives – patent rights are by nature 
incapable of fulfilling their own purposes. Thus, by restricting the accessibility of 
medicines, pharmaceutical patent rights are not only unjustifiable from a right to health 
perspective, but by not adequately fulfilling the objectives and purposes of the 
international patent regime, cannot be regarded as justified in themselves either. In 
particular, it was identified that the granting of private exclusive rights requires a 
counterbalance in form of distinct obligations to ensure that patents fulfil their 
purposes and not merely hamper the fulfilment of public objectives. Lacking these 
balancing mechanisms, it is concluded that the current international patent regime 
cannot be regarded as justified. 
Accordingly, it is essential for improving the justness of the international patent regime 
that the obligations of patentees, particularly of the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry, are clearly defined, and that some form of benchmarks are introduced which 
set specific requirements for the patentability of medications, paying due regard to the 
social dimension of IP. Furthermore, it is crucial that upper limits of patent protection 
are introduced and explicitly recognised by international IP laws to prevent an 
unrestricted proliferation of the protection of exclusive private rights to the detriment 
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of the public interest.369 The following chapter elaborates potential possibilities by 
which the international patent regime can be improved, indicating that a variety of 
existing voluntary measures have particular shortcomings in that their effectiveness is 
completely dependent on the willingness of the for-profit industry to place social aims 
above their monetary interests. An effective approach therefore requires the 
introduction of binding rules via amendments to the very IP treaties themselves, 
beginning with the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
 
369 cf. Frankel S (n 37) 1030; Xiong P (n 93) 186. 
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Chapter Five 
5 Identifying Responsibilities of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
As established by the preceding chapter, the current international patent regime cannot 
be regarded as justified, either within itself, or with regard to human rights, and 
particularly the right to health. Notably, the regime fails to sufficiently balance private 
and public interests, which can be attributed to an inadequate balance of the rights and 
obligations provided by international patent laws. In particular, it can be observed that 
while the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-Plus agreements provide detailed rights to 
patent holders, the international patent regime refrains from implementing distinct 
responsibilities or obligations of rights holders. If anything, the objectives and 
purposes of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS imply the general existence of rights holders’ 
obligations, but those obligations are not further defined and commonly neglected. To 
address this issue, this chapter analyses the possibility of identifying and adopting clear 
responsibilities of private corporations, and particularly of pharmaceutical patent 
holders, towards the realisation of the right to health, to ensure that private and public 
interests are appropriately balanced with each other. 
The first part of this chapter elaborates on soft law instruments and voluntary 
measures, which base the identification of the human rights responsibilities of private 
corporations on the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This section then 
aims to provide an answer to Research Question 4:  
Why is the corporate social responsibility approach of identifying the human 
rights responsibilities of the private business sector in non-binding international 
soft law instruments, insufficient for adequately regulating the pharmaceutical 
industry’s conduct towards the right to health? 
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The second part of this chapter scrutinises a different approach to establishing a 
balance between private and public interests, considering the introduction of direct 
obligations of patent holders by amending the TRIPS patent regime itself. Ultimately, 
this section aims to answer Research Question 5:  
Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime? 
 
5.1 Conventional Ways of Addressing the Human Rights 
Responsibilities of the Private Business Sector 
5.1.1 Introduction to the Identification of Corporate Human 
Rights Responsibilities 
The following section provides an overview of conventional measures taken by the 
international community, and in particular by the UN, to further the cause of human 
rights protection, including measures to safeguard the right to health, by providing 
guidance on the responsibilities of the private business sector and multinational 
corporations. As will be discussed, these measures generally constitute soft law 
instruments located in the broad field of corporate social responsibility (CSR), rather 
than providing binding legal obligations for which non-state actors can directly be held 
liable. While it is generally welcomed that international organisations provide 
guidance on the identification of corporate responsibilities towards human rights, the 
main problem with soft law instruments is that they are voluntary in nature. Therefore, 
unless domestic governments implement binding legal provisions, corporations have 
ample leeway to circumvent adherence to responsibilities that conflict with or do not 
complement their economic interests. 
Throughout the processes of globalisation, an international trend has emerged 
recognising the importance of conducting human actions in a sustainable manner. It is 
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therefore now widely accepted that the responsibilities of the private business sector 
exceed the mere goal of profit maximisation, and further entail a social dimension 
recognised as CSR.1 Often, however, the main reason for companies to consider their 
social responsibilities derives from self-interests, as adhering to such responsibilities 
can enhance the public view of their brand names.2 Furthermore, when companies 
voluntarily take steps towards adhering to CSR, governments might see less necessity 
for taking legislative measures to regulate corporate activities, so that corporations can 
maintain a greater degree of independence.3 Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that 
certain moral responsibilities apply to businesses regardless of their self-interests. As 
corporate activities can cause social problems, it is the responsibility of businesses to 
mitigate the consequences of such problems.4  
According to the Financial Times Lexicon: 
CSR is a concept with many definitions and practices. The way it is 
understood and implemented differs greatly for each company and 
country. Moreover, CSR is a very broad concept that addresses many and 
various topics such as human rights, corporate governance, health and 
safety, environmental effects, working conditions and contribution to 
economic development. Whatever the definition is, the purpose of CSR is 
to drive change towards sustainability.5  
While providing a detailed analysis of CSR, relevant laws and policies, as well as 
compliance mechanisms, exceeds the scope of this thesis, it is submitted here that 
while a variety of factors and nuances impact the legal standing of such 
responsibilities, in summary CSR can be identified as a quasi-voluntary measure of 
good practice rather than a codex of binding obligations.6   
Nevertheless, it can be generally observed that the concept of CSR has considerable 
impact on the ways we understand business and the ways corporations address all 
stakeholders concerned. In the context of pharmaceuticals and the right to health, 
 
1 Crane A and Matten D, Business Ethics (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 51. 
2 ibid 51. 
3 ibid 51. 
4 ibid 52. 
5 Financial Times, ‘Financial Times Lexicon: Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)’ 
<http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR)> accessed 09 February 
2019. 
6 Principal People, ‘What is Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
<https://www.principalpeople.co.uk/blog/2015/11/what-is-corporate-social-responsibility> 
accessed 09 February 2019.  
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particularly Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and Novartis can be 
identified as prime examples of corporations paying due regard to CSR in their conduct 
of business. First introduced in 1943,7 Johnson & Johnson follows a Credo that 
identifies the company’s first responsibility as being ‘to the patients, doctors and 
nurses, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services.’8 
Additionally, the Credo explicitly recognises the importance of ‘maintaining 
reasonable prices’ as well as helping ‘people be healthier by supporting better access 
and care in more places around the world.’9 Similarly, GSK adopts a pricing policy 
that aims to ‘[i]mprove the health of millions of people each year by making our 
products available at responsible prices that are sustainable for our business’.10 In this 
regard, GSK’s code of conduct commits ‘to ensuring access to medicines and patient 
safety, and to sharing scientific information to help further research and development, 
wherever possible.’11 Likewise, Novartis adopts an access policy which takes account 
of income levels and economic realities in pricing strategies, to enhance the 
affordability of medicines for the poor.12 Furthermore, the company commits to 
conducting research into neglected diseases, to which end it established and maintains 
the specialised Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases.13 Such substantial efforts 
towards sustainable CSR, however, are not adopted by all actors across the 
pharmaceutical sector, and may in fact constitute a minority within the industry. 
Furthermore, while the commitment towards CSR is laudable, the exact scope of 
specific responsibilities and commitments is left undefined. 
With this in mind, international organisations adopted policies and recommendations, 
aiming to identify the human rights responsibilities of the private business sector by 
 
7 Johnson & Johnson, ‘Our Heritage: 8 Fun Facts About Our Credo – Johnson & Johnson's Mission 
Statement’ <https://www.jnj.com/our-heritage/8-fun-facts-about-the-johnson-johnson-credo> 
accessed 09 February 2019. 
8 Johnson & Johnson, ‘Our Credo’ <https://www.jnj.com/credo/> accessed 09 February 2019. 
9 ibid. 
10 GlaxoSmithKline, ‘Our Approach to Responsible Business’ 
<https://www.gsk.com/media/5097/our-approach-to-responsible-business_sept-18.pdf> accessed 
09 February 2019. 
11 GlaxoSmithKline, ‘Living Our Values and Expectations: Our Code of Conduct’ 
<https://www.gsk.com/media/4800/english-code-of-conduct.pdf> accessed 09 February 2019, 22. 
12 Novartis, ‘Affordability’ <https://www.novartis.com/our-company/corporate-
responsibility/expanding-access-healthcare/access-principles/affordability> accessed 16 March 
2019.  
13 Novartis, ‘Research & Development’ <https://www.novartis.com/our-company/corporate-
responsibility/expanding-access-healthcare/access-principles/research-development> accessed 16 
March 2019. 
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connecting their strategies to the general concept of CSR. The following sections will 
discuss two different approaches taken by the international community to address 
human rights challenges in our changing global economic and ecological reality. The 
first approach, briefly addressed in sub-chapter 5.1.2, discusses two distinct plans of 
action drafted by the international community, consisting of (1) the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), and (2) the successively adopted Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). While these plans are mainly focussed on the actions of 
governments and states, they also recognise the importance of including the private 
business sector for achieving the intended goals. The second approach, discussed in 
sub-chapter 5.1.3, elaborates soft law guiding principles and guidelines endorsed by 
the UN, identifying direct human rights responsibilities of the private business sector. 
This section specifically addresses John Ruggie’s ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights’ focussing on the responsibilities of multinational corporations in 
general, and Paul Hunt’s ‘Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in 
Relation to Access to Medicines’ elaborating the particular responsibilities of the 
pharmaceutical industry with regard to the right to health. 
5.1.2 International Development Goals  
After a decade of talks and negotiations, in its 8th plenary meeting on 8 September 
2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ 
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).14 The MDGs consisted of 
eight elaborate goals, and several targets which aimed to foster development and lead 
to a substantial reduction of global extreme poverty levels by the year 2015.15 For the 
scope of this thesis, and in connection with the responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
corporations towards the right to health, Target 8.E of MDG 8 is of particular 
importance, stating: ‘In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access 
 
14 UNDP, ‘Millennium Development Goals’ 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html> accessed 09 
February 2019. 
15 ibid. 
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to affordable essential drugs in developing countries’.16 With the assertion of this 
target, the international community explicitly recognised the crucial importance of 
involving pharmaceutical corporations in the attempts and ambitions aimed at finding 
adequate strategies for enhancing the accessibility and affordability of medicines. 
While not imposing any direct duties or responsibilities on the pharmaceutical 
industry, the MDGs constituted an important step towards identifying the role of the 
private business sector for the promotion and protection of the right to health. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the MDGs were 
a great overall success in that the final Millennium Development Goals Report of 2015 
indicates that the MDGs have ‘produced the most successful anti-poverty movement 
in history.’17 Nevertheless, as can be observed today, the MDGs did not succeed 
entirely as gross inequalities and extreme poverty continue to burden a majority of 
developing countries and LDCs; or, as the UNDP puts it, ‘the job is unfinished for 
millions of people’.18 It is here that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
connect to the MDGs by recognising ‘rising inequalities within and among countries’ 
and suggesting that billions of human beings ‘continue to live in poverty and are denied 
a life of dignity.’19 For this reason, ‘[t]he new Agenda builds on the Millennium 
Development Goals and seeks to complete what they did not achieve, particularly in 
reaching the most vulnerable.’20  
Building upon the achievements of the MDGs, the SDGs were adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 70/1 on 25 September 2015, taking over where the 
mandate of the MDGs terminated.21 In their scope and ambitions, the newly adopted 
SDGs go further than the MDGs by providing 17 main Goals with a substantial number 
of Sub-Targets for each of those goals. This unprecedented approach is particularly 
ambitious but appears surprisingly successful, at least on paper, supported by and thus 
 
16 United Nations, ‘Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development’ 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml> accessed 20 May 2019; United Nations, ‘List 
of Millennium Development Goals, and Goal 8 Targets and Indicators’ 
<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg8_targets.pdf> accessed 20 May 
2019. 
17 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (United Nations 2015) 3. 
18 UNDP (n 14). 
19 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’ (21 October 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1, para 14. 
20 ibid para 16. 
21 ibid paras 1 and 3. 
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applicable to all countries alike.22 The overarching theme provided by the agenda aims 
to ensure that the needs of every human being are met,23 in particular by promoting 
‘universal respect for human rights and human dignity’.24  
Correspondingly, the SDGs reaffirm the importance of the accessibility of quality 
health care for everyone with the explicit qualification that ‘[n]o one must be left 
behind.’25 In this regard, the agenda promulgates the intention of paying increased 
attention to addressing neglected diseases that mainly burden developing countries.26 
Furthermore, governments are urged to abstain from adopting unilateral measures 
imposing sanctions on other states that result in the creation of obstacles for the 
development process of developing countries.27 Thereby, the SDGs appear to 
reemphasise that governments should, inter alia, refrain from pressuring developing 
countries into limiting the TRIPS flexibilities, or into accepting TRIPS-Plus patent 
standards that are inappropriate for their specific developmental needs. 
With reference to the discrepancies between international patent rights and the right to 
health, Goal 3 of the SDGs is of particular relevance in that it aims to ‘[e]nsure healthy 
lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’.28 In this regard, Target 3 of Goal 3 
strives for the eradication of a number of communicable diseases, including AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other neglected diseases, by 2030.29 To achieve this 
ambitious aim, Target 8 of Goal 3 elaborates on the accessibility of essential medicines 
by recognising the importance of their affordability.30 Similarly, Goal 3.b not only 
acknowledges the importance of the research and development (R&D) of new 
medicines but furthermore acknowledges the crucial importance of the Doha 
Declaration reaffirming ‘the right of developing countries to use to the full the 
provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to 
medicines for all’.31  
 
22 ibid para 5. 
23 ibid para 4. 
24 ibid para 8. 
25 ibid para 26. 
26 ibid para 26. 
27 ibid para 29. 
28 ibid Goal 3. 
29 ibid Goal 3.3. 
30 ibid Goal 3.8. 
31 ibid Goal 3.b. 
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Additionally, Goal 9 of the SDGs aims at the promotion of inclusive and sustainable 
industrialisation and the fostering of innovation.32 The targets of this goal include the 
enhancement of technological capacities, particularly in developing countries, by 
supporting local technological development as well as by increasing the accessibility 
of information.33 Furthermore, Goal 10 of the SDGs strives for the reduction of 
inequalities both ‘within and among countries’.34 In this regard, Target 6 of Goal 10 
emphasises the importance of paying due regard to the concerns of developing 
countries in international negotiations, and Goal 10.a of the SDGs expresses the need 
to  grant differential treatment to developing countries and LDCs.35 When read in 
conjunction with each other, and applied to the context of this thesis, it can be derived 
from Goals 9 and 10, that patent rights need to be adequate for the specific 
developmental needs of developing countries and LDCs, and that further they should 
not create obstacles for the dissemination and transfer of technologies to, and 
technological capacity building in, developing countries and LDCs. However, Goal 
10.a qualifies this suggestion by stipulating that differential treatment shall be ‘in 
accordance with World Trade Organisation agreements’.36 It is therefore submitted 
that the SDGs implicitly require a necessary amendment to the TRIPS Agreement 
which ensures that patent rights fulfil their objectives and purposes, furthering the 
cause of the SDGs rather than constituting a potential obstacle for their effective 
achievement. 
With the intention of tackling the most pressing challenges of global sustainable 
development, it can be observed that many of the targets of the SDGs are extremely 
ambitious; in fact, some targets may almost be considered unrealistically high. On the 
other hand, the SDGs set out an agenda of issues that urgently require comprehensive 
solutions, so that the definition of ambitious benchmarks is conducive for realising the 
highest possible achievements. While this agenda is mainly applicable to states and 
governments, highlighting the importance of realising their collective ambitions by 
revitalising a ‘global partnership for sustainable development’,37 the SDGs 
furthermore ‘call on all businesses to apply their creativity and innovation to solving 
 
32 ibid Goal 9. 
33 ibid Goal 9.5, Goal 9.b, and Goal 9.c. 
34 ibid Goal 10. 
35 ibid Goal 10.6 and Goal 10.a. 
36 ibid Goal 10.a. 
37 ibid paras 61-62. 
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sustainable development challenges.’38 This call by itself, however, does not impose 
any binding responsibilities on private corporations and thus simply provides another 
international declaration suggesting that the private business sector should voluntarily 
contribute to its implementation. More generally speaking, while setting out clearly 
defined and qualified goals and targets of what to achieve, the SDGs do not provide 
any guidance or plans on how those goals and targets shall be achieved in the 
anticipated timeframe. Thus, specific strategies for the achievement of the SDGs need 
to be developed and implemented in both national policies and further international 
instruments. In respect of human rights, and particularly the right to health in line with 
Goal 3 of the SDGs, the following section elaborates on two international instruments 
aimed at clarifying the responsibilities of the private business sector towards human 
rights. 
5.1.3 UN Human Rights Guidelines and Guiding Principles  
The following section provides an overview of the approach taken by the UN in 
identifying the international human rights responsibilities of privately-owned 
corporations. In this respect, the analysis focuses in particular on the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, elaborating the human rights 
responsibilities of corporations in general, and the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, identifying in 
particular the specific human rights responsibilities of the pharmaceutical industry. 
This thesis is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the scope and 
content of the specific guidelines and principles of either of the instruments, but rather 
briefly elaborates on the general structure, scope, and purposes of the frameworks in 
order to identify their potential shortcomings. For a comprehensive analysis of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights see Barakat (2016), Jägers (2011), 
 
38 ibid para 67. 
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Lagoutte (2016), and Wettstein (2015).39 For the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines see Hunt (2008), Lee 
and Hunt (2012), and Moon (2013).40 This section concludes by submitting that 
voluntary measures are not strong enough to ensure that corporations adhere to the 
identified human rights responsibilities, particularly when monetary interests are at 
stake. 
5.1.3.1 John Ruggie’s UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 
After a six-year drafting and consultation process conducted by Professor John Ruggie, 
under his mandate as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Business 
and Human Rights, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Guiding Principles) were unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC) in Resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011.41 Thereby, Ruggie introduced a global soft 
law instrument that explicitly addresses the human rights responsibilities of both states 
and corporations, establishing authoritative principles that bring together prior 
regulations and interpretations of the responsibilities of the business sector in a single 
framework.42  The Guiding Principles affirm ‘[t]he role of business enterprises as 
specialized organs of society performing specialized functions, required to comply 
with all applicable laws and to respect human rights’.43 In this regard, the SDGs 
 
39 Barakat N, ‘The U.N. Guiding Principles: Beyond Soft Law’ (2016) 12 Hastings Bus. L.J. 591; 
Jägers N, ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real 
Corporate Accountability’ (2011) 29 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 159; Lagoutte S, ‘The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Confusing “Smart Mix” of Soft and Hard 
International Human Rights Law’ in Lagoutte S, Gammeltoft-Hansen T, and Cerone J (eds), 
Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (OUP 2016); Wettstein F, ‘Normativity, Ethics, 
and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (2015) 14 
Journal of Human Rights 162. 
40 Hunt P, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (11 August 2008) United Nations General 
Assembly, UN Doc A/63/263; Lee JY and Hunt P, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines’ (2012) 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 220; 
Moon S, ‘Respecting the Right to Access to Medicines: Implications of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights for the Pharmaceutical Industry’ (2013) 15 Health and Human 
Rights 32. 
41 Jägers N (n 39) 159; Lagoutte S (n 39) 237; Moon S (n 40) 32; Leipziger D, The Corporate 
Responsibility Code Book (3rd edn, Greenleaf Publishing 2016) 141; Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights’ (2011) UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04. 
42 cf. Jägers N (n 39) 159; Lagoutte S (n 39) 235; Leipziger D (n 41) 141-142. 
43 OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n 41) 1.  
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acknowledge the importance of businesses applying the Guiding Principles as a means 
of tackling sustainable development challenges.44 
To a certain extent, the Guiding Principles are connected to an earlier attempt by the 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights to adopt a legally binding framework 
providing Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, commonly referred to as the Draft 
Norms. After the implementation of the Draft Norms failed in the early 2000s, due to 
considerable objections from businesses and states, the international discussion on 
human rights responsibilities of non-state actors practically stagnated.45 When taking 
up his mandate, Ruggie successfully managed to revive the debate.46 To achieve a 
consensus this time round, the Guiding Principles follow a different approach based 
on a ‘principled pragmatism’ which is focussed on the consultation of various 
stakeholders and the willingness to accept compromises.47 Therefore, rather than 
aspiring to the adoption of a legally binding framework that has proven to face 
considerable opposition in the international community, Ruggie took a moderated 
approach by drafting voluntary Guiding Principles aiming at the goodwill of the 
private business sector, and anticipating further legal developments in the future.48 The 
Guiding Principles thus refrain from the creation of any directly binding legal 
obligations.49 Nevertheless, the framework seems to be more extensive than common 
soft law policies, in that the guidelines suggest that all corporations have the elaborated 
responsibilities irrespective of their size or consent, or the consent of their home 
states.50 While corporations are thus prompted to abide by international human rights 
law, the Guiding Principles notably lack the adoption of significant enforcement 
mechanisms, so that the framework itself remains strictly voluntary.51  Ruggie leaves 
the implementation of binding corporate human rights responsibilities and their 
enforcement to the willingness of domestic legislators.52 In this respect, the Guiding 
 
44 UNGA, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (n 19) para 67. 
45 Jägers N (n 39) 159-160; Lagoutte S (n 39) 239; Wettstein F (n 39) 162. 
46 Jägers N (n 39) 159. 
47 Jägers N (n 39) 160; Wettstein F (n 39) 163 and 175. 
48 Wettstein F (n 39) 165. 
49 Lagoutte S (n 39) 239 and 243. 
50 Leipziger D (n 41) 143; Wettstein F (n 39) 165. 
51 Barakat N (n 39) 592 and 613. 
52 Lee JY and Hunt P (n 40) 223; Wettstein F (n 39) 166. 
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Principles can be regarded as an instruction to eager governments on how effective 
human rights responsibilities of corporations can be realised.  
Thus, while the framework is drafted in a manner which can be misconceived in a way 
that suggests an extension of the scope of the applicability of human rights standards 
to non-state actors, factually, the international legal sphere remains unaltered.53 
Notably, the Guiding Principles explicitly state that they are not intended to create 
‘new international law obligations’.54 In this regard, a particular criticism of the 
framework is that it seems to have missed the opportunity of establishing directly 
legally binding obligations regulating the human rights responsibilities of 
corporations.55 Ultimately, however, it must be acknowledged that Ruggie’s 
pragmatism and his abstention from the intention of creating legally binding 
obligations were key to the authoritative endorsement of the Guiding Principles by the 
HRC. 
Nonetheless, the frequent use of the term ‘should’ by the principles indicates the 
weakness of the framework and the leeway left for corporations to circumvent their 
responsibilities.56 Thus, the effective enforcement of the identified responsibilities 
requires states to act on a domestic level.57 Unfortunately, even though the Guiding 
Principles remain largely focussed on the responsibility of states to effectively regulate 
the private business sector, the framework is frequently criticised for taking a  weak 
approach to providing governmental obligations.58 In this regard, it is submitted by 
Jägers that the Guiding Principles may be regarded as a step backwards.59 Indeed, 
while the framework reinforces the duty of states to protect human rights, the weak 
terms adopted by the Guiding Principles risk diluting the significance of prior existing 
obligations of states under international human rights law.60 
Generally speaking, the underlying ‘protect, respect, and remedy’ terminology of the 
Guiding Principles provides that states have the duty to protect human rights, while 
 
53 Lagoutte S (n 39) 236. 
54 OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n 41) 1. 
55 Jägers N (n 39) 160; Leipziger D (n 41) 142. 
56 OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n 41) Guidelines 11-24; Wettstein F 
(n 39) 165. 
57 Jägers N (n 39) 162. 
58 ibid 160 and 162; Wettstein F (n 39) 165. 
59 Jägers N (n 39) 161. 
60 Barakat N (n 39) 600; Jägers N (n 39) 161; Lagoutte S (n 39) 236; Wettstein F (n 39) 165. 
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corporations have the mere responsibility of respecting human rights.61 The main 
element of the term ‘to respect’ is defined by the framework as a negative or passive 
responsibility of not infringing human rights, i.e. of doing no harm.62 This approach is 
often criticised for reducing the human rights responsibilities of the business sector to 
the absolute minimum, particularly in consideration of the vast political power of 
certain multinational corporations.63 When regarded in relation to the comparatively 
marginal economic and political power of some developing countries, it becomes 
apparent that the responsibilities of corporations should go beyond the simple 
requirement of doing no harm.64 
On the other hand, according to Ruggie, the Guiding Principles are to be understood 
in a way in which the responsibility to not infringe  human rights constitutes the general 
baseline to which all businesses should always adhere, in any given circumstances.65 
Thus, the concept of ‘respect’  entails additional responsibilities for corporations 
depending on the circumstances of specific situations, for example when a business 
fulfils crucial social functions.66 It may therefore be suggested that in consideration of 
the vital public function of the pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical corporations 
have higher responsibilities than simply avoiding the commitment of human rights 
violations by their direct actions. These specific responsibilities of the pharmaceutical 
industry were explored by Paul Hunt in his Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, elaborated in the next 
section. 
5.1.3.2 Paul Hunt’s Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines 
On 11 August 2008, Paul Hunt, then UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 
submitted a report to the UN General Assembly in which he elaborates a voluntary 
framework identifying responsibilities of pharmaceutical corporations towards the 
right to health. The framework recognises the assertion of senior public officials who 
 
61 Lagoutte S (n 39) 235; Leipziger D (n 41) 142; Moon S (n 40) 33. 
62 Jägers N (n 39) 162; Moon S (n 40) 35; Wettstein F (n 39) 169. 
63 Jägers N (n 39) 160; Wettstein F (n 39) 165 and 172. 
64 Wettstein F (n 39) 172. 
65 Lee JY and Hunt P (n 40) 223. 
66 Moon S (n 40) 35. 
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suggest that the implementation of the right to health is hampered by the policies and 
practices of certain pharmaceutical corporations, observing that particularly pricing 
policies and the neglect of research into diseases that mainly affect the poor, create 
severe obstacles for the accessibility of medicines.67 For this reason, there is an urgent 
requirement to regulate the activities of the pharmaceutical industry and particularly 
their specific responsibilities towards the right to health. While it is generally accepted 
that states are the main duty bearers of human rights responsibilities, Hunt 
acknowledges Goal 8.E of the MDGS, reaffirming that the right to health entails a 
shared responsibility between states and pharmaceutical corporations.68 Hunt further 
notes that while CESCR General Comment No 14 provides that non-state actors, 
including the private business sector, have certain responsibilities towards the right to 
health, the scope and dimension of these responsibilities is not further defined and 
therefore is unclear.69 In this consideration, the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines (Guidelines) address 
the pressing need of clearly identifying the human rights responsibilities of the 
pharmaceutical industry.70  
While accepting that from a technical perspective the human rights responsibilities of 
corporations cannot be the same as the obligations of states, Hunt elaborates that the 
pharmaceutical industry nevertheless has distinct responsibilities towards three of the 
main elements of the right to health; namely the availability, the accessibility and the 
affordability of medical products.71 Nevertheless, in order to be regarded as 
reasonable, the responsibilities of pharmaceutical corporations need to be balanced. 
Thus, in consideration of economic realities, it must be acknowledged that private 
corporations have responsibilities towards shareholders, including the derivation of 
profits.72 Hunt therefore suggests that while it is unreasonable to expect that 
corporations suffer cumulative losses, it may be adequate to suggest that 
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pharmaceutical corporations should operate on a non-profit model in respect of 
providing medicines to impoverished populations.73 
In his work as UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Hunt took on the task of 
debunking a common misconception of pharmaceutical corporations in which the 
research-based industry regards patents as the company’s crown jewels.74 While this 
may be true from an economic perspective, given the monetary value of patents, the 
granting of patents is subject to further considerations, including an essential social 
dimension.75 By developing new, potentially life-saving medicines, pharmaceutical 
corporations perform honourable public health functions.76 Patent rights awarded for 
the successful R&D activity of a pharmaceutical company can thus be regarded as a 
reward for the fulfilment of this vital social function.77 As noted before, in chapter 4.4, 
the granting of patent rights entails an implicit social contract, according to which 
patent holders receive exclusive market positions, while the public has a reasonable 
expectation that corporations take positive actions towards enhancing the accessibility 
of their patented medicines.78 In other words, the social dimension of the development 
of a new medicine, which is rewarded by patent rights, entails a corporate 
responsibility of making treatment accessible to patients.79 
Thus, in their general scope, the responsibilities of pharmaceutical corporations 
elaborated in Hunt’s Guidelines go further than Ruggie’s Guiding Principles in that 
they not merely address the importance of corporations respecting human rights, but 
rather explore specific responsibilities beyond the responsibility to respect.80 At the 
same time, Hunt rests his framework on a robust interpretation of the responsibility to 
respect, elaborating specific actions contravening the right to health, which 
pharmaceutical corporations should forgo. Guideline 4, for instance, provides that 
pharmaceutical corporations should refrain from encouraging states to disregard their 
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human rights obligations under national and international law.81 To this end, the 
Guidelines emphasise that the lobbying activity of the pharmaceutical industry should 
not be directed at the creation of stronger patent protection standards than those 
provided for under TRIPS.82 In particular, corporations should refrain from lobbying 
in LDCs with the aim of persuading low-income countries to comply with international 
patent standards before the end of the transitional periods provided to them by the 
WTO.83 Furthermore, the Guidelines reemphasise the importance of the Doha 
Declaration by acknowledging that the private business sector has a responsibility to 
respect the declaration, and that corporations should consequently refrain from 
imposing economic sanctions on states that justifiably utilise the Doha Declaration’s 
export solution, now regulated by Article 31bis TRIPS, as elaborated in chapter 
2.4.3.8.84 
In addition to these provisions addressing the negative responsibility of businesses to 
respect human rights, the Guidelines provide positive responsibilities for 
pharmaceutical corporations towards the realisation of the right to health. Notably, in 
consideration of the availability of medicines, Hunt identifies two dimensions of the 
responsibilities of corporations. Firstly, medicines should be made ‘available in 
sufficient quantities in the countries where they are needed.’85 This implies, inter alia, 
that the distribution of medicines should not be arbitrarily declined to specific 
countries, for example as an economic sanction in retaliation of insufficient domestic 
IP protection standards.86 Secondly, the availability of medicines requires that 
adequate research is conducted into the development of new medical products. In this 
regard, the Guidelines recognise that in particular current incentives for the 
development of drugs for the treatment of neglected diseases are insufficient, and that 
therefore pharmaceutical corporations should commit to conducting research into 
highly needed medications for the poor.87 
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In this consideration, Guideline 5 addresses the special requirements of disadvantaged 
individuals, communities, and populations, emphasising that pharmaceutical 
corporations should pay due regard to the needs of the most vulnerable, particularly 
with regard to  people living in severe poverty.88 In respect of the accessibility and the 
affordability of medicines, this implies that pharmaceutical corporations should ensure 
that their medical products are accessible to everyone, including populations living in 
rural areas.89 Furthermore, the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical corporations should 
ensure that their medicines are affordable for people living in poverty.90 Similarly, in 
recognition of the impact of patents on the prices of medical products, Guideline 32 
encourages research-based pharmaceutical corporations to refrain from filing patents 
for marginal advancements of prior existing drugs, such as new uses or new dosages.91 
Lastly, it is to note, that similar to Ruggie’s Guiding Principles, Hunt’s Guidelines 
adopt the term ‘should’ rather than ‘must’ when elaborating on the responsibilities of 
corporations in order to avoid controversial doctrinal issues, which indicates that 
adherence to the framework is voluntary.92 In this regard, in a response to a report 
submitted to the UN General Assembly by Hunt in his role as Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health, summarising his visit to GSK, the company contested the existence 
of any international legal norms arising from the Guidelines.93 While preparing the 
Guidelines, Hunt visited the headquarters of GSK in June 2008 to prepare a report 
examining the company’s policies regarding the right to health, particularly focussing 
on the accessibility of medicines in developing countries.94 In June 2009, his report 
was presented to the UN Human Rights Council, and although GSK wished to respond 
to the report, permission to speak was not granted by the UN.95 In this regard, GSK 
provided a written statement in which it welcomed the engagement of Hunt, and 
expressed an interest in reviewing the report.96 The company further noted the 
importance of the right to health, but expressed that private actor responsibilities are 
not sufficiently defined by international human rights law.97 In this consideration, GSK 
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emphasised that its access to medicines programme and ongoing commitment is not 
required by international legal norms.98  
5.1.4 The Insufficiency of Voluntary Frameworks 
First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that both Hunt and Ruggie conducted 
remarkable work in reviving the stagnating debate on the human rights responsibilities 
of non-state actors, providing two of the most authoritative frameworks identifying 
and elaborating on specific responsibilities.  These frameworks reinforce the notion 
that corporations have direct responsibilities under international human rights law, and 
in particular identify those responsibilities which the International Bill of Rights and 
the various CESCR General Comments left undefined. The strongest trait of the 
approach taken by Hunt and Ruggie is to be seen in the drafting of non-binding soft 
law instruments which may be regarded as the essential key to receiving the 
endorsement of the UN, and thereby for the establishment of internationally recognised 
responsibilities. This trait, however, simultaneously constitutes the greatest weakness 
of the frameworks in that adherence to the Guidelines and Guiding Principles remains 
strictly voluntary for corporations. Thus, the frameworks may suffer the same fate of 
being neglected as international human rights law, when the soft law responsibilities 
of the private business sector stand in conflict with the rights of corporations under 
more strongly worded international trade law treaties, particularly when monetary 
interests are at stake. 
The main problem with soft law instruments in this regard is that while they may have 
political implications for governments, their direct effect on corporations seems to be 
far less stringent.99 According to Lagoutte, the Guidelines and the Guiding Principles 
dress CSR in the language of international law, thereby creating the illusion that there 
is a binding effect attached to them, ‘while in fact CSR stays within the realm of 
voluntary commitments by business enterprises.’100 Due to the very nature of voluntary 
measures, the adherence of private businesses to their human rights responsibilities 
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remains subjected to the goodwill of individual corporations.101 As can be observed 
throughout this thesis, economic realities suggest that monetary interests are 
commonly the primary concern of private companies, so that  the willingness of 
corporations to voluntarily observe social objectives is heavily dependent on 
concomitant potential negative impacts on their profitability.102 As corporations have 
a direct obligation towards their shareholders of maximising economic returns, 
voluntary human rights responsibilities, which are likely to result in considerable 
reductions of profits, are prone to being ignored.103 This is of particular concern in 
regard to the right to health, as reducing the prices of medical products, in order to 
make them more widely accessible to patients living in poverty, entails significant 
reductions of the profitability of pharmaceutical corporations. Thus, as long as the 
maximisation of profits is underlying the business model of the pharmaceutical 
industry, monetary interests will presumably trump human rights objectives.104 
On the other hand, soft law instruments cannot be considered as downright ineffective, 
as the identification of non-binding responsibilities offers the opportunity of finding 
fast-track solutions to pressing issues, which, while not being a priori binding, may 
constitute an important step towards the future development of binding regulations.105 
Furthermore, soft law instruments offer a certain degree of protection as the possibility 
of detrimental impacts on public opinion resulting from the omission of human rights 
responsibilities may encourage corporations to observe non-binding standards. The 
effectiveness of the human rights protection provided by public opinion, however, is 
contested. Wettstein suggests that powerful vocal stakeholders, for instance, have 
distinct advantages over vulnerable and marginalised populations which commonly 
lack the opportunity of voicing their concerns, and thereby shaping  public opinion in 
their favour.106 Thus, leaving the enforcement of corporate responsibilities to a domain 
that is heavily influenced by its most powerful actors seems to contravene the very 
purpose of human rights law itself, namely the protection of vulnerable groups against 
the abuse of power.107 
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Thus, in recognition of the crucial importance of the right to health for safeguarding 
human life in dignity, an answer to Research Question 4 can be provided:  
Why is the corporate social responsibility approach to identifying human rights 
responsibilities of the private business sector in non-binding international soft 
law instruments insufficient for adequately regulating the pharmaceutical 
industry’s conduct towards the right to health?  
The direct implications of the realisation of the right to health on the lives and 
livelihood of millions of people around the globe are of such magnitude that the 
adherence to responsibilities for its respect and protection must not simply be regarded 
as a voluntary option. In view of the historical evidence, leaving the realisation of the 
accessibility of medical products, as an integral part of the right to health, to the 
goodwill of the pharmaceutical industry has proved to be insufficient, as can be 
concluded from the scope of this thesis. The first thing to remember is that the right to 
health competes with conflicting IP rights provided under strongly worded 
international trade law treaties, which enable pharmaceutical corporations to act in 
accordance with a business model that almost unreservedly favours their own 
corporate interests. As the maximisation of profitability in order to enhance 
shareholder value can be regarded as one of the primary aims of the research-based 
industry, human rights concerns are likely to only ever receive marginal consideration 
in corporate policies. This issue is highly unlikely to be changed by the adoption of 
non-binding soft law instruments that keep the human rights responsibilities of profit 
driven corporations in the realm of voluntarism. 
It can thus be submitted that while the adoption the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights and the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies 
in Relation to Access to Medicines constitutes major steps forward, both instruments 
missed the opportunity of establishing the strongly drafted binding obligations which 
would be required for inducing actual change. Corporations that refuse to acknowledge 
their human rights responsibilities thus do not have much to fear, so that there remains 
a real risk that private businesses will only ever be inclined to do the bare minimum.108 
Consequently, the effectiveness of these frameworks intrinsically depends on 
considerable governmental action in enacting binding domestic legislation, and the 
 
108 cf. Jägers N (n 39) 163. 
260 
 
willingness of states to enforce the human rights responsibilities of the private business 
sector.109 
Ultimately, however, it must be acknowledged that both Hunt and Ruggie were 
successful in getting their frameworks endorsed by the UN, especially because they 
took the voluntary, non-binding soft law approach. The fact that the UN-Sub 
Commission on Human Rights failed in their attempt to adopt a legally binding 
framework on corporate human rights responsibilities in the early 2000s proves just 
how difficult it is to find consensus on binding obligations in the realm of international 
human rights law. In regard to the pharmaceutical industry, however, the very 
patentability of medical products itself opens up a different approach for regulating the 
responsibilities of patent holding corporations. While patents currently severely 
impact on the affordability of medicines, they also offer an opportunity for 
implementing specific responsibilities of corporations in hard law international trade 
agreements, as will be elaborated in the next section. 
5.2 Suggested Amendments to the TRIPS Agreement: 
Implementing Responsibilities of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry as Obligations under International Patent Law 
In recognition of the shortcomings of soft law instruments when it comes to the 
enforcement of corporate human rights responsibilities, a different approach to the 
implementation of responsibilities of the private business sector seems to be required. 
In this regard, the second part of this chapter explores the possibilities of introducing 
distinct responsibilities for private actors as explicit obligations under international 
patent laws. In doing so, this section provides an answer to Research Question 5:  
Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime? 
In the first place, it must be acknowledged that the aforementioned voluntary 
principles constitute a progressive step in the right direction for identifying the general 
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human rights responsibilities of the private business sector. This chapter therefore is 
not aimed at contesting the possibility that soft law principles regulating corporate 
human rights responsibilities may have considerable positive impacts on the general 
realisation and protection of human rights in a variety of fields and sectors. An analysis 
of these impacts, however, is not encompassed by the scope of this thesis. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, the situation is distinctively different from other business 
sectors in that the provision of exclusive private patent rights to corporations itself 
constitutes a major threat to the realisation of the right to health, particularly when 
those private rights are not sufficiently balanced with public health interests. As 
pharmaceutical patents thereby directly impact on human health and the capability of 
human beings to achieve a life in dignity, the realisation of the right to health should 
not simply be left to the benevolence of corporations, and their willingness to abide by 
voluntary guidelines. It is therefore submitted that in regard to the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products the right approach is not about identifying generalised human 
rights responsibilities of the private business sector, but about defining specific 
responsibilities of patent holders which arise from the provision of a patent itself. In 
other words, in order for the right to health to be realised and not obstructed by the 
provision of patents, it is crucial to define the social responsibilities of patent holders 
that are implicitly connected to the granting of exclusive rights.   
With this in mind, it is suggested that the nature of patent laws provides a distinct 
opportunity for implementing binding responsibilities of corporations in international 
trade law instruments. Notably, this is facilitated by the granting of desirable patent 
rights to successful inventors in the pharmaceutical sector, as the provision of those 
rights can be subjected to concomitant obligations. The human rights responsibilities 
of the research-based industry can thereby be turned into legally binding obligations. 
Therefore, the enforcement of corporate responsibilities can be executed by making 
the adherence to relevant obligations a requirement for patentability, and non-
compliance a reason for the revocation of a patent. Comparatively, this approach is 
considerably more radical than the strategy of identifying voluntary corporate human 
rights responsibilities in soft law instruments. However, the controversial doctrinal 
issues arising when aiming for the implementation of general business responsibilities 
in the realm of public international human rights law, which is traditionally only 
directly applicable to states, can be avoided by instead seeking the direct introduction 
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of corporate obligations into private international trade law. In particular, this can be 
achieved by subjecting the provision of valuable private rights to the compliance with 
concomitant responsibilities. 
Furthermore, this approach seems to be legally desirable under human rights law 
considerations, as, by implementing binding corporate obligations and thereby 
effectively regulating the activities of third parties, states would eventually meet their 
duties to fulfil and protect human rights against abuses by third parties. In recognition 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which reemphasise the 
duties of states to protect and fulfil human rights under international law, it can be 
deduced that states are required to ensure that international trade agreements are 
compatible with the right to health under international human rights law.110 The 
ratification of an agreement such as TRIPS, and the adoption of any TRIPS-Plus 
agreements, which fail in safeguarding prior existing human rights law, may in fact 
constitute a violation of those conventions.111  It is suggested here that such a violation 
can only be averted by the implementation of provisions which explicitly balance 
private economic rights with public human rights requirements.112 Consequently, it 
can be suggested that an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement is required under 
international human rights law in order for states to fulfil their right to health 
obligations.113  
Although this may be true, in the international political landscape any proposed 
amendment to a large-scale trade agreement is likely to face vigorous opposition, so 
that finding sufficient support for revising the TRIPS Agreement may entail 
considerable difficulties.114 In particular, opposition from the US may constitute a 
severe obstacle for any attempt at lowering IP protection standards, as the US has never 
formally ratified the ICESCR. Therefore, the US can exclude itself from the obligation 
of states to pay due regard to the right to health in international agreements.115 
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Additionally, the lobbying activity of the powerful research-based pharmaceutical 
industry may create further obstacles to overcome when aiming for a weakening of 
protection standards in the international patent regime. That it is nevertheless possible 
to amend the TRIPS Agreement is evidenced by the successful first-ever adoption of 
an amendment implementing Article 31bis TRIPS which entered into force in 2017, 
as elaborated in chapter 2.4.3.8. This recent amendment indicates that states may 
become more willing to regulate IP laws in a manner conducive to the right to health.  
For these reasons, the following sections of this chapter consider potential methods of 
how the TRIPS Agreement can be amended in order to bring it in line with 
international human rights requirements. First, sub-chapter 5.2.1 examines a proposed 
amendment text launched by the ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Transition’ Project, 
providing suggestions for a general amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. Second, in 
sub-chapter 5.2.2, I suggest a different approach to amending the TRIPS Agreement, 
focussing only on a specific revision of the patentability of pharmaceutical products in 
regard to the right to health. 
5.2.1 The Proposed Amendment Text by the ‘Intellectual 
Property Rights in Transition’ Project 
The following section of this thesis provides a brief analysis of some of the key 
suggestions made by the ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Transition’ Project (IPT 
Project) in respect of international patent laws in a proposed amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Launched by the University of Stockholm’s Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Market Law (IFIM), in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law in Munich, the University of 
Copenhagen’s Institute for Civil Law, and the IPR University Center in Helsinki, the 
IPT Project was coordinated by Marianne Levin and Annette Kur, joined by a 
considerable number of scholars and experts in the field of international IP law.116 The 
rationale behind the project was to address the impacts of international IP rights on 
public welfare, and the growing scepticism towards unreasonably high IP protection 
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standards, particularly in respect of distinct negative consequences on ‘sensitive issues 
such as public health, nutrition, and the dissemination of knowledge.’117 The work of 
the IPT Project culminated in the proposition of a substantial amendment to the text of 
the TRIPS Agreement, suggesting a revision of seemingly deficient IP provisions, and 
the implementation of adequate mechanisms for balancing private exclusive rights 
with public societal interests.118 
From an overall view, it can be observed that the IPT Project adopts a moderated and 
broad approach to revising the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, while addressing all sections 
of the agreement, including proposals for the amendment of patent rights in general, 
the proposed amendment holds back on providing specific regulations tailored to the 
issues surrounding the patentability of pharmaceutical products. Nevertheless, the 
approach taken by the IPT Project can be regarded as sensible. Ultimately, if 
implemented, the proposed amendment would potentially significantly improve the 
international IP regime by extending the capability of governments to act in 
accordance with their human rights duties without necessarily violating their 
obligations under international IP law. For the purpose of this thesis, this section 
briefly elaborates on the benefits and short comings of the IPT Project’s proposal, 
particularly focusing on the suggested amendments to objectives and principles of 
TRIPS in Articles 7 and 8, and the proposed revision of Articles 27 and 30 in the patent 
section of TRIPS.119 
5.2.1.1 Proposed Amendments to the Objectives and Principles in 
Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS 
In recognition of the crucial importance of the objectives and purposes of the TRIPS 
Agreement for the establishment of an adequately balanced IP regime, the IPT Project 
proposes a number of substantial changes to the wording of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, 
as well as the introduction of two new provisions in Articles 8a and 8b.120 In general 
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consideration of the objectives of the international harmonisation of IP laws, it is 
submitted that Article 7 of the current TRIPS Agreement cannot be regarded as 
completely inadequate. Notably, the objectives of the agreement explicitly recognise 
the importance of providing mutual advantages for both producers and users of 
technological knowledge, and of enhancing social and economic welfare by balancing 
rights and obligations.121 The IPT Project, on the other hand, more strongly emphasises 
public objectives by placing social and economic welfare at the core of an amended 
Article 7, explicitly recognising that IP rights should take ‘due account of the larger 
public interest’.122 Furthermore, the proposed amendment of Article 7 provides a 
qualification for the balancing of rights and obligations, suggesting that IP protection 
shall be in proportion to the contribution made by an invention towards both 
innovation and society at large.123 In this regard, it is suggested that incremental 
innovations should not be protected by the provision of strong exclusive rights.124 The 
implementation of this provision, however, seems particularly problematic with 
respect to the 20-year minimum patent period provided by TRIPS, and the introduction 
of secondary patents for new uses and new dosages of medications under TRIPS-Plus 
FTAs. Thus, to be effectively realisable, the non-patentability of incremental 
innovations requires substantive amendments to the term of protection provided by 
Article 33 TRIPS, which is not further addressed by the IPT Project. All things 
considered, it can be submitted that the proposed amendment of Article 7 TRIPS adds 
weight to the importance of public societal interests and the necessity of establishing 
an adequate balance in the overall objectives of all IP rights under TRIPS. In regard to 
the impacts of patents on public health, however, these objectives nevertheless require 
the support of distinct regulations in the patent section of TRIPS, addressing the 
specific issues associated with the patentability of medicines. 
Addressing Article 8 TRIPS, the IPT Project proposes changes to the language and 
expressions adopted by the TRIPS Agreement in the identification of the underlying 
principles. For example, rather than stipulating that WTO members may adopt 
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measures for the protection of public health, the proposed amendment suggests the 
wording that members should adopt measures for the protection of public health.125 
While it is submitted that the suggested amendment provides beneficial improvements 
to the elaboration of the basic principles in Article 8 TRIPS, a detailed analysis of the 
linguistic intricacies goes beyond the scope of this thesis. For a detailed explanation 
of the proposed amendment of Article 8 see the IPT Project’s ‘Proposed Amended 
Text (synopsis)’126 and the IPT Project’s ‘Explanatory Memorandum’.127  
Additionally, The IPT Project’s amendment suggests the introduction of a specific 
balancing clause in a newly proposed Article 8a.128 The proposed provision, entitled 
‘Balance of Interests’, is of particular importance in that it strengthens the binding 
force of Article 7 and 8 by explicitly reaffirming their applicability to the specific IP 
provisions of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement.129 Paragraph 1 of the proposed Article 
8a reads: 
Members shall take due account of the objectives and principles set out in 
Articles 7 and 8 when formulating or amending their laws and regulations. 
In doing so, they shall ensure that the protection granted reflects a fair 
balance between private economic interests and the larger public interest 
as well as the interests of third parties.130  
To stipulate that the establishment of an adequate balance is an integral requirement 
under the TRIPS Agreement, and thus not merely optional, the proposal specifically 
adopts the mandatory term ‘shall’ rather than the more moderated expression 
‘should’.131 In summary, it can thus be concluded that the suggested introduction of 
Article 8a can effectively tackle the issue that the objectives and principles of Articles 
7 and 8 TRIPS were frequently neglected in the past, particularly in consideration of 
the patentability of medical products, as elaborated in chapter 4.3. It is therefore 
submitted that this provision should be implemented in any future amendment 
proposal to the TRIPS Agreement, irrespective of whether further amendments to the 
general scope of Articles 7 or 8 TRIPS are considered. 
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5.2.1.2 Proposed Amendments to the Patentable Subject Matter 
under Article 27 TRIPS 
In respect of specific patent provisions as regulated in Section 5 of Part II TRIPS, the 
IPT Project proposes an amendment to Article 27 TRIPS on Patentable Subject Matter 
which substantially changes the scope of this provision. While keeping the requirement 
that patents shall be available for inventions in all fields of technology, the proposed 
amendment abolishes the respective non-discrimination principle, as discussed in 
chapter 2.4.3.1.132 Article 27 would thus only prohibit discrimination as to the place 
of invention, meaning that differential treatment of patents in specific fields of 
technology, such as pharmaceutical products, would be permissible.133 This is deemed 
necessary, as the current ‘one size fits all’ approach has proven to be insufficient for 
addressing the specific intricacies of certain technological sectors, so that appropriate 
patent regulations for individual fields of technology are required, particularly in the 
field of pharmaceuticals.134 Furthermore, the proposed amendment of Article 27 
abolishes the non-discrimination principle as to the place of  production of patented 
products.135 In other words, under the proposed amendment, governments have the 
freedom to implement a local working requirement in national patent laws, thereby 
effectively attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) into the establishment of 
domestic production facilities.136 Notably, this proposal gives effect to the objectives 
and principles of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly in that it adequately facilitates the 
transfer of technology, the dissemination of knowledge, and technological capacity 
building in developing countries.137  
As can be seen, the IPT Project addresses some of the most problematic issues arising 
from the TRIPS Agreement’s patentability standards of Article 27 in respect to both 
public health and technological capacity building in developing countries. The 
proposed amendment, however, refrains from introducing further specific regulations 
on these issues. Consequently, the exact construction of domestic strategies is left for 
states and national legislators, which entails the risk that pressure from industry 
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lobbyists and detailed provisions in TRIPS-Plus FTAs may prevent states from 
adopting adequate policies. Moreover, by enabling the differential treatment of 
different fields of technology without providing any qualification or protective 
measures, the amended Article 27 may facilitate a potential push by the research-based 
industry towards even stricter protection of pharmaceutical patents. 
5.2.1.3 Proposed Amendment to the Exceptions under Article 30 
TRIPS 
The IPT Project’s amendment to the patent section of TRIPS, additionally proposes 
extensive changes to Article 30, which is discussed in chapter 2.4.3.6, essentially 
redesigning the entire scope and content of this provision. To begin with, this proposal 
suggests a distinct amendment of the title of Article 30, replacing the notion of 
‘Exceptions to the Rights Conferred’ with ‘Limitations’, indicating that this regulation 
shall not be regarded as providing mere exceptions to the general rule, but that the 
limitations provided are intrinsic to all patent rights.138 In this regard, paragraph 1 of 
the proposed Article 30 amendment suggests a number of mandatory limitations, 
enumerating acts and uses which shall not be encompassed by the protection conferred 
by patents.139 Accordingly, the new regulation can be regarded as a type of ‘ceiling 
rule’, setting transparent and clear upper limits to the extent of patent protection 
standards.140 These limitations, inter alia, exempt from patent protection the use of an 
invention as necessary for engaging in reverse engineering, experimentation with the 
aim of improving an invention, and experimentation for the purposes of submitting 
data for the marketing approval of products entering the market after a patent 
expires.141 Furthermore, in respect of pharmaceutical patents, paragraph 1(e) of the 
proposed Article 30 provides that patents shall not prevent pharmacies from preparing 
extemporaneous medicines for individual prescriptions.142 The rationale behind this 
limitation is that pharmacists should not be subject to patent infringement when 
providing individual patients with on-demand preparations according to the 
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prescription of doctors.143  This is the only limitation provided by the amendment that 
explicitly addresses issues regarding the accessibility of medicines, so that it is 
submitted that the proposed limitations to the rights conferred are not sufficiently 
equipped for safeguarding that pharmaceutical patents will not interfere with the 
realisation of the right to health.  
Paragraph 3 of the proposed amendment to Article 30, on the other hand, suggests the 
implementation of an explicit authorisation for WTO member states ‘to further restrict 
the protection conferred by patents’ in accordance with the proposed amendments to 
the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement.144 This provision would enable 
governments to adopt measures limiting patent rights as necessary for the protection 
of public health. Paragraph 3 of Article 30 would thus facilitate a balanced 
implementation of the patent provisions of TRIPS, enabling states to limit 
pharmaceutical patent protection where this protection would conflict with the 
interests of society at large. While in general, this seems to be a sensible approach to 
safeguarding public health objectives, the proposed amendment refrains from defining 
the scope of legitimate measures available to states. On the one hand, this provides 
governments with considerable freedom in designing measures adequate to their 
individual needs. On the other hand, however, such measures may be subject to legal 
scrutiny, as the industry is likely to contest any policy adopted by governments, which 
is not explicitly recognised by the TRIPS Agreement. Industry representatives may 
further persuade governments to refrain from the adoption of such measures all 
together. Lastly, the open manner in which paragraph 3 is formulated insinuates that 
public health remains an exception to patent rights, rather than a limitation thereof. As 
noted in chapter 4.2.3, however, human health is of such crucial importance for human 
dignity that its protection should never be just an exception to private economic rights. 
5.2.1.4 Concluding Remarks 
All things considered, the proposed amendment by the IPT Project emphasises the 
necessity of balancing public and private interests, and suggests valuable 
improvements to some of the key provisions of TRIPS that impact on the capability of 
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WTO member states to take measure for the protection of public health. The proposed 
amendment therefore constitutes an important step in the right direction, indicating 
how some of the most detrimental impacts caused by the current international patent 
regime can be alleviated. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the distinct value of the 
proposed amendment, and without the intention of being dismissive of its laudable 
contribution, it can be suggested that the IPT Project took a moderate approach, in that 
it refrains both from making clear human rights references and from elaborating direct 
obligations of patent holders towards public interests. In this respect, it is particularly 
regrettable that while the amendment to Article 7 suggests that the protection conferred 
by IP rights shall be proportionate to the actual positive contribution of an invention, 
the proposal leaves the general minimum patent period of 20 years under Article 33 
TRIPS completely unaddressed. Similarly, the proposed amendment refrains from 
specifically engaging with patentability requirements, reasons for revocation, and the 
protection of undisclosed information in Section 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Ultimately, it can be concluded that while the proposed amendment provides a sensible 
approach to updating some of the controversial issues arising from the TRIPS 
Agreement, certain distinct concerns in regard to the patentability of pharmaceutical 
products remain unattended. Therefore, especially focussing on pharmaceutical 
patents and the realisation of the right to health, the next section of this thesis considers 
a different approach to amending the TRIPS Agreement, exploring the possibility of 
conditioning the award and revocation of patent rights to the adherence to specific 
concomitant obligations. 
5.2.2 Proposed Revisions of the Patentability Standards for 
Pharmaceutical Products Linking Distinct Obligations to the 
Rights Conferred 
To adequately contribute to the realisation of the right to health, the patent section of 
the TRIPS Agreement urgently requires a more substantial amendment than that 
suggested by the IPT Project. While any more radical approach is also more likely to 
encounter additional difficulties and obstacles than a moderated approach when 
seeking global implementation, the author submits that the patentability of 
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pharmaceutical products itself provides unique parameters in this field that sensibly 
facilitate the consideration of ambitious amendments.  
Research-based pharmaceutical corporations seek desirable protection for their 
inventions in the form of exclusive patent rights that provide inventors with the 
capability of receiving monopoly rents on the markets. The provision of a patent is 
subject to the fulfilment of certain patentability requirements which currently specify 
mere technicalities that need to be fulfilled in order for an invention to qualify as a 
patentable innovation. According to the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, on the 
other hand, IP rights shall be further balanced with obligations of rights holders. At 
the present time, however, the patent section of the TRIPS Agreement fails to stipulate 
any distinct obligations associated with the provision of patent rights. Therefore, the 
implementation of obligations is urgently required. Patent rights should thus be 
subjected to specific obligations of rights holders, with non-compliance constituting a 
reason for the revocation of a patent. It can be assumed that the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry would adhere to such obligations, as patent rights provide 
corporations with a valuable means for recouping R&D investments and realising 
substantial profits. Consequently, depending on the willingness of the international 
community, the nature of patents provides an opportunity for implementing right to 
health obligations directly into international patent laws.  
At the same time, it must be ensured that these obligations are adequately balanced 
with patent rights, as excessive obligations may render pharmaceutical patents 
unattractive for the industry. Innovative corporations could then be inclined to refrain 
from filing patent applications, with the repercussion that the composition of new 
medicines remains undisclosed. This, on the other hand, would enable other 
pharmaceutical corporations, and particularly the generic industry, to engage in reverse 
engineering. Furthermore, the disclosure of an innovation is ultimately required for the 
purposes of marketing approval, so that governments retain a certain leeway when 
contemplating the introduction of distinct obligations for balancing the provision of 
patent rights. 
The rationale behind the following proposed revision to the patent section of TRIPS is 
based on unique opportunities offered by the patentability of pharmaceutical products 
in consideration of its adverse impacts on the protection of public health. It is therefore 
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not suggested that a similar approach would be suitable for implementing corporate 
human rights responsibilities for patent holders in other sectors, or IP rights holders 
more generally. Although similar amendments may be possible, such considerations 
exceed the scope of this thesis. In this respect, the revisions proposed in the following 
sections are solely focussed on addressing the specific issues arising from the 
provisions of pharmaceutical patents.  
The proposed revision of TRIPS is based on the acknowledgement that the current 
international patent regime is not justified. Consequently, amendments are required 
that balance the provision of private exclusive rights with the broader public interest. 
In this respect, egalitarian moral reasoning suggests that human rights concerns need 
to be duly regarded, particularly when human dignity is at stake. Consequently, private 
economic rights must not constitute obstacles for the realisation of human rights, but 
should instead contribute to their achievement. According to Gewirth’s Principle of 
Generic Consistency, as elaborated in chapter 3.2.2.3, it can thus be submitted that the 
responsibilities of corporations towards the right to health go beyond the mere ‘doing 
no harm’ requirement of the responsibility to respect human rights. On the contrary, 
patent holders should be expected to take reasonable steps towards ensuring the 
accessibility of their patented medicines for all patients in need, and should further 
adequately contribute to the development of new pharmaceuticals. Not all human 
rights requirements, however, can be reasonably expected to be fulfilled by the private 
business sector, as the realisation of the right to health, for example, requires cheap 
medications, which, in order to be affordable by every person, potentially need to be 
distributed at prices below their production costs.  
The following sections therefore elaborate on corporate responsibilities that can be 
sensibly implemented into the international patent regime in order to establish a 
reasonable balance between private and public rights and obligations. The proposed 
revisions are indicative of a feasible approach to amending the TRIPS Agreement in 
respect of right to health concerns without providing an elaborate amendment text.145 
The drafting of such a concrete amendment text ultimately needs to be conducted by a 
diverse working group consisting of both IP and Trade Law specialists as well as 
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experts in the field of human rights with a particular focus on the right to health, and 
open for broad consultation and debate.  
5.2.2.1 Explicit Differential Treatment of Pharmaceutical Products 
in Comparison to Other Commodities 
The revision of the TRIPS Agreement being proposed here, suggesting specific 
regulations for the patentability of pharmaceutical products, is based on a fundamental 
change to the patent section of the agreement, facilitating the differential treatment of 
pharmaceuticals by abolishing the requirement that patents shall be available without 
discrimination as to the field of technology. Distinguished from the IPT Project’s 
proposed amendment to Article 27 TRIPS, it is submitted that the anti-discrimination 
principle as to the field of technology should not only be dropped, but that 
pharmaceutical products should be explicitly treated differently from patents in other 
fields of technology. In this regard, I suggest two possible approaches to facilitating 
the differential treatment of pharmaceutical patents. Firstly, Article 27 can be amended 
to explicitly require the differential treatment of pharmaceutical products and 
processes, with further specific regulations on pharmaceutical patents being 
implemented into a revised patent section of the TRIPS Agreement. Secondly, in a 
more radical approach, the patentability of pharmaceutical products may be entirely 
disconnected from the current patent section of TRIPS, adding a new section to Part II 
of the agreement that specifically focusses on the regulation of pharmaceutical patents. 
The rationale behind the differential treatment of pharmaceutical patents is derived 
from the fact that pharmaceutical products exhibit distinct differences from other 
technological sectors, particularly with regard to their impacts on the health, life, and 
dignity of human beings. Life-saving medicines are fundamental to human wellbeing 
and thereby disparate from other commodities such as new smartphones which a 
consumer can freely choose not to purchase until the prices drop.146 Not being able to 
promptly afford new medications, on the other hand, may be decisive for the death or 
survival of a patient. Furthermore, monopoly prices for ordinary products are more 
elastic than those of medicines, as consumers are likely to refrain from purchasing 
overpriced commodities, so that the price range of such products is limited by the 
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maximum amount consumers are willing to pay.147 As elaborated in chapter 4.2.2, 
however, individuals burdened by diseases rely on medical treatment, with the result 
that patients commonly accept higher prices for medicines, meaning that monopolists 
on pharmaceutical markets exercise greater freedom regarding the increase of prices 
to unreasonable levels. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the disparities between pharmaceutical products and 
other commodities confirm the urgent requirement that pharmaceutical patents are 
specifically regulated in an adequate manner, different from patents in other fields of 
technology. Notably, this requirement seems to be implicitly recognised by the Doha 
Declaration which provides specific measures for the protection of public health, 
rendering the differential treatment of health-related patents necessary.148 In the long 
run, an amendment of Article 27 TRIPS therefore seems inevitable for balancing 
patent rights with public health concerns. 
5.2.2.2 Revision of the Rights Conferred  
Article 28 TRIPS provides patent holders with exclusive rights, enabling them to, inter 
alia, prevent third parties from using their patented inventions.149 This provision entails 
the possibility that patent holders exert their rights to restrict the use of their products 
and processes by other researchers. Thus, to ensure that patents themselves do not 
create obstacles for adequate research activity, an amendment of Article 28 is required. 
This amendment needs to stipulate that the right to prevent others from using a 
patented invention shall not encompass uses which are necessary for conducting 
further research to improve upon an invention, or for developing new products based 
on patented processes or prior inventions. If such use leads to the development of new 
products, the implementation of a derivative right for the initial patent holders may be 
considered which grants them a reasonable share of new patents, proportionate to the 
contribution of the original patent to the new invention. This approach differs from the 
proposal of the IPT Project, which provides a limitation clause, exempting the use for 
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research purposes from patent protection in an amendment of Article 30 TRIPS that 
evokes semblance to a generalised exception.150 An amendment to Article 28 TRIPS, 
on the other hand, can provide a specific definition of the term ‘use’ within the 
regulation itself, stipulating that the term shall never encompass uses for further 
research activities. 
5.2.2.3 Implementation of Obligations of (Pharmaceutical) Patent 
Holders 
In recognition that the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement affirm the existence of both 
rights and obligations, which, according to Article 7 TRIPS, must be balanced with 
each other,151 Part II of the TRIPS Agreement exhibits a distinct lack of any elaborate 
obligations of patent holders. While Article 28 TRIPS provides a clear definition of 
the rights conferred by patents, there is currently no similar provision addressing 
concomitant obligations. I therefore propose the implementation of an Article 28bis, 
titled ‘Obligations of Patent Holders’, which in particular shall stipulate explicit 
provisions establishing the obligations of pharmaceutical patent holders. Notably, 
clear rules are required which implement obligations towards the accessibility of 
medicines to facilitate that public health becomes a main concern of patent standards, 
rather than being side-lined to the exceptions, as discussed in chapter 4.2.3.152 
In this respect, it is suggested that a first obligation of pharmaceutical patent holders 
shall stipulate that patented medical products must be made available worldwide, 
without any unreasonable delay. To this end, it is paramount that the acts of 
withdrawing pharmaceutical products from a specific market, and/or refraining from 
introducing new medicines to a specific country as a retaliation for allegedly 
insufficient domestic patent protection standards or the use of compulsory licenses, as 
elaborated in chapter 2.4.3.7, shall be explicitly prohibited. A violation of this 
prohibition shall constitute a reason for the revocation of a patent. To add force to this 
obligation, and to ensure that required medications are available in all countries alike, 
the revocation should not only be applicable in a domestic context. Instead, a severe 
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breach of this obligation should facilitate considerations of a global revocation of the 
respective patent, as elaborated below in 5.2.2.6. 
Additionally, following Guidelines 5 and 33 of Hunt’s Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, the realisation of the 
accessibility of medicines for all requires corporations to pay due regard to 
disadvantaged people and communities, and particularly to populations living in 
poverty, when implementing their pharmaceutical pricing policies.153 In recognition of 
Guideline 34, pharmaceutical corporations should furthermore take particular account 
of the stage of a country’s economic development.154 Based on these principles, it is 
submitted that the TRIPS Agreement should entail an obligation for pharmaceutical 
patent holders to refrain from excessive pricing strategies, particularly where such 
strategies would induce prohibitive prices in low-income countries. As elaborated in 
chapter 4.2.2, it can be economically viable to charge higher drug prices in poor 
markets than in industrialised countries, as the profitability peaks in inelastic demand 
curves when the prices are set so high that they are only affordable to the richest ten 
percent of the population. While it may be impracticable to define clear upper limits 
of permissible prices, the current situation indicates the need for the introduction of a 
means to identify whether prices are so excessive that they amount to an abuse of a 
monopolistic market position. Such an abuse should then be defined as a reason for 
the revocation of the patent under Article 32 TRIPS.  
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement should not merely prevent the abuse of patent 
rights, but rather oblige pharmaceutical corporations to take active steps towards 
realising the accessibility of their patented products. In this respect, pharmaceutical 
patent holders should be required to offer medicines in developing countries at cheaper 
prices than in industrialise nations. Currently, however, a differential pricing system 
is not feasible, as its facilitation requires further changes to the TRIPS Agreement, 
particularly to Article 6 addressing the exhaustion of IP rights, as elaborated in the 
next section. Similarly, corporations should be required to engage in meaningful 
research, especially with regard to tropical diseases that mainly affect poor 
populations. The introduction of such a responsibility, however, is not entirely 
unproblematic, as private corporations would seemingly be required to make private 
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investments against their economic interests, for the fulfilment of a public function, as 
further elaborated below in 5.2.2.5.  
Lastly, a revised TRIPS Agreement can theoretically elevate Hunt’s Human Rights 
Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines to a 
legally binding status, at least for patent holding corporations, by implementing an 
obligation for pharmaceutical patent holders to comply with the Guidelines. While 
such a move would provide a solution for the current voluntariness of the Guidelines, 
the specific responsibilities of pharmaceutical corporations would be relegated to an 
instrument outside the international patent system. Therefore, key obligations of 
pharmaceutical patent holders should nevertheless be explicitly implemented into the 
TRIPS Agreement. Only then could an additional reference to Hunt’s Guidelines add 
a further level to the human rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders.  
5.2.2.4 Facilitating Differential Pricing Strategies 
A differential pricing strategy is based on the idea that the prices of medical products 
should be proportionate to the wealth or poverty level of the country where the 
medicine is sold.155 In other words, differential pricing pays due regard to the actual 
economic and social differences between developing countries and industrialised 
nations.156 The successful realisation of a differential pricing strategy requires that in 
developing countries, the pharmaceutical industry implements a low-price-high-
volume marketing policy.157 Differential pricing strategies for pharmaceutical 
products are thus commonly based on the Ramsey Pricing model. The theory behind 
Ramsey Pricing provides that the prices of medicines in each individual market shall 
at least be equal to their marginal production costs, while the prices in all markets 
combined need to lead to a revenue that additionally covers at least the relevant R&D 
costs, and further provides a reasonable profit.158 By applying this model, the research-
 
155 Bakhoum M, ‘TRIPS, Patent Rights and Right to Health: “Price” or “Prize” for Better Access to 
Medicines?’ (2009) Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law 
Research Paper Series No. 10-07 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1619215> accessed 24 February 
2019, 30. 
156 ibid 35. 
157 Abbott FM and Reichman JH, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10 
JIEL 921, 982. 
158 For further discussion of the Ramsey Pricing model see: Bakhoum M (n 155) 36; Opderbeck DW, 
‘Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game’ (2005) 58 Vand. L. Rev. 501, 531. 
278 
 
based industry can recoup their R&D investments by keeping medicine prices in 
wealthy countries comparatively high, while the drug prices in low-income countries 
can be kept close their production costs to increase their accessibility for the poor.159 
This implies, however, that patients in industrialised countries have to accept high drug 
prices to maintain the required research incentives.160 
A substantial problem inherent to the differential pricing approach is that the 
pharmaceutical industry fears a dilution of drug prices in wealthy markets, as cheaper 
products may be parallel imported from developing countries, particularly when 
industrialised nations apply a system of international exhaustion.161 Notably, 
international exhaustion enables consumers to import cheaper products that were 
lawfully placed on markets in other countries.162 Therefore, the current exhaustion rule 
under Article 6 TRIPS, which enables domestic states to freely implement their 
preferred exhaustion regime, is insufficient for facilitating differential pricing 
strategies.163 Consequently, it is submitted that in order to encourage, or even require 
pharmaceutical patent holders to adopt a differential pricing policy, Article 6 TRIPS 
needs to be revised accordingly.164 It must be noted, however, that such a revision 
cannot simply mandate that all countries shall apply national exhaustion regimes, 
which are impossible to implement in regional trade areas165 such as the EU.166 It 
follows that any amendment to Article 6 TRIPS must rule out international exhaustion 
regimes, while at the same time retaining the possibility for regional unions to 
implement a regime of regional exhaustion. Otherwise, such a revision would 
inevitably lack the required support of the EU and other regional trade areas. As a 
result, differential pricing strategies cannot be facilitated within regional unions. This 
can raise particular issues in unions consisting of mid- and low-income countries, 
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where it must be expected that medicine prices are set at a level proportionate to the 
wealth of the mid-income countries. Ultimately, however, where an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement prevents the parallel importation of drugs from poor countries to 
wealthy markets, a differential pricing strategy can be implemented on an international 
level.167 
A further obstacle for the adoption of a differential pricing strategy is that the 
pharmaceutical industry may be exposed to reference pricing strategies utilised by 
wealthy countries, which negotiate for cheaper drug prices with reference to the prices 
charged in low-income countries.168 This is a particular concern for the research-based 
industry, when, according to differential pricing policies, the prices charged in 
developing countries merely entail marginal profits.169 It follows that if wealthy 
countries use developing country prices as benchmarks in price negotiations, the 
pharmaceutical industry loses its capability to recoup R&D costs.170 Consequently, 
differential pricing strategies can only be feasible if industrialised nations refrain from 
referencing lower prices available to developing countries.171 A potential solution for 
this problem is suggested in the implementation of a ‘system of secret rebates’ which 
facilitates differential pricing by keeping the prices offered to individual countries 
secret, and therefore unavailable to foreign price negotiators.172 Such a system, 
however, may be susceptible to leaks which could be abused by industrialised country 
negotiators seeking to push for lower prices. I therefore propose that a meaningful 
solution should clearly define parameters in the very provisions proposed for the 
regulation of differential pricing strategies in the TRIPS Agreement, which explicitly 
prevent industrialised countries from utilising reference pricing as a means to lower 
medicine prices to developing country levels.  
Lastly, it must be acknowledged, however, that differential pricing policies cannot 
provide a comprehensive solution for all the issues associated with the accessibility of 
medicines in developing countries. While differential pricing offers certain solutions 
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regarding the pricing of pharmaceutical products in developing countries, such a 
system is only feasible for medications that treat diseases which are prevalent in both 
low-income and high-income countries.173 This is because differential pricing is based 
on the theory that by recouping R&D investments and realising reasonable profits in 
wealthy markets, a research incentive for new medications can be established, despite 
prices in developing countries being low. For neglected diseases, on the other hand, 
there are commonly no viable markets in industrialised countries, so that the necessary 
R&D investments cannot be recovered there, meaning that differential pricing does 
not offer incentives for the development of medicines for the poor.174 Furthermore, 
even if medications for neglected diseases were developed, differential pricing 
strategies would not be applicable, as without the availability of wealthy markets, 
prices in developing countries would remain high. It can thus be concluded that 
differential pricing strategies offer solutions for the pricing problem of medicines in 
developing countries only for products with global markets, leaving the issues 
surrounding neglected diseases unresolved.175  
5.2.2.5 Research Incentives for Neglected Diseases 
By and large, the scope of this thesis reveals that current international patent laws are 
insufficiently equipped for addressing the specific issues of medicines with minor 
demand on global markets. From this it can be concluded that a system which relies 
solely on market conditions for incentivising investments is inadequate for 
encouraging appropriate pharmaceutical research activities.176 In further recognition 
of the adverse impacts of high drug prices on public health, it must be questioned 
whether the prospect of monopoly pricing is ultimately the most favourable way of 
incentivising pharmaceutical R&D.177 As long as patents function as the primary 
research incentive, however, patent laws should provide clear regulations and 
specifications on the scope of appropriate research. In particular, benchmarks should 
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be defined, ensuring that patent protection levels distinctly reflect the effort that goes 
into the development of a new pharmaceutical product. It is therefore proposed that 
patent protection should be proportionate to research expenses, meaning that 
incremental developments should not receive the same term of protection as ground-
breaking research projects.178 
As patent protection nevertheless only provides incentives where there are profitable 
markets, the encouragement of research into neglected diseases appears to require a 
more radical approach, potentially by implementing clear responsibilities or 
obligations. It may be quite problematic, however, to propose the imposition of 
research obligations for the development of public goods on private corporations, 
particularly when concomitant investments expose corporations to the risk of incurring 
losses. The prevailing question would be, how to justify that some corporations are 
required to make private investments into the development of public goods, but not 
others?  
At the same time, the granting of exclusive patent rights shall, in fact, stimulate 
research by enabling corporations to increase their profitability by charging higher 
prices. Such an incentive, however, is insufficient for satisfying some of the most 
urgent research needs. It may therefore be reasonable to suggest that the award of 
patent rights should be subjected to specific qualifications and requirements. 
Considering that high prices only provide sufficient incentives for the development of 
medicines with markets in wealthy countries, an obligation should be introduced, 
requiring patent holders to spend a certain amount of their monopoly profits on 
research into neglected diseases.179 To be effective, it is crucial for such an obligation 
to be implemented on a global scale. An amendment to TRIPS that simply provides 
domestic governments with the option of implementing a provision that requires patent 
holders to conduct research into local diseases may discourage pharmaceutical 
corporations from placing new products on respective markets, particularly in 
developing countries and LDCs.180 On balance, however, it must be acknowledged 
that such a solution is still not optimal for addressing the specific issues surrounding 
neglected diseases, and that more research is required to identify how the TRIPS 
 
178 See thereto: chapters 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, and 4.3.5. 
179 Opderbeck DW (n 158) 551; Trouiller P and others (n 159) 2193. 
180 Opderbeck DW (n 158) 550-551. 
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Agreement can effectively ensure that the research-based pharmaceutical industry 
pays due regard to the needs of the poor. 
Ultimately, one may need to accept that a patent system under which incentives for 
innovation are solely reliant on market forces may simply not be the optimal place for 
seeking solutions to the neglect of research into diseases for which there is no market. 
Notably, the private business sector which needs to be incentivised, is driven by 
economic interests, which by their nature do not cater for the needs of certain groups 
and populations, if the fulfilment of such needs is economically not viable.181 Applied 
in context, it can be observed that the development of new medical products entails 
substantial opportunity costs, so that drugs with minor profitability prospects do not 
provide economic incentives, irrespective of the strength of the available patent 
protection.182 In further recognition that the development of new medicines serves an 
essential public health function, it should not be left to the profit driven private 
business sector alone.183 Instead, strong public commitments are required. 
It is important to realise that the provision of market exclusivity under patent laws is 
not the only available option for incentivising pharmaceutical research.184 On the 
contrary, governments can resort to non-market incentives, so-called push 
mechanisms, for example, by providing tax concessions based on investments rather 
than results; by subsidising research investments into neglected diseases; or by 
providing public grants for specific research projects.185 Similarly, governments could 
make purchase commitments for medicines treating neglected diseases prior to their 
development, thereby mitigating the risks of non-viable markets.186 In special 
consideration of neglected diseases, another approach which is suggested, is the 
establishment of a so-called ‘prize system’ according to which successful innovators 
can choose to receive a monetary reward instead of patent protection, subject to the 
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(ed), Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules: Intellectual 
Property in the WTO Volume I (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 689. 
186 Abbott FM, ‘Trade in Medicines’ (184) 126. 
283 
 
actual contribution of an invention.187 Such an approach  not only provides a research 
incentive for neglected diseases, but furthermore ensures that newly developed 
medicines immediately enter the public domain.188 When a prize system then runs 
parallel to a patent system, the patent system can be utilised to incentivise research 
into diseases with global markets, while the prize system can foster research 
investments into neglected diseases.189 The remaining question, however, is who shall 
pay for the prizes offered? This crucial question applies equally to all subsidies offered 
as research incentives. For neglected diseases, Abbott suggests that subsidies should 
be internationally coordinated.190 Ultimately, the successful creation and sustainability 
of a system of subsidies is heavily dependent on political sentiments.191 In the end, it 
must nevertheless be recognised ‘that governments are in the best position to provide 
and regulate essential public goods.’192  
5.2.2.6 Non-compliance as Reason for Revocation 
The TRIPS Agreement only briefly, and arguably insufficiently, addresses options for 
the revocation and forfeiture of patent rights. In fact, the agreement refrains from 
providing any specific conditions or reasons which explicitly permit the revocation of 
a patent. In its current form, Article 32 TRIPS reads: ‘An opportunity for judicial 
review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent shall be available.’193 It follows 
that the only regulation provided on this matter is a protection clause for patent holders 
against arbitrary expropriation. There are no distinct measures, however, for the 
protection of the public interest. In order to give force to the obligations of 
pharmaceutical patent holders proposed in this chapter, it is therefore crucial to amend 
Article 32 to implement an enforcement mechanism by rendering non-compliance 
with the proposed obligations a reason for the revocation of patents. 
In particular, a revised Article 32 should explicitly prohibit the abuse of patent rights, 
by stipulating that any such abuses shall result in the revocation of the respective 
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patents.194 In this respect, the affordability of patented medicines can be established as 
a requirement for patentability by defining that excessive pricing of medicines shall 
constitute an abuse of monopoly powers. Similarly, where corporations arbitrarily 
refuse to place patented products on certain markets where medications are needed, an 
opportunity for revocation must be available to ensure that patients gain access to the 
required treatment. In this regard, it must be remembered that a number of developing 
countries and LDCs lack the capacity to produce generic medicines. A national 
revocation of patents may thus be insufficient for facilitating that the required 
medications reach all people in need. The revocation of patents for severe abuses of 
monopoly powers should therefore be internationally coordinated. While it may be too 
radical to suggest that a patent should then be globally revoked, a mechanism seems 
to be required which ensures that generics can be produced in countries with 
pharmaceutical production capacities for the export to countries where a patent has 
been revoked, without the need of going through the compulsory licensing system.  
Ultimately, it is crucial that an amended TRIPS Agreement facilitates the 
enforcement195 of the proposed obligations for pharmaceutical patent holders. In this 
respect, these obligations need to become an integral part of patent laws and non-
compliance must be a reason for revocation. Article 32 TRIPS therefore needs to be 
revised to explicitly define the permissible grounds for revocation. This enumeration 
should be non-exhaustive to ensure that governments can adapt their patent laws to 
unforeseen circumstances in the future. A general problem with the enforcement of 
such obligations, however, is that it is reliant on the willingness of governments to 
implement the required domestic legislation. If a state refrains from implementing 
appropriate revocation mechanisms, there are currently no means under TRIPS which 
enable the general public to challenge the inactivity of governments, as the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) only concerns TRIPS disputes that are 
brought by a state against another state.196 To ensure the effective protection of the 
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public interest, a mechanism is thus required which enables the general public, or 
NGOs acting on behalf of the public interest, to challenge states that fail to adequately 
implement the proposed enforcement mechanisms.  
5.2.2.7 Ceilings of Protection 
Scrutinising the justification of the current international patent regime, chapter 4.2.3 
identified that one of the main obstacles for the establishment of a balanced patent 
system is that the TRIPS Agreement, while providing a clear minimum of IP 
protection, refrains from defining appropriate maximum protection standards. 
Therefore, to ensure that patent protection is not raised to unreasonable levels, TRIPS 
should be revised to include clearly defined ceilings of protection. When considering 
the introduction of such ceilings, there are two potential ways by which upper limits 
can be established. Firstly, ceilings can be defined as limitations to the protection 
conferred by patents, as suggested by the IPT Project’s proposed amendment of Article 
30 TRIPS, elaborated earlier in this chapter.197 Secondly, ceilings of protection can be 
established by implementing upper limits to which IP protection can extend, for 
example, by defining a distinct maximum patent period, applicable to both 
governments enacting domestic patent provisions and international FTAs establishing 
TRIPS-Plus patent standards. The second approach connects to the peculiarity of 
international IP laws which have historically only aspired to strengthening IP rights, 
leading to ever-increasing protection levels without sufficient attention to 
considerations of proportionality.198 
Unfortunately, this trend is currently permissible under TRIPS, as Article 1(1) 
explicitly enables states to grant stronger IP protection than that provided for by the 
minimum standards defined in the agreement.199 Article 1(1) qualifies this permission 
by requiring that higher protection levels shall ‘not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.’200 Pragmatic experience, however, indicates that this qualification leaves 
too much leeway, as it can be observed that TRIPS-Plus FTAs frequently impose 
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unfavourable IP standards on developing countries, contravening their public interests. 
It is therefore suggested that a clear definition of distinct maximum standards can 
provide a better safeguard against the introduction of excessive patent protection.  
It must be acknowledged here that the suggested limitations in the amendment to 
Article 30 TRIPS proposed by the IPT Project, indicate a suitable approach to 
providing ceiling rules by adopting mandatory exceptions from patent protection in 
order to enable governments to establish an adequate balance between private and 
public interests.201 As the first approach to introducing adequate ceilings of protection 
is thus appropriately addressed by prior scholarship, the following section of this 
chapter will elaborate on the second approach, with a particular focus on the 
introduction of maximum protection periods.  
When proposing the introduction of ceiling rules regarding patent periods, it may be 
suggested that the current 20-year term of protection seems to be quite excessive for 
pharmaceutical products, especially in respect of the adverse impacts of monopolistic 
market positions on the affordability of medicines. In consideration of the global 
acceptance of this minimum protection term, however, it seems that the international 
community regards 20 years as the appropriate duration for incentivising and 
rewarding successful R&D efforts. Therefore, any attempt at lowering the minimum 
protection period is expected to encounter considerable opposition, with meagre 
prospects of success. In return, accepting that this term is sufficiently appropriate for 
incentivising R&D, it can be suggested that patent protection should not generally be 
extendable beyond 20 years. Consequently, any extension to the minimum patent 
period should be based on reasonable grounds, for example to compensate for 
administrative delays or marketing approval times. It is therefore proposed that the 
TRIPS Agreement should be revised to reflect that the minimum patent protection 
period of 20 years shall likewise constitute the generally permissible maximum. To 
protect the public interest, patent term extensions to compensate for administrative 
delays should be an exception to the general rule, and not the rule itself. While 
dissenting opinions may potentially suggest that the maximum duration should be 
longer than the minimum term, such an approach seems inadequate, as it entails the 
risk that industry lobbyists seek to push governments to always grant the maximum 
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patent term, so that the ceiling of protection would effectively become the new 
minimum standard. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the TRIPS Agreement should directly address secondary 
patents for new uses and new dosages of existing medications, which is currently not 
possible under TRIPS itself, as Article 27 explicitly requires patentable innovation to 
be new and to involve an inventive step.202 Article 1(1), on the other hand, permits the 
implementation of more extensive protection.203 As this seemingly enables TRIPS-
Plus FTAs to frequently require the granting of secondary patents, as elaborated in 
chapter 2.5.1.1, the TRIPS Agreement should be revised and adapted to this new 
situation. In particular, it is proposed that TRIPS should stipulate that secondary 
patents on prior existing products shall not qualify for the same 20-year minimum 
protection period as regular innovations. Instead, the term of protection should be 
proportionate to the effort required to detect a new use or new dosage. It follows that 
the protection of secondary patents should regularly be shorter than the protection 
granted to radically new innovations. To establish a proportionate level of protection, 
corporations seeking secondary patents should be required to disclose the research 
investments made towards the discovery of a new use or new dosage. The appropriate 
protection term can then be calculated based on the specific costs involved. As such a 
system may be susceptible to abuse, clear guidelines for the definition of eligible costs 
are required to prevent corporations from submitting strategic calculations indicating 
higher than actual investments. 
From a public health point of view, it is submitted that for first patents on new 
innovations, a similar approach of proportioning the level of protection to the 
contribution of an invention or the research efforts involved would be more suitable 
for the establishment of an adequate balance between private and public interests. In 
particular, it can be questioned why incremental innovations should receive the same 
protection term as high-risk ground-breaking research projects. It must be re-
acknowledged, however, that an attempt at lowering the 20-year minimum protection 
term for an initial patent is likely to be regarded as too radical with little chance of 
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success, and therefore currently not a sensible approach to proposing an amendment 
of the TRIPS patent regime. 
Ultimately, to prevent patent protection being raised to inappropriate levels, it is 
fundamental to at least define clear maximum protection standards, including a distinct 
maximum protection term. Irrespective of the chosen term, introducing ceilings of 
protection for patent rights requires amendments to both Article 1 and Article 33 
TRIPS. First, to facilitate the introduction of and adherence to general maximum 
protection standards, the wording of Article 1 TRIPS needs to be revised so that the 
allowance of more extensive protection is explicitly conditioned to defined maxima 
provided by the specific IP sections in Part II of the agreement. Second, an amendment 
to Article 33 TRIPS needs to define an explicit maximum protection term, and should 
further provide that the minimum protection period of 20 years is not applicable to 
secondary patents. Lastly, in recognition that the provision of a maximum protection 
term which deviates from the minimum patent period entails the risk that such a 
maximum is turned into the new minimum standard, the TRIPS Agreement should 
explicitly stipulate that any extension beyond minimum protection terms must be 
appropriately based on considerations of proportionality.  
5.2.2.8 Introducing Clear Human Rights References to the TRIPS 
Agreement 
At the present time, it can be observed that while explicitly addressing the importance 
of public health, both the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration refrain from the 
adoption of human rights language or making direct references to international human 
rights law, as discussed in chapter 3.1.3.2.204 In regard to the fundamental importance 
of human rights, and the considerable lack of a distinct hierarchy between trade law 
and human rights law on an international level, it is proposed that a revision of the 
TRIPS Agreement should provide an explicit reference to the validity of human rights 
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standards. Such a reference should be drafted in a similar language as the current 
acknowledgement of the validity of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention in 
Article 2(2) TRIPS. A newly adopted Article 2(3) could thus read:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the existing human rights 
obligations of Members under the International Bill of Rights.205  
The Bill of Rights should then be defined as at least encompassing the UDHR, the 
ICESCR, and the ICCPR, although other human rights treaties and conventions should 
be regarded as well. 
The proposed implementation of a human rights reference in Article 2(3) TRIPS can 
effectively introduce a binding conflict clause, by establishing a clear link between 
trade law and human rights.206 Thereby, human rights can be placed at the core of the 
TRIPS Agreement, providing overarching obligations, rather than mere exceptions to 
the general rule.207 As a result, external human rights provisions can act as valid 
limitations to the IP rights of TRIPS, and thus contribute to the establishment of an 
appropriate balance of private and public interests, ensuring that private rights do not 
hinder the realisation of public health.208 In other words, human rights standards 
themselves could become mandatory ceilings of IP protection. Furthermore, by 
establishing that the TRIPS Agreement shall not contravene human rights norms, 
governments would be permitted to adopt measures inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement for the protection of the right to health.209  
5.2.2.9 Protection of Undisclosed Information 
Besides the protection of pharmaceutical patents, the protection of undisclosed 
information submitted for the marketing approval of new medicines under Article 
39(3) TRIPS can also create severe obstacles for the realisation of the right to health, 
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as elaborated in chapter 2.4.4. Therefore, amendments to the patent section of the 
TRIPS Agreement, aimed at establishing an improved balance between private and 
public interests with particular respect to human health, should furthermore consider 
revisions to Article 39 TRIPS. In particular, the protection of undisclosed information 
should not create obstacles for further research aimed at improving an invention, or 
the marketing approval of generic drugs entering the market after a patent expires. In 
similar fashion to the suggested amendments to the regulation of pharmaceutical 
patents, it is submitted that the protection of undisclosed information should not simply 
side-line public health to an exception clause, but that a revised Article 39 should 
explicitly provide safeguards for its realisation.  
5.2.3 Concluding remarks 
In the final analysis, the preceding sections of this chapter can be summarised to 
provide an answer to Research Question 5:  
Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement, in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime?  
As identified in chapter 4, the justification of the international patent regime is 
decisively dependant on the establishment of an adequate balance between private and 
public interests, which in turn is dependent on the balancing of the rights and 
obligations of IP rights holders. This is of particular concern in respect to the right to 
health, as the provision of pharmaceutical patent protection creates severe obstacles 
for the realisation of public health. Therefore, by introducing enforceable 
responsibilities of the pharmaceutical industry, an amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement can provide the required balance of the rights and obligations of patent 
holders. This can then lead to the establishment of an adequate balance between IP 
rights and public health concerns, and a stronger justification of the international patent 
regime.  
In this regard, I have argued in this chapter that it is the very patentability of 
pharmaceutical products itself which provides the opportunity for implementing the 
291 
 
responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders as a direct obligation into 
international IP laws. This is inherently connected to the circumstance that 
pharmaceutical corporations seek the protection of their inventions and research 
investments, as patents are a valuable asset to research-based industries. The granting 
of exclusive rights can, and should thus be subjected to concomitant obligations. For 
the regulation of specific obligations of pharmaceutical patent holders, and specific 
conditions to the patentability of pharmaceuticals more generally, it is crucial that 
Article 27 TRIPS is amended to facilitate the differential treatment of patents 
according to the field of technology. Then, obligations of pharmaceutical patent 
holders can be introduced by a newly implemented Article 28bis. The adherence to 
these obligations should furthermore be defined as a requirement for the patentability 
of pharmaceutical products. In particular, the obligations should require 
pharmaceutical patent holders to pay due regard to marginalised and vulnerable groups 
in their pricing policies, especially with regard to poverty levels in developing 
countries. To provide an enforcement mechanism, both the non-compliance with 
obligations as well as the abuse of monopolistic market positions should be explicitly 
defined as reasons for the revocation of patents. To furthermore prevent TRIPS-Plus 
FTAs from corrupting the newly established balance, ceilings of protection are 
required which, on the one hand, should provide distinct limitations to the scope of 
protection that is provided by patent rights, and, on the other hand, should clearly 
define a maximum protection period. Lastly, it is submitted that the best results in 
establishing an appropriate balance between private IP rights and public right to health 
concerns may be achieved by implementing a direct human rights reference into the 
general provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
In general, there are two possible approaches suggested for the implementation of an 
amendment to the patent provisions of TRIPS in regard to pharmaceutical products. 
For the most part, the preceding proposals have focussed on the first approach, which 
aims to regulate pharmaceutical patents differently from patents on regular goods, by 
adopting specific provisions in added paragraphs and articles within the current patent 
section of TRIPS. The second approach, on the other hand, proposes that 
pharmaceutical patents should be completely disconnected from the current patent 
section. A new section should then be introduced to Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which specifically regulates pharmaceutical patents with all their nuances and 
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intricacies. While this would ultimately be the preferred approach, it has to be 
recognised that this proposal is rather radical, and thus likely to face strong opposition 
and severe obstacles in international negotiations. It is therefore concluded that at the 
current time, the first approach seems to be the sensible way of proposing an 
amendment to the patentability of pharmaceutical products, as it has the greatest 
chance of successfully establishing the required balance between IP rights and public 
health. 
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Conclusion 
 
As outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, almost two billion people around the 
globe lack adequate access to medical products.1 It is estimated that ten million lives 
are lost each year due to the insufficient accessibility of live-saving medicines.2 While 
it is acknowledged that a variety of reasons contribute to this inaccessibility, it is 
generally accepted that the prices of medicines, which are predominantly determined 
by the availability of pharmaceutical patent rights, are one of the main determinants of 
whether people living poverty can afford medical treatment.3 
In light of this situation, and with particular regard to the detrimental impacts brought 
about by the international harmonisation of IP laws, which introduced the global 
patentability of pharmaceutical products, the main objective of this thesis has been the 
identification of the currently insufficiently defined responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
patent holders towards the right to health. In considering this, this thesis aimed to 
indicate potential improvements of the international patent regime, which could 
enhance the balance between the provision of private exclusive rights and the societal 
interest in public health. Before such improvements to the patent system could be 
proposed, however, it was important to elaborate on the shortcomings of the current 
patent regime, and its normative conflicts with human rights law. In this regard, Part I 
of this thesis provided an overview of the relevant legal framework, focussing on the 
right to health under international human rights law, and international patent laws 
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established by the TRIPS Agreement, and successive TRIPS-Plus free trade 
agreements (FTAs).  
First, chapter 1 outlined the normative scope of the right to health under international 
human rights law with a particular focus on Article 12 ICESCR, which I regard as the 
most comprehensive affirmation of the right to health in that the covenant has an 
almost global reach, and is legally binding on its 161 state parties. The analysis of the 
right to health, inter alia, establishes that the accessibility of medicines constitutes a 
human right, as the highest attainable standard of health is only attainable when all 
people have sufficient access to affordable medical treatment. Furthermore, chapter 1 
addressed the interrelation of human rights, indicating that health is an indispensable 
precondition for the realisation of other human rights, such as the rights to life and 
development. In brief, additionally to having the main obligation of realising and 
protecting the right to health in a domestic context, states are required to pay due regard 
to the right to health, both within their jurisdiction and in other countries, when 
entering into international agreements, such as TRIPS or TRIPS-Plus agreements. 
Lastly, while chapter 1 reaffirmed that states are the main duty bearers under 
international human rights law, non-state actors, such as the private business sector, 
have responsibilities towards the right to health, too. These responsibilities, however, 
are not sufficiently defined, and therefore unclear. 
Successively, chapter 2 provided an overview of the current international patent 
regime, globally harmonised by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, and indicated its 
negative impacts on the accessibility of medicines. After briefly introducing the 
evolution of patent rights, this analysis examined the scope of the TRIPS Agreement’s 
patent regulations, elaborating how the non-discrimination requirement as to the field 
of technology led to the global introduction of pharmaceutical patentability, and that 
the harmonised 20-year minimum protection term prolonged patent periods in a 
number of WTO member states. Furthermore, the analysis elaborated that the TRIPS 
Agreement’s mere provision of minimum protection standards led to the introduction 
of so-called TRIPS-Plus agreements, which further strengthen IP protection levels. In 
particular, TRIPS-Plus agreements tend to relax patentability requirements, and 
restrict the use of the flexibilities and exceptions provided by the TRIPS agreement, 
thereby aggravating the problems created by pharmaceutical patent rights.  
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After providing an overview of the relevant legal framework in Part I, Part II of this 
thesis analysed the justification of the current international patent regime, and 
proposed improvements to the system, so that private patent rights can be adequately 
balanced with human rights objectives and the societal interest in public health. Before 
addressing the justification of the patent regime, however, it was important to establish 
the parameters against which the justification can be scrutinised. To this end, chapter 
3 elaborated on whether there exists a legal hierarchy between the right to health and 
IP rights, or whether non-legal considerations may suggest the legitimacy of 
prioritising one above the other. In this regard, the first part of chapter 3 addressed 
Research Question 1: 
What is the relationship between international human rights law and 
international IP/trade law? 
In essence, the analysis found that under international law different treaty regimes are 
functionally detached, and therefore act independently from each other. It follows that 
currently there exists no hierarchical structure between the right to health and IP rights 
under international law. The comparatively strong enforcement mechanisms provided 
by international trade law, however, seem to lead to a factual prioritisation of trade 
concerns, jeopardising the adequate realisation of human rights.  
In regard to the non-existing legal hierarchy, the second part of chapter 3 addressed 
Research Question 2: 
Are there valid moral principles that can be utilised to justify the prioritisation 
of the right to health over contradictory provisions of international trade law and 
patent law? 
This analysis elaborated on the concept of morality, focussing in particular on human 
dignity and human agency. Based on Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency 
(PGC), it is established that all human agents have equal rights to the generic needs 
necessary for their agency, i.e. the rights to freedom and well-being. Furthermore, 
Gewirth establishes a needs-based hierarchy, which prioritises those needs that are 
most essential for the realisation and protection of human life and well-being. By 
applying this needs-based hierarchy to the concept of human dignity, recognised as the 
foundation of human rights law, the PGC can be utilised to justify the prioritisation of 
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human rights that are fundamental for the realisation of human dignity over less-
essential rights. Consequently, this thesis scrutinised the justification of the 
international paten regime, inter alia, against its compliance with the right to health. 
In this respect, chapter 4 explored Research Question 3:  
Recognising the importance of the right to health and access to medicines for 
human life in dignity, is the current international patent regime (under TRIPS 
and TRIPS-Plus) justified when the protection of private interests directly 
impacts on the affordability of medicines and public health? 
The answer to this question was derived from two Sub-Questions. First, Sub-Question 
3.1 asked: 
Do the aims and purposes of patents justify a short-term restriction of the 
accessibility of medicines? 
This analysis outlined the objectives and purposes of the international patent regime, 
which should, inter alia, provide enhanced research incentives, and, in the field of 
pharmaceutical patents, ultimately lead to the development of new medical products. 
In recognition of the crucial importance of the future availability of new medicines for 
the realisation of the right to health, the analysis raised the controversy of whether the 
availability of new medicines can justify a restriction of the accessibility of available 
medications for persons in need of treatment now. This controversy cannot be 
conclusively answered, as this would require the determination of whether current 
patients, or future patients are of higher importance, which conflicts with the basic 
human rights principle that all human beings are equal. It is suggested, however, that 
for a short-term restriction of the accessibility of medicines to be at all justifiable, 
pharmaceutical patent rights would need to adequately and completely fulfil their aims 
and purposes. 
In this regard, the second part of chapter 4 addressed Sub-Question 3.2: 
Do patents on pharmaceutical products actually fulfil their purposes and 
objectives?   
In brief, the analysis indicated that patent rights are not capable of adequately fulfilling 
their purposes. It was observed that patents do not sufficiently incentivise the 
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development of radically new products, as particularly the relaxation of patentability 
requirements seems to incentivise research into low-risk marginal improvements. 
Similarly, patents fail to provide adequate incentives for conducting research into so-
called neglected diseases, as medications for such conditions offer no viable markets. 
As the value of patent rights, however, is dependent on the existence of profitable 
markets, patents are by nature incapable of providing incentives for the development 
of medications for conditions that predominantly affect the poor. As patents thus fail 
in realising the sufficient availability of new medicines, the restriction of the 
accessibility of available medications cannot be regarded as justified. Consequently, 
Research Questions 3 is negated, concluding that the current international patent 
regime is not justified. In particular, it is suggested that the current patent regime fails 
to provide adequate counter-balance mechanisms for the excessive rights provided to 
patent owners. This was considered to be directly attributable to the lack of a definition 
of distinct responsibilities or obligations of patent holders which could balance the 
private rights with public interests.  
Recognising that some of the most detrimental impacts resulting from the patentability 
of pharmaceutical products can be averted by introducing responsibilities of 
pharmaceutical patent holders towards human rights, chapter 5 addressed the main 
objective of this thesis; the identification and implementation of responsibilities of the 
pharmaceutical industry towards the right to health. To this end, the first part of this 
chapter scrutinised existing approaches to the identification of corporate human rights 
responsibilities, which are traditionally based on the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). This analysis focussed in particular on international 
development goals and human rights guidelines for corporations, identifying their 
biggest flaw in the fact that these frameworks constitute non-binding soft law 
instruments. This issue was then addressed by Research Question 4: 
Why is the corporate social responsibility approach of identifying the human 
rights responsibilities of the private business sector in non-binding international 
soft law instruments, insufficient for adequately regulating the pharmaceutical 
industry’s conduct towards the right to health? 
In essence, it was submitted that the implications of the right to health on the lives and 
livelihood of human beings are of such magnitude that the adherence to responsibilities 
for its respect and protection must not simply be regarded as a voluntary option. 
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Furthermore, the historic evidence suggests that leaving the realisation of the right to 
health to the goodwill of the pharmaceutical industry is insufficient, particularly when 
considering that the realisation of the accessibility of medicines directly impairs the 
revenues of profit driven corporations. In this regard, the second part of chapter 5 
addressed this thesis’s determinative Research Question 5: 
Can responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of 
the right to health be implemented into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
establish a balance between private interests and public health, thereby 
enhancing the justification of the international patent regime? 
The analysis suggested that the very patentability of pharmaceutical products itself 
provides a unique opportunity for implementing enforceable responsibilities of 
pharmaceutical patent holders as direct obligations under international IP laws. This 
opportunity arises from the fact that patents are valuable assets for research-based 
corporations which seek the protection of their R&D investments. Consequently, by 
revising the TRIPS Agreement, the granting of exclusive rights can be subjected to 
concomitant obligations. In this consideration, chapter 5 proposed a number of 
amendments to TRIPS. First, Article 27 could be revised to facilitate the differential 
treatment of pharmaceutical products, which significantly differ from ordinary 
commodities. Second, this thesis proposed the introduction of distinct obligations for 
pharmaceutical patent holders to ensure that patent rights do not interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights. To further ensure the enforcement of these obligations, I 
proposed the introduction of clearly defined reasons for the revocation of patents, 
which should explicitly include the non-adherence to obligations as well as the abuse 
of exclusive market positions. Eventually, the introduction of distinct obligations 
would counterbalance the extensive rights granted by TRIPS, thereby harmonising the 
protection of private and public interests, and safeguarding that human rights concerns 
are duly regarded.  
By applying Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency and the needs-based 
hierarchy to the concept of human dignity, in this thesis I have argued for a distinct 
moral rationale for suggesting the legitimacy of prioritising the human rights to health 
and life, over conflicting private patent rights under international trade law. This 
prioritisation then provided a clear foundation, enabling me to analyse the justification 
of the international patent regime from a right to health perspective. By further 
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accounting for the objectives and purposes of patent rights, I was able to strengthen 
the claim that the current international patent regime is not justified, either from a 
human rights perspective, or within itself. Scrutinising the results of this analysis, I 
particularly identified that the lack of distinct legal responsibilities of patent holders 
disregards the requirement of TRIPS to establish an adequate balance, both of rights 
and obligations under the agreement, and between private and public interests. I 
thereby reaffirmed the existence of an ongoing urgent requirement to introduce distinct 
responsibilities of pharmaceutical patent holders towards the realisation of the right to 
health. 
Successively, after indicating that while existing approaches to implementing 
corporate responsibilities and mitigating the detrimental impacts of international 
patent laws are reasonable, and positive steps in the right direction, I suggested that 
the urgency of the current situation, which directly negatively impacts on the 
enjoyment of human life in dignity, requires a stronger approach. In addition to 
considering different concepts for addressing the known issues arising from the 
international patent regime throughout my research, the originality of this thesis lies 
particularly in adopting a non-conventional approach to addressing the specific 
challenges of pharmaceutical patentability, in that I explored the unique opportunity 
offered by pharmaceutical patent rights themselves, to regulate the activity of 
pharmaceutical patent holders. I therefore proposed an amendment to the patent 
section of TRIPS, diverging from the often-suggested general amendments to patent 
standards, as for example proposed by the IPT Project. Instead, I elaborated on the 
opportunity to specifically regulate pharmaceutical patents differently from patents on 
commodities in other fields of technology, proposing a patent system tailored to, and 
suitable for the specific requirements of pharmaceutical products. Acknowledging the 
distinct opportunity offered by pharmaceutical patent rights, I have taken a novel 
approach in that I suggested that patent laws should not only provide rights to 
pharmaceutical patent holders, but further implement distinct obligations, which, in 
accordance with Article 7 TRIPS, could then lead to an adequate balance of rights and 
obligations, paying due regard to the wider societal interest in health. To ensure the 
efficacy of these obligations, I further suggested that the obligations should become 
patentability criteria, so that the non-adherence to these obligations can be 
implemented as a ground for the revocation of a patent. While, because of the 
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constraints and limitations of this research, this thesis does not provide conclusive 
solutions to all issues created by pharmaceutical patentability, for example with regard 
to the encouragement of research into neglected diseases, my proposal offers a non-
conventional approach away from identifying soft law responsibilities, towards 
implementing distinct enforceable legal obligations. My suggestions can thus offer a 
new perspective for future research and debates on these issues.  
In particular, the findings of this thesis could, inter alia, feed into current discussions 
at UN level, including future work conducted under the recommendations provided by 
the final report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access 
to medicines (hereinafter: ‘the High-Level Panel’).4 Despite having developed the 
scientific knowledge to make exceptional advances in the development of medicines, 
major parts of the world’s population still lack adequate access to medical treatment. 
In this regard, and in particular recognition of SDG 3 which aims to promote the 
healthy lives and well-being of all people, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
established the High-Level Panel in 2015, with the task of reviewing the current 
incoherence between the rights of innovators under trade rules, and international 
human rights law.5 Under its mandate, the High-Level Panel addressed a variety of 
issues, including, among others, the interrelation between IP rights and access to health 
technologies,6 and incentives for the development of new health technologies, 
including medicines for neglected tropical diseases.7 While a detailed analysis of the 
High-Level Panel Report is not encompassed by scope of this thesis, it can be generally 
observed that the recommendations of the panel are mainly aimed at better utilising or 
improving existing tools, rather than changing the scope of current international legal 
norms, for example by suggesting that WTO members make full use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities, and by suggesting that governments shall refrain from pressuring other 
countries to neglect their right of using these flexibilities.8 Additionally, however, the 
High-Level Panel suggests the creation of ‘an inter-agency taskforce on health 
technology innovation and access’ with the purpose of overseeing the implementation 
 
4 United Nations, ‘United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines: 
Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies’ (2016) 
<http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report> accessed 21 September 2019. 
5 ibid 3, 7, 12. 
6 ibid 21-28. 
7 ibid 29-32. 
8 ibid 9. 
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of the High-Level Panel’s recommendations, as well as ‘increasing coherence among 
United Nations entities and relevant multilateral organizations like the WTO.’9 The 
report thus indicates the importance of paying continued attention to the issues arising 
between private IP rights the public interest in accessible health care, in order to find 
a sustainable long-term solution to these problems. To this end, the findings and 
suggestions of this thesis can provide an additional perspective to future debates on 
how to implement a balanced patent regime to safeguard the accessibility of medicines 
for everyone. Depending on political will, the indicative proposed amendment can then 
be utilised as a guide, supporting developing countries in future trade negotiations, 
when seeking to implement appropriately balanced patent standards. 
Ultimately, this thesis concludes with the acknowledgement of the fundamental and 
indispensable importance of those human rights that realise and protect human life in 
dignity.  
 
To deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very humanity. 
– Nelson Mandela10 
 
In respect to Mandela’s words, it is thus submitted that private exclusive rights which 
directly impair the enjoyment of fundamental human rights cannot be justified. 
Consequently, in this thesis I have argued for the urgent necessity of amending the 
international patent regime in order to bring patent rights into accord with human rights 
demands. Focussing on the specific issues concerning the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals and the right to health, this thesis elaborates how the international 
patent regime can be amended, and what amendments are urgently required. The 
findings of this thesis lay the foundation for future research to draft the exact scope of 
a TRIPS amendment proposal, and can thereby feed into international debates on 
patents and human rights. 
 
9 ibid 10. 
10 New York Times, ‘The Mandel Visit; Excerpts from Mandela Speech to Joint Meeting of Congress’ 
New York Times (New York, 27 June 1990) <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/27/world/the-
mandel-visit-excerpts-from-mandela-speech-to-joint-meeting-of-congress.html> accessed 17 May 
2019. 
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the Affordability of Medical Products in Developing Countries’ (2016) 19 Trinity 
C.L. Rev. 175. (The footnoting style was amended in this appendix, to match the 
general footnoting style adopted by this thesis.) 
 
Introduction 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is a long-awaited and ambitious 
agreement which implements high standards for global trade. It was concluded in early 
October, 2015, and signed on 4 February 2016 following 6 years of negotiation. There 
are currently 12 nations from the Asia-Pacific region party to the treaty.1 It is estimated 
that this region is the world’s fastest growing market, predicted to have a middle class 
of about 3.2 billion people by 2030.2 The aim of the agreement is to enhance trade and 
investment between the nations by resolving legal, political, and trade issues, including 
the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights.3 However, the introduction of the 
TPP should not be construed as an unmitigated success. There are concerns in relation 
 
1 These are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States of America, and Vietnam <https://ustr.gov/tpp/#what-is-tpp> 
accessed 15 February 2016. 
2 United States Trade Representative, ‘The TPP Intellectual Property Chapter Summary’ (2015) 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Intellectual-Property.pdf> accessed 28 
January 2016, 8. 
3 Pike G, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Intellectual Property’ (2015) 32 Information Today 13. 
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to the disproportionate impact it will have on countries at various stages of 
development, as well as different sections in society.4 
The TPP acknowledges the benefits which a high standard of protection for IP rights 
has for the promotion and development of pharmaceuticals. However, it has been 
subject to criticism for allowing multi-national corporations, in particular, the 
pharmaceutical industry,5 to exercise considerable influence over the drafting process.6 
This involvement was criticised for promoting economic aims and maximisation of 
profits over public health interests in having affordable medicines, which are of 
particular importance for developing countries. 
The IP section of the TPP significantly changes the current international patent regime 
by introducing increased data exclusivity provisions, creating the possibility of 
‘evergreening’ patents due to the patentability of new uses of known products, and by 
increasing IP protection terms for office delays in granting patents and marketing 
approval.7 The TPP has therefore been accused of depriving people of adequate 
treatments by delaying generic competition in the pharmaceutical sector.  This 
Agreement is likely to be unfavourable to those with serious health conditions who 
cannot afford adequate treatment.8 Several Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
have therefore warned that the agreement threatens the lives of millions of human 
beings.9 This view is supported by Médecins Sans Frontières which argues that 
increased patent provisions keep lifesaving treatment out of reach for large parts of the 
population of developing countries.10 
 
4 See, for example: Ruckert A, Schram A and Labonté R, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: 
Trading away our health?’ (2015) 106 Canadian Journal of Public Health 249. 
5 Gleeson D and others, ‘How the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry Pursues its Interests Through 
International Trade and Investment Agreements: A Case Study of the Trans Pacific Partnership’ in 
De Jonge and Tomasic (eds), Handbook of Research on Transnational Corporations (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., Forthcoming) 9 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668576> accessed 8 January 
2016. 
6 Beard M, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the public health’ (2015) 128 The New Zealand 
Medical Journal (Online) 41, 41 <https://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/read-the-journal/all-
issues/2010-2019/2015/vol-128-no-1415/6550> accessed 27 May 2019. 
7 Ruckert A, Schram A, and Labonté R (n 4) 250. 
8 McCall C, ‘Trans-Pacific trade pact triggers fears over drug prices’ (2015) 385 The Lancet 2450, 
2450. 
9 Kapczynski A, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership – Is It Bad for Your Health?’ (2015) 373 The New 
England Journal of Medicine 201, 201. 
10 Médecines Sans Frontières, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement – Trading Away Health’ 
<http://www.msfaccess.org/spotlight-on/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement> accessed 16 
February 2016. 
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This paper expounds the potential threats that the TPP creates for the affordability of 
essential medical products in developing countries. To begin with, I propose to look at 
the content of the agreement’s IP section in respect of (a) its data exclusivity 
provisions, (b) the scope of patentable subject matter, and (c) term adjustments for 
office delays and the potential dangers to access to medicine. Secondly, I will consider 
the highly criticised Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions of the treaty 
with regards to their capacity to undermine democratic principles and public policy 
decisions. Finally, I will examine specific threats the TPP creates for developing 
countries, including those that are not party to the treaty. 
 
I. The TPP’s Effect on Access to Medicine 
A. The Effect of the IP Provisions 
It has been argued that the high level of IP protection in the TPP promotes investment 
in research and the development of new medicines.11 It is further argued that illicit 
trade of counterfeit products harms innovative corporations and that counterfeit goods, 
especially in the pharmaceutical sector, can directly threaten human health.12 While 
this is certainly true to a certain extent, the TPP has been widely criticised by NGOs 
and academics for its overly rigorous patent right provisions. It is feared that the TPP 
regulations are capable of restricting the affordability of medical products by delaying 
the introduction of generic drugs to the market, thereby posing an increased threat to 
public health care. Patent periods provide patent holders with exclusive rights over 
products, basically enabling them to occupy a monopoly position in the market with a 
patented product. Exploiting the monopoly power, pharmaceutical corporations can 
demand high prices for their medical products. Once the patent period has expired 
however, the development of generic medicines generates competition and drives 
down prices. Generic medicines are commonly lower priced than patented products, 
and are therefore crucial to ensure the affordability of medical treatment, especially in 
developing countries. The price difference between original products and generics can 
be significant. In the case of HIV medication, for example, the average price of second-
 
11 Inside US Trade, ‘Final TPP Deal on Drug IP Has One Standard with Transitions, Leak Shows’ 
(2015) InsideHealthPolicy.com <http://insidehealthpolicy.com/> accessed 29 November 2015. 
12 United States Trade Representative (n 2) 9. 
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line treatment has dropped by 75% between 2006 and 2013 due to the introduction of 
generics.13 To supply the population with original versions of a drug can therefore put 
a huge burden on a country’s health system and on individuals who cannot rely on 
such a system. In developing countries this price gap can consequently make the 
difference between successful treatment and death due to a curable, or at least 
treatable, disease.  
This article examines the novel patent law rules of the TPP in respect of these concerns, 
focussing in particular, on its increased data exclusivity provisions, its increased scope 
of patentable subject matter, and its compensation regulations for office delays. 
 
i) Data Exclusivity Provisions 
When first entering the market, a pharmaceutical company can apply for a patent for 
a drug. The registration of a patent requires the disclosure of all relevant data regarding 
the production of that drug, i.e. ingredients and formulas. The patentee has to consent 
to the publication of this information to receive a patent, enabling other corporations 
to conduct further research with that information.14 For a period of at least 20 years, 
however, the marketing rights of that product are exclusive to the patent holder. To 
introduce a drug to the market, a company further needs to receive marketing approval 
by a government, for which the patent holder has to establish that a product is 
reasonably safe and effective. The data necessary to receive marketing approval differs 
from the information needed to acquire a patent. Further research needs to be 
undertaken in order to establish that the product is safe for marketing. This research 
includes, inter alia, the disclosure of possible side effects.15 The process of marketing 
approval is lengthy, commonly taking place while a patent term is already running. 
The research results submitted for marketing approval do not have to be made publicly 
available according to patent requirements. A state may nevertheless require the 
publication of such information if no data exclusivity provisions are in existence.  
 
13 Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Generic Competition Pushing Down HIV Drug Prices, But Patents 
Keep Newer Drugs Unaffordable’ <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/press-
release/generic-competition-pushing-down-hiv-drug-prices-patents-keep-newer-drugs> accessed 
15 February 2016. 
14 Denoncourt J, Intellectual Property Law: 2012-2013 (3rd ed., Routledge Revision 2012). 
15 MedicineNet, ‘Drug Approvals - From Invention to Market ... A 12- Year Trip’ 
<http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9877> accessed 15 February 2016. 
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Data exclusivity provisions are a set of legal instruments preventing manufacturers of 
generic products from using pre-existing research results in order to prepare their own 
marketing approval applications for generic versions of the prior marketed goods for 
a certain time. In effect, these provisions are an additional form of IP protection 
alongside classic patent rights capable of extending patent terms and delaying the 
accessibility of cheaper generic drugs, as elucidated below.16 As a result, it has been 
argued that the increased data exclusivity provisions in the TPP might directly affect 
the availability of affordable drugs in developing countries across the world.17 
Article 18.50.1 TPP states that if a party to the agreement requires the submission of 
undisclosed test or other data as a condition for marketing approval for new 
pharmaceutical products, no third person – i.e. a potential manufacturer of generic 
medicines – shall be permitted to make use of this information to market the same 
product for a period of at least five years, without the consent of the person that initially 
submitted the information. The five-year period begins on the date of the marketing 
approval of the new product. According to Article 18.50.1(b) the same five-year data 
protection period shall be applied when a Party to the treaty permits the submission of 
evidence of prior marketing approval of a product in another country for marketing 
approval. In essence, Article 18.50.1 provides that generic drug manufacturers cannot 
have access to existing clinical test data to develop and market a generic version of a 
medical product for the period of at least five years. As this information however, is 
vital to place a product on the market, generic manufacturers either need to wait for 
the information to enter the public domain, or need to conduct their own research and 
clinical tests. This can substantially delay the availability of competition and cheaper 
generic drugs or make them more expensive as the generic manufacturer will also have 
to refinance his research. 
Article 18.50.2(a) provides that the data exclusivity provision of paragraph 1 shall 
further be applied 
[…] for a period of at least three years with respect to new clinical 
information submitted as required in support of a marketing approval of a 
 
16 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D, ‘Public Health and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’ 
(2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 279, 299-300. 
17 Kapczynski A (n 9) 202. 
307 
 
previously approved pharmaceutical product covering a new indication, 
new formulation or new method of administration […] 
This provision provides an additional period of three years of protection for data 
submitted for new uses of previously marketed products. Effectively, this enables 
companies to extend the period of their monopoly positions by further delaying generic 
competition in regard to new uses of one and the same product. The provision could 
also encourage pharmaceutical companies not to disclose all of their data at the time 
of a product’s first marketing approval. Instead, they could submit data regarding 
different uses towards the end of the patent term in order to make use of these extended 
data exclusivity periods. This would not only delay the marketing of generic drugs, 
but may also delay the availability of new treatment methods for certain diseases in an 
attempt to maximise future profits, even where these treatments are known to a 
manufacturer from the beginning.  
An illustrative example for this is the well-known drug Aspirin. Best known for its use 
to treat mild pains, Aspirin is a multi-purpose drug which is used, inter alia, to treat 
patients who suffered from a stroke or a heart attack, as a preventative measure for 
patients with a high risk of getting a stroke or a heart attack, and to treat patients with 
colorectal cancer.18 Assuming that Aspirin was a novel drug, and that its developer 
knows about all its possible usages, making use of the TPP’s data exclusivity 
provisions, a pharmaceutical company with the patent on Aspirin could apply for 
marketing approval for the drug for the use as a mild pain medication. In the interest 
of an increased monopoly position and for the sake of maximised profits, they may 
withhold information regarding the drugs capability to treat heart attacks, strokes, and 
colorectal cancer. This information is of bigger value to the corporation when 
disclosed at a later time. When the five-year data exclusivity period for Aspirin as a 
mild pain medication is about to expire, the company can then apply for another data 
exclusivity period in regard of marketing approval as a treatment method for heart 
attacks and strokes. Again, when this data exclusivity period is about to expire, a 
further three-year protection period can be acquired for Aspirin as a treatment for 
colorectal cancer. At this point, the availability of Aspirin as a treatment method for 
cancer has been effectively delayed by eight years.  
 
18 Nordqvist C, ‘Uses, Benefits, and Risks of Aspirin’ (last updated 18 December 2017) 
<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/161255.php> accessed 27 May 2019. 
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Article 18.52 recognises the specific interest of corporations investing in research 
regarding pharmaceutical biologics, i.e. products that are or contain “a protein 
produced using biotechnology processes, for use in human beings for the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition.”19 Article 18.52.1(a) declares that in 
respect of new pharmaceuticals which contain biologics, Articles 18.50.1 and 18.50.3 
shall be implemented with a protection period of at least eight years from the date of 
first marketing approval. This extended protection period of eight years is deemed 
necessary so as to support investment into research with biologics, which is a relatively 
new field of science. It is submitted that encouraging investment in this field of 
pharmaceutical research can create an enhanced environment for the development of 
improved treatment methods.20  
Article 18.52.1(b) provides an alternative to introducing an eight-year period of 
protection for biologics.  A protection period of five years is considered to be sufficient 
if a state provides adequate market protection through other measures. Those other 
measures are not defined in any further detail within the treaty. However, it seems 
reasonable to assume that this alternative may inter alia refer to Article 18.50.2(a), 
suggesting that a party could grant an additional protection period of at least three 
years for new indications, formulations, or methods of administration of formerly 
approved products containing biologics. 
The particular circumstances regarding research in the new field of biologics are 
explicitly recognised by Article 18.52.3 which provides that the parties to the 
agreement shall consult ten years after the entry into force of the treaty to review the 
regulations regarding biologics to accommodate for potential changes in the area. 
In considering these data exclusivity provisions in the TPP, it becomes clear that the 
agreement aims to create a high level of protection for the monetary interests of 
innovative pharmaceutical corporations in order to encourage further research and 
development to find new treatments for conditions and diseases. Whilst these 
provisions are adequate for securing that goal, they certainly create a threat to public 
health care and the affordability of medical products by delaying generic competition. 
 
19 Article 18.52(2) Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
20 US Food and Drug Administration, ‘What are “Bologics” Questions and Answers’ 
<http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucm
133077.htm> accessed 15 February 2016. 
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This adverse effect of the regulations was recognised during the negotiation processes. 
As a result of this realisation, various articles in the IP section of the treaty support the 
protection of public health. Article 18.3.1 read in conjunction with Article 18.6.1(a) 
provides that the obligations under the IP section shall not prevent states from taking 
measures to protect public health and promoting the access to medicines for all. Article 
18.6.1(a) further reaffirms a party’s right to determine national emergencies and other 
circumstances of extreme urgency in accordance with Article 5(c) of the Declaration 
on TRIPS21 and Public Health,22 commonly referred to as the Doha Declaration. Under 
these provisions and in accordance with Article 5(b) of the Doha Declaration a party 
can grant compulsory licenses, permitting a third party to make use of patented subject 
matter without the patent holder’s consent, to manufacture generic medical products. 
This right of the parties to the TPP is further reaffirmed in Article 18.50.3 with direct 
reference to Article 18.50 paragraphs 1 and 2 in relation to the protection of 
undisclosed test or other data, as well as to Article 18.52 in relation to the market 
protection of biologics. It can therefore be presumed that Article 18.50.3 grants the 
parties the right to provide generic manufacturers with undisclosed test or other data 
when granting compulsory licences in cases of national emergencies or circumstances 
of extreme urgency. Such cases of national emergencies and extreme urgency are 
neither defined in the TRIPS agreement, nor in the TPP. However, as seen above, 
Article 5(c) of the Doha Declaration gives states the right to self-determine the 
existence of such situations. 
Besides situations of national emergencies and circumstances of extreme urgency, 
however, the data exclusivity provisions of the TPP substantially increase the 
monopoly periods of new drugs.23 As seen above, those provisions are capable of 
delaying the marketing approval for generic drugs, as they hamper a fast development 
of generic products. While generic drug manufacturers are prohibited from marketing 
their products during a product’s patent term anyway, data exclusivity provisions 
further prevent generic manufacturers from conducting research using existing 
knowledge, effectively hampering the development of generic drugs. This may delay 
 
21 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
22 WTO, ‘Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health’ 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> accessed 14 February 
2016. 
23 Gleeson D and others (n 5) 22. 
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the availability of marketable generics even after a patent term expires. Further, Article 
18.54 declares that data exclusivity rights remain in force in the event that their 
protection period exceeds the patent periods of a product. This provision is designed 
to further protect the monetary interests of innovative corporations when they have 
acquired a patent for a new drug, but need to undertake further research to receive 
marketing approval, which can often be a lengthy process in the pharmaceutical sector. 
For the industry and for the availability of new drugs, such a protection can be regarded 
as vital, as the main driver for innovative companies is generating profits from their 
investments in research and development. In light of public health concerns, such 
extended protection periods have to be regarded with scepticism. On the one hand they 
ensure the availability of new medicines, yet on the other hand, they delay the 
affordability of such products for the majority of the world’s population by deferring 
the introduction of generic products. 
 
ii) The Scope of Patentable Subject Matter and the Risk of Patent Evergreening 
A similar risk is introduced by the TPP in regard to patent terms. When IP regulations 
are designed in a way that enables patent holders to acquire successive patents for new 
uses of an established product, they create the possibility of abusing patent rights in 
order to extend monopoly periods.24 The TPP IP section has been criticised for 
potentially facilitating this so called ‘patent evergreening’,25 which refers to the 
perpetuation of the benefits of patent rights using strategic methods, as patent holders 
can acquire new patents on existing drugs by establishing a new target group or a new 
method for the administration of such medical products.26 As illustrated below, the 
TPP provides that patents shall be made available for new uses or methods of using a 
known product, even when those variances do not enhance the efficiency of a 
product.27 Through this method, pharmaceutical companies can manage the disclosure 
of data regarding the use of a product in order to acquire successive patents for new 
uses, expanding their monopoly positions. This stands in direct contrast to the TRIPS 
 
24 Kilic B, Brennan H, and Maybarduk P, ‘What Is Patentable Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership? - 
An Analysis of the Free Trade Agreement's Patentability Provisions from a Public Health 
Perspective’ (2015) 40 Yale Journal of International Law Online 1, 4-5 
<http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-40-killic.pdf> accessed 27 May 2019. 
25 McCall C, (n 8) 2451. 
26 Kilic B, Brennan H, and Maybarduk P (n 24) 6. 
27 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 301; Kilic B, Brennan H, and Maybarduk P (n 24) 6. 
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agreement which requires a product to be new and involving an inventive step in order 
to be patentable,28 and under which it is therefore not possible for pharmaceutical 
companies to evergreen their patented products.  
Article 28.37.1 provides that parties to the agreement  
[…] shall make patents available for any invention, whether a product or 
process, in all fields of technology, provided that the invention is new, 
involves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application. 
Footnote 30 of Chapter 18 TPP further defines that the terms “inventive step” and 
“capable of industrial application” shall respectively be considered as being 
synonymous with the terms “non-obvious” and “useful”. This paragraph is equivalent 
to the respective TRIPS provision to be found in Article 27(1) TRIPS.  
The novelty of the TPP’s patent regime however, derives from Article 18.37.2 which 
requires parties to make patents available 
[…] for inventions claimed as at least one of the following: new uses of a 
known product, new methods of using a known product, or new processes 
of using a known product. A Party may limit those processes to those that 
do not claim the use of a product as such. 
This arrangement constitutes a substantial extension of international patent law 
regulations, contravening the international patent regime provided by TRIPS, and 
undermining both Article 27(1) TRIPS as well as Article 18.37.1 of the TPP itself.  By 
introducing the patentability of new uses, new methods of using, and new processes 
of using known products, paragraph 2 effectively abrogates the purpose of those 
provisions to only award patents for new products – it basically eliminates the need 
for an inventive step. By introducing the possibility of constructing evergreening 
patents, Article 18.37.2 creates an incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to 
efficiently manage the life circle of products, effectively extending patent periods.29 
To reach this goal, companies may consider a similar strategy as with the disclosure 
of data for marketing approval. Thus, information about medical products, known 
when a product was patented for the first time, may not be disclosed until a later stage 
of a patent period in order to maintain the opportunity of receiving a second patent 
 
28 Article 27(1) TRIPS. 
29 Gleeson D and others (n 5) 14. 
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term by establishing new uses, methods of using, or processes of using at the end of 
that product’s original patent term. Such life circle management arrangements not only 
affect the introduction of cheaper generic medicines due to the extended durations of 
patent protections. They also comprise the risk that additional or improved procedures 
of treating diseases and conditions will enter the market with serious delays, 
compromising the health of those affected by these conditions. Reconsidering the 
above example of Aspirin as a multi-purpose drug, a company could apply for a first 
patent for Aspirin as a mild pain medication. At the end of the 20-year patent period, 
the company then can – according to the TPP provisions – apply for a patent for 
Aspirin’s new use as a heart attack and stroke treatment, acquiring a second patent 
term of another 20 years. A third patent period can then be acquired for its new use as 
a treatment for colorectal cancer. The availability of Aspirin as a treatment for cancer 
would therefore be delayed by 40 years, and the availability of generic competition 
would be delayed by 60 years, giving the patent holder a monopoly position on the 
market with all its detriments for public health. Exploiting the monopoly power, 
pharmaceutical corporations can demand high prices for their patented medical 
products. The main threat of the provisions in Article 18.37.2 can therefore be seen in 
the risk that when human health is balanced against financial interests, human health 
will most certainly draw the short straw. 
To diminish this risk, Articles 18.40 and 18.41 TPP reaffirm a party’s right to introduce 
exceptions from the patent right protection under certain circumstances. Article 18.40 
TPP declares 
A Party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interest of the patent owner, taking account of legitimate 
interests of third parties. 
This is a vague provision as it does not define the terms “unreasonable conflict” and 
“legitimate interests of third parties”. When read in conjunction with Article 18.41, 
which provides that nothing in the IP chapter shall limit rights and obligations under 
Article 31 TRIPS however, it should be interpreted to mean that in cases of national 
emergencies or circumstances of extreme urgency public health constitutes a 
legitimate interest of third parties, and that restrictions of the exploitations of patents 
in such situations are not deemed unreasonable.  
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A further instrument to protect public health can be found in Article 18.37.3(a) TPP, 
which grants parties the option to exclude “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals” from patentability.30 This means that 
the mere technique of how a condition or disease is treated cannot be patented. 
While the TPP created the incentive to generate evergreening patents, the agreement 
also introduced certain measures to balance the risks posed by this by providing 
exceptions to protect human health. How far states will exert their rights under those 
provisions in the future remains to be seen. Concerns have been raised that states might 
be reluctant to apply such exceptions so as not to incur liability under the ISDS clauses 
provided by the TPP as scrutinised below.  
 
iii) Term Adjustments for Pharmaceutical Patents to Compensate for Office Delays 
The third controversial issue of the TPP’s IP regulations is the compensation for 
unreasonable office delays in granting patents or marketing approval for 
pharmaceutical goods. Since a patent term usually begins at the time of application a 
delay in granting can lead to a significant curtailment of the period in which a patentee 
can actually make use of it. The same is true when a patent has already been granted 
but marketing approval is being delayed. The agreement includes measures to adjust 
patent terms for affected products, further delaying the availability of generic 
medicines.31  
Article 18.46.1 states that parties to the treaty shall avoid unreasonable or unnecessary 
delays in processing patent applications. Similarly, Article 18.48 provides the same 
provision in relation to marketing approval applications for pharmaceutical products. 
In the case that unreasonable delays occur in the issuance of a patent or there is an 
unreasonable curtailment in the marketing approval process, Article 18.46.3 declares 
that parties shall make available adjustments to the patent term to compensate for 
unreasonable delays.  Similarly, Article 18.48.2 provides for patent term adjustments 
to compensate for unreasonable curtailments. While such patent term adjustments 
seem fair from the point of view of innovative pharmaceutical companies, they could 
 
30 Article 18.37.3(a) Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
31 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 302-303; Gleeson D, Lopert R, and Reid P, ‘How the 
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement could undermine PHARMAC and threaten access to 
affordable medicines and health equity in New Zealand’ (2013) 112 Health Policy 227, 231. 
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delay the introduction of affordable medicines. Article 18.46.4 however, reduces these 
concerns by defining that an unreasonable delay in the issuance of a patent only exists 
when more than five years have passed since an application has been filed. There is no 
similar definition for unreasonable delays of marketing approval applications. Article 
18.48.3 nevertheless grants parties the option of implementing conditions and 
limitations to the compensation rules, as long as they continue to give effect to these 
compensations. 
While it seems just to compensate patent holders for unreasonable office delays, it is 
recognised that patent term adjustments mainly burden people with diseases or 
conditions who cannot afford adequate treatment with the original product.32 It is 
therefore submitted that the patent term adjustment measures in the TPP are not an 
adequate instrument to compensate for unreasonable delays. The fault for such delays 
lies within the offices of the treaty’s members, and thus so too should the liability. 
 
B. The Investor State Dispute Settlements and Its Effects 
Chapter 9 of the TPP regulates the protection of foreign investments, including an 
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system. This system enables private 
investors to bring claims directly against a state for breaching treaty regulations. An 
investor does not need to rely on his home state to bring an action against another state, 
as is usually the case in international law. This is important so as to encourage foreign 
investments, as states are sometimes reluctant to bring an action against other states, 
in the interest of maintaining positive political relationships. ISDS claims are usually 
heard by arbitrational tribunals instead of domestic courts, a process which was 
deemed necessary in the past given that developing countries often do not have a fair 
working judicial system.33 Introducing ISDS clauses and arbitrational proceedings was 
subsequently seen as an encouragement of foreign investment with the possibility of 
supporting economic growth and development in these countries.34  
There is controversy, however, over whether such claims against states should be heard 
outside of national courts. On the one hand, it is argued that this is a necessary means 
 
32 McCall C (n 8) 2450. 
33 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 282-283. 
34 ibid 286; de Mestral A, ‘Investor-State Arbitration between Developed Democratic Countries’ 
(September 2015) CIGI Investor-State Arbitration Series, Paper No. 1, 1. 
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as arbitration awards are commonly easier to enforce than national judgements.35 On 
the other hand, it is often criticised that arbitration hearings are conducted by groups 
of corporate appointed lawyers,36 with a lack of neutrality and a lack of expertise in 
certain public interests like public health care. The lack of transparency in such 
arbitration proceedings in general has also been the subject of criticism.37 A further 
controversy regarding ISDS clauses is that they give private investors the possibility 
of suing sovereign states over democratic public policy decisions, enabling private 
investors to challenge any of those policies, disregarding the public interest.38 As a 
result, whenever an investor claims to have reduced profits or to have suffered a loss 
in connection with a party allegedly breaching a TPP regulation, arbitrational 
proceedings would be the likely consequence.39 Such a system may create an 
environment in which the corporate interests of private investors are privileged over 
broader public interests.40 This poses the risk that the sovereignty of a state is 
restricted, and that a part of such power is transferred to multinational corporations.41 
It has therefore been indicated that these shifts in sovereign power directly challenge 
the rights of states to self-regulation.42  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that such challenges to national policies can 
only occur when a state has breached its treaty obligations in the first place. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that public policies in democratic countries are also 
frequently challenged in front of national courts when an individual or a company 
argue that a certain policy creates obstacles to their rights.43 It is submitted however, 
that domestic courts commonly have a higher expertise in assessing the legal 
foundations and justifications of public policies, as well as a democratic perspective 
and an interest in such policies, which arbitrational tribunals do not have. Considering 
the possible restriction of the sovereignty of national governments, academics and 
 
35 Malawer S, ‘Looking at Dispute Resolution in the Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (2015) 254 New York 
Law Journal 4. 
36 Beard M (n 6) 41. 
37 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 284; de Mestral A (n 34) 12. 
38 Ruckert A, Schram A, and Labonté R (n 4) 249. 
39 Beard M (n 6) 41; Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 284. 
40 Mitchell A, Voon T, and Whittle D (n 16) 284. 
41 Beard M (n 6) 42. 
42 de Mestral A (n 34) 14. 
43 ibid 14-15. 
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NGOs have raised concerns that ISDS clauses as found in the TPP are inappropriate 
and anti-democratic.44  
In addressing the concerns regarding the impartiality of arbitrators, it is submitted that 
they have to be considered on a case by case basis. It cannot be generalised that 
arbitrators are biased and, vice versa, that all national courts are completely neutral. 
Prejudice can exist anywhere, but among professionals, problems associated with 
prejudice can generally be regarded as exceptional. To create a balanced and fair 
working system, Article 9.21.1 provides that an arbitration tribunal consists of three 
arbitrators. Whilst the disputing parties have the right to mutually agree on a different 
way of procedure, the general rule requires each party to appoint one arbitrator. Those 
arbitrators then select a third arbitrator by agreement, who will be the neutral chair of 
the arbitration proceedings. This system grants both parties equal rights while ensuring 
impartiality in the arbitration. 
A main concern surrounding arbitration proceedings in general is that according to the 
current international standard, arbitration hearings are conducted in secret.45 
Particularly when the subject matter of a dispute concerns public interests, closed 
sessions are highly controversial.46 The TPP admittedly steps away from the 
international norm by providing enhanced transparency provisions in Article 9.23. As 
analysed by Sonja Heppner, the TPP regulation expediently improves arbitration 
hearings, by introducing the requirement that those hearings are open to the public.47  
However, Article 9.23.2, provides an exception to this new rule when a hearing 
requires a party to disclose protected information. In such instances, an arbitration 
“tribunal shall make appropriate arrangements to protect such information from 
disclosure which may include closing the hearing for the duration of the discussion of 
that information.”48 According to Article 9.23.4(d) the tribunal has the right to 
determine whether information qualifies as protected information. The possibility to 
temporarily close a hearing to the public is necessary to protect confidential 
information and in so far as such closures are adequately restricted to exceptional 
 
44 ibid 4-5; Beard M (n 6) 43. 
45 Beard M (n 6) 42. 
46 de Mestral A (n 34) 11. 
47 Heppner S, ‘A Right of Public Access to Investor-State Arbitral Proceedings?’ (09 December 2015) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/12/09/a-right-of-public-access-to-investor-state-arbitral-
proceedings/> accessed 15 January 2016. 
48 Article 9.23.2 Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
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circumstances they constitute an appropriate procedure. Therefore, the transparency 
provision of the TPP is not only a welcome measure by which to establish a fair 
environment for arbitrational hearings. It can further help to establish arbitrational 
precedents and hence help to shape investment law for the future by publication of the 
arbitrational findings and therefore creating references for future arbitrations.49 
In relation to public health, the major problem of introducing ISDS mechanisms to the 
TPP is the prospect of states being sued over public health policies and regulations that 
are capable of restricting IP rights of multinational corporations. This may lead to a 
‘regulatory chill’.50 Governments may express a reluctance to introduce appropriate 
measures to protect public health if there is a realistic risk of facing expensive litigation 
with the potential of becoming liable to extensive payments in damage 
compensations.51 This may prove true for developing countries in particular, which 
might face difficulties defending themselves due to lack of funds. Armand De Mestral 
has objected to this argument claiming that proof for such allegations is very scarce. 
However, it can be seen by the example of Uruguay applying for funds from 
Bloomberg Philantropies and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to defend itself 
in an arbitrational proceeding against Phil Morris International, that expensive 
arbitrations create real obstacles for developing countries.52  
Whether or not the TPP ISDS system will lead to such a ‘regulatory chill’ can only be 
determined in the future. However, the TPP provides regulations mitigating the risk in 
consideration of public health. First, there are the above-mentioned exceptions in the 
IP section of the agreement which reaffirm a party’s right to protect public health 
according to the TRIPS agreement and the Doha Declaration. Further, Article 9.15 
provides that 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that 
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory 
objectives.  
 
49 Heppner S (n 47). 
50 Ruckert A, Schram A, and Labonté R (n 4) 250. 
51 ibid; Kapczynski A (n 9) 202. 
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Whether this provision is capable of reducing the fear of expensive litigation and the 
concomitant risk of ‘regulatory chills’ is not clear. Although the regulation protects 
the public health interests of a state, scrutinising whether or not a state acted according 
to this rule remains in the authority of an arbitrational tribunal. 
To summarise, the main threat of the intensified patent law provisions of chapter 18 
TPP is that states have to award increased patent terms and data exclusivity periods 
thereby enabling pharmaceutical corporations to effectively control the life circle of 
patents. This can occur through management of the disclosure of relevant information 
about medical products, exhausting to the fullest extent the new regulations regarding 
the patentability of new uses, new methods of using, and new processes of using 
known products. While states have the exceptional right to introduce measures 
restricting the exclusive rights granted by patents, awarding compulsory licenses in 
cases of national emergencies and other circumstances of extreme urgency, 
governments, especially of developing nations, may be reluctant to make proper use 
of those exceptions, as the circumstances of such situations are not sufficiently defined. 
Although Art 5(c) of the Doha Declaration provides that each member to the TRIPS 
agreement has the right to self-determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
circumstance of extreme urgency, it must be recognised that chapter 9 TPP gives 
private investors the opportunity to challenge basically any national policy. This 
constitutes a direct challenge to human rights protection, as human health and human 
life might be balanced against monetary interests, which stands in a contrast with the 
purposes of the human right to health and the human right to life. 
With regard to essential medicines, monopoly powers and concomitant high drug 
prices combine to create the risk of rationing of medical treatment.53 The delayed 
introduction of cheaper medicines, supported by the novel regulations of the TPP’s IP 
section, not only represents an obstacle to the adequate access to essential drugs, but 
might further induce the unaffordability of certain drugs for major sections of human 
populations.54  
 
 
53 Inside US Trade (n 11). 
54 Beard M (n 6) 42. 
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II. The Potential Spill-Over Effect of the TPP 
The annexes of the TPP provide only limited exceptions regarding the adoption of the 
agreement’s regulations in certain member states, so that generally speaking, all parties 
to the treaty have to introduce the same standards irrespective of their level of 
development and differences in poverty or wealth between those countries.55 However, 
the TPP’s patent regime may not only disadvantage less wealthy countries that are 
party to the treaty. There exists a realistic risk that spill-over effects broaden the reach 
of its regulations,56 adversely affecting the distribution of essential medicines in other 
developing countries in the Pacific region and around the world. 
It has been recognised that the TPP is capable of setting a new baseline for future trade 
treaties, becoming a model agreement and therefore further extending the geographical 
scope of its regulations.57 There is a reasonable possibility that the TPP can form a 
starting point for future negotiations of treaties,58 possibly setting a standard for future 
regional trade agreements and potentially even for one at WTO level.59 The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently under negotiation 
between the USA and the EU, already follows a very similar approach and the 
successful conclusion of the TPP could provide a template for the future TTIP scheme. 
The TPP is designed in a way that not only offers the possibility for other countries to 
join the treaty,60 but also creates indirect incentives pushing those states to do so. It 
creates an incentive for multinational corporations and private investors to locate 
foreign investments in countries that are party to the agreement as they will have 
established certain securities to protect such investments. A negative spill-over effect 
for other countries can therefore especially be found in diversions of trade investments 
to party states.61 To remain part of regional and international trade, those countries not 
party to TPP need to provide similar protection measures so as to attract foreign 
investment, meaning that they have to implement potentially detrimental regulations 
 
55 Inside US Trade (n 11). 
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to keep pace with international trends. Since nations not party to the TPP are therefore 
affected by the negative effects of the treaty,62 it lies in their interest to join the 
agreement in the future in order to likewise access its benefits, despite negative 
consequences. Consequently, a number of other countries in the Pacific region had 
already expressed their interest in joining while the TPP was still under negotiation.63 
The US are anticipating that members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), such as China, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand will accede in 
the future.64  
As the countries involved in the TPP are host to some of the world’s most influential 
multinational enterprises, it is likely that potential spill-over effects of the treaty will 
have a far reach on global trade, as those corporations have the power to set new 
standards in international trade.65 For example, as one of the world’s largest 
economies, India – which currently is not a party to the TPP – has strong economic 
connections with many of the TPP member states.66 It is estimated that while they are 
not parties to the treaty, China and India will be the main ‘losers’ of the TPP.67 It can 
therefore be anticipated that India will consider appropriate measures to reduce any 
negative effects on its economy,68 which may include potentially joining the 
partnership.69 While India’s current patent system provides patents on new medical 
products in accordance with its obligations under the TRIPS agreement,70 section 3(d) 
of India’s Patent Act explicitly excludes the patentability of new forms and new uses 
of known products if such novelties do not enhance the efficacy of known products.71 
By not comprising the possibility of evergreening patents, this provision effectively 
prevents companies from exploiting patent regulations through adjusting a patent’s life 
circle management.72 While India has traditionally been reluctant to provide higher IP 
protection standards, economic pressure might force a reconsideration of this stance in 
the future. India’s pharmaceutical industry has been crucial in providing developing 
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countries with adequately priced generic antiretroviral (ARV) medicines for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS. The possibility of India providing such kinds of generics is 
already hampered by the implementation of the TRIPS agreement.73 Therefore, 
changing India’s patent regime so as to align with the TPP IP regulations would imply 
a further major obstacle for the distribution of adequately priced and affordable 
medical products in developing countries, as currently India can be seen as one of the 
world’s main sources for cheaper generic medicines.74 
 
III. Conclusion 
After scrutinising the regulations provided by the TPP, it becomes apparent that many 
of the apprehensions expressed before the agreement was concluded are well founded.  
In particular, the IP section of the treaty gives rise to concerns regarding the future 
distribution of affordable medicines. The newly introduced patentability of new uses, 
new methods of using, and new processes of using known products runs the high risk 
of effectively delaying the introduction of generic drugs to the market by extending 
patent terms and data exclusivity protection periods. Additionally, it is reasonable to 
assume that pharmaceutical corporations will delay the disclosure of essential research 
findings regarding the application of new medical products as a means of extending 
the life circle of patent periods for such products, which can lead to a situation where 
enhanced methods of treating diseases and conditions are only made available after 
substantial delays. Therefore, it can be argued that the TPP’s IP system considerably 
aggravates the international patent regime by introducing the possibility of 
evergreening patents. 
While it should be recognised that member states still have an opportunity to introduce 
measures for protecting public health, inter alia by applying exceptions in cases of 
emergencies, those options are somewhat constrained by the TPP’s investment 
protection clauses. The ISDS provisions found in the investment chapter of the 
agreement enable private investors and corporations to challenge basically any policy 
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by claiming that such a policy creates an obstacle to their investment by breaching a 
treaty regulation.   
Arbitrational proceedings for international investment disputes already existed before 
the TPP was negotiated. In this regard it has to be recognised that the ISDS system 
provided by the agreement is not as bad as had been anticipated prior to its conclusion. 
It has to be acknowledged that the transparency regulations provided by Article 9.23 
TPP are a welcome improvement, capable of taking the appropriateness of the system 
of international arbitration a step further.   
Nevertheless, the mere possibility that private investors can challenge a state’s public 
health policy – which is in the interest of its whole population – can be seen as an 
obstacle that may lead to a ‘regulatory chill’. The criticism that such a regulation may 
be anti-democratic is justified as it means that investors can challenge measures 
adopted by democratically elected governments outside their national courts. 
Despite the limited applicability of the TPP to its member states, it is a realistic threat 
that an agreement of such a magnitude can extend negative effects to other countries 
as well. Those states may be pressured into implementing similar regulations to those 
provided by the TPP in order to attract foreign investment and for remaining players 
in regional and international trade. As the TPP is a platform agreement, more countries, 
including developing countries, are being encouraged to join the treaty which further 
expands the applicability of its regulations. As the TPP might, moreover, become a 
model for future trade agreements, the negative consequences of the partnership may 
find their way into other treaties as well, additionally expanding their geographical 
scope. 
Finally, if India should join the TPP, the world might lose one of its most important 
distributors of essential generic medicines. This could potentially have devastating 
effects on the affordability of adequate treatment for a majority of the population of 
developing countries around the world. In this regard, it is fair to say that when the 
advantages the TPP provides for the development of new medical products are 
balanced against the constraints it constitutes for the affordability of essential 
medicines, the negative effects on public health care are likely to weigh more heavily. 
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